Fleurimond v. Noem et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Samson Fleurimond,
Petitioner,
v.
Kristi Noem, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-26-00037-PHX-MTL (CDB)
ORDER
I.
Petitioner, a Haitian citizen, has been present in the United States since March 8,
2023, when he was approved for humanitarian parole under the Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua,
and Venezuela parole program. (Doc. 1 at 4 ¶¶ 9-10.) He was placed in removal
proceedings, in which he filed and continues to pursue applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
(Id. at 4-5 ¶ 11.) His parolee status expired on March 6, 2025. (Id. at 38.)
On October 10, 2025, he was detained by Department of Homeland Security agents.
(Id. at 5 ¶ 12.) The Immigration Judge found Petitioner inadmissible under Section
212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). (Id. at 31.) The
Immigration Judge also denied Petitioner a bond hearing because he was an “arriving alien,
and alternatively, significant flight risk.” (Id. at 33.) Petitioner filed this habeas corpus
action challenging his immigration detention and seeking a bond determination hearing
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Respondents argue that Petitioner is subject to mandatory
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detention without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). (Doc. 9 at 4-5.)
II.
A.
For the reasons explained in Chavez v. Noem, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2026 WL 381618,
at *1-2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 9, 2026), the Court finds that a person who entered the United States
illegally and is clearly and beyond a doubt not entitled to admission, is subject to mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See also Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, — F.4th —, 2026
WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026).
Based on this record, the Court finds that Petitioner is present without having been
admitted1 and is therefore treated as an applicant for admission under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(a)(1). The Court further finds that an immigration officer has not determined
Petitioner clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, and therefore mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies. Petitioner is therefore not entitled under
the INA to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Count One of the Petition is thus
denied.
B.
As far as Petitioner alleges that his detention violates due process in Count Two of
the Petition, he is mistaken.
The government began removal proceedings against Petitioner under procedures set
forth in the INA. (Doc. 1 at 4-5 ¶ 11.) He was later issued a Notice to Appear charging him
as an alien present in the United States without possession of a valid entry document or
suitable travel document, in violation of Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA. (Id. at 28-
31.) Petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection, and he is
still pursuing those claims. (Id. at 4-5 ¶ 11.)
1 That Petitioner was paroled upon his entry to the United States does not change the
Court’s analysis. Vazquez Romero v. Garland, 999 F.3d 656, 661 (9th Cir. 2021) (“The
parole of an alien into the United States does not affect the alien’s immigration status.
Aliens paroled elsewhere in the country for years pending removal are treated for due
process purposes as if stopped at the border.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
Further, Petitioner does not explain how he can still be considered a parolee when his parole
expired in March 2025. (See Doc. 1 at 38.)
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An alien unlawfully present in the United States “has only those rights regarding
admission that Congress has provided by statute.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020); see also Espinoza Lopez v. Noem, 26 Civ. 00345
(JHR), 2026 WL 266597, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2026).
In this case, Petitioner received due process in two respects. First, he was afforded
the procedural protection of the INA. Second, he was subject to the determination
procedures established by Congress in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act where an immigration officer determined that he was not entitled to a
bond hearing.2 These procedures represent the due process as provided by Congress in
statute. Petitioner is entitled to nothing further under the Constitution, and Count Two of
the Petition is denied.
C.
Count Four asserts that Petitioner’s detention violates the Equal Protection clause
of the Fifth Amendment; this Count also lacks merit. Interpreting § 1225 as applying both
to those who present themselves for inspection and those who do not is fully consistent
with the Equal Protection clause. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964)
(“[T]he concept of equal protection has been traditionally viewed as requiring the uniform
treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the governmental action questioned
or challenged.”). Accepting Petitioner’s argument would mean that he would be treated
more favorably than others similarly situated who unlawfully enter the United States. The
Equal Protection clause is not a barrier to Petitioner’s mandatory detention, particularly in
this sphere, where “Congress has particularly broad and sweeping powers . . . and is
therefore entitled to an additional measure of deference when it legislates as to . . . matters
pertaining to aliens.” Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(per curiam).
. . . .
2 Petitioner does not address the IJ’s alternate finding for denial of bond that he was a
“significant flight risk” (Doc. 1 at 33); that the IJ reviewed the matter of Petitioner’s
custody on the merits confirms that Petitioner received the process to which he was entitled.
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D.
Petitioner’s claim in Count Five of the Petition that his detention without a bond
hearing violates the Suspension Clause is likewise rejected. The Suspension Clause
provides that the “Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S. Const. art.
