Amezquita v. Garcia-Cortez et al

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN JOSE DIVISION
JOSE G. AMEZQUITA,
Plaintiff,
v.
GARCIA-CORTES, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 20-cv-08285-BLF
ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS IN
LIMINE
[Re: ECF Nos. 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99,
100, 101]
Before the Court are Plaintiff Jose G. Amezquita’s four motions in limine (“MILs”), see
ECF Nos. 93, 94, 95, 96, and Defendants Correctional Officer Pedro Garcia-Cortes and Lieutenant
Dwayne Meredith’s five MILs, see ECF Nos. 91, 98, 99, 100, 101. The Court held the Final
Pretrial Conference on October 2, 2026, and issued oral rulings on the Parties’ MILs. ECF No.
122. The Court subsequently issued orders approving and adopting the Parties’ Joint Pretrial
Statement, see ECF No. 123, and setting trial schedule and procedures, see ECF No. 124. For the
reasons stated by the Court on the record at the hearing and set forth below, the Court rules on the
Parties’ MILs as follows.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an inmate at Salinas Valley State Prison. ECF No. 12 at 4. On January 23,
2020, six inmates initiated a physical altercation on one of the prison yards. ECF No. 102 at 2.
Plaintiff alleges that although he was not involved in the fight, Mr. Garcia-Cortes shot him directly
in the chest with a 40mm foam baton round. Id. Mr. Garcia-Cortes concedes that his shot struck
Plaintiff, but asserts that he was aiming at the inmates engaged in the brawl. Id. Mr. Garcia-
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Cortes alleges that he missed his intended target, causing the 40 mm round to ricochet and
unintentionally hit Plaintiff. Id. at 2–3. Plaintiff alleges that the shot bruised his sternum and
caused him substantial pain for several months. Id. at 3. Plaintiff further contends that after he
filed a grievance against Mr. Garcia-Cortes, Defendant Meredith retaliated against Plaintiff by
removing him from his position on the Inmate Advisory Council. Id.
On November 23, 2020, Plaintiff initiated this action. ECF No. 1. Following summary
judgment, Plaintiff’s remaining allegations include claims of (1) excessive force (42 U.S.C.
§ 1983), (2) violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1), (3) civil battery,
and (4) negligence. ECF No. 102 at 4. Plaintiff has also brought a First Amendment retaliation
claim against Mr. Meredith under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to
make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. “[R]elevant evidence is admissible
unless another rule or federal law provides otherwise,” while “irrelevant evidence is inadmissible.”
Crawford v. City of Bakersfield, 944 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2019); accord Fed. R. Evid. 402
(providing that relevant evidence is admissible unless precluded by the Constitution, federal
statute, the federal rules of evidence, or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court). Rule 401’s
“basic standard of relevance . . . is a liberal one.” Crawford, 944 F.3d at 1077 (alteration in
original) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993)). “The court
may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of
one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403; see also
United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001).
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine
1. MIL No. 1 to Bar Comment, Argument, Testimony or Evidence of Arrests, Tattoos, Law
Enforcement Contacts, Other Litigation and Other Alleged Bad Acts of Plaintiff
In his MIL No. 1, Plaintiff moves to exclude argument and evidence of arrests, past
incarceration, parole or probation status, alleged prior bad acts, drug use, law enforcement
contacts, prison security levels and points, prison classification assignments, Plaintiff’s prior civil
lawsuits, and his mental health status. ECF No. 93 at 2. During the October 2, 2026 hearing,
Plaintiff also requested that this MIL be expanded to exclude evidence of Plaintiff’s prior
convictions. Plaintiff argues that this evidence should be excluded as inadmissible character
evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Id. at 4. He asserts that admitting this evidence would
needlessly damage his credibility, mislead the jury, and cause unfair prejudice. Id. Defendants do
not oppose this MIL or the exclusion of Plaintiff’s prior convictions. ECF No. 103 at 1 n.1.
Absent certain exceptions, Fed. R. Evid. 404 prohibits the admission of evidence “of a
person’s character” or a “crime, wrong, or act . . . in order to show that on a particular occasion the
person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1), (b)(1). The Court finds
that this evidence is of little probative value and would be highly prejudicial to Plaintiff. Given
Defendants’ nonopposition and the risk of unfair prejudice, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s MIL
No. 1.
