Navarro Aguilar v. Albarran et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
HERMAN NAVARRO AGUILAR,
Petitioner,
v.
SERGIO ALBARRAN, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No. 26-cv-11309-RFL
ORDER DENYING PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND HABEAS
PETITION
Re: Dkt. No. 1
Herman Navarro Aguilar, a non-citizen with a reinstated order of removal, filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus seeking immediate release from immigration custody or a bond
hearing. Navarro Aguilar was granted a temporary restraining order requiring his immediate
release pending adjudication of a preliminary injunction. (Dkt. No. 8.) The Court consolidated
adjudication of the preliminary injunction with adjudication of the habeas petition. (Dkt. No.
11.) For the reasons stated below, both the preliminary injunction and habeas petition are
DENIED. This order assumes the reader is familiar with the facts of the case, the applicable
legal standards, and the parties’ arguments.
Warrantless Arrest Requirements and Fourth Amendment. Navarro Aguilar contends
that he was arrested without a warrant and without sufficient cause. While Respondents have
produced an arrest warrant, the record does not make clear whether that warrant was issued
before Navarro Aguilar’s arrest. (See Dkt. No. 3-1 at 7–9; Dkt. No. 4-1 ¶ 8.)1 Assuming without
deciding that Navarro Aguilar was arrested without a warrant, he has not demonstrated that this
1 All citations to page numbers in filings on the docket refer to ECF pagination.
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justifies habeas relief. Respondents cited cases holding that warrantless arrests do not justify
immediate release through a habeas petition, when the petitioner’s detention would otherwise be
lawful. These cases rely on Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent holding that the remedy
for an unlawful arrest is the suppression of evidence from the arrest, not release from custody,
and that the discovery of a person’s identity is not suppressible as the fruit of an unlawful arrest.
See, e.g., Herrera v. Blanche, No. 26-cv-1684-MLP, 2026 WL 1733493, at *2 (W.D. Wash. June
16, 2026) (citing, among other cases, United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 443 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th
Cir. 2006)); Ramirez v. Acting Warden of the Adelanto Det. Ctr., No. 26-cv-4806-AS, 2026 WL
2677300, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2026) (citations omitted). Navarro Aguilar has not identified
any case law that discusses this reasoning and reaches a contrary conclusion in the context of a
habeas petition. Nor has he otherwise provided a basis to find this reasoning inapplicable. The
same is true for Navarro Aguilar’s argument that Respondents did not have sufficient cause to
justify arrest. Although the Court might reach a different interpretation of the law with more
developed briefing, it declines to do so here. It is Navarro Aguilar’s burden to justify habeas
relief on this ground, and to provide a basis to distinguish the precedent cited by Respondents.
He has not done so.
Due Process. Assuming without deciding that Navarro Aguilar has a protectible liberty
interest, he has not demonstrated a procedural due process violation. Navarro Aguilar does not
contest that he was previously ordered removed and is currently detained under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(2)(A). That statute requires detention of any non-citizen with a final order of removal
that is less than ninety days old. Navarro Aguilar’s reinstated order of removal became final on
October 2, 2026, so the ninety-day removal period has not yet elapsed. (See Dkt. No. 3-1 at 11;
Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 535 (2021).) As a result, his detention is currently
mandatory. The risk of an erroneous deprivation of Navarro Aguilar’s liberty interest is
therefore low. While 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) does not allow indefinite detention after the removal
period has elapsed, which would raise due process problems, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
701 (2001), that period has not yet elapsed, so prolonged detention is not yet a concern. See
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Khotesouvan v. Morones, 386 F.3d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he period of detention under
§ 1231(a)(2) . . . passes constitutional scrutiny.”).
Conclusion. The preliminary injunction and habeas petition are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 15, 2026
RITA F. LIN
United States District Judge
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