Tramposch di Genova v. Russo et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Trista Tramposch di Genova,
Plaintiff,
v.
Olivia Russo, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-00598-TUC-JCH
ORDER
Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Trista Tramposch di Genova’s Complaint
alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law by Defendants Dr. Olivia Russo
(“Dr. Russo”) and VCA Animal Hospital, Tucson (“VCA”) (“Complaint”) (Doc. 1). Also
before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In District Court Without Prepaying
Fees or Costs (“Motion”) (Doc. 2). The Court will grant the Motion and dismiss the
Complaint and this case.
I. Application to Proceed In District Court Without Prepaying Fees and Costs
The Motion indicates Plaintiff has insufficient funds to pay the filing fee. Good
cause appearing, the Court will grant the Motion.
II. Statutory Screening of In Forma Pauperis Complaints
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), in a case in which a plaintiff has been granted
in forma pauperis status, the Court shall dismiss the case “if the court determines that . . .
(B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
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relief.”1
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does not demand detailed
factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[A] complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A
claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Still, the Court must “construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d
338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se litigant] ‘must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). If the Court determines a complaint could
be cured by the allegation of additional facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity
to amend that complaint before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,
1127–29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
III. Complaint
Plaintiff alleges the following facts in her Complaint:
On August 24, 2023, Plaintiff entrusted a third party, Zoe Skinner, to take her
service dog, Hank/Dr. Hank, to the vet. Doc. 1 at 2. After having Hank for about an hour,
Ms. Skinner took him to VCA. Id. Though Plaintiff told Ms. Skinner “that Hank was to
receive antibiotics and post-surgical care . . . and requested a second opinion,” Ms. Skinner
represented to Dr. Russo that she was Hank’s owner and said Hank should be euthanized.
Id. Plaintiff’s name, phone number, and address were listed on Hank’s microchip and
veterinary records. Id. Dr. Russo was required by Arizona state law to make reasonable
efforts to contact Plaintiff before euthanizing Hank, but she did not. Id. Relying solely on
Ms. Skinner’s representations, Dr. Russo euthanized Hank. Id.
1 The Court also has an independent obligation to dismiss a case if the Court determines it
lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
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As a result of Dr. Russo euthanizing Hank, Plaintiff’s property was raided, and other
animals in her possession were seized. Id. Plaintiff subsequently had a bench trial during
which Dr. Russo falsely testified that Hank “would not have been ‘as bad’ had he been
brought in sooner.” Id. Plaintiff has suffered severe emotional distress and trauma among
other damages resulting from the “cascading consequences” of Hank’s euthanasia. Id.
IV. Analysis
A. Federal Law Claim
The Complaint brings five counts: professional negligence and deprivation of
property without due process against Dr. Russo, corporate negligence/failure to supervise
against VCA, and intentional infliction of emotional distress and conversion/trespass to
chattels against both Defendants. See Doc. 1 at 3. Count Two, deprivation of property
without due process purportedly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is the only federal law
claim alleged in the Complaint. See id. Under this Count, Plaintiff argues that her service
animal was protected property under the Fourth Amendment, and Dr. Russo, “acting jointly
with law enforcement and under color of state authority, deprived Plaintiff of property
(Dr[.] Hank) without notice or opportunity to be heard.” Id.
Generally, the guarantees in the Constitution run only against federal and state
governments—not private individuals. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614, 619 (1991). In other words, state action is required. But “[a]lthough the conduct of
private parties lies beyond the Constitution’s scope in most instances, governmental
authority may dominate an activity to such an extent that its participants must be deemed
to act with the authority of the government and, as a result, be subject to constitutional
constraints.” Id. at 620. Only in limited circumstances can a private entity qualify as a state
actor, including, relevant here, “when the government compels the private entity to take a
particular action . . . [or] when the government acts jointly with the private entity.”
Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck,587 U.S. 802, 809 (2019) (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff states Dr. Russo “act[ed] jointly with law enforcement and under
color of state authority” when she euthanized Hank. Doc. 1 at 3. But these words alone are
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not enough to establish state action or state a claim under federal law. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice [to state a claim].”). None of Plaintiff’s factual
allegations support this claim. Plaintiff brings Count Two only against Dr. Russo, who is
a private citizen that Plaintiff does not allege works for a government entity.2 Nowhere in
the Complaint does Plaintiff allege any government entity was involved in the decision to
euthanize Hank. See generally Doc. 1. The only factual allegation that insinuates Dr. Russo
may have been involved in with any government entity is the claim that she testified at
Plaintiff’s bench trial, but this allegedly happened after Hank’s euthanasia and therefore
cannot support the deprivation of property claim. And, ultimately, the allegation flies in
the face of common sense. Plaintiff cannot manufacture a federal claim simply by stating
Dr. Russo was acting with law enforcement and under color of state authority.3
B. State Law Claims
Because Plaintiff fails to state a federal claim, the Court will not exercise
jurisdiction over her state law claims.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. A federal basis, via either diversity
of citizenship or federal question, is required for a federal court to adjudicate a case.