I, § 9, cl. 2. Petitioner has not been precluded from bringing this habeas petition and
asserting constitutional and statutory challenges to his detention, nor has this Court been
precluded from reviewing and ruling on it. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003)
(holding that § 1226(e) did not bar a habeas petition raising constitutional challenges, so
federal courts had jurisdiction to review those challenges); Brown v. Muniz, 889 F.3d 661,
676 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he Suspension Clause establishes no particular review standard
for habeas petitions; it does, however, guarantee access to the federal courts to press a
habeas claim.”); Puri v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2006); see also I.N.S. v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A straightforward reading of
[the Suspension Clause] discloses that it does not guarantee any content to (or even the
existence of) the writ of habeas corpus, but merely provides that the writ shall not (except
in case of rebellion or invasion) be suspended.”), superseded by statute on other grounds
as stated in Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 580 (2020); Perez v. Barr, 957 F.3d 958, 963
(9th Cir. 2020) (noting that the “privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a
meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to the erroneous
application or interpretation of relevant law” (emphasis added) (citation and quotation
marks omitted)). Petitioner’s Suspension Clause challenge therefore fails.
Even considering Petitioner’s argument on the merits, however, the Court is
skeptical of the conclusion that classifying an alien as subject to mandatory detention
would violate the Suspension Clause. Although the Ninth Circuit has stated that “[h]abeas
relief for people detained by executive officials of the federal government, including aliens,
has been guaranteed by statute since 1789,” Flores-Miramontes v. I.N.S., 212 F.3d 1133,
1142 (9th Cir. 2000), members of the Supreme Court have reasoned that even § 1226(e)’s
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bar of review of mandatory detention under § 1226(c) likely does not violate the
Suspension Clause because “historical evidence suggests that [an alien] would not have
been permitted to challenge his temporary detention pending removal until very recently.”
See Demore, 538 U.S. at 537-38 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 539 (“All in all, it
appears that in 1789, and thereafter until very recently, the writ was not generally available
to aliens to challenge their detention while removal proceedings were ongoing.”);
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 116 (“[T]he [Suspension] Clause, at a minimum, protects the
writ as it existed in 1789, when the Constitution was adopted.” (quotation marks omitted));
see also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Suspension Clause
guarantees the common-law right of habeas corpus, as it was understood when the
Constitution was ratified. There is no doubt whatever that this did not include the right to
obtain discretionary release.”). Indeed, given this Court’s conclusion that the INA permits
Petitioner to be classified as an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention,
any Suspension Clause argument would necessarily require the Court to issue a
“momentous” holding that “an Act of Congress unconstitutionally suspend[ed] the writ of
habeas corpus.” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 132. Such a conclusion cannot be lightly
reached, particularly on this limited record and Petitioner’s bare argument. Count Five of
the Petition is therefore denied.
E.
The Court rejects Count Three, which asserts that Petitioner’s detention violates the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), as being arbitrary and
capricious. Petitioner cannot assert an APA claim. Under 5 U.S.C. § 704 (emphasis added),
“[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no
other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.” By bringing a habeas
petition, Petitioner has an adequate remedy in court, so he cannot also bring an APA claim.
See Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 674 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (stating that
“habeas corpus, not the APA,” was the “proper vehicle” for claims involving alien transfers
because § 704 provides that “claims under the APA are not available when there is another
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adequate remedy in a court” (quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 672 (majority
opinion) (per curiam) (describing the claims as “within the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas
corpus and thus must be brought in habeas”).
Even on the merits, however, Petitioner’s claim fails. Because Petitioner was
classified and treated as the INA requires, the government has not acted arbitrarily or
capriciously. See F.C.C. v. NextWave Personal Commc’ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 300 (2003)
(“The Administrative Procedure Act requires federal courts to set aside federal agency
action that is ‘not in accordance with law . . . .’” (emphasis added) (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A))). Count Three is therefore denied.
F.
Finally, the Court addresses Count Six of the Petition, which alleges that ICE “failed
to follow immigration-specific arrest and processing regulations,” namely, regulations
involving warrantless arrests. (Doc. 1 at 22-23.) Petitioner alleges that his “warrantless
arrest and continued civil detention contravene the regulations governing immigration
arrests.” (Id. at 23.)
The government did not address this claim in its briefing, nor did Petitioner
elaborate further on it in any reply. (See Doc. 9.) The Court will therefore order further
briefing on the merits of Count Six of the Petition. Briefing should be supported by
documentary evidence, including declarations or affidavits, if appropriate.
III.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Counts One through Five of the Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) are DENIED.
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties must file supplemental briefing on
Count Six of the Petition no later than March 11, 2026.
Dated this 24th day of February, 2026.
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