Black v. Yavapai, County of et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Anthony E Black, II,
Plaintiff,
v.
County of Yavapai, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-26-08018-PCT-KML
ORDER
Plaintiff Anthony E. Black II filed a complaint and an application for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. (Docs. 1, 2.) Black is entitled to proceed in forma pauperis but
granting that application allows the court to determine whether the complaint states any
claims on which he might be able to obtain relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). It does not.
BACKGROUND
Black’s complaint includes copies of documents generated during land-use
proceedings in Yavapai County. Those documents are referenced in the complaint, and
they are deemed incorporated by reference. See Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899
F.3d 988, 1002 (9th Cir. 2018). The following facts are taken from the complaint and
incorporated documents.
Black “is the sole resident and occupant” of a parcel of land in Paulden, Arizona.
(Doc. 1 at 2.) “Legal title to the parcel is held by an Arizona LLC [Kuro Assets, LLC] for
privacy and estate-planning purposes.” (Doc. 1 at 2.) The present suit stems from land-use
enforcement actions taken against Kuro Assets, not Black.
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In May 2025, Yavapai County Development Services received “a public complaint
regarding operations” on the land owned by Kuro Assets. (Doc. 1 at 18.) A Yavapai County
Deputy Zoning Inspector—possibly defendant Joshua Warfield—went to the property and
noticed several zoning violations. (Doc. 1 at 18.) That visit prompted formal enforcement
proceedings, with an initial hearing on August 12, 2025. Black attended a hearing on that
date, but he does not disclose what occurred other than indicating the hearing was
continued to October 14, 2025. (Doc. 1 at 19.)
On September 26, 2025, defendant Damian Campbell, a “Land Use Supervisor” for
Yavapai County, sent an email to the Yavapai County Sheriff’s office. That email stated
Black had appeared at the August 12 hearing “carrying a very large, sheathed
knife/bayonet-type edged weapon.” (Doc. 1 at 25.) Based on that, Campbell requested the
Sheriff’s Office “provide security” for the administrative hearing on October 14. (Doc. 1
at 25.) The Sheriff’s Office agreed to send a deputy to the hearing. (Doc. 1 at 25.)
At the hearing on October 14 defendant Benjamin Kreitzberg, a Deputy County
Attorney, relied on “materials and exhibits that had not been provided to [Black] before
the hearing.” (Doc. 1 at 5.) Black was “prevented . . . from presenting controlling statutory
authority” at the hearing, although it is not clear what this means. (Doc. 1 at 5.) The hearing
resulted in a judgment finding Kuro Assets had committed numerous violations of Yavapai
County’s land-use regulations. (Doc. 1 at 28.) The judgment imposed a $1,000 dollar fine
and a civil penalty of $200,000. (Doc. 1 at 28.) The civil penalty, however, would be set
aside if Kuro Assets met ten conditions by January 20, 2026. The conditions included
actions such as ceasing the “unapproved commercial activity” on the land and obtaining
required permits for any continued activities. (Doc. 1 at 28.) Kuro Assets appealed the
judgment to the Yavapai County Board of Supervisors. (Doc. 1 at 30.)
On January 8, 2026, the Board of Supervisors “remanded the matter back to the
Hearing Officer” because there had been a recent amendment to the Yavapai County
Planning and Zoning Ordinance that “change[d] the requirements for agricultural
exemptions.” (Doc. 1 at 21.) The Board of Supervisors vacated the judgment, including the
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fine and civil penalty, and stated “[i]f the subject property does not achieve compliance,
the County may initiate a new enforcement action.” (Doc. 1 at 21.) Based on these
enforcement actions against Kuro Assets, Black filed the present suit.
In general, Black believes the enforcement actions against Kuro Assets were the
result of Yavapai County following a “custom and practice of conditioning agricultural
land-use exemption recognition on Title 42 tax classification by the Assessor.” (Doc. 1 at
3.) For unknown reasons, Black describes this custom and practice as “an extra-statutory
gatekeeping practice” that he identifies as the “Assessor Gate.” (Doc. 1 at 3.) His complaint
contains many cryptic references to this “gatekeeping” or “gate” idea, but Black does not
make clear the meaning he is attempting to convey.
