Sequoia Equipment Co., Inc. v. CNH Industrial America, LLC

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SEQUOIA EQUIPMENT CO., INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CNH INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, LLC,
Defendant.
Case No. 1:25-cv-00876-JLT-FJS
FINDING AND RECOMMENDATIONS
THAT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT BE GRANTED AND THE
CASE REMANDED
(ECF No. 13)
FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE
Plaintiff Sequoia Equipment Co., Inc. (“Sequoia”) moves for leave to file a second
amended complaint and seeks to join an additional defendant. (ECF Nos. 13, 30.) Defendant CNH
Industrial America, LLC (“CNH”) opposes this motion. (ECF Nos. 14, 32.) The court, having
considered the parties’ papers and the record in this case and for the reasons stated below,
RECOMMENDS (1) that the motion be granted, and (2) that the case be remanded upon filing of
the second amended complaint.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Early Procedural History
This action was filed on June 3, 2025, and was removed from Fresno County Superior
Court on July 16, 2025, based on diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1.) The court granted the parties’
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stipulation for Sequoia to file a first amended complaint. (ECF Nos. 5, 6, 7.) That first amended
complaint sought damages and injunctive relief under the California Business and Professions
Code sections 22902 and 17200 and for intentional and negligent interference with prospective
economic advantage. (ECF No. 7.) These causes of action were based on allegations that CNH
unlawfully amended a construction equipment sales and service agreement between the parties by
reducing Sequoia’s allotted sales and service market by fifty percent for the benefit of another
company, N & S Tractor Co., Inc. (“N&S”). (ECF No. 7 ¶ 5-18.) Sequoia’s first amended
complaint states that N&S had “foreknowledge” of CNH’s amendment to the construction
equipment sales and service agreement. (ECF No. 7 ¶ 18.) Sequoia knew about N&S’ conduct
before Plaintiff filed this action as the initial complaint makes allegations that, “[d]espite requests,
[CNH] has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse to restrain N&S from selling and
servicing [CNH’s] light and heavy products outside of N&S’ assigned Case CE SSM.” (ECF No.
1-1 ¶ 20.)
On August 29, 2025, CNH filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s entire operative complaint,
or in the alternative, to strike or dismiss Sequoia’s prayer for punitive damages. (ECF No. 8.)
B. The Motion to Amend
On November 13, 2025, Sequoia filed a motion for leave to file a second amended
complaint that would add N&S as a defendant and would assert claims of (1) conspiracy to violate
the Business and Professions Code section 22902, (2) unfair business practices under Business and
Professions Code section 17200, and (3) intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage. (ECF No. 13.) Two of these claims—unfair business practices and interference with
prospective economic advantage—track claims asserted against CNH. Conspiracy is a new claim
that Plaintiff asserts anew against N&S and CNH. Notably, adding N&S as a defendant would
destroy diversity jurisdiction because both Sequoia and N&S are California corporations.
On September 11, 2026, the court ordered supplemental briefing regarding the 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(e) factors because it is the proper standard for determining whether to allow post-removal
joinder of a diversity-destroying defendant. (ECF No. 29.) In response, the parties provided the
court with their supplemental briefing under this standard. (ECF Nos. 30, 32.)
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In support of this amendment, Sequoia states that N&S is a necessary party because “N&S
has continued to solicit Plaintiff’s customers.” (ECF No. 13-1 at 2; see ECF No. 13-2 ¶ 4.) Sequoia
also states that they “previously requested that [CNH] instruct N&S to confine its selling and
servicing of [CNH’s] light and heavy products to just is newly-assigned [sales and service
market],” but CNH refused. (ECF No. 13-1 at 2; see ECF No. 13-2 ¶ 2.) Sequoia argues that
joinder is required for just adjudication because if Plaintiff’s motion is denied, Plaintiff will be
forced to file a separate lawsuit against N&S out of the same facts and circumstances arising here
and this may risk inconsistent results and waste judicial resources. (ECF No. 30 at 4-5.)
CNH argues that there was undue delay in bringing this motion because Sequoia was
aware of all the facts alleged in the proposed second amended complaint since the initial action
was filed, that these amendments are futile, and that Sequoia brings this motion in bad faith to
destroy diversity jurisdiction and to frustrate CNH’s motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 14 at 8-10.)
