Shippy v. Banner Life Insurance Company

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Cheri Shippy,
Plaintiff,
v.
Banner Life Insurance Company,
Defendant.
No. CV-25-00177-PHX-JJT
ORDER
At issue is Defendant Banner Life Insurance Company’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 37, MSJ), to which Plaintiff Cheri Shippy responded (Doc. 45, Resp.), and
Defendant replied (Doc. 55, Reply). In her Response, Plaintiff requests relief under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) (Resp. at 16) and attached a Declaration of Fabian Zazueta,
Esq. in Support of Request for Rule 56(d) Relief (Doc. 45-1, Decl.). The Court finds this
matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f).
I. BACKGROUND
This matter arises from Defendant’s denial of benefits of an accidental death
insurance policy to Plaintiff after her husband, Mr. Shippy, died in a three-car collision.
Defendant denied Plaintiff’s claim on the basis that, inter alia, Mr. Shippy died while street
racing, which met an exclusion from coverage under the policy. (MSJ at 8–9.) Plaintiff
sued Defendant on the following claims: (1) declaratory judgement; (2) estoppel from
denying policy coverage; and (3) insurance bad faith. (Doc. 1-1 ¶¶ 22–62.) Defendant now
moves for summary judgment as to each claim, arguing that no genuine dispute exists as
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to whether: (1) Plaintiff failed to provide satisfactory proof that Mr. Shippy’s death was
covered under the policy; and (2) Defendant acted in good faith in denying Plaintiff’s
claim. (MSJ at 8–13.) Defendant filed its Motion nearly five months before the close of
discovery and nearly six months before the deadline to file dispositive motions. (See, e.g.,
Doc. 10.) To date, discovery remains open. (Id.) Plaintiff maintains that she cannot present
facts in opposition of the Motion and seeks relief under Rule 56(d). (Resp. at 16; Decl.
¶¶ 13–14.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 56(d), “[i]f a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for
specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition [to a motion for
summary judgment], the court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow
time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other
appropriate order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). “The burden is on the party seeking a Rule 56(d)
continuance to proffer sufficient facts to show that the evidence sought exists, and that it
would prevent summary judgment.” Atay v. Cty. of Maui, 842 F.3d 688, 698 (9th Cir. 2016)
(citation modified). “A party seeking additional discovery under Rule 56(d) must explain
what further discovery would reveal that is essential to justify its opposition to the motion
for summary judgment.” Stevens v. CoreLogic, Inc., 899 F.3d 666, 678 (9th Cir. 2018)
(citation modified). “This showing cannot, of course, predict with accuracy precisely what
further discovery will reveal; the whole point of discovery is to learn what a party does not
know or, without further information, cannot prove.” Id. Still, “the evidence sought must
be more than the object of pure speculation.” Id. (citation modified).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that none of the evidence sought by Plaintiff “could undermine or
shed light on the facts material to Banner Life’s motion.” (Reply at 11.) According to
Plaintiff’s Declaration, though, she seeks to depose Detective Guilbault who investigated
the vehicular collision and prepared the police report, Andrew Lugo who was involved in
the collision and informed investigators that he was not “racing” with Mr. Shippy, and
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Courtney Johnson who investigated and denied Plaintiff’s claim. (Decl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff avers
that these depositions “are essential to determining whether a ‘race’ or ‘contest’ actually
occurred, the credibility and admissibility of the police report, and how Banner interpreted
and applied the Racing Exclusion.” (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff also intends to “conduct additional
written discovery into Banner’s internal communications regarding the denial, its reliance
on external sources, and whether its decision was based on a reasonable and founded
investigation,” which would be germane to whether the denial was proper and in good
faith. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 12–13.) The Court agrees that this discovery has the potential to create a
genuine issue of material fact. Whether it will do so is “the whole point of discovery,”
which has not closed to date. Stevens, 899 F.3d at 678.
Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff should not be granted Rule 56(d) relief because
she has not diligently pursued discovery opportunities. (Reply at 10.) But the record shows
that Plaintiff issued disclosures (Docs. 12, 28, 30), served numerous discovery requests
(Docs. 17, 18, 26), served deposition notices to Defendant’s other fact witnesses (Docs. 23,
27) and engaged in discovery dispute litigation while the parties were still briefing
Defendant’s Motion (see, e.g., Doc. 40). The record also indicates that discovery occurred
even after the Motion was fully briefed. For example, the Court ordered Defendant to
produce relevant portions of its claim manual to Plaintiff on November 17, 2025 (Doc. 61),
which was issued thirteen days after briefing on the Motion ended. Discovery is still open
and underway, and Plaintiff has not failed to diligently engage in that discovery.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is still time to conduct discovery in this matter, and Plaintiff sufficiently avers
that such discovery may create a genuine issue of material fact that would defeat
Defendant’s Motion. “Especially where, as here, documentation or witness testimony may
exist that is dispositive of a pivotal question . . . lightning-quick summary judgment
motions can impede informed resolution of fact-specific disputes.” Burlington N. Santa Fe
R.R. v. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation, 323 F.3d 767, 774 (9th
Cir. 2003). Therefore, Rule 56(d) relief is appropriate, and the Court will grant Plaintiff
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that relief. Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant’s Motion without prejudice and
grant Defendant, on a sua sponte basis, leave to file a second motion for summary judgment
if or when it is appropriate.
IT IS ORDERED granting Plaintiff relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(d).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 37) without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendant, on a sua sponte basis, leave to
file a second motion for summary judgment if or when appropriate.
Dated this 16th day of December, 2025.
Honorable John J. Tuchi
United States District Judge
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