2. MIL No. 2 to Bar Comment, Argument, Testimony or Evidence of Commendations,
Awards, Promotions, or Accolades Received by Defendants and Similar Evidence
In his MIL No. 2, Plaintiff seeks to exclude testimony or evidence of Defendants’
commendations, awards, promotions, or accolades. ECF No. 94 at 1–2. Plaintiff argues that this
evidence is inadmissible character evidence with “virtually no probative value” that would cause
Plaintiff “unfair prejudice.” Id. at 2 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 404, 405).
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Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s motion is overly broad and might exclude relevant
evidence such as Defendants’ “training and knowledge” about matters related to this litigation.
ECF No. 103 at 1. They further argue that this MIL is premature because evidence of Defendants’
accolades might be admissible to rebut any attack on Defendants’ character or credibility. Id.
(citing Fed. R. Evid. 608(a)).
When assessing whether a correctional officer used excessive force, the trier of fact must
determine whether “the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary,” or was
“wanton and unnecessary.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). In making this
determination, it may be necessary for the jury to evaluate whether the “threat [was] reasonably
perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful
response.” Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). The Court recognizes that certain
aspects of a correctional officer’s training and background may tend to make it “more or less
probable” that the officer reasonably perceived the threat and employed adequate mitigation
efforts. See, e.g., Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1062 (9th Cir.
2003) (noting that “training materials are relevant not only to whether the force employed in this
case was objectively unreasonable . . . but also to whether reasonable officers would have been on
notice that the force employed was objectively unreasonable”).
As to Defendant Meredith, the First Amendment retaliation claim brought against him has
five elements: “(1) [a]n assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2)
because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s
exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate
correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005). As with Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment claim against Mr. Garcia-Cortes, the Court recognizes that certain aspects of
Mr. Meredith’s training may tend to make it “more or less probable” that his actions were
reasonably intended to “advance a legitimate correctional goal.”
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Plaintiff’s MIL No. 2 does not identify any specific evidence that Plaintiff wishes to
exclude. As noted during the hearing, a fine line may exist between evidence of a commendation
and evidence of an officer’s experience (e.g., the subtle distinction between a service award and
recognition for ten years of service and training). At this stage, it is unclear what evidence
Plaintiffs will submit and whether Defendants will need an opportunity to rehabilitate their
character. See Fed. R. Evid. 608(a) (“[E]vidence of truthful character is admissible only after the
witness’s character for truthfulness has been attacked.”)
Under these circumstances, the Court finds it appropriate and commonplace to provide
Defendants with the opportunity to introduce themselves to the jury. Therefore, the Court will
permit testimony and evidence of Defendants’ position, training, experience, and years of service.
However, the Court DEFERS ruling on Plaintiff’s MIL No. 2 to exclude evidence of Defendants’
commendations, awards, promotions, or accolades. If Defendants present evidence that is
excessively self-aggrandizing, Plaintiff may object at trial.
3. MIL No. 3 to Preclude Comment, Argument, Testimony or Evidence That Defendants
and Other California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Personnel Were
Not Subjected to Disciplinary Action or Investigation Stemming Out of Incidents
Pertinent to This Case or Were “Exonerated”
In MIL No. 3, Plaintiff moves to exclude argument or evidence that the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation did not subject Defendants to an investigation, did
not pursue disciplinary action, or otherwise exonerated them for the actions at issue in this
litigation. ECF No. 95 at 2. Plaintiff argues that admitting this evidence would mislead the jury
by causing them to believe that Defendants “were found not liable for a Constitutional violation
against Plaintiff.” Id. at 3.
Defendants oppose this motion, arguing that Plaintiff failed to identify any “specific
investigations or exonerations he seeks to exclude.” ECF No. 103 at 2. Defendants further argue
that the results of any internal investigations are relevant to assessing Mr. Meredith’s intent and
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determining whether Mr. Garcia-Cortes “acted in a good-faith effort to maintain discipline or
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Id. at 2. Defendants also contend that reviews of
peace officer conduct are typically admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(8). Id.