Additionally, CNH counters that N&S is not a necessary party to this action because Sequoia has
been aware of N&S since filing its original complaint yet omitted N&S as a defendant. (ECF No.
32 at 3.) CNH also argues that Sequoia’s claims can be fully adjudicated without N&S and thus
there is no basis for deeming N&S a necessary party. (ECF No. 32 at 5.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“[T]he proper standard for deciding whether to allow post-removal joinder of a diversity-
destroying defendant is set forth in 28 U.S.C. 1447(e).” Boon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 229 F. Supp. 2d
1016, 1019 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing, inter alia, Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686,
691 (9th Cir. 1998), and Yniques v. Cabral 985 F.2d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 1993));1 see also Hardin,
813 F. Supp. 2d at 1173 (“Plaintiffs may not circumvent 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) by relying on Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a) to join non-diverse parties.”). Courts in this district generally apply 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(e). See Hardin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1173 (E.D. Cal. 2011);
1 The parties’ briefed Sequoia’s motion to amend under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The court advised the parties of the applicability of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) and afforded
the parties an opportunity to file supplemental briefs. (ECF No. 27.) Plaintiff opted to provide the
court with supplemental briefing. (ECF No. 28.) As a result, the court ordered supplemental
briefing for both parties. (ECF No. 29.)
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Magana v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., No. 20-CV-00578, 2021 WL 2349877, at *5 (E.D. Cal.
June 9, 2021); Gutierrez v. Helena Agri-Enters., LLC, No. 1:23-CV-01369, 2024 WL 749684, at
*2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2024). Section 1447(e) states: “If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join
additional defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny
joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.” 28 U.S.C. 1447(e).
Section 1447(e) is “couched in permissive terms” and “clearly gives” district courts
discretion in deciding whether to permit or deny joinder of a non-diverse defendant. Newcombe,
157 F.3d at 691; see also IBC Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de
C.V., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (“Under 1447, whether to permit joinder of a
party that will destroy diversity remains in the sound discretion of the court.”). A court should
consider the following factors when weighing whether to permit joinder under section 1447(e):
(1) whether the new defendant is required for just adjudication and would be
joined under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a); (2) whether the statute of
limitations would bar an action against the new defendant in state court; (3)
whether there has been an unexplained delay, or the joinder request is untimely;
(4) whether the plaintiff intends joinder solely to defeat diversity jurisdiction; (5)
whether the claims against the prospective defendant appear valid; and (6)
whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced by denial of joinder.
IBC Aviation Servs., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1011. Any of the factors might prove decisive, and
none is a required condition for joinder. Vasquez v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 77 F. Supp. 3d
911, 921 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
III. DISCUSSION
The court evaluates each of the section 1447(e) factors identified above.
A. Rule 19(a) Joinder
Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires joinder of persons whose absence
would preclude the grant of complete relief, or whose absence would impede their ability to
protect their interests or would subject any of the parties to the danger of inconsistent obligations.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). A necessary party is one “having an interest in the controversy, and who
ought to be made [a] part[y], in order that the court may act on that rule which requires it to decide
and finally determine the entire controversy, and do complete justice, by adjusting all the rights
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involved in it.” CP Nat’l. Corp. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 928 F.2d 905, 912 (9th Cir.1991)
(quoting Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 139, 15 L.Ed. 158 (1854)). This standard is
generally met “when failure to join will lead to separate and redundant actions,” but not when the
defendants whose joinder is sought “are only tangentially related to the cause of action or would
not prevent complete relief.” Boon, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1022. Although courts consider whether a
party would meet Rule 19’s standard for a necessary party, “amendment under § 1447(e) is a less
restrictive standard than for joinder under Rule 19.” Khachunts v. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am., 682 F.
Supp. 3d 827, 833 (C.D. Cal. 2023).
Here, there is significant overlap in facts, evidence, and witnesses. Plaintiff seeks to bring
an additional cause of action against N&S and Defendant for civil conspiracy based on violation of
the California Business and Professions Code section 22902. Plaintiff also seeks to add N&S to its
existing claims of unfair business practices and intentional interference with economic advantage.
