Done v. Partee

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
STEPHEN ERIC DONE,
Plaintiff,
v.
BEN PARTEE,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-cv-10069-HSG
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT AND TERMINATING
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Re: Dkt. Nos. 32, 33
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint (“FAC”), Dkt. No. 29, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Motion to
Dismiss (“Mot.”), Dkt. No. 32; Opposition (“Opp.”), Dkt. No. 34; Reply (“R.”), Dkt. No. 36. In
conjunction with his motion to dismiss, Defendant also filed a request for judicial notice. Dkt. No.
33. The Court found this matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the matter
was deemed submitted. Civil L.R. 7-1(b); Dkt. No. 37. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion
to dismiss and TERMINATES AS MOOT the related request for judicial notice.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
This is a Section 1983 civil rights action alleging deprivation of procedural due process.
FAC § IV. Plaintiff Stephen Done alleges that he was the former head men’s basketball coach at
Santa Rosa Junior College. FAC ¶ 3. On or around October 18, 1999, Defendant Ben Partee, the
College’s then-athletic director, authored and transmitted a false and unsubstantiated “written
determination” (the “Determination”), which stated that Plaintiff and other coaches committed
recruiting violations. FAC ¶¶ 4, 6–13. Defendant sent the Determination to the Bay Valley
Conference Commissioner, which resulted in disciplinary action against Plaintiff and his
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basketball team. FAC ¶¶ 6, 8, 21. The Commissioner relied upon the Determination to impose
those sanctions. Id.
Notwithstanding all of these allegations, Plaintiff also asserts as follows:
The constitutional violation arises from the creation and transmission
of the concealed Written Determination itself, not from any
subsequent penalties, meeting, or events known to Plaintiff at the
time. This claim is based solely on the October 18, 1999 Written
Determination and is distinct from any later statements or
communications, including those referenced in 2021.1
FAC ¶ 24.
Defendant issued the Determination without providing Plaintiff with notice of the
Determination’s existence or an opportunity to be heard on its findings. FAC ¶¶ 13–14. Plaintiff
was not aware that the Determination existed until June 23, 2025, when Plaintiff was given a copy
by a third party. FAC ¶¶ 13–17.
At some unspecified time, Plaintiff obtained a copy of his personnel and employment
records from the Sonoma County Junior College District (the “District”). FAC ¶ 19. They did not
contain the Determination. Id. Nor was the Determination provided to Plaintiff in response to
“records requests made to the District.” FAC ¶¶ 19, 29. Defendant asserts that the District
“affirmatively withheld” the Determination. Id.
Plaintiff originally sued the District, and the Court dismissed on Eleventh Amendment
grounds. Dkt. No. 27. Plaintiff then filed the FAC, suing Defendant in his individual capacity.
FAC ¶ 4.
//
//
1 The Court reads “later statements or communications, including those referenced in 2021”
to refer to the allegations in Plaintiff’s first Complaint, which he omitted in the FAC, alleging that
in 2021 the District’s Vice President of Human Resources stated in a letter that the District
conducted a disciplinary hearing regarding Plaintiff in 1999 without his presence. Dkt. No. 1 at 5;
see Wendover Prods., LLC v. PayPal Inc., No. 24-cv-09470-BLF, 2026 WL 1799239, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. June 22, 2026) (citing Sicor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 859 (9th Cir. 1995)). Plaintiff
appears to have recognized that his prior allegations likely posed a statute of limitations problem.
See Dkt. No. 27 at 1 n.1 (dismissal order noting in dicta that “as a practical matter, it is very likely
that these claims are time-barred and will eventually fail”).
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II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss challenge the adequacy of a plaintiff’s pleadings. Rule
8(a)(2) requires the complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “is
appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support
a cognizable legal theory.” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 1008 (9th Cir.
2018) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially
plausible when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Courts
“accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most
favorable to” the plaintiff, Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th
Cir. 2008), but do not accept the complaint’s “legal conclusions” or “allegations that are merely
conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–
79; Khoja, 899 F.3d at 1008 (quotation omitted).
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on statute of limitations grounds is appropriate “only when
the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint.” Von Saher v. Norton Simon
Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). “A
complaint cannot be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim.” Id. (quotation omitted) (cleaned up).
