Robinson v. Johnson et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MARION ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
J. JOHNSON, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 26-cv-09025-RFL
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
Marion Robinson a state prisoner at San Quentin Rehabilitation Center, proceeding pro
se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has been granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. The complaint is now before the Court for review pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to file an amended complaint on
or before November 13, 2026. Failure to file an amended complaint correcting the deficiencies
identified by November 13, 2026, or a failure to comply in every respect with the instructions
given in this order, will result in the dismissal of this suit under Rule 41(b) for failure to
prosecute.
DISCUSSION
A. 	Standard of Review
A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner
seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, a court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss
any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or
seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1),
(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901
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F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).
A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Furthermore, a court “is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual
allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v.
Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994).
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a plaintiff must provide “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Rule 8 requires “sufficient
allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them.” McKeever v. Block,
932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991)). Accord Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L.P., 52 F.3d 640,
645 (7th Cir. 1995) (amended complaint with vague and scanty allegations fails to satisfy the
notice requirement of Rule 8.) “The propriety of dismissal for failure to comply with Rule 8
does not depend on whether the complaint is wholly without merit,” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d
1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements:
(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that
the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
B. 	Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff alleges as follows:
In 2025, Defendant Johnson searched Plaintiff’s cell and destroyed his personal property.
(Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) Several months later, Johnson searched his cell again. (Id. at 2-3.) When
Plaintiff inquired about the reason for the cell search, Johnson responded, “because I can.” (Id.
at 3.) On October 22, 2025, Johnson placed Plaintiff into a dayroom holding cage, performed a
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strip-search, and took some of his papers without issuing a property receipt. (Id.) This was due
to Plaintiff questioning the prior search. (Id.) In November 2025, Plaintiff filed a grievance
regarding this incident. (Id.)
On March 28, 2026, Plaintiff was searched prior to entering the visiting area for a family
visit. (Id.) After the visit ended, Plaintiff was walking back to his housing unit when Defendants
Henderson, Kyte, and Perez stopped him, placed him against the wall, and performed a full
clothed pat down search. (Id.) Plaintiff states this second search was in retaliation for his
grievance against staff. (Id. at 4.)
C. 	Analysis
“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five
basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2)
because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s
exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a
legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005)
(footnote omitted). Accord Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (prisoner suing
prison officials under Section 1983 for retaliation must allege that he was retaliated against for
exercising his constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action did not advance legitimate
penological goals, such as preserving institutional order and discipline). The prisoner must show
that the type of activity he was engaged in was constitutionally protected, that the protected
conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the alleged retaliatory action, and that the
retaliatory action advanced no legitimate penological interest. Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265,
267-68 (9th Cir. 1997) (inferring retaliatory motive from circumstantial evidence). The mere
threat of harm can be a sufficiently adverse action to support a retaliation claim. Shepard v.
Quillen, 840 F.3d 686, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2016).
The retaliation claim is dismissed with leave to amend. With respect to the allegation
that Johnson searched Plaintiff’s cell on October 22, 2025, because Plaintiff previously
questioned his conduct, Plaintiff must provide more information. He has not alleged facts
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showing why this search was in retaliation for his questioning of the earlier search. He does not
provide enough details about what was said in the exchange and when the discussion took place.
Also, he does not sufficiently allege facts showing that his questioning of the earlier search was
protected conduct. In some circumstances, a verbal complaint could be enough to constitute
protected conduct for purposes of a retaliation claim. See Hackworth v. Torres, No. 1:06-CV-
773-RCC, 2011 WL 1811035, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 2011). But, without more, simply asking
why he was being searched does not plausibly constitute protected activity.
Plaintiff next contends that the search on March 28, 2026, was in response to a grievance
he filed in November 2025. Yet, the grievance concerned Johnson, and the search was
performed by three others. Plaintiff must provide more information demonstrating that the
search was because of his earlier grievance and how he knows the three other Defendants were
aware of the grievance against Johnson and searched him as a form of retaliation.
To the extent Plaintiff also seeks to present a claim regarding the destruction or
confiscation of his property, the claim is dismissed with leave to amend. Neither the negligent
nor intentional deprivation of property states a due process claim under Section 1983 if the
deprivation was random and unauthorized. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535-44 (1981)
(state employee negligently lost prisoner’s hobby kit), overruled in part on other grounds,
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)
(intentional destruction of inmate’s property). The availability of an adequate state post-
deprivation remedy, e.g., a state tort action, precludes relief because it provides sufficient
procedural due process. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128 (1990) (where state cannot
foresee, and therefore provide meaningful hearing prior to, deprivation statutory provision for
post-deprivation hearing or common law tort remedy for erroneous deprivation satisfies due
process). California law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Barnett v. Centoni,
31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810-895). Plaintiff may attempt
to present additional facts to state a federal claim in an amended complaint, but he is also
encouraged to seek relief using the appropriate state procedures.
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CONCLUSION
The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to file an amended complaint on or before
November 13, 2026. The amended complaint must include the caption and civil case number
used in this order (26-9025 RFL (PR)) and the words FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT on the
first page. The first amended complaint must also appear on this Court’s form, a copy of which
will be sent to him. Because an amended complaint completely replaces the previous
complaints, Plaintiff must include in his amended complaint all the claims he wishes to present
and all of the Defendants he wishes to sue. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.
1992). Plaintiff may not incorporate material from any prior complaint by reference. Failure to
file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in dismissal of this action
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) without further notice to Plaintiff.
It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court
informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice of
Change of Address.” He must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion or ask for an
extension of time to do so. Failure to comply may result in the dismissal of this action pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 13, 2026
RITA F. LIN
United States District Judge
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