The facts involving Defendant and N&S are so interwoven that N&S was identified in the initial
complaint filed on June 3, 2025, as a non-party and N&S’ actions were discussed or mentioned in
at least twelve paragraphs of the complaint. (See ECF No. 1-1.) It would be a waste of judicial
resources and potentially result in inconsistent results if Plaintiff were forced to litigate these same
issues in two separate lawsuits. N&S is more than tangentially related to Defendant’s claims based
on the allegations alleged in the initial complaint regarding N&S. This factor favors joinder and
amendment.
B. Statute of Limitations
Under this factor, the court considers “whether the statute of limitations would prevent the
filing of a new action against the new defendants should the Court deny joinder.” Khachunts, 682
F. Supp. 3d at 834.
Plaintiff seeks to bring an additional cause of action against N&S and CNH for civil
conspiracy based on violations of section 22902 of the California Business and Professions Code.
Plaintiff also seeks to add N&S to its existing claims of unfair business practices under section
17200 of the California Business and Professions Code and intentional interference with economic
advantage. Neither party discusses the statute of limitations.
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Assuming the truth of the factual assertions in the proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff
would appear able to file a separate action in state court against Defendant. The statute of
limitations for interference with prospective economic relations is two years. Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 339, subd. 1; see Augusta v. United Service Automobile Assn., 13 Cal. App. 4th 4, 10 (Ct. App.
1993). The statute of limitations for civil conspiracy “is determined by the nature of the action in
which the conspiracy is alleged.” McFaddin v. H. S. Crocker Co., 219 Cal. App. 2d 585, 591 (Ct.
App. 1963) (citation modified). Business and Professions Code section 22900 et seq. does not
provide a statute of limitations. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22925). Thus, the four-year statute of
limitations for an action upon any contract pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section
337 appears to apply. There is a four-year statute of limitations for violation of Business and
Professions Code section 17200. Blanks v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP, 171 Cal. App. 4th 336, 364 (Ct.
App. 2009). Because Plaintiff’s allegations are based on events that occurred in or about late 2024
or early 2025, (ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 7), the court cannot now conclude that the statute of limitations
prevents Sequoia from filing a new action against N&S.2 This factor tips against allowing
amendment under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e).
C. Unexplained Delay/Untimely Joinder
“While there is no bright line rule as to what qualifies as timely, courts consider the
amount of time that has lapsed since removal, the progress of the case, and how much time has
passed since opposing counsel refused to stipulate to any proposed amendment.” Khachunts, 682
F. Supp. 3d at 834.
The court finds that there has not been unexplained delay in this instance. Although N&S’
involvement in this action was known at the initial filing on June 3, 2025, Plaintiff believed that
CNH and N&S would cease and desist the objectional conduct alleged in their complaint, and
Sequoia attempted to communicate with Defendant regarding this. (ECF No. 13-2 ¶¶ 2-4.) Sequoia
previously amended its complaint once. (ECF No. 7.) Approximately four months lapsed before
Plaintiff sought to stipulate to a second amended complaint on October 29, 2025, and this motion
2 This analysis is not intended to foreclose or prejudice any statute of limitations defense a party
may choose to raise in the future.
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was filed on November 13, 2025, just one day after it was apparent that Sequoia’s attempt to
stipulate were unsuccessful. (ECF No. 13-2 ¶¶ 7-8.) Four months is not sufficient to show undue
delay where no scheduling order has been entered, no trial scheduled, and no amendment deadline
set. This factor weighs in favor of granting joinder and leave to amend.
D. Validity of Claims
Under section 1447(e), the court need only determine whether the claim “seems valid.”
Hardin, 813 F. Supp. 2d. at 1174; IBC Aviation Servs., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012–13. This is a
more relaxed standard than the standard in either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary
judgment. See Plasse v. Ford, No. 2:17-cv-01136, 2017 WL 6033075, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 6,
2017).
