Gonzalez et al v. Ahern et al

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DANIEL GONZALEZ, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:19-cv-07423-JSC
ORDER RE: FINAL APPROVAL OF
SETTLEMENT
Re: Dkt. No. 605
Plaintiffs, current and former detainees at Santa Rita Jail, filed this action bringing
conditions of confinement claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs named as defendants
Alameda County, which oversees the Jail; Wellpath, the third-party contractor providing medical
services at the Jail; and Aramark, the third-party contractor providing food services at the Jail.
Plaintiffs’ claims against Aramark and Wellpath have been resolved. Plaintiffs’ motion for final
approval of their Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive relief class action settlement with the County resolving
their sanitation related claims is now pending before the Court. (Dkt. No. 605.1) After carefully
considering the arguments and briefing submitted including the supplemental submission, the
Court concludes oral argument is unnecessary, see Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), and GRANTS the motion for
final approval.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed this putative class action in November 2019 alleging they are subject to
unlawful, inhumane, and unconstitutional treatment at the Santa Rita Jail. In May 2023, the Court
denied in part and conditionally granted in part Plaintiffs’ second motion for class certification.
1 Record Citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the
ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the document.
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(Dkt. No. 264.) The motion was denied as to the inadequate medical care and inadequate food
subclasses because Plaintiffs had not offered evidence of a systemic policy or practice as to either
claim. (Id. at 11.) The Court conditionally granted the motion as to Plaintiffs’ inadequate
sanitation subclass on the condition Plaintiffs’ counsel obtain qualified co-counsel. (Id. at 20.)
Two months later, upon appearance of additional Plaintiffs’ counsel, the Court granted
certification of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) class on Plaintiffs’ inadequate
sanitation claim. (Dkt. No. 312.)
On March 6, 2024, after the close of fact discovery and while expert discovery was
underway, the parties attended a settlement conference with Magistrate Judge Beeler. (Dkt. No.
409.) At a further settlement conference on May 21, 2024, Plaintiffs reached a settlement of their
claims with the County and Aramark. (Dkt. No. 440.) Pursuant to the settlement, Plaintiffs
subsequently stipulated to dismiss their claims against Aramark. (Dkt. No. 477.) On July 12,
2024, the Court granted Wellpath’s motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in its
favor. (Dkt. No. 475.) Plaintiffs’ appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remains pending.
As to the remaining sanitation claims against the County, Plaintiffs filed a motion for
preliminary approval on August 20, 2024. (Dkt. No. 485.) Because there were numerous issues
with the motion and the settlement did not appear to be final, the Court denied the motion. (Dkt.
No. 511.) Over the next year, the Court held several status conferences and eventually an
evidentiary hearing on the County’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement. (Dkt. No. 554.)
Following the evidentiary hearing, the parties met and conferred as to further revisions to the
settlement agreement and Plaintiffs filed the now pending motion for approval of the class action
settlement. (Dkt. Nos. 558, 591, 602, 605.) Upon review of the motion, the Court had concerns
regarding the class definition and scope of the release of class member’s injunctive relief claims
and ordered the parties to meet and confer and file a supplemental statement. (Dkt. No. 610.) The
supplemental statement is discussed below. (Dkt. No. 612.)
DISCUSSION
Approval of a class action settlement involves a two-step determination: (1) can the class
be certified “for purposes of judgment on the proposal”; and (2) is the settlement “fair, reasonable,
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and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B).
I. CLASS CERTIFICATION
The Court previously certified an injunctive relief only class under Rule 23(b)(2). (Dkt.
Nos. 264, 312.) Thus, “the only information ordinarily necessary is whether the proposed
settlement calls for any change in the class certified, or of the claims, defenses, or issues regarding
which certification was granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 Advisory Committee’s Note to 2018
Amendment.
A. Modification of Class Definition
The parties’ Settlement Agreement uses the definition from the Court’s class certification
order: “all male detainees who are now, or will in the future be, subjected to the [identified]
sanitation policies and practices.” (Dkt. No. 606-1 at 3.) Because the Court had concerns that
notwithstanding the absence of language regarding the scope of class member’s release of claims,
a judgment of dismissal could have preclusive effect on future injunctive relief claims of
settlement class members, see Cooper v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 880 (1984),
the Court ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding whether a narrower class definition was
appropriate. (Dkt. No. 610.)