Rule 403 provides that the Court may “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by . . . unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Considering the arguments
presented by the Parties, the Court finds that this evidence should be excluded due to its marginal
relevance and high risk of prejudice. The absence of disciplinary action or Defendants’
exoneration would only be somewhat relevant to determining whether Defendants’ violated
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Admitting this evidence, however, risks misleading the jury by
causing the jurors to credit these investigative findings over an objective assessment of the
evidence presented at trial. This would be highly prejudicial to Plaintiff. Admitting this evidence
would also cause undue delay by prompting an effective “mini trial” in which the attorneys
relitigate the facts and conclusions from these internal investigations. For these reasons, the Court
GRANTS Plaintiff’s MIL No. 3 to exclude evidence that Defendants were not subject to
disciplinary action, investigation, or were otherwise exonerated.
4. MIL No. 4 to Bar Comment, Argument, Testimony or Evidence of Defendant
Meredith’s Alleged Good Faith and Feelings About Being Sued
Plaintiff’s final MIL seeks to exclude argument or testimony concerning “Defendant
Meredith’s alleged good faith and feelings about being sued.” ECF No. 96 at 1. Plaintiff argues
that this evidence is irrelevant because there is no good faith defense to a First Amendment
retaliation claim. Id. at 2. Plaintiff further maintains that admitting this evidence will cause unfair
prejudice, waste time, and confuse the jury. Id. at 2–3.
Defendants argue that evidence of good faith is relevant to proving the elements of a First
Amendment retaliation claim by helping determine whether “there was no legitimate correctional
purposes motivating” Mr. Meredith’s actions. ECF No. 103 at 3 (citing Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567–
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68). Defendants also contend that this evidence is relevant to determining “whether Plaintiff’s
exercise of constitutionally-protected conduct was the ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind
Mr. Meredith’s conduct.” Id. at 3 (quoting Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314
(9th Cir. 1989)). Finally, Defendants assert that evidence of Mr. Meredith’s “feelings about being
sued” might be relevant depending on the evidence presented at trial. Id.
To succeed on a First Amendment retaliation claim Plaintiff must demonstrate that
Mr. Meredith’s actions had no legitimate connection to a correctional goal. Pratt v. Rowland, 65
F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] successful retaliation claim requires a finding that the prison
authorities’ retaliatory action did not advance legitimate goals of the correctional institution . . . .”
(citation and internal quotations omitted)). Plaintiff must also show that his constitutionally
protected conduct “was a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor” for the retaliation. Soranno’s
Gasco, 874 F.2d at 1314. Testimony regarding whether Mr. Meredith was acting in good faith
when he removed Plaintiff from the Inmate Advisory Council would tend to make it “more or less
probable” that Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected speech was not a motivating factor for Mr.
Meredith’s conduct. Given that Mr. Meredith’s motivation is relevant to Plaintiff’s First
Amendment claim, Defendants must be provided with an opportunity to provide such evidence.
For this reason, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s MIL No. 4 as to evidence and testimony regarding
Mr. Meredith’s alleged good faith.
The Court finds, however, that testimony and argument concerning Mr. Meredith’s
feelings about being sued are not admissible. Mr. Meredith’s feelings about this suit are
completely irrelevant to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim and may unfairly prejudice Plaintiff.
See Crawford, 944 F.3d at 1077 (“[I]rrelevant evidence is inadmissible.”). Accordingly, the Court
GRANTS Plaintiff’s MIL No. 4 as to testimony about Mr. Meredith’s feelings about being sued.
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B. Defendants’ Motions in Limine
1. MIL No. 1 to Bar Plaintiff’s Improper “Rebuttal” Expert
In Defendants’ MIL No. 1, they move to exclude rebuttal witness Dirk Duffner, and all
opinions or argument based on his expert report. ECF No. 91 at 1. On July 17, 2026, Defendants
disclosed a report from Tony Diaz, a prison practices and use-of-force expert. Id. at 1. On August
17, 2026, after the deadline for initial expert disclosures, Plaintiffs disclosed their rebuttal expert,
licensed mechanical engineer Dirk Duffner, and his report. Id. at 1–2. Defendants argue that
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, parties can only submit an expert rebuttal “if the
evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by
another party.” Id. at 2 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D)(ii); Matthew Enterprise, Inc. v.
