Hodge v. NAPA Genuine Auto Parts

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Najib A Hodge,
Plaintiff,
v.
NAPA Genuine Auto Parts,
Defendant.
No. CV-26-03101-PHX-JAT
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment as to NAPA
Genuine Auto Parts (Doc. 32). The Court now rules.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (Doc. 12) against
Defendants NAPA Genuine Auto Parts (“NAPA”) and DoorDash, Inc. (“DoorDash”).
After the Court compelled arbitration as to Plaintiff’s claims against DoorDash and stayed
the proceedings as to DoorDash only (Doc. 31), the Court severed Plaintiff’s claims as to
NAPA. (Doc. 1). This case involves only Plaintiff’s claims against NAPA.
The Court’s October 8, 2025 Screening Order (Doc. 16) dismissed two counts
against NAPA, but ordered NAPA to respond to Plaintiff’s claims of public
accommodation discrimination (under federal and state law) and negligent supervision
(state common law) against NAPA. (Doc. 16 at 2–4, 7). NAPA was served with process
on December 8, 2025. (Doc. 21). NAPA has failed to appear or otherwise defend this
action, and on December 29, 2025, the Clerk of the Court entered NAPA’s default pursuant
Case 2:26-cv-03101-JAT Document 35 Filed 05/18/26 Page 1 of 12

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to Rule 55(a). (Doc. 25). Plaintiff’s previous application for entry of default judgment
(Doc. 26) was denied without prejudice in this Court’s January 22, 2026 Order (Doc. 28).
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the pending Motion for Default Judgment as to NAPA (Doc. 32).
II. DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 requires a “two-step process” that consists of (1)
seeking the clerk’s entry of default and (2) filing a motion for entry of default judgment.
Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). If a defendant fails to plead or
otherwise defend an action after being properly served with a summons and complaint, the
clerk must enter the party’s default pursuant to Rule 55(a). Once the clerk has entered
default, a court may, but is not required to, grant default judgment under Rule 55(b). Aldabe
v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). In considering whether to
enter default judgment, a court may consider the following factors:
(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of
plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the
complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the
possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether
the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong
policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
favoring decisions on the merits.
Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. When considering these factors, a defendant is deemed to have
admitted all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint but does not admit allegations related
to damages or those that do no more than “parrot” the elements of a claim. DirecTV, Inc.
v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007).
Finally, before awarding a default judgment against a defendant, the Court must
determine the adequacy of service of process, as well as the Court’s jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties. In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999) (“When entry
of judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend, a district
court has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject matter and
the parties.”).
Because service appears to have been proper and default judgment may be entered
against NAPA, the Court will address the Eitel factors to determine whether default
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judgment is appropriate. (Doc. 12 at 5–6; Doc. 16; Doc. 21; Doc. 24).
A. Possible Prejudice to Plaintiff
A possibility of prejudice exists when failure to enter default judgment denies a
plaintiff judicial resolution of the claims presented or leaves them without other recourse
for recovery. Elektra Entm’t Grp., Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 392 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
NAPA has neither answered nor appeared. If Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is not
granted, he will likely be left without recourse. Therefore, the first Eitel factor weighs in
favor of granting the motion.
B. Sufficiency of the Complaint and Merits of Plaintiff’s Claim
“The second and third Eitel factors address the substantive merits of the claim and
the sufficiency of the complaint and are often analyzed together.” Joe Hand Promotions,
Inc. v. Garcia Pacheco, No. 18-cv-1973-BAS-KSC, 2019 WL 2232957, at *2 (S.D. Cal.
May 23, 2019); Ariz. Bd. of Regents v. Doe, 555 F. Supp. 3d 805, 816 (D. Ariz. 2021). “Of
all the Eitel factors, courts often consider the second and third factors to be the most
important.” Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 555 F. Supp. 3d at 816 (quoting Vietnam Reform Party v.
Viet Tan-Vietnam Reform Party, 416 F. Supp. 3d 948, 962 (N.D. Cal. 2019)); see also
Sotanski v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n, No. 15-CV-01489-LHK, 2015 WL 4760506, at
*7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2015) (“[C]ourts routinely deny any motion for default judgment
predicated on a legally insufficient or dismissed pleading.”), aff’d sub nom. Sotanski v.
