Potter v. Meza et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Phillip Potter,
Plaintiff,
v.
Robert Meza, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-00663-PHX-DWL
ORDER
After being declared a vexatious litigant in Arizona state court, Plaintiff (who is
proceeding pro se) filed this action, asserting an array of claims against five Defendants:
(1) Arizona Attorney General Kris Mayes (“AG Mayes”); (2) the Presiding Judge of the
Maricopa County Superior Court; (3) former Arizona State Senator and State House
Member Robert Meza (“Meza”); (4) former Arizona Board of Regents member and
gubernatorial candidate Karrin Taylor Robson (“Robson”); and (5) Alane Ortega
(“Ortega”), the attorney of Plaintiff’s ex-wife. On January 6, 2026, the Court issued a
lengthy order that dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims but granted limited leave to amend.
(Doc. 100.)
Plaintiff has now filed three motions for reconsideration of that order. (Docs. 101-
03.)1 Plaintiff’s requests for oral argument are denied because argument would not assist
1 The Court notes that LRCiv 7.2(g)(1) provides for the filing of a “motion for
reconsideration of an Order.” Id. (emphasis added). Plaintiff filed three motions for
reconsideration, all directed at the Court’s order at Doc. 100. Under LRCiv 7.2(e)(1), a
motion for reconsideration of an Order “may not exceed seventeen (17) pages.” By filing
three separate motions (which collectively exceed 17 pages) for reconsideration of one
order, Plaintiff has attempted an end-run around the Local Rules. The motions for
Case 2:25-cv-00663-DWL Document 105 Filed 01/23/26 Page 1 of 6

- 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
the decisional process. For the reasons that follow, all three motions are denied.
LEGAL STANDARD
“The Court will ordinarily deny a motion for reconsideration of an Order absent a
showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could not have
been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” LRCiv 7.2(g)(1).
Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy” that is available only in “highly unusual
circumstances.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Motions for reconsideration are
disfavored . . . and are not the place for parties to make new arguments not raised in their
original briefs. Nor is reconsideration to be used to ask the Court to rethink what it has
already thought.” Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 582
(D. Ariz. 2003) (citations omitted). See also FTC v. Noland, 2022 WL 901386, *3 (D.
Ariz. 2022) (“Local Rule 7.2(g) . . . [creates] essentially the same standard a district court
outside the District of Arizona . . . would apply when resolving a reconsideration motion
under Rule 54(b).”) (citation omitted); 2 Gensler, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules
and Commentary, Rule 54 (June 2025 update) (“Rule 54(b) is not a mechanism to get a ‘do
over’ to try different arguments or present additional evidence when the first attempt failed.
. . . While the Rule 59(e) scheme does not directly control a trial court’s ability to review
interlocutory orders, courts have looked to its common-sense guideposts because the same
general principles apply in both settings. In sum, trial courts will exercise their discretion
to reconsider interlocutory rulings only when there is a good reason to do so, including (but
not limited to) the existence of newly discovered evidence that was not previously
available, an intervening change in the controlling law, or a clear error rendering the initial
decision manifestly unjust.”) (footnotes omitted).
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, large sections of Plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration reiterate
reconsideration could be denied on this basis alone. LRCiv 7.2(i) (“If a motion does not
conform in all substantial respects with the requirements of this Local Rule, . . . the Court
may dispose of the motion summarily.”).
Case 2:25-cv-00663-DWL Document 105 Filed 01/23/26 Page 2 of 6

