Longhini #335286 v. Thornell et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Ernest Joseph Longhini, III,
Petitioner,
v.
Ryan Thornell, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-24-00785-PHX-DJH
ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner Ernest Longhini’s Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) and United States Magistrate Judge Camile M.
Bibles’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending denial of the same
(Doc. 18). Petitioner subsequently filed Objections (Doc. 27) to the Magistrate Judge’s
R&R. Respondents have not responded and the time to do so has expired. Petitioner also
seeks status updates on his case (Docs. 28 & 29). The Court overrules Petitioner’s
objections and will adopt the R&R as the Order of this Court.
I. Legal Standards
This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court
“must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection
is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.
2003) (en banc). Indeed, the Court is not required to conduct “any review at all. . . of any
issue that is not the subject of an objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985);
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see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
II. Discussion
Petitioner argues four grounds for relief in his federal habeas Petition. He
contends (1) his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers was violated when he
was unable to question the victims; (2) his right to Due Process was violated because he
was unable to present a defense of guilty except insane under A.R.S. § 13-502; (3) that he
was denied effective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to raise the guilty
except insane defense; and (4) that his constitutional right to enter into a plea knowingly
and voluntarily was violated when he was not apprised of the ability to put forth a guilty
except insane defense. (Doc. 1 at 13). The R&R recommends that each claim be denied.
(Doc. 18). Petitioner’s objections are addressed below in turn.
A. Sixth Amendment Right to Confront Victims
Magistrate Judge Bibles concluded that Petitioner had waived his Sixth
Amendment claim by knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty. (Doc. 18 at 16 (“A
federal habeas claim based on the deprivation of a constitutional right, other than a
jurisdictional claim, which violation is alleged to have occurred prior to the entry of the
petitioner’s guilty plea, is waived by the entry of a knowing and voluntary guilty plea.”).
In doing so, she specifically rejected the argument Petitioner advanced in his reply brief
that his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers was “a non-existent right” that
could not be waived when he pled guilty. (Doc. 18 at 18). She explained that
Petitioner’s right to confront the victims was “in effect prior to his criminal proceedings”
and thus was waived by his subsequent entry of a guilty plea. (Id.) She also
distinguished Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Ducey, 638 F. Supp. 3d 1048 (D.
Ariz. 2022), cited by Petitioner, noting that the case only applied to the First Amendment
rights of criminal defense attorneys and was, in any event, no longer good law. (Id. citing
Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Mayes, 127 F.4th 104, 112–13 (9th Cir. 2025)
(reversing and remanding)).
In his Objection, Petitioner says the R&R erred in finding the district court’s
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decision in Arizona Attorneys for Justice v. Ducey irrelevant and says despite its
subsequent reversal by the Ninth Circuit, it should still control his case.
The Court disagrees with Petitioner. First, this Court was never bound by the
holding in Arizona Attorneys for Justice. United States District Court rulings like
Arizona Attorneys for Justice are only ever persuasive authority on other federal courts,
including other district courts. In contrast, United States Court of Appeals rulings from
each circuit are binding on the district courts in the same circuit. In its 2025 decision, the
Ninth Circuit reversed the Arizona district court’s holding in Arizona Attorneys for
Justice that found that A.R.S. § 13-4433 was an unconstitutional restraint of criminal
defense attorneys’ First Amendment rights. The district court order is therefore no longer
persuasive law. Moreover, even if the district court decision that was reversed by the
Ninth Circuit could be considered good law, the Court also agrees with Judge Bibles that
the case is irrelevant to Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim. Arizona Attorneys for
Justice addressed the First Amendment rights of criminal defense attorneys, not Sixth
Amendment rights of criminal defendants like Petitioner. These objections are overruled.
B. Inability to Present Defense of Guilty Except Insane Defense
Petitioner claims that he was denied due process when he was unable to present a
defense of guilty except insane. Petitioner presented this claim to the Arizona Court of
Appeals in his post-conviction action, asserting his right to due process was violated
because “there is more than enough evidence to support the defense of ‘Guilty except
Insane’ set out in A.R.S. §13-502.” (Doc. 13-1 at 308, 325). In that action, Petitioner
argued he “had a Constitutional right [to] have this defense presented in his case.” (Id.)
The appellate court denied relief and found “[t]he superior court did not abuse its
discretion when it found Petitioner waived this issue by pleading guilty. A plea
agreement waives all nonjurisdictional defenses, errors, and defects that occurred prior to
the plea. . . Thus, we deny relief on this issue.” State v. Longhini, 2022 WL 17684887, at
*1–4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec 15, 2022).
