Hunter #038313 v. Paul et al

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JL
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
James R. Hunter,
Plaintiff,
v.
Theodora Paul, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-03118-PHX-JAT (CDB)
ORDER
Plaintiff James R. Hunter, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex-
Yuma, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and
an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 9). The Court will dismiss this action.
I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee
The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1). The Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. Id. The statutory filing
fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income credited
to Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government
agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula.
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28
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U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff
has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2).
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does
not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual
allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there
are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681.
But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts
must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342
(9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)).
If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other
facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal
of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, without leave to amend
because the defects cannot be corrected.
III. Complaint
In his three-count Complaint, Plaintiff sues NaphCare Health Incorporated
(NaphCare); Centurion of Arizona (Centurion) and its parent company, Centene
Corporation (Centene); Centurion Vice President Tom Dolan; Regional Director Young;
Director of Nursing D. Mendoza; Dr. Theodora Paul; Oyuki Coronado; Clinical
Coordinator Erica Johnson; Nurse Practitioner Pfingston; and Nurse R. Branum. Plaintiff
also sues Columbia Casualty Company, Scottsdale Insurance Company, Zurich American
Insurance, and Starr Indemnity Insurance Company. Finally, Plaintiff sues the law firm of
Broening, Oberg, Woods & Wilson and attorneys Sarah Barnes and Katrina Chappel.
Plaintiff brings claims regarding Defendants’ alleged conduct in another of Plaintiff’s
pending civil rights cases in this Court, Hunter v. Paul, CV-24-02068-PHX-JAT (CDB).
He seeks injunctive and relief.
A. Background
To lend context to Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court describes the ongoing litigation
in Hunter v. Paul. Plaintiff originally filed the Complaint in state court and named
NaphCare, Centurion, Centene, Dolan, Young, Mendoza, Paul, Coronado, Johnson,
Pfingston, Branum, and various insurance companies as Defendants. Defendant Centurion
removed the case to this Court. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint.
(Doc. 8 in CV-24-02068.) The Court determined that Plaintiff stated an Eighth
Amendment claim in the Third Amended Complaint against Defendants Coronado, Paul,
and Pfingston and directed them to answer the claim. (Id., Doc. 12.) The Court dismissed
the remaining Defendants. (Id.) Sarah Barnes and Catrina Chapple of Broening, Oberg,
Woods & Wilson entered a Notice of Appearance on behalf of Defendants Coronado, Paul,
and Pfingston.
On February 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Permanent Injunction, and on
April 7, 2025, he filed an Emergency Motion for Injunction. (Id., Docs. 23, 26.) In both
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Motions, Plaintiff asked the Court to issue an order enjoining defense counsel Sarah Barnes
and her firm, Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson, from representing any litigant where the
opposing party is a prisoner. Plaintiff alleged that Barnes had concealed evidence and
created false issues of material fact, which has led to prisoner deaths. In a June 3, 2025
Order, the Court denied the Motions, finding no evidence of misconduct. (Id., Doc. 30.)
On July 18, 2025, Defendants Coronado, Paul, and Pfingston filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Id., Doc. 37.) Plaintiff moved to strike Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment, arguing that Plaintiff sought his own medical records during
discovery, but Defendants objected to their production and then relied on those same
records in their summary judgment motion. (Id., Doc. 39.) In a September 8, 2025 Order,
the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike and ordered Defendants to facilitate Plaintiff
obtaining his medical records and to file a notice of compliance. (Id., Doc. 52.) The next
day, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Disqualify Defendants’ Attorneys, alleging that during
telephone conversations in February and August 2025, defense counsel made inappropriate
statements regarding a non-party inmate and threatened Plaintiff with vexatious litigant
designation unless he withdrew certain filings. (Id., Doc. 53)
On September 19, 2025, Defendants filed their Notice of Compliance. (Id., Doc.