Chrysler Group LLC, No. 13-cv-04236, 2016 WL 4272430, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2016)).
Defendants maintain that “[p]ortions of an expert’s rebuttal that opine on subjects that were not
addressed in the expert report purportedly being rebutted may be excluded.” Id. at 3 (quoting
Hyundai Motor Company v. Hyundai Technology Group, Inc., No. 23-cv-01709, 2025 WL
1711440, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2025)). Defendants assert that Mr. Duffner’s report (“Duffner
Report”) is inadmissible because it sets forth new theories and discusses topics that were not
addressed in Mr. Diaz’s expert report (“Diaz Report”). Id. at 4–5.
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the Duffner Report is appropriate because it addressed
only the opinions presented in the Diaz Report. ECF No, 112 at 2. Plaintiffs assert that the Diaz
Report addressed the ultimate issues of this case: (1) “that a rubber bullet inadvertently struck
[Plaintiff] as result of a ricochet, and (2) that [Plaintiff]’s opposing contention—i.e., that [he] was
intentionally shot by Defendant Pedro Garcia-Cortes—is incorrect.” Id. Plaintiffs argue that by
addressing the central issue of this litigation, “Defendants opened the door for [Plaintiff] to offer a
rebuttal expert opinion on how the shooting occurred.” Id. Plaintiff then proceeds to compare the
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expert reports to show that the Duffner Report stays within the confines of the subject matter
discussed in the Diaz Report.
In his report, Mr. Diaz concluded that (1) “there is no physical evidence . . . that would
lead [him] to believe that Officer Garcia-Cortes intended to strike [Plaintiff] with the direct impact
round or that he intentionally aimed the 40mm launcher at [Plaintiff]”; (2) “a 40mm direct impact
round . . . can ricochet off a surface and indiscriminately strike an unattended target”; (3) “there
was no error . . . on the part of Officer Garcia-Cortes when he . . . aimed for [another inmate]’s
right thigh”; and (4) “[t]he ricochet off the ground eventually struck [Plaintiff] in the chest area.”
ECF No. 102-6 at 12–14.
In rebuttal, Mr. Duffner conducted a ballistics analysis and concluded that Plaintiff’s
“injury was the result of a direct fire to his chest area, and not the result of a ricochet of a round
fired elsewhere.” ECF No. 102-3 at 4. Based on his analysis, Mr. Duffner also concluded that the
“ricochet of a round fired elsewhere never rises high enough above the ground to cause
[Plaintiff]’s injury.” Id.
After reviewing these reports, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the Duffner Report did
not exceed the boundaries of a proper rebuttal witness. The Diaz Report concluded that Mr.
Garcia-Cortes did not aim at Plaintiff directly, but that the bullet ricocheted off the ground before
hitting Plaintiff in the chest. ECF No. 102-6 at 12–14. The Duffner Report directly contradicts
Mr. Diaz’s findings by concluding that Plaintiff could not have been struck in the chest unless Mr.
Garcia-Cortes fired at him directly. EF No. 102-3 at 4. Because the Duffner Report only rebuts
evidence that was the subject matter of the Diaz report, it is properly within the scope of a rebuttal.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D)(ii). Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ MIL No. 1 to
exclude Plaintiff’s rebuttal expert.
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2. MIL No. 2 Indemnification
Defendants’ MIL No. 2 seeks to exclude any testimony or argument indicating that
Defendants may be indemnified by the state if judgment is rendered against them. ECF No. 98
at 1. Defendants argue that evidence of indemnification is prejudicial because a jury may be more
likely to “deliver a verdict against” Defendants or “inflate the award” if it believes that the state
will cover the costs. Id. Plaintiff does not oppose this MIL to the extent Defendants do not open
the door to admission of this evidence. ECF No. 108 at 2.