Black’s complaint names eight defendants:
1. Yavapai County;
2. Jeremy Dye, Director of Yavapai County Development Services;
3. Damian Campbell, Land Use Supervisor;
4. Joshua Warfield, Land Use Specialist;
5. Taylor Rossi, Appraiser Supervisor;
6. Dawn Capotosti, Environmental Health Unit Manager;
7. Benjamin Kreitzberg, Deputy County Attorney; and
8. Michael Gordon, Deputy County Attorney.
Black alleges four federal claims and four state-law claims against various combinations
of these defendants. All claims incorporate the complaint’s first 43 paragraphs containing
factual allegations and add a few more conclusory allegations.
The first federal claim is identified as “First Amendment Retaliation” brought
against “all defendants.” (Doc. 1 at 8.) Beyond incorporation of the earlier paragraphs,
Black does not specifically identify the protected activity or adverse actions at issue.
Instead, Black merely recites the elements of a First Amendment Retaliation claim. (Doc.
1 at 8.)
The second federal claim is identified as “Procedural Due Process,” again against
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“all defendants.” Without specifics, Black alleges he was deprived of “protected liberty
and property interests” as well as a “fair process.” (Doc. 1 at 9.) Black also alleges it
violated procedural due process for defendants to “enforc[e] extra-statutory gatekeeping
and by proceeding on a predetermined enforcement path.” (Doc. 1 at 9.) And Black was
denied a “meaningful opportunity to be heard,” presumably during the enforcement
proceedings. (Doc. 1 at 9.)
The third claim is identified as “Monell Liability,” against Yavapai County. Black
alleges Yavapai County has a “policy, custom, or practice of conditioning land-use
exemption recognition on non-statutory gatekeeping mechanisms and departmental
‘gates,’ reflected in County materials, repeated enforcement rationales, and enforcement
actions.” (Doc. 1 at 10.) As mentioned previously, it is not clear why Black is using the
terms “gatekeeping” and “gates” in this manner. Black also points to the ordinance changes
in December 2025 as establishing a policy of “ongoing restrictive licensing system over
agricultural use.” (Doc. 1 at 10.) Strangely, Black seems to include the new ordinance
adopted in December 2025 as part of the “policies and practices” responsible for the
violation issued five months earlier in July 2025. (Doc. 1 at 10.)
The fourth federal claim is identified as “Conspiracy to Deprive Civil Rights,”
against all “individual defendants.” (Doc. 1 at 11.) Black alleges the individual defendants
“reached an agreement to enforce the County’s gatekeeping premise, escalate enforcement,
and retaliate against [Black] for challenging it.” (Doc. 1 at 11.) There are no factual
allegations indicating when or how all these individuals entered into such an agreement.
The first state-law claim is identified as “Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress,” brought against Campbell, Warfield, Rossi, and Capotosti. The second state-law
claim is identified as “Gross Negligence and Willful Misconduct” against “all defendants.”
(Doc. 1 at 12.) These two claims appear similar in that they are based on defendants
pursuing enforcement actions against Black, requesting a deputy sheriff at the October
hearing, and “knowingly enforcing extra-statutory gates.” (Doc. 1 at 12.)
The third state-law claim is identified as “Recording of Groundless Document,”
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against Warfield, Dye, and Yavapai County. Black alleges these defendants recorded the
notice of violation in July 2025 and that notice is treated as an “adverse predicate” that
“continues to generate collateral consequences.” (Doc. 1 at 13.)
The fourth state-law claim is identified as “Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,”
against Yavapai County and the individual defendants in their official capacities. (Doc. 1
at 13.) This claim requests declaratory relief that Yavapai County’s ordinance changes in
December 2025 violated the Arizona “Legislature’s anti-restriction mandate.” (Doc. 1 at
13.) Black requests the court “defin[e] the lawful boundary between permissible
verification and unlawful regulation.” (Doc. 1 at 14.)
In terms of overall relief, Black seeks a declaration that the original violation report
issued in July 2025 “was unlawful,” a permanent injunction prohibiting the enforcement
of at least a portion of the Yavapai County Planning and Zoning Ordinance against the land
owned by Kuro Assets, and compensatory damages. (Doc. 1 at 15.)
ANALYSIS
Based on the limited information available, Black is not the proper party to pursue
the federal claims at issue. And even if Black were the proper party, his complaint does not
contain sufficiently clear factual allegations identifying what each defendant did
underlying each federal claim.
I. Proper Plaintiff
Black’s complaint recognizes that he may not be the proper plaintiff to bring the
current claims. The complaint states that “[t]o the extent any claim or requested relief is
determined to belong to the title-holding entity, [Black] requests leave to amend and/or
join or substitute the real party in interest upon appearance of counsel.” (Doc. 1 at 2.) Black
makes a similar request in the context of his claim for “Recording of Groundless
Document.” (Doc. 1 at 13.)