As discussed above, there is no contention that the statute of limitations has lapsed on any
of the proposed amended claims. N&S is added as a defendant to the preexisting claims for
unlawful business practices under the Business and Professions Code and for intentional
interference with prospective advantage. The court only considers whether these claims are valid
as pled against N&S and not the prior claims against CNH that are not in question under this
proposed amendment.3
1. Unlawful business practices
Unlawful business practices under the Business and Professions Code section 17200
requires there be “‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Capito v. San Jose
Healthcare Sys., LP, 17 Cal. 5th 273, 283 (2024). This embraces “‘anything that can properly be
called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law” or even “a practice may
be deemed unfair even if not specifically proscribed by some other law.” Id. “Unfair” has not been
defined. Id. Sequoia’s proposed amendment states that N&S “actively solicited [Sequoia’s]
customers, offering them pricing and services below the prices and/or margins of [Sequoia] as well
as actually selling products and services – confidential and proprietary business information
3 The court’s discussion of the validity of the proposed claims is not intended to prejudge the
outcome of CNH’s pending or future motions to dismiss. This test is a more relaxed standard than
a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment. See Freeman v. Cardinal Health Pharmacy
Servs., LLC, No. 14-cv-01994, 2015 WL 2006183, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2015).
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known to N&S only through its efforts to acquire [Sequoia] and protected by a Nondisclosure
Agreement.” (ECF No. 13-2 at ¶ 44.) CNH argues that Sequoia’s “SSM was non-exclusive” and
thus any “conclusory allegation that N&S engaged in any unfair or wrongful conduct by selling to
its customers does not hold water.” (ECF No. 14 at 14.) CNH’s objections appear to be based on
disputed facts, not the elements of this cause of action. The focus here should be whether the
elements of the claims are properly alleged. See Magana, 2021 WL 2349877, at *7; Plasse, 2017
WL 6033075, at *5. Because Sequoia articulated a “seemingly” valid claim against N&S, this
factor weighs in favor of granting the motion.
2. Intentional interference with prospective advantage
Intentional interference with prospective advantage requires that “(1) an economic
relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability of future economic
benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional acts on
the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship”; “(4) actual disruption of the
relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the
defendant.” Golden Eagle Land Inv., L.P. v. Rancho Santa Fe Assn., 19 Cal. App. 5th 399, 429-30
(Ct. App. 2018). This seemingly appears to be a valid claim for section 1447(e) purposes because
Sequoia makes allegations that it had an economic relationship with multiple third parties, that
N&S was aware of these relationships, that N&S and CNH disrupted these relationships by means
of unlawfully amending or conspiring to amend the subject agreement in violation of Business and
Professions Codes sections 17200 and 22902, that N&S and CNH’s conduct caused a reduction in
purchases by these third parties, and Sequoia suffered injury to its business accordingly. (ECF No.
13-2 at 24.) Once again, CNH’s objections focus on disputed facts, i.e., that the amendment to the
subject agreement was not a violation of sections 17200 or 22902, not whether the claim alleged
facts that seemingly satisfy the elements to satisfy the cause of action under California law. See
Magana, 2021 WL 2349877, at *7. Because Sequoia has articulated a seemingly valid claim
against N&S, this factor weighs in favor of granting the motion.
3. Civil conspiracy
There was a preexisting claim for violation of Business and Professions Code section
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22902(b) and the claim for civil conspiracy that is proposed is based on that same violation.
CNH’s objections to conspiracy are based on disputed facts (i.e., whether there has been an
amendment to the subject agreement). (ECF No. 14 at 11.) As the allegations state that N&S and
CNH conspired to violate Business and Professions Code section 22902 and caused damage, this
claim seems valid. See Mosier v. S. Cal. Physicians Ins. Exch., 63 Cal. App. 4th 1022, 1048 (Ct.
App.1998) (“The elements of a civil conspiracy are (1) the formation and operation of the
conspiracy; (2) the wrongful act or acts done pursuant thereto; and (3) the damage resulting.”)
(citation modified). As the claim for violations of Business and Professions Code section 22902
was a preexisting claim asserted against CNH (see ECF 13-2 at 20), the court does not find it
necessary to conduct an extensive review of the underlying claim to civil conspiracy. Because
Sequoia has articulated a seemingly valid claim of civil conspiracy against N&S, this factor
weighs in favor of granting the motion.