The Ninth Circuit has long held that “evidence of . . . indemnification is not admissible on
the issue of damages.” Larez v. Holcomb, 16 F.3d 1513, 1518 (9th Cir. 1994). Given this
longstanding precedent and Plaintiff’s nonopposition, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ MIL No. 2
to exclude evidence of indemnification.
3. MIL No. 3 Bifurcation
In their MIL No. 3, Defendants move to bifurcate the liability and punitive damages phases
of the trial. ECF No. 99 at 1. Defendants assert that litigating punitive damages would require
disclosing Defendant’s sensitive financial information. Id. They argue that such disclosure risks
prejudicing Defendants by confusing the jury, potentially leading them to award compensatory
damages based on Defendants’ ability to pay rather than on their liability. Id. Defendants also
maintain that revealing a correctional officer’s net worth to a prisoner may raise security concerns
and lead to an increased risk of harassment. Id. Given these risks, Defendants assert that the
Court should prevent the “unnecessary disclosure” of Defendants’ private information by
reserving argument on the amount of punitive damages until after Plaintiff “proves his entitlement
to punitive damages.” Id. at 2. Plaintiffs oppose bifurcation, arguing that it would confuse the
jury and lengthen the trial unnecessarily. ECF No. 106 at 2.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) courts may bifurcate trials “[f]or convenience, to avoid
prejudice, or to expedite and economize.” District courts have discretion to determine whether to
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bifurcate a trial. Estate of Diaz v. City of Anaheim, 840 F.3d 592, 601 (9th Cir. 2016). Under
California law, “an award of punitive damages cannot be properly reviewed unless the record
contains evidence of a defendant’s financial worth.” Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244, 1259
(9th Cir. 1993). This “evidence must be presented to the jury.” Id.
Having considered the parties’ arguments, the Court agrees with Defendants that revealing
their sensitive financial information needlessly would cause them undue prejudice. Accordingly,
the Court GRANTS Defendants’ MIL No. 3 to bifurcate the trial. The trial will be bifurcated into
two phases, the first establishing Defendants’ liability and the second determining the extent to
which Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages.
4. MIL No. 4 Precluding Lay Opinions Regarding Diagnoses and Whether the Force
Used Was Excessive
In MIL No. 4, Defendants seek to bar Plaintiff from providing lay opinion testimony about
his medical or mental health conditions and whether Mr. Garcia-Cortes’s use of force “was
excessive, unreasonable, or greater than necessary.” ECF No. 100 at 1. While Defendants
acknowledge that Plaintiff may provide testimony about “his own sensory perceptions, or
symptoms,” they assert that as a lay person, Plaintiff is not qualified to opine on his diagnoses or
the cause of his mental and physical health conditions. Id. at 2–4. They argue that Plaintiff also
lacks the expertise necessary to testify as to whether Mr. Garcia-Cortes’s use of force was
excessive. Id. at 2. Defendants maintain that admitting this evidence will cause undue prejudice
and waste time by requiring Defendants to provide expert witness testimony to address each of the
lay opinions provided. Id. at 4.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that his limited education may hinder his ability to separate
medical testimony from subjective testimony about his personal experience, causing him to
inadvertently violate this MIL. ECF No. 114 at 3. Consequently, Plaintiff argues that excluding
this evidence “exceeds the bounds of reason and fairness.” Id.
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A lay witness cannot provide testimony “based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701(c). Courts in this district have
previously applied Rule 701 “to bar lay witnesses from testifying . . . . as to the causation of [their]
emotional distress and any diagnoses.” Lillie v. ManTech Int’l Corp., No. 17-cv-02538, 2018 WL
6323076, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2018); see also NeSmith v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 15-cv-629,
2022 WL 272011, at *16 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2022) (precluding a non-expert witness from
diagnosing an individual’s PTSD or causally linking the PTSD to the alleged incident.). The
Court recognizes, however, that the distinction between opining on a medical diagnosis and
discussing one’s experience of their own physical and mental health can often be subtle. See
Sanchez v. Master Prot., LP, 20-cv-8472, 2022 WL 2092995, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2022)
(finding that under Rule 701, the plaintiff could not diagnose himself, but could “testify generally
that he felt depressed, anxious, or sleep deprived”). Given the inherent challenges with
differentiating medical testimony from subjective testimony a priori, the Court DEFERS ruling on
Defendants’ MIL No. 4 as to his diagnoses. Plaintiff is permitted to offer testimony on his
personal feelings and experience, such as sadness or emotional distress. However, at trial,
Defendants may object to any of his testimony regarding medical diagnoses or the cause of his
health conditions.