53). Defendant Barnes filed a Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify, stating that
she advised Plaintiff that his filings appeared substantially similar to filings by the other
inmate, who had indicated that he would share documents with Plaintiff. (Id.) Barnes
recounted that she told Plaintiff that the continued submission of meritless filings could
result in Rule 11 sanctions and/or vexatious litigant designation. (Id.) In an October 3,
2025 Order, the Magistrate Judge denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify, concluding that
the timing of Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify—which he filed the day after the Court
denied his Motion to Strike—suggested that the Motion was not filed for a legitimate
concern, Plaintiff had not demonstrated the likelihood of cognizable harm, there was no
risk that the public would perceive defense counsel’s representation of Defendants as
improper, and Plaintiff could file a complaint with the State Bar for any allegedly unethical
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conduct by Defendant Barnes. (Id., Doc. 60.)
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment remains pending, and Plaintiff’s
Response to the Motion is currently due on December 22, 2025. (Id., Doc. 62.)
B. Allegations
In Count One, Plaintiff asserts a First Amendment claim for denial of access to the
courts. Plaintiff alleges that in Hunter v. Paul, he requested his medical records from
Defendants Cornado, Paul, and Pfingston, through their attorney, Defendant Barnes, but
Defendants refused to provide his medical records. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants then
used his medical records to support their Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff
contends that Defendants have “frustrated and impeded” his ability to have the Court “fully
review” his claims, thereby denying him access to the courts. Plaintiff also claims that
Defendants Cornado, Paul, and Pfingston, through Defendant Barnes, violated the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) when they used his medical records
in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, where neither Defendants nor their
counsel obtained Plaintiff’s authorization for the release of his records.1
In Count Two, Plaintiff asserts a First Amendment retaliation claim. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants Cornado, Paul, and Pfingston, through Defendant Barnes, retaliated
against him through the conduct alleged in Count One because Plaintiff sought relief for
violations of his Eighth Amendment rights.
In Count Three, Plaintiff asserts another First Amendment retaliation claim.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Cornado, Paul, and Pfingston, through Defendant Barnes,
retaliated against Plaintiff by concealing evidence—that is, Plaintiff’s medical records—
as described in Count One. Plaintiff claims that “over the years,” Defendant Barnes has
“utilized this same practice of withholding vital evidence from almost all pro per prison
litigant[]s” who have brought claims against Corizon, Centurion, and NaphCare. Plaintiff
contends that because Defendant Barnes has denied crucial evidence to pro se prisoner
1 HIPAA “provides no private right of action.” Webb v. Smart Document Sols.,
LLC, 499 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007).
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plaintiffs, Defendant Barnes’s clients have prevailed in almost every case in which a
prisoner is pro se. Plaintiff claims that Defendants Centurion and NaphCare “condone and
are a party to this unethical practice.”
IV. Discussion
A. Absolute Immunity
If a government attorney is performing acts “intimately associated with the judicial
phase” of the litigation, that attorney is entitled to absolute immunity from damages
liability.” Fry v. Melaragno, 939 F.2d 832, 836-38 (9th Cir. 1991). “The proper forum for
challenges to these allegedly improper actions is in the adversary proceedings, not in a
separate suit for damages.” Id. Likewise, “[w]itnesses . . . are accorded absolute immunity
from liability for their testimony in judicial proceedings.” Paine v. City of Lompoc, 265
F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. 2001). Defendants Paul, Coronado, Pfingston, Barnes, Chappel,
and the law firm of Broening, Oberg, Woods & Wilson are absolutely immune from
liability for damages for their roles in Hunter v. Paul, and these Defendants will be
dismissed.
B. Defendants Dolan, Young, Mendoza, Johnson, and Branum
Plaintiff makes no specific allegations against Defendants Dolan, Young, Mendoza,
Johnson, and Branum and apparently has named them as Defendants here solely because
he named them as Defendants in Hunter v. Paul. Defendants Dolan, Young, Mendoza,
Johnson, and Branum were dismissed on screening and had no other involvement in Hunter
v. Paul. Plaintiff cannot state any constitutional claim against them based on their
involvement in Hunter v. Paul, and Defendants Dolan, Young, Mendoza, Johnson, and
Branum will be dismissed.
