Hill v. Ciolli et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney
Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-02658-CNS-TPO
DAVID E. HILL,
Plaintiff,
v.
A. CIOLLI, Warden,
C. HARVEY, Unit Manager,
D. ENGLISH, Case Manager, and
K. DELL, Case Manager,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court are four motions filed by Plaintiff: (1) Motion for Reconsideration,
ECF No. 55; (2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal, ECF No. 65; (3) Plaintiff’s Motion for
Recusal, ECF No. 68; and (4) a Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No. 70. Defendants
have filed responses to each pending motion opposing Plaintiff’s requested relief. See
ECF Nos. 64, 72, 73, 74. The Court presumes familiarity with the parties’ briefing, as well
as the relevant factual and procedural background, and for the reasons explained below,
Plaintiff’s pending motions are DENIED.
I. 	SUMMARY FOR PRO SE DEFENDANT
This order concerns four of your motions currently pending before this Court,
including two motions requesting that I recuse myself from these proceedings, ECF Nos.
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65, 68, and two motions requesting that the Court reconsider its ruling denying your
request for a preliminary injunction, ECF Nos. 55, 70. For the reasons explained in greater
detail below, the Court denies each of these motions.
With respect to your recusal request, you argued that I should recuse myself
because I am biased against you in these proceedings. The primary evidence that you
present to support the claim that I am biased is the reasoning contained in the order
denying your preliminary injunction. However, as discussed further below the outcome in
the preliminary injunction order was based on the facts of the case and not any outside
influence or bias against you. For those reasons, your recusal motions are denied.
Additionally, your request that the Court reconsider its order on your motion for a
preliminary injunction is also denied because you failed to meet the standard for
reconsideration. After re-reviewing the factors required to grant a preliminary injunction,
the Court properly determined that you failed to demonstrate irreparable harm because,
ultimately, you are seeking monetary damages. Additionally, although you requested that
the Court enjoin Defendants from enforcing the 2024 50/50 Agreement until after the
administrative grievance process concluded, the allegations in your proposed amended
complaint make clear that process is now complete.
II. 	ANALYSIS
A. Motions for Recusal
Plaintiff has filed two motions arguing that I should recuse myself because I am
unable to impartially oversee these proceedings. See ECF Nos. 65, 68. As Plaintiff is
proceeding pro se, the Court construes his filings liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551
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U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), but does not serve as Plaintiff’s advocate, see Gallagher
v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1067 (10th Cir. 2009).
28 U.S.C. § 455 provides that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the
United States shall disqualify [herself] in any proceeding in which [her] impartiality might
reasonably be questioned,” including if she “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning
a party.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(a), 455(b)(1). When determining whether recusal is warranted,
courts ask “whether a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor
doubts about the judge’s impartiality.” Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir.
1987). “Though judges ‘have a strong duty to recuse when appropriate,’ they also have
‘a strong duty to sit,’ and § 455 must not be so broadly construed as to make recusal
mandated ‘upon the merest unsubstantiated suggestion of personal bias or prejudice.’”
United States v. Mobley, 971 F.3d 1187, 1205 (10th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v.
Wells, 873 F.3d 1241, 1251 (10th Cir. 2017)). “The party moving to disqualify a judge is
ordinarily assigned the burden of proof.” Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 23-3244, 2024
WL 4003734, at *3 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2024) (citing Topeka Hous. Auth. v. Johnson, 404
F.3d 1245, 1247 (10th Cir. 2005)).
Plaintiff appears to argue that I should recuse for three primary reasons, including
because I: (1) denied Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction for reasons other than
the merits of this case, ECF No. 65 at 4; (2) prejudiced Plaintiff by determining that his
claims lack merit before Defendants’ pending motion to dismiss was decided, id., ECF
No. 68 at 4; and (3) have a “bias or prejudice [] directed against [Plaintiff],” ECF No. 68 at
4. In response, Defendants argue that the Court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for a
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preliminary injunction was properly decided and that the issues raised in Plaintiff’s
motions do not warrant recusal. See ECF No. 72 at 5–6; ECF No. 73 at 5–6. The Court
agrees with Defendants that recusal is not appropriate.
With respect to his first argument, Plaintiff contends that I improperly considered
and ruled on Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary judgment based on Plaintiff’s previously
dismissed lawsuits and by adopting the arguments in Defendants’ motion to dismiss. ECF
No. 65 at 4, 5–6. This is not so. Where the Court’s preliminary injunction order references
Plaintiff’s previous lawsuits, that information is included as background, ECF No. 48 at 3,
4, or because the issues Plaintiff raises here are similar to the issues considered in a
previous suit, see id. at 11. They were not used, as Plaintiff contends, as a basis for
forming the Court’s opinion. Nor did I adopt Defendants’ rationale for why Plaintiff’s claims
should be dismissed in reaching my conclusion on Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary
injunction. Although the preliminary injunction order notes that arguments advanced in
Defendants’ pending motion to dismiss, see ECF No. 48 at 8, it also notes a litany of other
issues with Plaintiff’s requested relief, including the fact that Plaintiff previously admitted
that “‘some of the core elements are missing’ in his causes of action,” ECF No. 48 at 2
(citing ECF No. 44 at 1)—a concession that, standing alone, remains fatal to Plaintiff’s
motion for a preliminary injunction. However, the preliminary injunction order also notes
that Plaintiff failed to meet the other three preliminary injunction factors. See id. at 9–12.