The parties filed a response to the Court’s Order agreeing to modification of the class
definition, but disagreeing as to the language. (Dkt. No. 612.) Plaintiffs propose a definition
which would include individuals who are detainees at the Jail in the 18 months following the
Court’s final approval order. (Id. at 2.) The County proposes a definition that encompasses
detainees between “the date the class was certified by the Court on August 31, 2023 through
December 17, 2026.” (Id.) The Court will adopt the County’s proposed definition. While the
Court is mindful of Plaintiffs’ concern that a longer term will better “enable class members with
the participation of class counsel, to insure that the settlement agreement is implemented,”
Plaintiffs agreed to a 12-month monitoring term in the Settlement Agreement. See Dkt. No. 606-1
at 7, ¶ 3.1.6. Indeed, the Court raised the issue precisely to ensure class members are not
indefinitely releasing claims regarding sanitation issues at the Jail. (Dkt. No. 610 at 2 (“the Court
is concerned with a class definition which perpetually releases male detainees’ sanitation claims
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given how broadly these claims were pled” and “proposes the settlement class definition be
modified to include a durational limit.”).
Accordingly, the Court modifies the class definition to cover all male detainees who are or
were detained at the Santa Rita Jail between August 31, 2023 through December 17, 2026, and
who were or are subjected to the following sanitation policies and practices:
1. The Jail’s policy requiring inmates to maintain the sanitation of their own cells and
common areas, but failing to have a policy or practice which provides inmates with
adequate sanitation supplies, or a policy for addressing inmates housed with those
who cannot functionally maintain their own sanitation because of mental health
issues, which impacts sanitation for all inmates within that congregate housing
area.
2. The Jail’s policy of not providing bathrooms in the common areas, and inmates’
difficulties obtaining access to bathroom areas during POD or out-of-cell time.
B. Notice
As the class was certified as an injunctive relief-only class under Rule 23(b)(2), notice is
not required. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 362 (2011) (stating notice is
discretionary “[f]or any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2),” Fed. R. Civ. P. 2(c)(2), as
Rule 23(b) “does not ... oblige the District Court to afford [classes certified under (b)(1) and
(b)(2)] notice of the action.”). Given the nature of relief here and that settlement class members
do not release any damages claims, the Court finds notice is unnecessary. See, e.g., Jeanne and
Nicolas Stathakos v. Columbia Sportswear Company et al., No. 4:15-CV-04543-YGR, 2018 WL
582564, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2018) (“In injunctive relief only class actions certified under
Rule 23(b)(2), federal courts across the country have uniformly held that notice is not required.”)
(collecting cases).
II. FINAL SETTLEMENT APPROVAL
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides “[t]he claims, issues, or defenses of a
certified class—or a class proposed to be certified for purposes of settlement—may be settled ...
only with the court’s approval.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). “The purpose of Rule 23(e) is to protect the
unnamed members of the class from unjust or unfair settlements affecting their rights.” In re
Syncor ERISA Litig., 516 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008). So, before a district court approves a
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class action settlement, it must conclude the settlement is “fundamentally fair, adequate and
reasonable.” In re Heritage Bond Litig., 546 F.3d 667, 674–75 (9th Cir. 2008).
In determining whether a class action settlement agreement meets this standard, the court
may consider some or all of the following factors:
(1) the strength of the plaintiff’s case; (2) the risk, expense,
complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of
maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (4) the amount
offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed and the
stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience and views of counsel; (7)
the presence of a governmental participant; and (8) the reaction of the
class members to the proposed settlement.
Roes, 1-2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 944 F.3d 1035, 1048 (9th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
Whether a settlement agreement has been negotiated before a class has been certified or
after, the court must also undertake an additional search for more “subtle signs that class counsel
have allowed pursuit of their own self-interests and that of certain class members to infect the
negotiations.” Briseño v. Henderson, 998 F.3d 1014, 1023 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that courts
must apply the collusion factors set forth in In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liability Litigation,
654 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011), to post-class action settlements as well as those settled before
certification.).