Courts in the Ninth Circuit liberally construe complaints by pro se plaintiffs at the motion
to dismiss stage. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, “pro se litigants
are bound by the rules of procedure,” Young v. Meta Platforms Inc., No. 24-cv-03583-HSG, 2025
WL 754064, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2025), and “must still meet” the governing “pleading
standards,” Bayer v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 22-cv-07440-AMO, 2023 WL 5988585,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2023) (citation omitted).
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III. DISCUSSION
Defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) on three grounds: (a) Plaintiff’s claim is
time-barred; (b) a prior settlement agreement bars the claim; and (c) immunity under Will v.
Michigan Department of State Police and the Eleventh Amendment. 491 U.S. 58, 64–66 (1989).
The Court grants the motion on the ground that the FAC’s allegations conclusively establish that
the claim is time-barred, and thus does not reach Defendant’s other arguments.
From the beginning of this case, Plaintiff has been confronted with an obvious challenge:
all of the events underlying his claim fundamentally concern what he contends were unlawful
actions the District took against him in October of 1999. FAC ¶¶ 6 (explaining that the Written
Determination was “authored and transmitted” “[o]n or about October 18, 1999”), 21 (alleging
that “[f]ollowing the transmission of the Written Determination, sanctions were imposed affecting
Plaintiff and his program, including penalties impacting postseason eligibility”). But the
applicable statute of limitations ran long ago for these actions taken over 25 years ago, and
nothing in Plaintiff’s FAC plausibly establishes a basis that could make those claims timely.
For Section 1983 claims, state law determines the statute of limitations period and federal
law governs claim accrual. Lukovsky v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1048
(9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Section 1983 claims are treated as personal injury actions and
are currently subject to a two-year statute of limitations in California for claims accruing as of
January 1, 2003. Id.; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1; Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954–55
(9th Cir. 2004) (discussing California’s shift from a one- to two-year limitations period). Claims
accrue under federal law “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is
the basis of the action.” Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1048 (internal quotations omitted). The federal
common law incorporates a discovery rule that postpones accrual until a plaintiff “discovers (or
reasonably should discover) he has been injured.” Id. (citing Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
920 F.2d 446, 450–51 (7th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted)).2
2 Defendant cites the discovery rule doctrine under California state law, but that rule is
inapplicable here because accrual is analyzed under federal law. Compare Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at
1048 with Mot. at 5–6 (quoting Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103 (1988)).
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Even liberally construing the FAC in Plaintiff’s favor and drawing all reasonable
inferences, federal law establishes as a matter of law that Plaintiff’s claim accrued well before the
initiation of this litigation. Mot. at 5–8; R. at 3–5. Lukovsky is instructive. In that case, the Ninth
Circuit addressed a civil rights case alleging racial and national origin hiring discrimination by
San Francisco, its transportation agency, and various individual defendants. 535 F.3d at 1046.
The plaintiffs argued that their claims “did not accrue” under federal law until plaintiffs had
knowledge or reasonably were on notice of “both the actual injury (failure to hire) and the legal
wrong (racial discrimination).” Id. at 1048. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that
a “wealth of authority” provides that federal accrual law only requires reasonable knowledge of
the actual injury itself, not the theory establishing the legal wrong. Id. at 1049–51 (collecting
cases). This is because at that point, “plaintiffs knew they had been injured and by whom” such
that they were on inquiry notice as to the circumstances surrounding those injuries. Id.
The same analysis applies here. By his own admission, Plaintiff began suffering the
adverse effects of the Determination at some point in 1999 or 2000, “impacting postseason
eligibility.” FAC ¶¶ 6, 8, 21. Like the Lukovsky plaintiffs who knew they had received
unfavorable hiring decisions but did not know whether those choices were based on
discrimination, here Plaintiff had knowledge of the actual injury giving rise to his claim at the time
that the Commissioner imposed penalties. Id. Whether or not Plaintiff knew the specific facts
underlying the alleged “legal wrong” of his denial of procedural due process until 2025 when he
uncovered the Determination is not relevant under federal accrual law.
Given that accrual occurred at some point in 1999 or 2000 based on the FAC, California’s
one-year statute of limitations applies. Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955 (holding that California’s
amended two-year statute of limitations was only made retroactive for September 11, 2001
victims). This means that, absent some basis for tolling, this litigation needed to be filed no later
than some point in the early 2000s.
In some circumstances, equitable doctrines can be available where a cause of action has
accrued and the statute of limitations has run. These doctrines arise from the relevant state’s law.
