Brixton LLC v. Wooden Bay Co. LLC

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BRIXTON LLC, a California limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,
v.
WOODEN BAY CO. LLC, d/b/a
BRONXTON, a Utah limited liability
company,
Defendant.
Case No.: 25-CV-1155 JLS (SBC)
ORDER (1) DENYING MOTION TO
DISMISS AND (2) GRANTING
MOTION TO STRIKE
(ECF No. 6)
Presently before the Court are Defendant Wooden Bay Co. LLC, d/b/a Bronxton’s
Motion to Dismiss and Strike Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Mot.,” ECF No. 6), Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion to Dismiss and Strike (“Mem.,” ECF No.
6-1), and Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN,” ECF No. 7). 	Also before the Court are
Plaintiff Brixton LLC’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Request for
Judicial Notice (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 9) and Defendant’s Reply in Support its Motion to
Dismiss and Strike (“Reply,” ECF No. 10). 	For the reasons stated below, the Court
DENIES the Motion to Dismiss and GRANTS the Motion to Strike.
/ / /
/ / /
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BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Brixton, LLC, a clothing brand specializing in the sale of hats, is the owner
of three registered trademarks at issue: (1) U.S. Trademark No. 6,497,912 (the “’912
Mark”) for use on: “[c]lothing, namely, shirts, T-shirts, tank tops, sweaters, sweatshirts,
vests, jackets, coats, belts for clothing, pants, trousers, shorts, sweatpants, dresses, skirts,
swimwear, board shorts, socks, and headwear, namely, hats, caps”; (2) U.S. Trademark
No. 6,497,912 (the “’915 Mark”) for use on “[c]lothing, namely, shirts, T-shirts, tank tops,
sweaters, sweatshirts, vests, jackets, coats, belts for clothing, pants, trousers, shorts,
sweatpants, dresses, skirts, swimwear, board shorts, socks, and headwear, namely, hats,
caps”; and (3) U.S. Trademark No. 7,720,726 (the “’726 Mark”) for use on “[b]ackpacks;
Briefcases; Satchels; Suitcases; Wallets; Athletic bags; Beach bags; Coin purses; Credit
card cases; Credit card cases being wallets; Duffel bags; Fanny packs; Hat boxes for travel
not of paper or cardboard; Key cases; Toiletry cases sold empty; Tote bags; Travel cases”
(collectively, the “Brixton Marks”). Compl. ¶¶ 6–9. Plaintiff has used the Brixton Marks
in commerce since November 15, 2019, and the U.S. Trademark Office registered the
Marks on July 13, 2021 (’912 Mark, ’915 Mark) and March 11, 2025 (’726 Mark). Id. ¶¶
6–8. 	Plaintiff alleges that it “prominently displays” the Brixton Marks across its media,
promotional materials, and goods, and has used the Marks as its logo since at least
November 2019. Id. ¶ 10. The Brixton Marks have thus “become a source identifier” for
the brand. Id.
Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	Defendant 	Wooden 	Bay 	Co. 	LLC, 	doing 	business 	as
“Bronxton,” a clothing brand that primarily sells men’s luxury goods, prominently displays
the allegedly infringing mark (the “Bronxton Mark”) as its logo on its website. 	Id. ¶ 12.
Plaintiff alleges that the Bronxton Mark “uses a similar font as used in the Brixton Marks,”
“uses a shield of the same shape as used in the Brixton Marks,” and uses the Bronxton
Mark “to promote and sell goods of the same class of goods promoted and sold by Brixton
using the Brixton Marks.” Id. ¶ 13.
/ / /
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On May 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed this action for trademark infringement against
Defendant over its alleged infringement of the Brixton Marks. 	Id. ¶ 13. 	Defendant
thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss and Strike Plaintiff’s Complaint. 	See generally
Docket.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the
defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To
survive a 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	A claim is
facially plausible when the facts pled “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. That is not to say that the claim
must be probable, but there must be “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of
a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Though 	this 	plausibility 	standard 	“does 	not 	require 	‘detailed 	factual
allegations,’ . . . it [does] demand[] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.” 	Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 	In other words, a
complaint will not suffice “if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” 	Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 	Put
differently, “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Review under Rule 12(b)(6) requires a context-specific analysis involving the
Court’s “judicial experience and common sense.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. In performing
that analysis, “a district court must accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint, and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” 	Wi-LAN Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
382 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1020 (S.D. Cal. 2019). 	“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
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alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679 (second alternation in original). 	If a complaint does not survive Rule 12(b)(6), a
court grants leave to amend unless it determines that no modified contention “consistent
with the challenged pleading could . . . possibly cure the deficiency.” 	Schreiber Distrib.
Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986).
ANALYSIS
I. 	Judicial Notice
Defendant requests judicial notice of documents to demonstrate, by way of evidence
of other registered trademarks depicting a shield design, the relative weakness of the
Brixton Marks. 	See RJN; Mem. at 6. Such a request is improper because the strength of
the Brixton Marks is in dispute, and a court may only take judicial notice of facts that are
“not subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see also Pinterest Inc. v. Pintrips
Inc., 15 F. Supp. 3d 992, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (denying request for judicial notice of
documents to show genericness of mark); Zero Motorcycles, Inc. v. Zero Labs Grp., LLC,
No. 22-CV-04034-SVK, 2023 WL 3237505, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2023) (“In the context
of the present motion to dismiss, judicial notice of the USPTO documents is not appropriate
because the fact for which Defendant offers them—to prove that Plaintiff’s trademarks are
weak—is disputed.”). Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Request for Judicial
Notice.
II. 	Motion to Dismiss
Defendant seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for trademark infringement for failing
to allege facts that support a likelihood of confusion. 	Mem. at 4. 	To state a claim for
trademark infringement, a plaintiff must show that “(1) it has a valid, protectable
trademark, and (2) that [the defendant]’s use of the mark is likely to cause confusion.”