HSBC Bank USA, NA, 671 F. App’x 999 (9th Cir. 2016). These two factors may favor
entering default judgment when, considering the complaint and subsequently submitted
affidavits, a plaintiff shows a plausible claim for relief. Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386,
1388 (9th Cir. 1978); see also J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Molina, No. CV15-0380 PHX
DGC, 2015 WL 4396476, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 17, 2015) (considering affidavits attached to
the motion for default judgment).
The Court’s October 8, 2025 Screening Order allowed Plaintiff’s claims of public
accommodation discrimination and negligent supervision and retention to proceed because
Plaintiff’s amended complaint, construed liberally, states a claim for those counts. (Doc.
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16 at 3). However, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the Court’s determination that Plaintiff
stated a claim does not automatically mean Plaintiff’s claims are plausible, and the Court
specifically allowed these claims to proceed without prejudice to NAPA making
appropriate motions, including a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 16 at 4 n.1); See Coleman v.
Maldnado, 564 F. App’x 893, 894 (9th Cir. 2014) (a district court may properly grant a
motion to dismiss despite a prior screening order finding the complaint stated a claim);
Jones v. Sullivan, 19-CV-0025BKSCFH, 2020 WL 5792989, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 29,
2020) (“A court’s initial screening under § 1915(e) and/or § 1915A does not preclude a
later dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).”). Thus, the Court will address the merits of
each claim.
i. Public Accommodation Discrimination
Plaintiff brings a claim of racial discrimination under Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, and the Arizona Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”), A.R.S. § 41-
1442. (Doc. 12 at 8; Doc. 16 at 3).
a. Title II
Title II provides that “[a]ll persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place
of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation
on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a). The statute
defines “place of public accommodation” as lodgings, restaurants, gas stations, and
entertainment facilities. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b); Ford v. Surprise Fam. Urgent Care Ctr.,
LLC, No. CV 10-1920-PHX-SRB, 2011 WL 13137866, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 2011).
Courts construe this list narrowly and have consistently declined to expand the scope of
the statute beyond the facilities specifically enumerated. Dragonas v. Macerich, No. CV-
20-01648-PHX-MTL, 2021 WL 3912853, at *4 (D. Ariz. Sept. 1, 2021); 303 Creative LLC
v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570, 609 (2023) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a limits the establishments that qualify to “hotels, restaurants, gas stations, movie
theaters, concert halls, sports arenas, stadiums”). Plaintiff has not alleged that NAPA is a
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lodging, restaurant, gas station, or entertainment facility, or any facility exhaustively
enumerated in Title II. NAPA is an auto parts store, and therefore Title II is not applicable
to NAPA. See Hodge v. Home Depot, 2024 WL 4026218, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 3, 2024)
(stating that Title II is not applicable to a hardware store). Accordingly, Plaintiff is not
entitled to relief under Title II.
b. ACRA
The ACRA provides that “[d]iscrimination in places of public accommodation
against any person because of race, color, sex, national origin or ancestry is contrary to the
policy of this state and shall be deemed unlawful.” A.R.S. § 41-1442(A). “Places of public
accommodation” is defined as places of entertainment, restaurants, lodgings, “and all
establishments which cater or offer their services, facilities or goods to or solicit patronage
from the members of the general public.” A.R.S. § 41-1441(2). Although Title II is not
applicable to NAPA, Arizona’s public accommodation statute is broader in scope and is
applicable to NAPA. See 303 Creative LLC, 600 U.S. at 615 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(noting that Arizona’s public accommodation statute has a broader scope than the federal
counterpart); Hameen v. Dollar Tree Stores Inc., 2022 WL 17416768, at *5 (D. Ariz. Dec.
5, 2022) (applying the ACRA to a retail store).
The ACRA prohibits the denial or withholding of “accommodations, advantages,
facilities or privileges” based on these characteristics, or distinction in “price or quality of
any item, goods or services offered” based on these characteristics. A.R.S. § 41-1442(B).
In applying Arizona’s statute, courts in this district have applied the analytical framework
in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims and Title II claims. York v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n,
2019 WL 3802535, at *4–5 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2019). To succeed on a claim under Title
II, a plaintiff must show that he: “(1) is a member of a protected class; (2) attempted to
exercise the right to full benefits and enjoyment of a place of public accommodations; (3)
was denied those benefits and enjoyment; and (4) was treated less favorably than similarly
situated persons who are not members of the protected class.” Id. at *5 (quoting Brown v.
