Peter Schuman et al v. Microchip Technology Incorporated et al

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United States
 District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
PETER SCHUMAN, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MICROCHIP TECHNOLOGY
INCORPORATED, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 16-cv-05544-HSG
AMENDED ORDER1 DENYING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO AMEND
SCHEDULING ORDER TO REOPEN
DISCOVERY
Re: Dkt. No. 226
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to amend the scheduling order to reopen
discovery. See Dkt. No. 226 (“Mot.”). Briefing on this motion is complete. See Dkt. No. 232
(“Opp.”); Dkt. No. 235 (“Reply”). The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without
oral argument and the matter is deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons
discussed below, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion.
I. BACKGROUND
As the parties are familiar with the facts and extensive procedural history of this long-
running case, the Court recites only the procedural history necessary to adjudicate this motion.
The Court further incorporates by reference the background detailed in its recent and related order
denying Defendants’ motion to decertify the class. Dkt. No. 241.
The parties began written discovery in January 2018. See Dkt. No. 123 at 3. Following
class certification, the Court issued a scheduling order which set deadlines for the close of
discovery, dispositive motions, and trial. See Dkt. No. 132. At the time, the close of fact and
expert discovery was July 15, 2020. Id. The Court later continued the case schedule in light of
1 This amended order simply adjusts the date on page 5 to accurately reflect that trial starts on July
9, 2026.
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United States District Court
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the COVID-19 pandemic and the appeal in the related action, Berman v. Microchip Technology
Incorporated, Case No. 17-cv-01864-HSG. In the amended scheduling order, the Court extended
the close of fact discovery for both this case and Berman to October 8, 2021. See Dkt. No. 157.
In December 2021, by stipulation of the parties, the Court stayed all briefing on Defendants’
motion for summary judgment and vacated all deadlines in this case pending resolution of the
motions for summary judgment in Berman. See Dkt. No. 165. After denying the cross-motions in
Berman, the Court stayed this case pending the Berman trial. See Dkt. No. 169. At the time, the
parties acknowledged that fact discovery had closed. See Dkt. No. 167 at 6. Defendants also
indicated that they believed this case could ultimately be resolved on a motion for summary
judgment “for the reason that the releases bar any recovery.” Id. at 8.
In January 2023, after Berman settled, the Court held a case management conference and
lifted the stay and reopened this case. See Dkt. Nos. 170–172, 186. Although Defendants
expressed a desire to renew their motion for summary judgment, they did not seek to reopen
discovery. Dkt. Nos. 172, 173. The Court accordingly amended the scheduling order, including
deadlines for the summary judgment briefing as well as trial. See Dkt. No. 175. In August 2023,
the Court granted in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that the named
Plaintiffs’ releases were enforceable as knowing and voluntary under a six-factor test applied by
several district courts in this Circuit. See Dkt. No. 185 at 11–12. Finding that everyone would
benefit from interlocutory review of the summary judgment order, the Court entered final
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) in favor of Defendants and against the
two named Plaintiffs. Dkt. No. 198.
Plaintiffs appealed. Dkt. No. 199. In June 2025, the Ninth Circuit reversed the summary
judgment order. Schuman v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 139 F.4th 1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 2025). As an
initial matter, the Ninth Circuit held that “when a breach of fiduciary duties is alleged, courts must
evaluate releases and waivers of ERISA claims with ‘special scrutiny designed to prevent potential
employer or fiduciary abuse.’” Id. at 1052 (citing Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006,
1012 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)). The court reasoned that such heightened scrutiny is consistent
with ERISA’s purpose “to protect . . . the interests of participants in employee benefit plans . . . .”
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Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)). Thus, in evaluating the validity of a release of claims under
ERISA, “courts must consider alleged improper conduct by the fiduciary in obtaining a release as
part of the totality of the circumstances concerning the knowledge or voluntariness of the release
or waiver.” Id. at 1053. The Ninth Circuit identified the following non-exhaustive factors:
(1) the employee’s education and business experience; (2) the
employee’s input in negotiating the terms of the settlement; (3) the
clarity of the release language; (4) the amount of time the employee
had for deliberation before signing the release; (5) whether the
employee actually read the release and considered its terms before
signing it; (6) whether the employee knew of his rights under the plan
and the relevant facts when he signed the release; (7) whether the
employee had an opportunity to consult with an attorney before
signing the release; (8) whether the consideration given in exchange
for the release exceeded the benefits to which the employee was
already entitled by contract or law; and (9) whether the employee’s
release was induced by improper conduct on the fiduciary’s part.