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007) (citations omitted). Though Plaintiff did not
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specifically raise any such doctrines in his opposition papers, given the factual allegations in the
FAC and Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court considers equitable tolling and equitable estoppel.
Neither doctrine can overcome the facial time-bar here given the allegations on the face of the
FAC.
a. Equitable Tolling
Equitable tolling in California applies where there is: (1) timely notice and lack of
prejudice to the defendant; and (2) reasonable and good faith conduct on the part of the plaintiff.
St. Francis Mem’l Hospital v. State Dep’t of Pub. Health, 9 Cal. 5th 710, 724 (2020) (citations
omitted). The rule arose from lines of cases addressing situations where plaintiffs were involved
in parallel lawsuits or administrative proceedings, or where estoppel was required to “serve the
ends of justice.” Id. at 1040.
This doctrine does not apply to make Plaintiff’s claim timely. This case is not like the
parallel action lines of cases, because there was no prior filed action that would make “tolling . . .
appropriate in a later suit.” Azer v. Connell, 306 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 2002). Prior proceedings
can include certain administrative actions, McDonald v. Antelope Valley Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal.
4th 88, 99–105 (2008), and state court lawsuits, Azer, 306 F.3d at 934–36. But FAC alleges no
prior lawsuit by Plaintiff on this issue before filing this Section 1983 action.
This conclusion remains true even if the Court were to take notice of Plaintiff’s judicial
admission in his original complaint that he filed a “federally protected civil-rights grievance” on
December 10, 1998 with the District’s human resources department. Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”) at 4;
see Wendover Prods., LLC v. PayPal Inc., No. 24-cv-09470-BLF, 2026 WL 1799239, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. June 22, 2026) (citing Sicor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 859 (9th Cir. 1995)). These
December 1998 administrative proceedings did not stem from the Determination, as they predate
by almost a year the October 1999 disciplinary proceedings that resulted in the Determination.
Compare Compl. at 4 with FAC ¶¶ 4, 6–13.3 In any event, Plaintiff has not pled any facts
3 That is assuming, without deciding, that a grievance with a human resources department
would constitute a “suit” for California’s equitable tolling doctrine. Azer, 306 F.3d at 936.
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plausibly supporting an inference that this human resources proceeding lasted decades such that
the tolling period would be sufficient to cover the necessary time period from claim accrual. See
Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 31 Cal. 4th 363, 370–71 (2003) (noting that equitable tolling ends at the
conclusion of the tolling event).
Nor does equitable tolling apply under the broader conception of the rule. Notice requires
that a defendant be “fully notified within the statute of limitations of plaintiff[’s] claims and their
intent to litigate.” St. Francis, 9 Cal. 5th at 726 (quotation omitted) (cleaned up). But Plaintiff
does not allege providing Defendant with any such notice before filing this case.4 Conversely,
Defendant would be prejudiced by having to litigate this decades-old action without “having
received timely notice of the possible . . . liability.” Addison v. State of California, 21 Cal. 3d 313,
318 (1978). And Plaintiff’s conduct in the lead up to this case was objectively unreasonable.5
Plaintiff was aware of the harms from his purported actual injury at some point in 1999 or 2000,
FAC ¶¶ 6, 8, 21, yet failed to pursue his claim in court for decades.
b. Equitable Estoppel
Equitable estoppel generally prevents a defendant from asserting a statute of limitations
defense where “the defendant’s conduct, relied on by the plaintiff, has induced the plaintiff to
postpone filing the action until after the statute has run.” Mills v. Forestex Co., 108 Cal. App. 4th
625, 652 (2003) (citation omitted). Equitable estoppel “focuses primarily on actions taken by the
defendant to prevent a plaintiff from filing suit, sometimes referred to as ‘fraudulent
concealment.’” Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1051 (emphasis in original). Equitable estoppel “halts the
statute of limitations where there is active conduct by a defendant, above and beyond the
wrongdoing upon which the plaintiff’s claim is filed, to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time.”
Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Parties
4 Plaintiff’s generic document request for his employment records did not provide such
notice. FAC ¶ 19. And Plaintiff’s receipt of a letter from the District’s Vice President of Human
Resources acknowledging the 1999 hearing and issuance of the Determination is not a
communication from Plaintiff to Defendant that he intended to litigate this matter. Compl. at 5.
5 The Court does not address the subjective prong of the good faith inquiry given that the
objective prong fails. St. Francis, 9 Cal. 5th at 728–30.