Luxor Hotel & Casino, 2014 WL 2858488, at *2 (D. Nev. June 23, 2014)). Once a plaintiff
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makes these showings, “the burden shifts to [the defendant] to proffer a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for its actions.” Fuentes v. Planet Fitness, 2022 WL 3577275, at *1
(D. Ariz. Aug. 19, 2022).
Plaintiff has established the first and second element. However, the third element
requires a plaintiff “to show a denial of service rather than a delay in order to state a claim.”
York, 2019 WL 3802535, at *5. Here, Plaintiff alleges that a NAPA employee was helping
Plaintiff when a second NAPA employee made a racially derogatory comment to Plaintiff
in passing. (Doc. 12 at 17–18). Plaintiff further alleges that as he was attempting to “deal
with this legal matter” with DoorDash and NAPA management, the assistant manager
contacted DoorDash for another delivery driver, who arrived 5 minutes later and completed
the job instead of Plaintiff. (Doc. 12 at 18).
By his own statement, Plaintiff admits that he was not initially denied service, as he
was helped by a NAPA employee as soon as he entered the store. (Doc. 12 at 17). Even
after the comment was made, Plaintiff does not suggest that a NAPA employee asked him
to leave or refused to sell him goods. Stray derogatory remarks “cannot, by themselves,
support [an ACRA discrimination claim] absent some connection to the denial of goods or
services.” Fuentes, 2022 WL 3577275, at *2. Here, there was no denial of goods or
services. Therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under the ACRA.
To the extent the assistant manager’s request for another delivery driver could be
construed as some sort of denial of goods or services, Plaintiff did not allege that the
assistant manager requested a new delivery driver because of Plaintiff’s race. Instead, the
facts alleged by Plaintiff suggest that the assistant manager called for another delivery
driver because Plaintiff was still at the NAPA store dealing with the incident and thus could
not have completed the delivery during that time. (Doc. 12 at 18). Thus, Plaintiff’s ACRA
claim would still fail because there was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to request
another delivery driver.
Therefore, the second and third Eitel factors weigh heavily against granting default
judgment for the public accommodation claim.
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ii. Negligent Supervision and Retention
Plaintiff also brings a claim of negligent supervision and retention under Arizona
law. (Doc. 12 at 8; Doc. 16 at 3). “An employer is liable for the tortious conduct of its
employee if the employer was negligent or reckless in hiring, supervising, or otherwise
training the employee.” Hernandez v. Singh, 2019 WL 367994, at *6 (D. Ariz. Jan. 30,
2019) (citation omitted). “Arizona follows the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213
(“Restatement”) for negligent hiring, supervision, and training claims.” Charley v. United
States, 437 F. Supp. 3d 745, 750 (D. Ariz. 2020) (citing Kassman v. Busfield Enters, Inc.,
131 Ariz. 163, 166 (App. 1981)). The Restatement provides that “[a] person conducting an
activity through servants or other agents is subject to liability for harm resulting from his
conduct if he is negligent or reckless” in giving improper instruction, in the employment
of improper persons, or in the supervision of the activity. Restatement § 213.
“For an employer to be liable for negligent supervision under Arizona law, a
plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the employer knew or should have known that the
employee was not competent to perform the assigned task and (2) that the employer’s
failure to supervise the employee caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Charley, 437 F. Supp. 3d
at 750. Importantly, “[f]or an employer to be held liable for the negligent hiring, retention,
or supervision of an employee, a court must first find that the employee committed a tort.”
Kuehn v. Stanley, 208 Ariz. 124, 130 ¶ 21 (App. 2004). “If the theory of the employee’s
underlying tort fails, an employer cannot be negligent as a matter of law for hiring or
retaining the employee.” Id. Here, the underlying injury is public accommodation
discrimination. (Doc. 16 at 3). As explained above, Plaintiff has not shown a plausible
claim for relief for public accommodation discrimination. Therefore, Plaintiff’s negligent
supervision and retention claim also fails.