- 3 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
arguments that Plaintiff already raised in response to the motions to dismiss or raise new
arguments or citations that Plaintiff could have raised when responding to the motions to
dismiss. Such arguments are not properly raised in a motion for reconsideration. Motorola,
215 F.R.D. at 582. Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s arguments for reconsideration also
independently fail for several other reasons, set forth below.
I. AG Mayes
Plaintiff contends that the Court committed “clear error” when it dismissed Counts
One and Two against AG Mayes for lack of standing. (Doc. 101 at 1.)
A. Count One
Count One asserted a “First Amendment Facial Challenge to A.R.S. § 12-3201,”
Arizona’s vexatious litigant statute. (Doc. 14 ¶¶ 113-207.) In the challenged order, the
Court concluded that Plaintiff lacked standing in relation to AG Mayes because (1) “A.R.S.
§ 12-3201 itself provides no method of enforcement (civil or criminal) that would implicate
AG Mayes” (Doc. 100 at 27), and (2) to the extent Plaintiff’s theory was that his plan to
violate A.R.S. § 12-3201 might expose him to prosecution under other statutes, “Plaintiff
has not identified, nor has the Court located, any authority that would allow him to invoke
the pre-enforcement framework where the statute he seeks to challenge on constitutional
grounds is not the statute under which he fears criminal prosecution” (id. at 31).
In his motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff argues that Am. Encore v. Fontes, 152
F.4th 1097 (9th Cir. 2025)—which was decided after Plaintiff responded to AG Mayes’s
motion to dismiss—“confirm[s] Plaintiff’s standing to challenge a state civil law based on
credible fear of criminal prosecution under a separate criminal statute.” (Doc. 101 at 2.)
But Plaintiff misinterprets American Encore. At issue in American Encore were two
provisions of the 2023 Election Procedures Manual (“EPM”): the Canvass Provision and
the Speech Provision. 152 F.4th at 1105. The plaintiffs challenged “these provisions as
violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. Importantly, the EPM “has the
force of law,” and “any violation of an EPM rule is punishable as a class two
misdemeanor.” Id. at 1106 (citation omitted). As relevant here, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
Case 2:25-cv-00663-DWL Document 105 Filed 01/23/26 Page 3 of 6

- 4 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
“the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs have standing to seek a preliminary injunction
enjoining the Speech Provision.” Id. at 1123. But unlike here, the plaintiffs in American
Encore were not attempting to raise a preenforcement challenge to the Speech Provision
by claiming they feared prosecution under other statutes. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit held
that the “[p]laintiffs have shown that there is a credible or substantial risk of enforcement
of the Speech Provision against them,” and “[p]oll workers may call the police or remove
individuals from voting centers based on the Speech Provision alone.” Id. at 1119
(emphasis added). “Ultimately, the touchstone of our inquiry is whether Plaintiffs have
adduced enough evidence to show that there is a realistic threat that the law in question
may be enforced against them.” Id. at 1118 (emphasis added). American Encore does not
alter or contradict the Court’s determination that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert a
preenforcement challenge against AG Mayes in relation to A.R.S. § 12-3201 based on his
claimed fear of prosecution under other statutes.
B. Count Two
Count Two asserted a “First Amendment Facial Challenge to A.R.S. § 13-2921,”
Arizona’s harassment statute. (Doc. 14 ¶¶ 208-214.) In the challenged order, the Court
concluded that Plaintiff had “failed to establish that his anticipated course of conduct is
‘proscribed by a statute’” and also failed to establish a credible threat of enforcement.
(Doc. 100 at 31-36.) As for whether his anticipated conduct is “proscribed by a statute,”
Plaintiff argues in his reconsideration motion that the Court was required to accept his
interpretation of the harassment statute so long as it was arguable. (Doc. 101 at 15.) But
the challenged order did not reject Plaintiff’s interpretation of the harassment statute;
rather, it found that Plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to support that the conduct in
which he intends to engage would even qualify as a statutory violation under his proffered
interpretation. As for the credible threat of enforcement, Plaintiff again relies on American
Encore and argues that allegations that state officials “collectively” can prosecute him is
sufficient to demonstrate his standing as to AG Mayes. (Id. at 16.) However, in American
Encore, the Secretary (unlike here) was named as a defendant and had also delegated
Case 2:25-cv-00663-DWL Document 105 Filed 01/23/26 Page 4 of 6