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have been estopped in contexts such as when a defendant informs a plaintiff that it will not enforce
a statute of limitations, only to do so in litigation; or where a defendant gives a plaintiff a
document purportedly “negat[ing] any basis for supposing that plaintiff’s termination was related
to” a protected characteristic. Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1052 (quotation omitted).
Even liberally construing the FAC and drawing reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor,
nothing in the FAC plausibly establishes a basis for equitable estoppel either. The FAC
generically asserts that Defendant “affirmatively withheld” the Determination from Plaintiff. FAC
¶ 19. But the fundamental problem is that even accepting the allegations as true, Plaintiff cannot
plausibly allege that Defendant’s actions with respect to the Determination prevented him from
filing this lawsuit in time, especially in light of what he has already pled in this case. In his
original complaint, Plaintiff alleged that in October 2021 the District’s Vice President of Human
Resources admitted in a letter that the District conducted a disciplinary hearing regarding Plaintiff
in 1999 without his presence. Compl. at 5. Plaintiff attached that letter to the first Complaint. See
Dkt. No. 4 at 14 (the “October 2021 Letter”). And the October 2021 Letter directly disclosed that
“upon subsequent review it was determined the representations made by [Defendant] to the Bay
Valley Conference were unsubstantiated and that you had not admitted to out-of-district
recruitment or acted inappropriately.” Id. This earlier allegation, including the document Plaintiff
incorporated by reference, was a judicial admission, and Plaintiff has not provided a legitimate (or
any) reason for now omitting it, and does not otherwise suggest that the prior allegations were
inaccurate. See Sicor, 51 F.3d at 859–860 (explaining that “a statement in a complaint may serve
as a judicial admission,” and noting that where the party making such an admission “explains the
error in a subsequent pleading or by amendment, the trial court must accord the explanation due
weight”). The allegations and Plaintiff’s judicial admissions thus establish that even assuming
Defendant concealed the Determination itself until 2025, Plaintiff was on inquiry notice of the due
process claim he asserts now by no later than October 2021. Given this, Plaintiff cannot plausibly
allege that any delay in the production of the Determination itself prevented him from timely filing
this lawsuit, even assuming the statute of limitations did not start running until he received the
October 2021 Letter.
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And to the extent Plaintiff now suggests, in conflict with his first Complaint, that his
theory in this case is limited to “the creation and transmission of the Written Determination itself,”
detached from any penalties or the 2021 communications, FAC ¶ 24, that argument does not save
his claim from being time-barred. Plaintiff’s claim is and always has been based on the harm that
resulted from the allegedly unlawful sanctions the Determination initiated. See FAC ¶ 21. Given
all of this, it is plain on the face of the pleadings here that the running of the statute of limitations
is conclusively established, meaning that Plaintiff’s claim is time-barred and the case must be
dismissed.6
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff’s allegations and judicial admissions over the course of two complaints
conclusively establish that the claim he asserts here is time-barred, further leave to amend would
be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1046 (9th Cir. 2011)
(affirming denial of leave to amend where claims were barred by statute of limitations).
Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, Dkt. No. 32,
and the Court TERMINATES AS MOOT the request for judicial notice, Dkt. No. 33. The Clerk
is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff and close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
______________________________________
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge
6 The Court’s first dismissal order was based solely on Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Dkt. No. 27 at 2. In dicta, the Court also opined that it “likely [could not] dismiss the case on the
grounds that the claims are time-barred.” Id. at 1 n.1. But the rationale for that suggestion, which
was not in any way necessary to the basis on which the Court dismissed the first Complaint, was
that “it’s not clear if Plaintiff knew about all the penalties (and any related injuries) against him
and his basketball program before 2025.” Id. Now having the benefit of the FAC’s framing, the
Court can conclusively say that this case is appropriate for dismissal because there is no plausible
basis for stating a claim based on the Determination alone, purportedly delinked from the ensuing
disciplinary process Plaintiff has alleged all along violated his rights. See FAC ¶ 27 (“By issuing
and transmitting the Written Determination to a governing authority for action, Defendant caused
a false and stigmatizing government determination to be made and relied upon, resulting in
sanctions, without affording Plaintiff due process of law.”). In other words, it is now clear that
even as alleged across the two complaints, Plaintiff was on inquiry notice of the claimed due
process violation here no later than October 2021.
10/14/2026
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