Moreno v. Kijakazi

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JUAN MORENO,
Plaintiff,
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI,
Defendant.
Case No. 23-cv-04263-HSG
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES
Re: Dkt. No. 16
After Plaintiff Juan Moreno brought this action for review of the Commissioner of Social
Security’s decision to deny benefits, the Court remanded the case, and after further proceedings,
the Commissioner issued a favorable decision. Plaintiff’s attorney, Katherine Siegfried, now
seeks $12,688.25 in attorney fees under section 206(b) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
406(b). ECF No. 16. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
After receiving disability benefits since 2019, Mr. Moreno was determined to be no longer
disabled as of April 2021 and, therefore, no longer entitled to disability benefits. Administrative
Record (“AR”) 167-168. This determination was upheld on reconsideration, after an initial
administrative hearing, and before the Appeals Council. AR 1. Mr. Moreno then brought this
action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). ECF No. 1. This Court granted the
parties’ stipulation to a remand for further administrative proceedings. ECF No. 12. The Court
subsequently granted the parties’ stipulation for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice
Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, in the amount of $7,436. ECF No. 15.
On remand, the Commissioner granted Plaintiff’s application and awarded $50,753 in past-
due benefits, as well as $2,988 in past-due benefits for his child. ECF No. 16, Ex. 3. Under a
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contingency fee agreement, Plaintiff agreed to pay counsel up to 25% of any past-due benefits
resulting from a favorable disability decision. ECF No. 16, Ex. 4.
In the Notice of Award, Plaintiff was informed that 25% of the past-due disability benefits
amounted to $12,688.25 (excluding the benefits due to him for his child) and that this amount was
set aside to pay his attorney fees. ECF No. 16, Ex. 3.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Attorneys handling Social Security proceedings may seek fees for their work under both
the EAJA and the Social Security Act. While the government pays an award pursuant to the
EAJA, an award under the Social Security Act is paid out of a successful claimant’s past-due
benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A); Russell v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991),
abrogated on other grounds by Sorensen v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). Section
406(b)(1) provides that a federal court that “renders a judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who
was represented before the court by an attorney” may grant the attorney “a reasonable fee for such
representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the
claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” In passing § 406, Congress sought to protect
attorneys from the nonpayment of fees, while also shielding clients from unfairly large fees. See
Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 805 (2002).
The Supreme Court in Gisbrecht explained that § 406(b) is meant “to control, not to
displace, [contingency] fee agreements between Social Security benefits claimants and their
counsel.” 535 U.S. at 793. Even if a fee request under § 406(b) is within the 25 percent statutory
limit, the attorney bears the burden of showing that the fee sought is reasonable, and the court is
responsible for serving as an “independent check” to ensure the reasonableness of the fee. Id. at
807. Following Gisbrecht, the Ninth Circuit has instructed that a § 406(b) fee request should be
assessed by “looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.”
Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at
808). The court should consider “the character of the representation and the results the
representative achieved,” and determine “whether the amount [of fees specified in the contingency
fee agreement] need be reduced,” for such reasons as “substandard performance, delay, or benefits
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that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” Id. at 1151. The reasonableness
determination is not governed by the lodestar method, because “[t]he lodestar method under-
compensates attorneys for the risk they assume in representing [social security] claimants and
ordinarily produces remarkably smaller fees than would be produced by starting with the
contingent-fee agreement.” Id. at 1149.
III. DISCUSSION
The Court finds counsel has met her burden to demonstrate that the requested fees are
reasonable. As noted above, Plaintiff entered into a contingent fee agreement providing for a 25%
fee, which is consistent with the statutory cap. There is no evidence that Siegfried’s performance
was substandard: to the contrary, counsel’s representation resulted in Plaintiff receiving $53,741
in past-due benefits for himself and his child. See Matos v. Saul, 2021 WL 1405467, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 14, 2021) (awarding 25% under contingent fee agreement where plaintiff received
$109,899.60 in benefits upon remand); Khlopoff v. Saul, 2020 WL 7043878, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
1, 2020) (awarding 25% under contingent fee agreement where plaintiff received $73,209.00 in
benefits upon remand).
Plaintiff’s counsel states her non-contingency based hourly rate for appellate cases (not
related to Social Security) is currently $500 per hour. ECF No. 16, Ex. 1. She also states she
spent 30.6 hours working on this case, leading to an effective hourly rate of $415 per hour. As the
Ninth Circuit has observed, “lawyers are not likely to spend unnecessary time on contingency fee
cases in the hope of inflating their fees” because “[t]he payoff is too uncertain.” Moreno v. City of
Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). “As a result, courts should generally defer to
the ‘winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the
case.’” Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112); see also Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal.
2003) (“The courts recognize that basing a reasonableness determination on a simple hourly rate
basis is inappropriate when an attorney is working pursuant to a reasonable contingency contract
for which there runs a substantial risk of loss.”). As such, the requested fee is reasonable because
of the substantial risk of loss. See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1153 (approving effective hourly rates of
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$519, $875, and $902); McCullough v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 6002324 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2018)
(approving effectively hourly rate of $874.72); Harrell v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 4616735, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2018) (finding de facto hourly rate of $1,213 reasonable under Gisbrecht);
Lopez v. Colvin, 2017 WL 168060, at * 2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2017) (approving effective hourly
rate of $1,131); Palos v. Colvin, 2016 WL 5110243, at * 2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2016) (approving
effective hourly rate of $1,546.39). The Court therefore finds the requested fees are reasonable.
Once the Court determines that the fee sought under § 406(b) is reasonable, it must
account for the attorney’s fees paid by the Commissioner under the EAJA. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at
796. “Congress harmonized fees payable by the Government under EAJA with fees payable under
§ 406(b) out of the claimant’s past-due Social Security benefits” by requiring the claimant’s
attorney to refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee up to the point where the claimant
receives 100% of the past-due benefits. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. Here, the Court finds
counsel’s § 406(b) request reasonable, and therefore counsel shall refund to Plaintiff the $7,436 in
EAJA fees previously awarded. See Khlopoff, 2020 WL 7043878, at *2 (finding § 406(b) request
reasonable and directing counsel to refund to client fees previously awarded under the EAJA).
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS counsel’s motion for attorney’s fees. The Commissioner is directed
to certify fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) in the amount of $12,688.25, payable to Katherine
Siegfried. The Court ORDERS the award of attorney fees pursuant to 406(b) to be paid out of
Plaintiff’s past-due benefits in accordance with agency policy, to the extent that such past-due
benefits are available and not used to pay an attorney fee under 406(a). Counsel is ORDERED to
reimburse Plaintiff the $7,436.00 in EAJA fees to offset the payment of 406(b) fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
______________________________________
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge
1/13/2026
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