- 5 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
“enforcement authority” of the Speech Provision to others. Am. Encore, 152 F.4th at 1118-
19. In any event, the challenged order granted leave to amend “because Count Two is
being dismissed at least in part based on insufficiently detailed allegations.” (Doc. 100 at
66.)
II. Presiding Judge
The only claim asserted against the Presiding Judge was Count One, the First
Amendment facial challenge to Arizona’s vexatious litigant statute. The Court concluded
that “although Plaintiff purports to sue the Presiding Judge in his administrative capacity,
no Article III controversy exists because the challenged actions taken by the Presiding
Judge were adjudicatory. . . . This determination makes it unnecessary to reach the
Presiding Judge’s remaining arguments regarding sovereign immunity and judicial
immunity.” (Doc. 100 at 61.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration largely
argues that the Presiding Judge does not enjoy sovereign immunity or judicial immunity.
(Doc. 102.) These arguments for reconsideration do not address the grounds on which the
Court decided the Presiding Judge’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff’s arguments, therefore,
do not provide a basis for reconsideration.2
III. Robson and Meza
In Count Three, Plaintiff asserted a § 1983 claim for First Amendment retaliation
against Robson and Meza. (Doc. 14 ¶¶ 215-37.) In Counts Four and Five, Plaintiff asserted
state-law claims for abuse of process and aiding and abetting abuse of process. (Id. ¶¶ 238-
69.) In the challenged order, the Court dismissed Counts Three through Five against
Robson and Meza, concluding that those claims “are barred by the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine” because they seek to hold Robson and Meza liable for protected petitioning
activity—i.e., the prosecution of their motion to have Plaintiff deemed a vexatious litigant.
(Doc. 100 at 50.) Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration identifies two reasons why this
2 In a footnote, Plaintiff also argues that because the Presiding Judge did not join in
AG Mayes’s merits arguments in the parties’ appellate briefing related to the denial of
Plaintiff’s second TRO motion, the Presiding Judge’s “merits position . . . qualifies as
‘newly discovered evidence’ justifying independent grounds for reconsideration.” (Doc.
102 at 6 n.3.) Even if that were true, any “admission” by the Presiding Judge concerning
the merits wouldn’t change the ruling on jurisdiction.
Case 2:25-cv-00663-DWL Document 105 Filed 01/23/26 Page 5 of 6

- 6 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
was “clear error.” (Doc. 103 at 1.) First, Plaintiff argues that the Court found that “Plaintiff
had a sufficient opportunity to present all of the coordinated false factual statements and
material omissions Meza and Taylor Robson made in an A.R.S. § 39-121, et seq. public
records case,” which provided the foundation for the determination that “the third sham
litigation exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine did not apply.” (Doc. 103 at 1.) But
this is not an accurate representation of the challenged order, which explained that
Plaintiff’s attempt to invoke the third sham litigation exception failed “for several reasons,”
the first of which was that Plaintiff failed to allege “misrepresentations that Meza and
Robson made to the superior court in connection with their prosecution of [the vexatious
litigant] motion.” (Doc. 100 at 47.) Thus, Plaintiff’s argument that he couldn’t have been
aware of all of the material omissions made by Robson and Meza over the last “seven
years” and in “numerous court proceedings, including proceedings to which Plaintiff was
not party” (Doc. 103 at 3) does not compel reconsideration.
Second, Plaintiff argues that a “‘motion’ is not a ‘lawsuit’ for Noerr-Pennington
purposes,” so the fact that Robson and Meza successfully prosecuted the vexatious litigant
motion is of no moment to the first sham litigation exception. (Doc. 103 at 2.) Plaintiff
cites Relevant Grp., LLC v. Nourmand, 116 F.4th 917 (9th Cir. 2024), but Plaintiff’s cited
passages from that case address the second sham litigation exception—i.e., a series of
lawsuits. Plaintiff nowhere alleged or argued that the second sham exception applies. In
any event, the concept of a “winning lawsuit” was raised in the parties’ briefing on
Robson’s and Meza’s joint motion dismiss, and Plaintiff has not cited any new law or facts
that warrant reconsideration.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration (Docs. 101, 102, 103)
are denied.
Dated this 23rd day of January, 2026.
Case 2:25-cv-00663-DWL Document 105 Filed 01/23/26 Page 6 of 6