On federal habeas review, Judge Bibles concluded that Petitioner could not show
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that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Petitioner had waived his due process
claim by pleading guilty was clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law. (Doc. 18 at 20). She found that Petitioner could not meet
his burden of establishing that his plea was not knowing and voluntary, and said he failed
to cite to any authority showing that a similar Sixth Amendment right is not waived by
pleading guilty. (Id.)
In his Objection, Petitioner contends, without citation to controlling authority, that
guilty except insane proceedings are considered post-trial proceedings under Arizona law
and therefore are exempt from the plea waiver. (Doc. 27 at 6). He also contends that
“the magistrate’s application of [Harrington v. Richter and Tallett v. Henderson] is
misguided.” (Id. at 9).
Federal review of a state prisoner’s grounds for habeas relief is highly deferential
when the same grounds for relief have been rejected by the state court. In such
circumstances, a federal habeas court can only grant relief if the petitioner shows the state
court’s decision denying the claim “was contrary to” or an “unreasonable application” of
federal law as clearly established in the holdings of the United States Supreme Court at
the time of the state court decision, or the petitioner establishes that the decision “was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 97-98 (2011). See also
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Through this lens, the R&R assessed the state court’s decision on Petitioner’s due
process claim and found that he had not met his burden of showing that the state court’s
decision that he had waived his right to make this claim when he pled guilty was contrary
to any controlling law. Petitioner’s objections do not show error in this conclusion. His
argument that guilty except insane proceedings are post-trial proceedings under Arizona
law and therefore are exempt from the plea waiver is unsupported by authority and only
gleaned from Petitioner’s own novel and protracted interpretation how the defense can be
substantiated under Arizona law. When the Supreme Court’s precedents do not “squarely
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address” the petitioner’s situation or give a “clear answer to the question presented,”
federal habeas relief must be denied because the state’s decision cannot be found to be an
unreasonable application of “clearly established” federal law as expounded by the United
States Supreme Court. E.g., Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122–23 (2009);
Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 20, 125–26 (2008).
Petitioner also objects to the R&R’s citations to Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
86, 97-98 (2011) and Tollett v. Hendersen, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) and distinguishes the
factual situations in those cases from Petitioner’s own. (See e.g., Doc. 27 at 9 (saying
Tollett “has no relevance to the instant proceedings nor does it address such a post-
conviction challenge to proceedings that encompass several different points in the
criminal justice process”) and 10 (saying “similar logic applies” as to the inapplicability
of Hendersen “since Petitioner has now established that the proceeding for which is
challenging is not in fact a due process claim that can be waived via a plea agreement”).
Petitioner says “the issue in this case turns on the determination of whether the
establishment of a guilty except insane defense under Arizona law is waived by a guilty
plea, even though it encompasses proceedings post-verdict.” But the R&R did not err in
its reliance on these cases, which it cited for general propositions that apply despite the
specific factual differences between Petitioner’s case and those cases.
These objections are also overruled.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Petitioner argued before the Arizona Court of Appeals that he was denied his right
to effective assistance of counsel for counsel’s failure “to raise the guilty except insane
defense during pretrial proceedings.” (Doc. 1 at 13). The Arizona appellate court
concluded that the claim lacked merit: Petitioner could neither substantiate his assertion
that his counsel “failed to ‘find’ A.R.S. § 13-502 or that the result ‘would have been
different’ had counsel presented the affirmative defense of guilty except insane under
A.R.S. § 13-502.” (Doc. 18 at 21). The Arizona court said the only evidence in the
record that supported Petitioner’s claim of a “mental defect” was “a 2018 psychologist’s
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report prepared at the request of Petitioner’s trial counsel.” (Doc. 18 at 21). The court
found stated that contrary to a suggestion of deficiency,
the psychologist’s report. . . shows counsel investigated Petitioner’s mental
health as part of counsel’s investigation of potential defenses to the charges.
The superior court found Petitioner competent after a Rule 11 evaluation by
two medical professionals. Petitioner’s counsel later filed a motion for a
court-appointed expert to evaluate Petitioner’s mental health for possible
mitigation purposes and ‘to meet the state’s allegations.’ The superior
court granted the motion and ordered that counsel be provided funds to
retain an expert. Counsel retained a psychologist that evaluated Petitioner
over three different dates and later prepared a report for counsel.