Although difficult to understand, at least the federal claims in the complaint appear
to belong to Kuro Assets, not Black. All of the enforcement proceedings were brought
against Kuro Assets and it was only Kuro Assets that was ordered to pay a fine and civil
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penalty. There are no clear allegations of a direct injury suffered by Black sufficient to
grant him standing to pursue the federal claims.1
Black can proceed only if he meets the basic standing requirements of “(1) an injury
in fact that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, (2) a causal connection
between the injury and the defendant’s conduct, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.” Kenney v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 791 F. Supp. 3d
1163, 1167 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (simplified). “Generally, a shareholder does not have standing
to redress an injury to the corporation.” Shell Petroleum, N.V. v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593, 595
(9th Cir. 1983). Courts have extended this to the context of LLCs, even when the LLC has
a single member. Thus, the sole member of an LLC “certainly has a financial interest in
the success of [an LLC] and is undoubtedly affected when the LLC suffers a financial
injury, but that injury is derivative of [the LLC’s] injury, and thus [the member is] not
injured directly and independently.” Kenney, 791 F. Supp. 3d at 1167 (simplified). In short,
when claims are based on injuries to an LLC, “the right of action lies with the LLC, not the
individual members.” Id. (simplified).
Based on the present allegations, Kuro Assets may have been harmed by the
enforcement proceedings. There is no indication, however, that the enforcement
proceedings resulted in an injury to Black that would permit him to bring the federal claims
he has alleged. The enforcement proceedings were brought against Kuro Assets, not Black,
and the judgment was entered only against Kuro Assets. Without clear allegations of
distinct harm to Black in his individual capacity, he does not have standing to pursue the
federal claims and they must be dismissed.
Assuming Black believes Kuro Assets has suffered cognizable injuries, he must hire
counsel to bring suit on behalf of Kuro Assets. As an LLC, Kuro Assets can proceed in
federal court only through counsel. See Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s
Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 203 (1993).
1 The federal claims fail for the reasons set forth in this order and, absent any federal claims,
the court chooses not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
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II. Failure to State a Claim
Even if the court were able to identify some way in which Black was personally
injured, the current complaint does not provide sufficient factual allegations to state a
plausible claim for relief under federal law.
A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although Rule 8 does not demand
detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id.
Here, Black has made factual allegations in the first 43 paragraphs of his complaint,
but he does not provide any meaningful allegations linking those factual paragraphs to his
particular federal claims for relief. For example, in his “First Amendment Retaliation”
claim, Black alleges he “engaged in protected activity by petitioning government, filing
administrative appeals, submitting public records requests, and addressing policymakers
through public comment.” (Doc. 1 at 8.) There are no factual allegations identifying when
or how Black engaged in each of these activities. Black then alleges all seven “individual
defendants” “took adverse actions substantially motivated by [his] protected activity.”
(Doc. 1 at 9.) But again, there are no specific factual allegations identifying the adverse
actions taken by each defendant. This type of vague group pleading is impermissible.
The Ninth Circuit recently addressed a similar situation. In that case, the plaintiffs
had “pleaded detailed facts” but “[a]ll details evaporate[d] when [plaintiffs] had to link
their facts to their causes of action.” Gibson v. City of Portland, --- F.4th ----, No. 24-1663,
2026 WL 235118, at *19 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 2026). The Ninth Circuit concluded “district
courts should not be forced to wade through a morass of allegations, trying to determine
how the facts might relate to the causes of action.” Id. at *18. In other words, “[f]actual
allegations, however detailed, must be tied to corresponding causes of action.” Id. at *20.
The same reasoning applies to Black’s current allegations. It must be possible to identify
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the factual basis for each of the alleged claims against each of the named defendants. The
current complaint falls well short of that and must be dismissed.
III. Leave to Amend
Leave to amend is appropriate because Black may be able to add additional
allegations identifying a legally-recognized harm he personally suffered such that he has
standing to pursue his federal claims. Alternatively, Kuro Assets—through counsel—may
may be able to state plausible claims for relief.
IT IS ORDERED the Application (Doc. 3) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND. No later than February 27, 2026, plaintiff shall file an amended
complaint or, if appropriate, arrange for counsel to file an amended complaint on behalf of
the limited liability company. The Clerk of Court shall enter a judgment of dismissal
without prejudice in the event no amended complaint is filed by that date.
Dated this 12th day of February, 2026.
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