Similarly, courts in this district have routinely excluded lay witness testimony about
whether “the force used by [d]efendants was excessive, unreasonable, or greater than necessary.”
Tan v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 8-cv-1564, 2010 WL 726985, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
26, 2010); Gray v. Clark, 654 F. Supp. 3d 1062 (E.D. Cal. 2023); see, e.g., Chien Van Bui v. City
& Cnty. of San Francisco, 11-cv-4189, 2018 WL 1057787, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018) (“Lay
witnesses may testify as to what they saw and the situation as they perceived it, but they may not
testify as to conclusions of whether the force the defendants used was excessive, unreasonable, or
greater than necessary”). Once again, the Court recognizes that there might be only subtle
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distinctions between testimony about Plaintiff’s subjective experience and testimony asserting that
the force Mr. Gonzalez-Cortes used was excessive. Therefore, the Court DEFERS ruling on
Defendants’ MIL No. 4 as to whether the force used was excessive.
5. MIL No. 5 to Exclude Expert Testimony by Dirk Duffner (Daubert)
In their final MIL, Defendants move to exclude Dirk Duffner’s opinions, testimony, and
any argument based on that testimony. ECF No. 101 at 1. Plaintiffs hired Mr. Duffner to provide
a ballistics analysis on the 40mm foam baton round that struck Plaintiff’s chest. Defendants argue
that Mr. Duffner is not qualified to conduct this analysis because he is not a “forensic crime or
ballistics expert.” Id. Defendants further assert that Mr. Duffner’s testimony is inadmissible
under Fed. R. Evid. 702 because his analysis was not supported by accurate data. Id. at 1. In
support of their argument, Defendants note that Mr. Duffner never saw the launcher or 40mm
round that struck Plaintiff and he never visited Salinas Valley State Prison to obtain accurate
measurements of Plaintiff’s and Mr. Garcia-Cortes’s relative positions. Id. at 4–5. They also
argue that Mr. Duffner’s methodology was deficient because he did not account for environmental
factors such as wind. Id. at 1, 5
Plaintiffs oppose this motion, arguing that as a licensed mechanical engineer, Mr. Duffner
is qualified to conduct a ballistics analysis to determine whether Mr. Garcia-Cortes shot Plaintiff
directly. ECF No. 113 at 3. Plaintiffs also argue that Mr. Duffner based his calculations on
sufficient data because he had access to substantial information about the launcher, 40mm round,
and measurements from the prison yard. Id. at 4–5. Finally, Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Duffner
used reliable principles and methods to reach his conclusions. Id. at 5–6.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that a qualified expert may testify if “(a) the
expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient
facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the
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expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the
case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702.
The Supreme Court’s cases addressing the admissibility of expert testimony make clear
that the district court must play a gatekeeping role, ensuring that any expert opinion admitted is
both relevant and reliable. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999); General
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 589 (1993). However, so long as an expert’s methodology is sound and the expert’s opinions
satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Evid. 702, underlying factual disputes and how much weight to
accord the expert’s opinion are questions for the jury. See Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 565
(9th Cir. 2010).
On December 1, 2023, the Judicial Conference’s amendments to Rule 702 went into effect,
“clarif[ying]” that expert testimony may be admitted only if the court determines “that it is more
likely than not that the proffered testimony meets the admissibility requirements set forth in the
rule.” Fed. R. Evid. 702, Advisory Committee’s Note to 2023 Amendment. The amendment
clarifies that a court must first find by a preponderance of the evidence that the expert’s basis and
methodology are sufficient. Only once that threshold has been met are further challenges to the
expert’s reliability or their conclusions considered questions of weight, which are left to the jury.