Even if Plaintiff had alleged a plausible claim under the public accommodation
discrimination statutes, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would show that NAPA
knew or should have known that the employee would act improperly or that NAPA’s
failure to supervise the employee caused Plaintiff’s injury. See Rice v. Brakel, 233 Ariz.
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140, 145 ¶ 19 (App. 2013) (“[W]hen an agent’s actions are actually hostile to the interests
of his employer, the presumption is that the employer has no knowledge of the agent’s
actions.”). Moreover, “Arizona law limits negligent supervision claims to instances where
an employee is performing a task on the employer’s behalf.” Mendez v. United States, 2026
WL 482685, at *4 (D. Ariz. Feb. 20, 2026). The NAPA employee who made the derogatory
comment was not the employee assisting Plaintiff and was not performing a task on the
employer’s behalf when he made the comment. (Doc. 12 at 4).
Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown a plausible claim for relief for negligent
supervision and retention. The second and third Eitel factors thus weigh heavily against
granting default judgment for the negligent supervision and retention claim.
C. Sum at Stake
“Under the fourth Eitel factor, the Court considers the amount of money at stake in
relation to the seriousness of [Defendant’s] conduct.” Bankers Ins. Co. v. Old W. Bonding
Co., LLC, 2012 WL 2912912, at *2 (D. Ariz. July 16, 2012). “When the money at stake in
the litigation is substantial or unreasonable, default judgment is discouraged.” Zekelman
Indus. Inc. v. Marker, 2020 WL 1495210, at *4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 27, 2020) (citation omitted).
In his motion for default judgment, Plaintiff states that he is seeking $16,383,350.00 and
concedes that this is substantial. (Doc. 32 at 5; Doc. 32-2 at 4); see Zekelman, 2020 WL
1495210, at *4 (finding that $639,774.25 is “a substantial sum”). Plaintiff’s claims against
NAPA stem from one derogatory comment made by a NAPA employee. As explained
above, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that NAPA is liable for its employee’s comment.
The seriousness of NAPA’s alleged violations is inconsistent with such a large award.
Accordingly, the fourth Eitel factor weighs heavily against default judgment.
D. Possibility of Disputed Material Facts
The fifth Eitel factor also weighs against default judgment. While the well-pleaded
facts in the complaint other than damages are taken as true on entry of default, as discussed
above, Plaintiff has not pleaded all material facts needed to support his claims. Thus, it is
possible a dispute may arise from a material fact not yet pleaded. Accordingly, the Court
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finds that the fifth Eitel factor weighs against default judgment. See Eason v. IndyMac
Bank, FSB, 2010 WL 4573270, at *3 (D. Ariz. Nov. 5, 2010).
E. Excusable Neglect
The sixth Eitel factor weighs in favor of default judgment. Here, the possibility that
default resulted from excusable neglect appears unlikely. NAPA failed to answer the
complaint or otherwise respond and did not oppose Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment.
Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of granting default judgment. See Eason, 2010
WL 4573270, at *3.
F. Policy Favoring Decision on the Merits
The seventh Eitel factor generally weighs against default judgment, given that cases
“should be decided on their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472.
However, the existence of Rule 55(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
authorizes default judgments, “indicates that this preference, standing alone, is not
dispositive.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177 (internal quotation marks omitted). Put
simply, “the default mechanism is necessary to deal with wholly unresponsive parties who
could otherwise cause the justice system to grind to a halt. Defendants who appear to be
‘blowing off’ the complaint should expect neither sympathy nor leniency from the court.”
2 Gensler, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rules and Commentary, Rule 55, at 123–24
(2021); Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 555 F. Supp. 3d at 816.
Therefore, because factors two, three, four, five, and seven weigh against granting
default judgment, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to default judgment against
Defendant NAPA.
III. DISMISSAL
Although the Court’s October 8, 2025 Screening Order (Doc. 16) allowed Plaintiff’s
public accommodation discrimination and negligent supervision claims against NAPA to
proceed, upon closer examination of the merits of Plaintiff’s claims under the Eitel factors,
the Court has determined that Plaintiff failed to state a claim against NAPA. Therefore, the
Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against NAPA. See Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 555 F. Supp.
