Trejo Blanco v. Mayorkas

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25-cv-3778-AGS-AHG
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Kevin Antonio TREJO BLANCO,
Petitioner,
v.
Alejandro MAYORKAS,
Respondent.
Case No.: 25-cv-3778-AGS-AHG
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION AT
SCREENING WITH LEAVE TO
AMEND AND DENYING MOTION
FOR RELEASE (ECF 2)
Petitioner Kevin Trejo Blanco seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
to free him from immigration detention. At this stage, he need only make out a claim that
is sufficiently cognizable to warrant a response. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases
in the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if it plainly
appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting court to apply Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases to
any “habeas corpus petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules permit “summary
dismissal of claims that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038,
1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). So “long as a petition has any potential merit, it is not
so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id.
But Trejo Blanco has named an inappropriate party—the former Secretary for the
Department of Homeland Security—as the respondent, so his petition must be dismissed.
“[T]he default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the
prisoner is being held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official.”
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004); see also Doe v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1188,
1199 (9th Cir. 2024) (“affirm[ing] the application of the immediate custodian” rule to
“habeas petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, including those filed by immigrant
detainees” and ruling a district court cannot consider a misnamed petition). As written, this
petition has no possible merit.
Case 3:25-cv-03778-AGS-AHG Document 3 Filed 12/29/25 PageID.<pageID> Page
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25-cv-3778-AGS-AHG
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Even if he had named the correct respondent, though, his motion for immediate
release (see ECF 2), or a “temporary restraining order” in the language of the federal rules,
would be meritless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. A temporary restraining order, like all injunctive
relief, is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the
plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7,
22 (2008). Trejo Blanco would need to clearly demonstrate, among other things, that “he
is likely to succeed on the merits.” See id. at 20. But he has not. His petition and motion
simply state that he’s been in immigration detention since “October 21, 2025,” and that
he’s “not subject to a final order of removal.” (ECF 1, at 1; see ECF 2, at 1.) But his
pleadings are devoid of any details about how he came to be in immigration detention,
which has a substantial impact on which statutory detention scheme he falls under.
Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (providing for mandatory detention without bond in certain
circumstances); with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (authorizing detention with the possibility of bond
or conditional parole); id. § 1226(c) (denying bond to certain categories of aliens). Without
more detail, Trejo Blanco has come nowhere near a clear showing of likelihood of success
on the merits.
By January 23, 2026, Trejo Blanco must file any amended petition, remedying the
deficiencies identified in this order. The amended petition must be complete in itself and
may not reference or incorporate any other prior filings. Failure to timely file an amended
petition will result in dismissal of this case.
Dated: December 29, 2025
___________________________
Hon. Andrew G. Schopler
United States District Judge
Case 3:25-cv-03778-AGS-AHG Document 3 Filed 12/29/25 PageID.<pageID> Page
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