Melius v. Deputy Button

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DASON B. MELIUS, Bk. No. 2310707,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEPUTY BUTTON,
Defendant(s).
Case No. 26-cv-07477-CRB (PR)
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE
TO AMEND AND DENYING MOTION
FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
(ECF No. 3)
Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee currently housed at Contra Costa County’s West County
Detention Facility (WCDF), has filed a pro se complaint for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging that on October 7, 2024, after arriving at Contra Costa County’s Martinez Detention
Facility (MDF), Deputy Button and other unnamed deputies and medical staff violated his federal
rights when they used unnecessary force against plaintiff and denied him adequate medical care.
Plaintiff also seeks appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
DISCUSSION
A. 	Standard of Review
Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of
the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id.
§ 1915A(b). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901
F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a
right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged
violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988).
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
B. 	Legal Claims
Plaintiff alleges that after arriving at MDF and being placed in a holding cell, he asked
Deputy Button for medical attention because his chest hurt but Button instead escorted plaintiff to
an adjacent cell holding plaintiff’s left hand behind plaintiff’s back and bending it upward “with a
lot of pressure.” ECF No. 1 (Compl.) at 3. Once in the adjacent cell, Button called for assistance
and other deputies came and cuffed plaintiff and escorted him to Intake. While on the way to
Intake, plaintiff heard and felt “2 loud popping or cracking sounds from his left wrist,” and stated,
“‘You just broke my wrist.’” Id. at 4. Deputies then demanded plaintiff sit on a stool for medical
attention. As plaintiff began to sit, deputies “jumped on [him],” and a “female deputy stomped on
[his] bare toes.” Id. A male nurse took plaintiff’s blood pressure but did not examine plaintiff’s
wrist despite plaintiff telling the nurse that “his wrist was just broken.” Id.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a post-arraignment pretrial
detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. See Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979)). To prove an
excessive force claim under § 1983, a pretrial detainee must show only that the “force purposely
or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S.
389, 397 (2015). “A court must make this determination from the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.” Id. “A court (judge or jury) cannot apply this standard mechanically.” Id.
“[O]bjective reasonableness turns on the ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case.’” Id.
(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Plaintiff’s allegations of use of excessive force against Button
and other unnamed deputies will be dismissed with leave to amend to set forth specific facts and
circumstances supporting a determination that the force used by Button and/or other deputies was
objectively unreasonable, if possible. See id. (considerations that may bear on reasonableness of
force used include “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force
used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the
amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by
the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting”). Plaintiff also must name every
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
individual defendant and link every named individual defendant with his allegations of
wrongdoing so as to show how every named individual defendant’s actions both actually and
proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d
628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
A claim for a violation of a pretrial detainee’s right to adequate medical care arises under
the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. See Gordon v. County of Orange,
888 F.3d 1118, 1122 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2018). The claim is evaluated under an objective deliberate
indifference standard.
[T]he elements of a pretrial detainee’s medical care claim against an
individual defendant under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment are: (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with
respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii)
those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering
serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available
measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the
circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk
involved—making the consequences of the defendant's conduct
obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused
the plaintiff’s injuries.
Id. at 1125. With regard to the third element, the defendant’s conduct must be objectively
unreasonable – “a test that will necessarily turn[] on the facts and circumstances of each particular
care.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The four-part test articulated in Gordon
requires the plaintiff to prove more than negligence, but less than subjective intent – something
akin to reckless disregard. Id. at 1125. Plaintiff’s allegations of denial of adequate medical care
against Button and other unnamed deputies and medical staff will be dismissed with leave to
amend to set forth specific facts and circumstances supporting a determination that the defendants’
conduct was objectively unreasonable and caused plaintiff’s injuries, if possible. And plaintiff
again must name every individual defendant and link every named individual defendant with his
allegations of wrongdoing so as to show how every named individual defendant’s actions both
actually and proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. See Leer, 844 F.2d
at 634.
C. 	Motion for Appointment of Counsel
Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (ECF No. 3) is
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
DENIED for lack of exceptional circumstances. See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th
Cir. 1991); Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). The court will consider
appointment of counsel on its own motion and seek volunteer counsel to agree to represent
plaintiff pro bono, if it determines later that appointment of counsel is warranted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is dismissed with leave to amend, as indicated
above, within 28 days of this order. The pleading must be simple and concise and must include
the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT on the first page. Failure to file a proper amended complaint within the designated
time will result in the dismissal of this action.
Plaintiff is advised that the amended complaint will supersede the original complaint and
all other pleadings. Claims and defendants not included in the amended complaint will not be
considered by the court. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).
The clerk is instructed to terminate the motion appearing on ECF as item number 3.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
______________________________________
CHARLES R. BREYER
United States District Judge
October 14, 2026
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