Any further discussion of these claims is not necessary at this early stage as CNH and
N&S can challenge the amended complaint under Rule 12 or Rule 56. Overall, this factor weighs
in favor of joinder and amendment.
E. Intent to Defeat Diversity Jurisdiction
Though Plaintiff’s motive is relevant, “[s]uspicion of diversity destroying amendments is
not as important now that § 1447(e) gives courts more flexibility in dealing with the addition of
such defendants.” IBC Aviation Servs., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012; see also Trotman v. United
Parcel Serv., No. C-96-1168, 1996 WL 428333, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 1996) (“The legislative
history to 1447(e) also suggests that it was intended to undermine the doctrine employed by some
courts that amendments which destroyed diversity were to be viewed with suspicion.”). The
district court should “decline[ ] to impute an improper motive to Plaintiff simply because Plaintiff
seeks to add a non-diverse defendant post-removal.” IBC Aviation Servs., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d at
1012.
There is no evidence that Sequoia files this amendment for the sole purpose of defeating
diversity jurisdiction or to thwart CNH’s pending motion to dismiss. Because there are numerous
facts involving CNH and N&S, N&S was named in the initial complaint as a non-party, and N&S’
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actions are discussed or mentioned in at least twelve paragraphs of the initial complaint, N&S does
not appear to be a sham defendant intended only to frustrate diversity jurisdiction. (See ECF No. 1-
1.) The authorities cited in the preceding paragraph instruct that pointing solely to the diversity-
destroying impact of a proposed section 1447(e) amendment as evidence of intent to defeat
diversity is insufficient to persuade this court absent other evidence. The non-moving party bears
the burden of establishing intent to destroy diversity jurisdiction beyond the diversity-destroying
impact. See Sagrero v. Bergen Shippers Corp., No. 22-cv-04535, 2022 WL 4397527, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 23, 2022) (rejecting assertion that proposed diversity-destroying defendants were shams
and holding that “[t]he removing party must prove there is no possibility that the plaintiff could
prevail on any cause of action it asserted against the non-diverse defendant.”) (quotations and
citations omitted). The court does not find CNH’s argument that Sequoia’s awareness of N&S at
the filing of the initial complaint shows an intent to destroy diversity jurisdiction persuasive. Thus,
this factor also favors joinder and amendment.
F. Prejudice
CNH’s motion to dismiss is pending and no responsive pleading has been filed in this
action. (See ECF No. 8.) Given that no scheduling order has been entered in this action, no trial
scheduled, and no amendment deadline set, the court finds that there is little risk of prejudice to
CNH. See Palestini v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 193 F.R.D. 654, 658 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (there was
little risk of prejudice to the defendant where there was a pending motion to dismiss and no
responsive pleading). Nothing prevents CNH from moving to dismiss the second amended
complaint, and “while preparing a motion to dismiss involves some expense, it is not so
burdensome as to preclude a fulsome review of the new complaint.” Malaney v. UAL Corp., No. C
10-02858, 2011 WL 13153253, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2011). In contrast, there is prejudice to
Sequoia because Sequoia would be forced to either forego its claims against N&S or be forced to
litigate a separate action in state court with completely overlapping facts and witnesses. Thus, this
factor favors granting Sequoia leave to amend.
After weighing and balancing the individual outcomes of these six IBC Aviation factors,
this court finds that it is appropriate to grant Sequoia leave to amend.
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IV. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned recommends Sequoia’s motion to file a second
amended complaint (ECF No. 13) be GRANTED and that the following be ORDERED:
1. Within seven (7) days from the date of the adoption of these findings and
recommendations, Sequoia shall file its proposed second amended complaint;
2. Upon filing of Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, this case will be remanded
back to Fresno County Superior Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1447(c) and 1447(e) because this
court lacks jurisdiction.
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States district judge
assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(B). Within fourteen
(14) days after being served with a copy of these findings and recommendations, a party may file
written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate
Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages.
Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limit may not be considered. Exhibits shall not be filed
with objections, but they may be referenced by the document and page number. No new exhibits
may be filed with objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the
specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834,
838–39 (9th Cir. 2014). This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 14, 2026 ______________________
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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