A. The Fairness Factors
1. The Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case and Risk, Expense, Complexity, and
Likely Duration of Further Litigation
The Court first considers “the strength of [Plaintiffs’] case on the merits balanced against
the amount offered in the settlement.” See Nat’l Rural Telecommunications Coop. v. DIRECTV,
Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 526 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Although this action settled before the Court ruled on the merits of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court
need not reach an ultimate conclusion about the merits of the dispute “for it is the very uncertainty
of outcome in litigation and avoidance of wasteful and expensive litigation that induce consensual
settlements.” Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City & Cty. of San Francisco, 688 F.2d
615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). To that end, there is no “particular formula by which th[e] outcome must
be tested.” Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir. 2009). Rather, the Court’s
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assessment of the likelihood of success is “nothing more than an amalgam of delicate balancing,
gross approximations and rough justice.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “In
reality, parties, counsel, mediators, and district judges naturally arrive at a reasonable range for
settlement by considering the likelihood of a plaintiffs’ or defense verdict, the potential recovery,
and the chances of obtaining it, discounted to a present value.” Id.
This case has been pending for over five years. Given the broad relief sought, the
challenges of litigation against an institutional defendant, the transient nature of the class member
detainee population, and the risks posed by continuing to litigate Plaintiffs’ claims, the certainty of
the injunctive relief and policy changes obtained under the Settlement Agreement weigh in favor
of granting final approval.
2. Settlement Amount
The Settlement Agreement provides for a variety of injunctive relief including (1) changes
to the Jail’s policies and procedures regarding detainee access to cleaning supplies, (2) ensuring
detainees are not housed in cells with biohazards, (3) ensuring detainees’ out of cell time is not
reduced so they have time to clean, and (4) requiring deputies to inspect housing units daily to
identify any cleanliness concerns. (Dkt. No. 606-1 at 30-60.) Class counsel will be able to
monitor compliance with these policy changes for a year by reviewing any detainee grievances
regarding sanitation issues. (Dkt. No. 606-1 at 7, ¶ 3.1.6.) The broad policy relief addresses many
of the sanitation issues raised, and thus, this factor likewise weighs in favor of final approval.
3. Extent of Discovery Completed and Stage of Proceedings
In the context of class action settlements, as long as the parties have sufficient information
to make an informed decision about settlement, “formal discovery is not a necessary ticket to the
bargaining table.” Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship, 151 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 1998). As
discussed above, this settlement was reached after years of litigation and with the assistance of
Magistrate Judge Beeler who presided over multiple settlement conferences with the parties. This
factor therefore also weighs in favor of settlement
4. Experience and Views of Counsel
The experience and views of counsel also weigh in favor of approving the settlement.
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Class Counsel has extensive experience in prisoner civil rights litigation and strongly supports
approval of the settlement given the risks and challenges involved.
5. Presence of a Government Participant
Alameda County is an administrative arm of the State of California and its participation
and consent to the injunctive relief weights in favor of approving the settlement. See Moreno v. S.
F. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., No. 3:17-cv-02911-JSC, 2019 WL 343472, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
28, 2019) (“BART is a governmental agency, and as such, its participation and consent to the
injunctive relief weighs in favor of approving the settlement.”); Garcia v. Los Angeles Cnty.
Sheriff's Dep’t, No. 2:09-cv-8943-MMM-SHX, 2015 WL 13646906, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14,
2015) (concluding because defendant county office of education was a government participant,
consideration of this factor weighed in favor of settlement); San Francisco NAACP v. San
Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (concluding that the fact
that “[t]he State and Local Defendants are all governmental participants” weighs in favor of
granting approval).
6. Reaction of the Class
Because notice was not necessary here, the reaction of the class is not considered in
weighing the fairness factors. See Lilly v. Jamba Juice Co., No. 13-CV-02998-JST, 2015 WL
2062858, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2015).