Because “[a]n injunction can issue only if each factor is established,” Denver Homeless
Out Loud v. Denver, Colorado, 32 F.4th 1259, 1277 (10th Cir. 2022), Plaintiff’s failure to
meet even one of the required criteria is sufficient to deny his request.
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Plaintiff’s second argument that I prejudiced him by determining that this case
lacks merit before Defendants’ motion to dismiss could be decided, see ECF No. 65 at 4,
ECF No. 68 at 4, is also unpersuasive because it misunderstands the standard by which
a motion for a preliminary injunction is evaluated. Among other factors, assessing a
motion for a preliminary injunction requires considering whether Plaintiff has established
that “he is likely to succeed on the merits” of his claims, Denver Homeless Out Loud, 32
F.4th at 1277, in light of the alleged facts and the ultimate relief sought, see Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Cruce, 972 F.2d 1195, 1198 (10th Cir. 1992). As discussed further below,
that is what I did in denying Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. See ECF No. 48
at 6–9. Importantly, although ruling on Plaintiff’s preliminary injunction required making a
prediction about Plaintiff’s likelihood of ultimate success, this did not prejudice the review
of Defendants’ pending motion to dismiss. An assessment of Defendants’ motion to
dismiss is not bound by the preliminary injunction order, which is evaluated under a
different standard. See, e.g., Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Herrera, 690 F.
Supp. 2d 1183, 1193 (D.N.M. 2010), on reconsideration in part, No. CIV 08-0702
JB/WDS, 2010 WL 3834049 (D.N.M. July 28, 2010) (“The standard on a motion to dismiss
is quite different from the standard for granting a preliminary injunction. In contrast to a
motion for a preliminary injunction, a motion to dismiss requires that the court determine,
while accepting all facts pled in the complaint as true and granting all reasonable
inferences from the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff, whether the complaint states a cause
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of action for which relief can be granted.”) (citations and alterations omitted). Utilizing a
different standard of review may result in a different conclusion.1
Equally unpersuasive is Plaintiff’s argument that I have a “bias or prejudice []
directed against [him],” ECF No. 68 at 4. The evidence Plaintiff presents to support this
contention is little more than the fact Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction was
denied. See id.; ECF No. 65 at 4. But “it is well-settled that adverse rulings do not
demonstrate bias and do not provide a basis for recusal.” United States v. Garcia, No.
24-CR-00106-NYW-1, 2025 WL 2021394, at *3 (D. Colo. July 18, 2025) (citing United
States v. Walker, 838 F. App’x 333, 337 (10th Cir. 2020)). Given that “a litigant's fear that
a judge may decide a question against him” in the future does not constitute a
“‘reasonable fear’ that the judge will not be impartial,” United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d
985, 992 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting H. Rep. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6351, 6355), Plaintiff fails to support
his contention that my preliminary injunction order was biased. See, e.g., Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid
basis for a bias or partiality motion.”) (citation omitted).
Finally, 	Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	the 	Court’s conclusion 	that 	Plaintiff 	is 	seeking
monetary damages, see ECF No. 48 at 7–8 n.7, is further evidence that his motion for a
1 Defendants’ pending motion to dismiss has been referred for review to Magistrate Judge O’Hara. See
ECF No. 27. However, the Court did not “tell[] Judge O’Hara to rule in Defendant[s’] favor or recommend
granting Defendant[s’] motion to dismiss,” as Plaintiff contends. See ECF No. 68 at 4. Rather, the
preliminary injunction order expressly states that the Court “declines to speculate on the outcome that
Magistrate Judge O’Hara might recommend,” ECF No. 48 at 8, and in any event, “findings of fact and
conclusions of law made by a court granting a preliminary injunction are not binding at trial on the merits.”
Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 1193 (citations and alterations omitted).
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preliminary injunction was decided on a basis other than the merits, see ECF No. 65 at
5. The validity of the Court’s determination is discussed in further detail below in
connection with Plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration; however, the Court notes that, with
respect to his recusal motions, Plaintiff fails to articulate on what alternative basis he
believes that determination was reached. There is no indication in the preliminary
injunction order, or in Plaintiff’s recusal briefing, that the Court concluded that Plaintiff was
seeking monetary damages on any basis other the Plaintiff’s own fillings.
Accordingly, in light of the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate that I am not impartial in my assessment of Plaintiff’s claims such that
recusal is appropriate. Plaintiff’s recusal motions, ECF Nos. 65, 68, are DENIED.
B. Motions for Reconsideration
In addition to the issues presented in his recusal motions, Plaintiff takes further
issue with the Court’s order denying his preliminary injunction in his two motions for
reconsideration and argues that the Court erred in at least eleven ways. See ECF Nos.