The psychologist’s report does not suggest that the result after trial
“would have been different.” The report addresses Petitioner’s “emotional
and social deficiencies” at length, but nowhere in the report does the
psychologist express the opinion or otherwise suggest that, at the times
Petitioner committed the offenses, Petitioner “was afflicted with a mental
disease or defect of such severity that [Petitioner] did not know the criminal
act was wrong,” i.e., that Petitioner was legally insane. A.R.S. § 13-502(A);
see also State v. Malone, 247 Ariz. 29, 31, ¶ 8 (2019) (noting that under
Arizona law a mental disease or defect that does not rise to legal insanity is
not admissible to challenge the mens rea of a charged offense).
(Doc. 18 at 21–22).
On federal habeas appeal, Judge Bibles found that Petitioner had failed to establish
that the state appellate court’s conclusion that counsel did not provide deficient
performance was unreasonable. (Doc. 18 at 24). She also found that Petitioner could not
show that the state court’s conclusion that Petitioner was not prejudiced by his counsel’s
advice to take the plea rather than proceed to trial and assert a defense of guilty but
insane was unreasonable. (Id. at 25).
Petitioner objects to the R&R’s reliance on Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958
(9th Cir. 2006). Petitioner says unlike his case, Weaver “did not rely on any, let alone a
significant background of development and mental health issues.” (Doc. 27 at 12). He
also says the case is distinguishable because of differences between Arizona and Oregon
criminal procedures, the former which “has a multi-step process for pleading the
affirmative defense of guilty except insane.” (Id.) The R&R cited to Weaver as an
example of a case where the court found that the plaintiff could not establish Strickland
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prejudice where the plaintiff’s proposed defense was unlikely to succeed or Strickland
deficient performance where the plea agreement was advantageous to the defendant and
where there was substantial evidence of guilt. (Doc. 18 at 25). The case was not
analogized factually but cited for general propositions. As the case law instructs, Judge
Bibles assessed the particular circumstances and facts of this case (see Doc. 18 at 23–25)
in reaching her well-reasoned conclusions. See also Woods v. Etherton, 578 U.S. 113,
117 (2016) (“When the claim at issue is one for ineffective assistance of counsel. . .
AEDPA review is ‘doubly deferential”). Moreover, the Court agrees with those
conclusions. This objection is overruled.
D. Knowing and Voluntary Plea
Petitioner argued before the state court that his plea was defective because his
attorney failed to make him aware of the possibility of a guilty-except-insane defense.
(Doc. 18 at 26). The state court rejected that claim on the merits because it was
unsubstantiated and because Petitioner could not show that but for his attorneys’ errors
there was a reasonable probability he would not have pled guilty and insisted on going to
trial. (Id.) In concluding that the state court’s denial of this claim was not contrary to or
an unreasonable application of federal law, the R&R stated in part that “[t]he Supreme
Court’s decisions do not suggest that a conscious waiver is necessary for each potential
defense relinquished by a guilty plea” and cited to United States v. Chavez-Diaz, 949
F.3d 1202 (2020) and United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989).
Petitioner objects to the R&R’s “heavy reliance” on Chavez-Diaz and Broce, and
distinguishes them factually and procedurally. (Doc. 27 at 14–15). Petitioner says that
“the term ‘knowing’ as established by the United States Supreme Court implies that the
petitioner would have had at least some conversation about possible defenses, and at the
time of plea negotiations, should have included advice about the waiver of GEI.” (Id. at
15). He says that because this was his “only foreseeable trial defense, counsel’s failure to
discuss it constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Id.)
Petitioner’s objections are overruled. First, Petitioner again fails to show how he
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substantiated to the state court his claim that he was unaware of the defense or that he
would have rejected the plea if he had known of it. Second, Petitioner fails to cite to any
controlling case law that says a plea is only considered knowing when trial counsel has
discussed a guilty except insane defense with a defendant prior to plea negotiations. On
habeas review, Petitioner has the obligation to show that the state court’s denial of relief
was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. The R&R correctly found
that Petitioner had failed to meet his burden here.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Objections (Doc. 27) are OVERRULED and
the R&R (Doc. 18) is ADOPTED as the Order of the Court in its entirety. Petitioner’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) is DENIED.
Petitioner’s Motions for Status (Docs. 28 & 29) seeking updates on this case are
GRANTED, as stated in this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING a requires for a certificate of
appealability because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall terminate this
action and enter judgment accordingly.
Dated this 18th day of June, 2026.
Honorable Diane J. Humetewa
United States District Judge
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