***
In sum, a balancing of the fairness factors leads the Court to conclude that this injunctive-
relief only Settlement Agreement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.
B. The Bluetooth Factors
Finally, the Court must determine whether the settlement was the result of good faith,
arms-length negotiations or fraud and collusion. In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654
F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 2011). In determining whether the settlement is the result of collusion,
courts “must be particularly vigilant not only for explicit collusion, but also for more subtle signs
that class counsel have allowed pursuit of their own self-interest and that of certain class members
to infect the negotiations.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has identified three such signs:
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1) when counsel receive a disproportionate distribution of the
settlement, or when the class receives no monetary distribution
but class counsel are amply rewarded;
2) when the parties negotiate a “clear sailing” arrangement providing
for the payment of attorneys’ fees separate and apart from class
funds, which carries the potential of enabling a defendant to pay
class counsel excessive fees and costs in exchange for counsel
accepting an unfair settlement on behalf of the class; and
3) when the parties arrange for fees not awarded to revert to
defendants rather than be added to the class fund.
Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 947 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). It is unclear if
Bluetooth’s second and third warning signs are applicable to a post-certification Rule 23(b)(2)
settlement for solely injunctive relief. McKinney-Drobnis v. Oreshack, 16 F.4th 594, 609 (9th Cir.
2021) (emphasis in original) (discussing Campbell v. Facebook, Inc., 951 F.3d 1106, 1127 (9th
Cir. 2020), and its conclusion that “the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that Bluetooth’s second and third warning signs—clear-sailing agreements and reverter
provisions—were inapplicable” to an injunctive relief only settlement.) Regardless, as the
Settlement Agreement here neither provides for a monetary settlement to the class nor attorneys’
fees for class counsel, the Bluetooth factors are inapplicable.2 (Dkt. No. 606-1 at 6, ¶ 2.2.2 (“No
portion of the settlement funds will be paid to Represented Plaintiffs’ counsel for their attorney’s
fees and costs incurred in litigating the class action claims asserted in the Subject Lawsuit.”)
***
In sum, the fairness factors support approval, and the Bluetooth factors do not indicate
collusion. The Court is therefore satisfied the Settlement Agreement was not the result of collusion
between the parties and instead is the product of arms-length negotiations between experienced
and professional counsel. For each of these reasons, the Settlement Agreement passes muster
under Rule 23(e) and final approval is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of
2 The $300,000 sum discussed in the Settlement Agreement will be divided between the 12 named
Plaintiffs for release of their individual damages’ claims. (Dkt. No. 606-1 at 6, ¶ 2.1.)
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the parties’ class action settlement. The Settlement Agreement encompasses all male detainees
who are or were detained at the Santa Rita Jail between August 31, 2023 through December 17,
2026, and who were or are subjected to the following sanitation policies and practices:
1. The Jail’s policy requiring inmates to maintain the sanitation of their own cells and
common areas, but failing to have a policy or practice which provides inmates with
adequate sanitation supplies, or a policy for addressing inmates housed with those
who cannot functionally maintain their own sanitation because of mental health
issues, which impacts sanitation for all inmates within that congregate housing
area.
2. The Jail’s policy of not providing bathrooms in the common areas, and inmates’
difficulties obtaining access to bathroom areas during POD or out-of-cell time.
These class members release their injunctive relief claims related to these policies and practices
through December 17, 2026. There is no release of any class member damages claims.
The Court is in receipt of Plaintiffs’ administrative motion for a hearing regarding
Plaintiffs’ request to modify the class action settlement. (Dkt. No. 613.3) Plaintiffs’ motion is
DENIED. The Court has determined no notice is required as the class is certified under Rule
23(b)(2). To the extent Plaintiffs have concerns regarding the County’s compliance with the
Settlement Agreement and any notice procedure they negotiated with the County, they shall meet
and confer with the County in accordance with the procedures outlined in the Settlement
Agreement.
This Order disposes of Docket Nos. 605, 613.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 10, 2026
JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY
United States District Judge
3 While the motion purports to attach several documents as exhibits, the exhibits are all blank.
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