See Newtok Vill. v. Patrick, 21 F. 4th 608, 615 (9th Cir. 2021). Here, Plaintiff does not
allege diversity jurisdiction,4 so the Court only has original jurisdiction if Plaintiff can
2 VCA Animal Hospitals, the other Defendant in this case and Dr. Russo’s alleged
employer, is a corporation incorporated and headquartered in California. See Cal. Sec’y of
St., Business Entities, https://bizfileonline.sos.ca.gov/search/business (last visited Jan. 13,
2026). See also Fed. R. Evid. 201 (a court may judicially notice facts “not subject to
reasonable dispute because [they] . . . can be accurately and readily determined from
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”).
3 Plaintiff has tried several times—unsuccessfully—to sue law enforcement for actions and
events related to the allegations here. See Tramposch di Genova v. Nosek et al., 4:23-CV-
00524; Tramposch v. Noon et al., 4:23-CV-00525; Tramposch v. Pima Animal Care Center
et al., 4:25-CV-00572; Tramposch v. Noon et al., 4:25-CV-00573; Tramposch di Genova
v. Conover et al., 4:25-CV-00597. The Court suspects Plaintiff’s allegations of law
enforcement involvement pertain to the “escalating sequence of retaliatory and malicious
events” that happened after Hank was euthanized, which were the subject of Plaintiff’s
prior suits.
4 Plaintiff would be unable to establish diversity jurisdiction even if she attempted to assert
it. Plaintiff is a resident of Tucson, Arizona, and Dr. Russo is a veterinarian operating in
Pima County. See Doc. 1 at 1–2. Also, the facts alleged show Plaintiff could not meet the
amount in controversy requirement. See 28 U.S.C. 1332(a).
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establish federal question jurisdiction via her allegations in Count Two. A court has federal
question jurisdiction when an action arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. When a district court has original jurisdiction over an
action, such as an action brought under federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 allows the court to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that “are so related to claims in the
action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A district court
can decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when the court has “dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction.” § 1367(c)(3).
Plaintiff has no federal claim. If her grievances against Defendants are actionable at
all, they would be rooted in state law. Because Plaintiff’s attempt to state a federal law
claim has failed at the screening stage, it is unclear whether the Court has original
jurisdiction over this case. Regardless, because the case has not progressed past screening,
the Court would decline to use its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. See Sanford v. Member Works,
Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (ordinarily when “all federal-law claims are
eliminated before trial” a court should decline jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the Complaint in its entirety.
V. No Leave to Amend
Though a pro se plaintiff is ordinarily entitled to an opportunity to amend her
complaint before dismissal of the action, see Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127–29, a court is not
required to grant leave to amend when doing so would be futile. See AmeriSourceBergen
Corp. v. Dialysist W., Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, the conduct Plaintiff
is alleging was committed solely by private parties. The Court finds Plaintiff could not
allege additional facts and state a claim under federal law. Without a viable federal claim,
the Court will not exercise jurisdiction over this case. Accordingly, amendment is futile,
and the Court will dismiss this case in its entirety.
///
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VI. Warnings
This case is one of five cases Plaintiff filed with the Court in 2025 and one of six
cases she has filed related to the same series of events.5 None of the complaints have made
it past screening. See id. The Court has already warned Plaintiff on multiple occasions that
if she continues to file frivolous lawsuits—particularly suits related to the events already
alleged in this and five other previous cases—the Court may place restrictions on Plaintiff’s
ability to file in the District of Arizona.6 Because this case was filed before the Court issued
the previous warnings, the Court will not issue another official warning. Plaintiff is
reminded, however, to heed the Court’s past orders before filing another case in the District
of Arizona, particularly a case related to these events, which have been thoroughly and
repeatedly reviewed by this Court and found lacking.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED granting Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In District Court
Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 2).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing the Complaint (Doc. 1) and this case in
its entirety. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this
case.
Dated this 14th day of January, 2026.
5 Tramposch di Genova v. Nosek et al., 4:23-CV-00524; Tramposch v. Noon et al., 4:23-
CV-00525; Tramposch v. Pima Animal Care Center et al., 4:25-CV-00572; Tramposch v.
Noon et al., 4:25-CV-00573; Tramposch di Genova v. Conover et al., 4:25-CV-00597;
Tramposch di Genova v. Russo et al., 25-CV-598 (instant case); Tramposch di Genova v.
Trump et al., 4:25-CV-00599.
6 See Tramposch di Genova v. Conover et al., 4:25-CV-00597 (Nov. 20, 2025) (first
warning); Tramposch v. Noon et al., 4:25-CV-00573 (Nov. 21, 2025) (second warning);
Tramposch di Genova v. Trump et al., 4:25-CV-00599 (Dec. 8, 2025) (third warning).
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