Applied Info. Scis. Corp. v. eBAY, Inc., 511 F.3d 966, 969 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Brookfield
Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Ent. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1053 (9th Cir. 1999)). “The core
element of trademark infringement is the likelihood of confusion, i.e., whether the
similarity of the marks is likely to confuse customers about the source of the products.”
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Off. Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting 	E. & J. Gallo
Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1290 (9th Cir. 1992)). 	Courts in the Ninth
Circuit evaluate the likelihood of confusion using the eight factors set out in AMF Inc. v.
Sleekcraft Boats: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the proximity of the goods; (3) the
similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6)
type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant’s
intent in selecting its mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion into other markets. 599 F.2d
341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated by Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d
792 (9th Cir. 2003). The Sleekcraft factors should be applied flexibly, with some factors
carrying more weight than others depending on the case. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
768 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (first citing Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054; and
then citing Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1045
(9th Cir. 2011)).
“‘Because a careful assessment of the pertinent factors that go into determining
likelihood of confusion usually requires a full record,’ dismissal of trademark disputes at
the pleading stage is generally disfavored.” Trader Joe’s Co. v. Trader Joe’s United, 150
F.4th 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Yuga Labs, Inc. v. Ripps, 144 F.4th 1137, 1167
(9th Cir. 2025)) (cleaned up); see also Celebrity Chefs Tour, LLC v. Macy’s, Inc., 16 F.
Supp. 3d 1141, 1153 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (noting that whether confusion is likely is a factual
determination “woven into the law” that courts routinely treat as an issue of fact for a jury
to consider (quoting Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1356, 1356 n.5
(9th Cir. 1985))). 	A defendant thus “faces a significant challenge to show that the non-
existence of such a likelihood can be determined as a matter of law at the pleading stage.”
Benchmark Cap. Holdings Co., LLC v. Benchmark Co., LLC, No. C 11-4883 RS, 2012 WL
13041640, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2012).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to show a likelihood of
confusion. Plaintiff alleges it has “expended substantial sums of money and resources in
the promotion of its . . . products using the Brixton Marks,” and thus, the Brixton Marks
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“are now known to be connected with Plaintiff” and “have become an asset of incalculable
value as a symbol of Plaintiff’s business and its quality products.” 	Compl. ¶ 17. 	The
Brixton Marks and the Bronxton Mark “use[] a similar font . . . and use[] a shield of the
same shape,” and are used “to promote and sell goods of the same class of goods . . . .” Id.
¶ 14. 	The Parties both have “a substantial social media following,” which they use to
promote their products, and “have significant overlap in their target audience as the
clothing, headwear, and accessories sold by the [P]arties are of a similar style and appeal
to persons interested in that style.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant “has a
history of copying Plaintiff,” and “willfully infringed upon Plaintiff’s exclusive rights to
the Brixton Marks with the intent to trade upon the goodwill of Plaintiff . . . .” 	Id. ¶¶ 15,
29. 	These facts tend to show a likelihood of confusion and therefore plausibly support
Plaintiff’s claim for trademark infringement.
Defendant’s 	arguments 	otherwise 	are 	unavailing. 	Somewhat 	confusingly,
Defendant 	spends 	part 	of 	its 	Motion 	discussing 	the 	“Brixton” 	and 	“Bronxton”
wordmarks—rather than the Brixton Marks at issue—arguing that the two marks have
“coexisted . . . for over a decade in a saturated market without any evidence of consumer
confusion.” 	Mem. at 4–12. 	In attacking the strength of the Brixton Marks, Defendant
relies on other marks using a shield design, which, as already discussed, is improper at this
stage. See id. at 6; Opp’n at 5.
Defendant further argues that “there are no demonstrated instances of confusion
even when the products were sold in the exact same stores,” and, thus, the proximity of the
goods weighs against confusion. Id. at 7. True, Plaintiff does not point to any instances of
actual confusion. 	See Compl. 	However, evidence of actual confusion is not required to
survive the motion to dismiss stage. See Good Clean Love, Inc. v. Audacious Beauty, LLC,
No. 6:24-CV-00444-MC, 2024 WL 4529028, *6 (D. Or. Oct. 17, 2024). 	And the Court
finds Plaintiff’s allegations that the Parties “sell the same class of goods . . . to the same
target audience” sufficient to show the proximity of the goods. Opp’n at 3; Compl. ¶¶ 11–
14. 	As to the similarity of the marks, Defendant argues that there is no likelihood of
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confusion because USPTO “has already considered the literal elements of the ‘Bronxton’
and ‘Brixton’ marks and allowed the registration of both trademarks on the principal
register.” 	Mem. at 9. 	Defendant makes this assertion without pointing to any authority
suggesting that the fact of two marks’ registrations negates similarity and, therefore,
confusion.
Rather than point to any meaningful deficiencies in Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendant
attempts to argue that, as a matter of law, there is no likelihood of confusion between the
Brixton Marks and the Bronxton Mark, without a complete factual record before the Court.
See generally Mem; see also Trader Joe’s Co, 150 F.4th at 1049 (“Because a careful
assessment of the pertinent factors that go into determining likelihood of confusion usually
requires a full record, dismissal of trademark disputes at the pleading stage is generally
disfavored.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 	Therefore, Defendant has
failed to demonstrate dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a claim for trademark infringement and DENIES
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
III. 	Motion to Strike
Defendant seeks to strike Plaintiff’s request for statutory damages under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117(c). Mem. at 13; see Compl. at 8. Plaintiff does not oppose Defendant’s Motion to
Strike. Opp’n at 1. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Strike.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 6) and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s
request for statutory damages (ECF No. 6).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 15, 2026
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