Id. The court further explained that where “the district court has found a genuine issue of fact
material to the issue of a breach of fiduciary duty in obtaining the release of claims, the final factor
warrants serious consideration and may weigh particularly heavily against finding that the release
was ‘knowing’ or ‘voluntary’ or both.” Id. at 1053–54.
After the mandate issued, this Court reopened the case and set a case management
conference in August 2025. See Dkt. No. 210. In the parties’ joint statement, Defendants
indicated that they intended to move to decertify the class and that they were “entitled to
additional discovery.” See Joint Status Report, Dkt. No. 211 at 7–8. At the time, however,
Defendants did not file a motion to reopen discovery. Instead, in November 2025 they filed a
motion to decertify the class. Dkt. No. 218. The Court set the briefing schedule on the motion to
decertify and set the bench trial for July 9, 2026. See Dkt. Nos. 220, 222. In February 2026, after
the briefing on the motion to decertify was complete, Defendants finally moved to amend the
scheduling order to reopen discovery. Dkt. No. 226.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 16 requires “good cause” and the consent of the Court to amend a scheduling order.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The good cause standard “primarily considers the diligence of the party
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seeking the amendment.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir.
1992). “Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification
might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving
party’s reasons for seeking modification.” Id. “If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should
end.” Id.; see also Zivkovic v. S. California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002)
(quotations omitted) (“If the party seeking the modification was not diligent, the inquiry should
end and the motion to modify should not be granted.”).
While diligence is the primary factor, in determining whether there is good cause to reopen
discovery, courts should also consider the following factors:
1) whether trial is imminent, 2) whether the request is opposed, 3) whether the non-moving
party would be prejudiced, 4) whether the moving party was diligent in obtaining
discovery within the guidelines established by the court, 5) the foreseeability of the need
for additional discovery in light of the time allowed for discovery by the district court, and
6) the likelihood that the discovery will lead to relevant evidence.
City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 866 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Much like their motion for decertification, Defendants’ argument to reopen discovery turns
on the premise that the Ninth Circuit’s recent opinion—and the nine-factor test it articulated—
transforms the nature of this case. As the Court already explained in denying the motion for
decertification, the Court disagrees that the opinion has such sweeping implications. See Dkt. No.
241. “Whether Defendants engaged in improper conduct in obtaining the releases truly is the
‘central’ and ‘most important’ issue in this case.” Id. at 15; see also Schuman, 139 F.4th at 1053–
54 (holding that “whether the employee’s release was induced by improper conduct on the
fiduciary’s part” “warrant[s] serious consideration” and “may weigh particularly heavily against
finding that the release was ‘knowing’ or ‘voluntary’ or both”). And critically, “[t]his issue is
common to the class . . . and [] can be decided based on common proof.” See Dkt. No. 241 at 15.
At this stage, therefore, the Court finds that individualized inquiries into the background and
personal experiences of each individual class member are unnecessary. Cf. In re Worlds of
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Wonder Sec. Litig., 1992 WL 330411, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 9, 1992) (“Absent a strong showing of
necessity, discovery [of absent class members] generally will be denied.”) (alterations in original).
The Court further notes that trial is imminent. It is set for July 9, 2026, less than six weeks
from now. Plaintiffs understandably oppose the expansive new discovery that Defendants now
seek: serving written discovery on, and deposing, over 200 former Atmel employees who signed
releases. See Opp. at 8. The Court agrees that the breadth and burdensome nature of the
discovery now sought by Defendants ensures that it could not possibly be completed or digested
before trial. The Court also has some concern that Defendants’ request is a strategic choice to
further delay this decade-old case. Defendants first raised the purported need to consider
individualized factors about whether the releases were knowing and voluntary back in 2021 when
they filed their motion for summary judgment.2 See Dkt. No. 163 at 7. And although Defendants
presented information at the time about the named Plaintiffs, they did not seek to reopen discovery
to obtain information about the other class members back then. Notably, even after the case was
reopened following the Ninth Circuit appeal, Defendants still waited six months to file this
motion. See Dkt. No. 226. Defendants offer no real explanation for this delay.
In short, the Court finds that Defendants have not shown good cause to reopen discovery at
this time. Nevertheless, as with class certification, the Court is not foreclosing the possibility that
it may need to revisit this issue. The Court may reassess the need to reopen discovery once it has
developed the common factual record regarding Defendants’ conduct in interpreting the Atmel
Plan and communicating with class members.
//
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2 Although the six-factor test that Defendants identified and this Court adopted was not identical to
the Ninth Circuit’s nine-factor test, there is considerable overlap. Compare Dkt. No. 163 at 7,
with Schuman, 139 F.4th at 1053.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to reopen discovery at this time. Dkt. No. 226.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
______________________________________
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge
6/5/2026
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