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3d at 819 (noting that a court’s conclusion that the second and third Eitel factors weigh
against the entry of default judgment on some claims “also cuts in favor of dismissing”
those claims because “it would be pointless to deny the default judgment motion but then
allow those claims to linger on the Court’s docket”); Health Cost IQ Inc. v. BDG Benefits
Design Group Inc., 2025 WL 1591284, at *3 (D. Ariz. June 5, 2025) (“Dismissal with
prejudice appears to be the common practice of courts that deny default judgment motions
as to some or all of the claims when amendment would be futile.”).
A. Title II
“A trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte under Rule 12(b)(6).” Omar v. Sea-
Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987). “Such a dismissal may be made without
notice where the claimant cannot possibly win relief.” Id. As explained in the Court’s Eitel
analysis, Title II is not applicable to NAPA because NAPA is not a “place of public
accommodation” as defined by the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b); see Hodge, 2024 WL
4026218, at *1. Because there is nothing Plaintiff could allege that would allow him to
obtain relief against NAPA under Title II, Plaintiff “cannot possibly win relief” on that
claim. Therefore, this Court may dismiss the Title II claim without notice. Omar, 813 F.2d
at 991. Moreover, because leave to amend would be futile, Plaintiff’s Title II claim against
NAPA is dismissed with prejudice. Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 297 (9th Cir.
1990) (concluding that dismissal with prejudice was proper when “amendment would not
cure the deficiencies in the complaint”); Fordjour v. Southwall Techs., Inc., 126 F. App’x
351, 353 (9th Cir. 2005).
B. State Law Claims
In the Court’s Eitel analysis, the Court determined that Plaintiff failed to allege facts
sufficient to state a claim for public accommodation discrimination or negligent
supervision under Arizona law. “Dismissal of a pro se complaint without leave to amend
is proper only if it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be
cured by amendment.” Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 1988)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should
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freely give leave when justice so requires.”). Unlike Plaintiff’s Title II claim, the Court
cannot determine with absolute certainty whether Plaintiff’s state law claims can be cured
by amendment. Therefore, the Court will dismiss the state law claims with leave to amend.
C. Leave to Amend
If Plaintiff chooses to amend, he is cautioned that he must first allege federal subject
matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. Although “when a court grants a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a federal claim, the court generally retains discretion to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, over pendent state-law claims,”
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006), the Court notes that with the dismissal
of Plaintiff’s Title II claim providing for federal question jurisdiction, the Court will
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
claim under subsection (a) if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it
has original jurisdiction.”); see United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726
(1966) (“[I]f the federal claims are dismissed before trial . . . the state claims should be
dismissed as well.”); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (9th Cir.
1988) (“The statement [in Gibbs] simply recognizes that in the usual case in which all
federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under
the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—
will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”);
see also Abhyanker v. HumanGood the Terraces Phx., 2024 WL 3992674, at *3 (D. Ariz.
Aug. 29, 2024). Therefore, if Plaintiff chooses to amend, he may not rely on supplemental
jurisdiction stemming from the dismissed Title II claim and must otherwise allege federal
subject matter jurisdiction.
The Court further cautions that if Plaintiff chooses to amend and adequately alleges
federal subject matter jurisdiction, he must allege material facts that would state a plausible
claim for relief under the state law claims—the requirements of which are detailed above
in the Court’s discussion of the second and third Eitel factors. See Balistreri v. Pacifica
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Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Dismissal can be based on the lack of a
cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal
theory.”). If Plaintiff fails to allege material facts that would entitle Plaintiff to relief under
these claims, the Court will determine that any further opportunities to amend would be
futile and will therefore dismiss this case without further leave to amend. See Bonin v.
Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (futility alone justifies denying leave to amend);
Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989) (repeated
failure to cure deficiencies is one of the factors to be considered in deciding whether justice
requires granting leave to amend).
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 32) is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. 12), as
severed (see Doc. 1), is DISMISSED. Plaintiff has 30 days from the date of this Order to
file a second amended complaint. If Plaintiff fails to file a second amended complaint
within this deadline, the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment dismissing this case. If
Plaintiff files a second amended complaint, it shall not be served until it is screened.1
Dated this 18th day of May, 2026.
1 In the event Plaintiff chooses to amend, the Court would vacate the Clerk of Court’s entry
of default (Doc. 25) because Plaintiff would need to serve NAPA again.
Case 2:26-cv-03101-JAT Document 35 Filed 05/18/26 Page 12 of 12