Mr. Duffner is a licensed mechanical engineer with a bachelor’s degree in mechanical
engineering from the University of California, Los Angeles and a master’s degree in mechanical
engineering from Stanford University. ECF No. 102-3 at 1. He has over forty years of experience
in mechanical engineering and materials science. Id. at 2. Mr. Duffner is the owner of Duffner
Engineering, a consulting firm that provides services in various areas of mechanical engineering,
including failure analysis, materials science, and metallurgy. Id. at 1–2. He has published
numerous articles in his field. Id. at 11–13. Although Mr. Duffner is not a ballistics expert, the
Court finds that the ballistics analysis he conducted is within Mr. Duffner’s area of expertise.
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Primiano, 598 F.3d at 565 (“Expert opinion testimony is relevant if the knowledge underlying it
has a valid connection to the pertinent inquiry. And it is reliable if the knowledge underlying it
has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline.”) As discussed
during his deposition, many of the calculations Mr. Duffner performed for his analysis involved
fundamental physics principles. See e.g., ECF No. 113-4 at 12 (explaining that the “coefficient of
restitution” is “a high school physics kind [sic] thing”). Given Mr. Duffner’s extensive experience
in mechanical engineering, the Court concludes that his “specialized knowledge will help the
[jury] understand” the force and trajectory of the 40mm round in question. See Fed. R. Evid.
702(a).
The Court also finds that Mr. Duffner had access to sufficient information to conduct his
ballistics analysis. Although Mr. Duffner did not visit the prison or see the launcher and round
responsible for striking Plaintiff, he based his calculations on a substantial amount of data. To
perform this analysis, Mr. Duffner used, inter alia, the manufacturer’s report on the size, weight,
and velocity of the 40mm foam baton round when it is fired. ECF No. 113 at 4. Mr. Duffner was
also provided with multiple photos, measurements, and diagrams of the relevant area in Salinas
Valley State Prison, allowing him to calculate the relative distance between Mr. Garcia-Cortes and
Plaintiff. Id. When doing this analysis, Mr. Duffner also took into account the materials used in
the 40mm round and the stiffness of the dirt in the prison yard. Id. at 5. To the degree that Mr.
Duffner did not take into account environmental factors such as wind, during his deposition he
explained that any impact from such conditions would be “very small.” ECF No. 113-5 at 47
(“And the environmental effects would be like something that would be an order of magnitude less
than that of an effect. So it really . . . wouldn’t make sense to use those values.”).
The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered testimony meets the
admissibility requirements set forth in Fed. R. Evid. 702. Mr. Duffner is qualified to offer these
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opinions and they are based on sound methodology. Any errors or deficiencies in his analyses are
appropriately the subject of cross-examination. Accordingly, Defendants’ MIL No. 5 is DENIED.
IV. ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
(1) Plaintiff’s MIL No. 1 to exclude evidence of arrests, tattoos, law enforcement
contacts, convictions, other litigation and other alleged bad acts of Plaintiff is
GRANTED.
(2) Plaintiff’s MIL No. 2 to exclude evidence of commendations, awards, promotions,
or accolades received by Defendants and similar evidence is DEFERRED.
(3) Plaintiff’s MIL No. 3 to preclude evidence that Defendants and other California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation personnel were not subjected to
disciplinary action or investigation stemming out of incidents pertinent to this case
or were “exonerated” is GRANTED.
(4) Plaintiff’s MIL No. 4 to exclude testimony on Defendant Meredith’s alleged good
faith and feelings about being sued is GRANTED as to Mr. Meredith’s alleged
good faith and DENIED as to his feelings about being sued.
(5) Defendants’ MIL No. 1 to bar Plaintiff’s improper “rebuttal” expert is DENIED.
(6) Defendants’ MIL No. 2 to exclude evidence of Defendants’ indemnification is
GRANTED.
(7) Defendants’ MIL No. 3 to bifurcate the trial is GRANTED.
(8) Defendants’ MIL No. 4 to preclude lay opinions regarding diagnoses and whether
the force used was excessive is DEFERRED.
(9) Defendants’ MIL No. 5 to exclude expert testimony by Dirk Duffner is DENIED.
(10) This order terminates ECF Nos. 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 9, 2026
______________________________________
BETH LABSON FREEMAN
United States District Judge
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