C. NaphCare, Centurion, and Centene
To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional public
function, such as providing medical care to prisoners, a plaintiff must allege facts to support
that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom
promulgated or endorsed by the private entity. See Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d
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1128, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2012). To state a claim against NaphCare, Centurion, and Centene,
Plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) NaphCare,
Centurion, and Centene had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom amounted to a
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving
force behind the constitutional violation. See Burke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725,
734 (9th Cir. 2009). In addition, if the policy or custom in question is an unwritten one,
Plaintiff must allege facts to support that it is so “persistent and widespread” that it
constitutes a “permanent and well settled” practice. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City
of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 167-68 (1970)). “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or
sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and
consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.”
Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff sues NaphCare, Centurion, and Centene solely because they were
Defendants in Hunter v. Paul. These Defendants were dismissed on screening and had no
other involvement in Hunter v. Paul. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against
NaphCare, Centurion, and Centene, and these Defendants will be dismissed.
D. Insurance Company Defendants
The insurance company Defendants did not act under color of state law, and Plaintiff
fails to allege any facts to support that he suffered any injury because of any conduct by
the Defendant insurance companies. Plaintiff has named the insurance companies as
Defendants solely because they were Defendants in Hunter v. Paul. Again, these
Defendants were dismissed on screening and had no other involvement in Hunter v. Paul.
The Court will dismiss Defendants Columbia Casualty Company, Scottsdale Insurance
Company, Zurich American Insurance, and Starr Indemnity Insurance Company.
E. Legally Malicious or Frivolous Claims
The Court finds Plaintiff’s claims are legally malicious or frivolous within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The purpose of § 1915A is to ensure that the targets of
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frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.” Nordstrom v. Ryan,
762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quote marks omitted). A claim is
“frivolous” if it has “‘no basis in law or fact.’” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th
Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013). A
claim is “malicious if it was filed with the ‘intention or desire to harm another.’” Andrews,
398 F.3d at 1121; Knapp, 738 F.3d at 1109.
The litigation history in Hunter v. Paul suggests that Plaintiff has a personal
vendetta against Defendant Barnes. Plaintiff, dissatisfied with the Court’s rejections of his
attempts to disqualify Defendant Barnes in Hunter v. Paul, has turned to filing suit against
Barnes with the apparent “intention or desire to harm” Barnes. There is no arguable legal
basis for Plaintiff to sue Defendant Barnes for her representation of the Defendants in
Hunter v Paul, to sue the Defendants whom Barnes represents, or to sue the Defendants
who were dismissed on screening.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim in the Complaint, and it will
be dismissed.
V. Dismissal Without Leave to Amend
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend should be freely
granted “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “The court considers five
factors in assessing the propriety of leave to amend—bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to
the opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether the plaintiff has previously
amended the complaint.” United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th
Cir. 2011) (citing Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004)). Although a
pro se plaintiff is generally entitled to notice of the deficiencies of his claims and an
opportunity to amend, see Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth
Circuit in Corinthian Colleges explained that leave to amend is not warranted unless the
deficiencies “can be cured with additional allegations that are ‘consistent with the
challenged pleading’ and that do not contradict the allegations in the original complaint,”
655 F.3d at 955 (quoting Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296–97 (9th Cir.
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1990)).
Plaintiff has sued only immune Defendants and Defendants who have no possible
involvement in the alleged injury. Moreover, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims are
malicious and frivolous within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Thus, the defects in the
Complaint cannot be cured with additional allegations that are “‘consistent with the
challenged pleading’ and that do not contradict the allegations” in the Complaint.
Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d at 955. The Court finds further leave to amend would be
futile. The Court will therefore dismiss the Complaint without leave to amend.
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 9) is granted.
(2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government
agency, Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is not assessed an initial partial filing
fee.
(3) The Complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.
(4) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the
dismissal for failure to state a claim may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
(5) The docket shall reflect that the Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), has considered whether an appeal
of this decision would be taken in good faith and certifies that an appeal would not be taken
in good faith for the reasons stated in the Order and because there is no arguable factual or
legal basis for an appeal.
Dated this 11th day of December, 2025.
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