55, 70.2 Defendants filed responses opposing each of Plaintiff’s arguments. ECF Nos.
64, 74. Defendants further argue that given Plaintiff’s continued efforts to resolve his
grievances administratively, Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction is no longer live.
2 Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the court erred by (1) dismissing his request for preliminary injunction
because the exhaustion requirement in the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, should have
been excused; (2) finding that Plaintiff had abandoned his request for a preliminary injunction; (3) applying
the heightened standard for disfavored preliminary injunctions; (4) determining that the preliminary
injunction sought reimbursement of funds; (5) not evaluating the factors under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976), when analyzing his due process claim; (6) determining he did not face irreparable harm
because he could be made whole with money damages; (7) finding that Plaintiff sought monetary damages
under the Little Tucker Act; (8) considering claims outside the body of the operative complaint in determining
whether Plaintiff faces irreparable harm; (9) failing to analyze his due process claim using the factors from
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); (10) not considering the public interest in protecting the civil rights of
prisoners, id.; and (11) failing to construe his pleadings liberally. See generally ECF Nos. 55, 70.
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See ECF No. 64 at 6–7; ECF No. 74 at 6–7. The Court considers these arguments below
and declines to overturn its order on Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF
No. 48, because it finds that Plaintiff’s requested injunctive relief is now moot and because
Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that reconsideration is warranted.
1. 	Legal Standard
While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically provide for motions
for reconsideration, Rule 54(b) states that “any order or other decision, however
designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . may be revised at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all claims and all the parties’ rights and
liabilities.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). A motion for reconsideration filed prior to the entry of
judgment falls within a court’s power to revisit and amend interlocutory orders. See
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Thompson Theatres, Inc., 621 F.2d 1088, 1090 (10th Cir.
1980) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)). A motion for reconsideration is appropriate where
there is “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously
unavailable, [or] (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Servants
of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). The
decision whether to grant or deny a motion to reconsider is committed to the court’s sound
discretion. Trujillo v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Public Schools, 212 Fed.Appx. 760,
765 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (“A district court has discretion to revise interlocutory
orders prior to entry of final judgment.”) (citation omitted).
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2. 	The Scope of Plaintiff’s Request for Injunctive Relief
As an initial matter, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration
should be denied because the Court can no longer grant the relief Plaintiff’s seeks. See
ECF No. 64 at 6–7; ECF No. 74 at 6–7. Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s motion
requested specific, time-bound relief in the form of an injunction that would last only “‘until
the Federal Bureau of Prison’s administrative remedy procedures have been concluded,’”
ECF No. 64 at 6 (citing ECF No. 3 at 5), and note that Plaintiff’s most recent proposed
amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff has now concluded his efforts to exhaust
administrative remedy process, id. (citing ECF No. 45-1 at 14). The Court agrees with
Defendants that Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction seeks time-bound relief.
Specifically, Plaintiff requested the following:
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ECF No. 3 at 5. In a memorandum submitted in support of his motion, Plaintiff
reiterated his request for a preliminary injunction to be in place “while he exhaust[s] his
administrative remedies with the [Bureau of Prisons (BOP)].” ECF No. 10 at 5. Given this,
the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff was seeking injunctive relief only through
the time required for him to exhaust his administrative remedies.
The Court likewise agrees that Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint contains
additional allegations detailing the steps he has taken to resolve his grievances via the
available administrative procedures. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that (1) he filed a BP-8
requesting that the debt encumbrance be removed from his account and that his funds
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be returned; (2) his request was denied by the Warden on August 29, 2024; (3) the
Warden’s denial was affirmed by the Regional Director on September 30, 2024; and
(4) the Central Office affirmed the Regional Director’s response denying his request on
October 28, 2024. See ECF No. 45-1 at 14, ¶ 7. According to Defendants, these
allegations make clear that Plaintiff has “now completed the administrative remedy
process regarding his claim,” ECF No. 74 at 6–7, such that the Court can no longer grant
the time-barred relief Plaintiff seeks. Upon review of the administrative grievance
procedure 	available 	to 	Plaintiff, 	the 	Court 	agrees 	with 	Defendants 	that 	Plaintiff’s
administrative efforts have now concluded.
The BOP has established a four-step Administrative Remedy Program, codified at
28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10–542.19, which “allow[s] an inmate to seek formal review of an issue
relating to any aspect of his/her own confinement.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.10. Under this
process, an inmate must first attempt informal resolution with prison staff, 28 C.F.R. §
542.13(a). If the grievance is not informally resolved, the inmate must then submit a formal
written Administrative Remedy Request, or a B-9 form, with his institution. See id. §
542.14(a). An inmate who is dissatisfied with the Warden’s response may then submit an
appeal to the Regional Director. Id. § 542.15(a). Finally, if the inmate is dissatisfied with
the Regional Director’s response, he may file an appeal to the General Counsel via
submission to the Central Office. See id.; id. § 542.15(b)(1). “Appeal to the General
Counsel is the final administrative appeal.” Id.
As 	his 	proposed 	amended 	complaint 	makes 	clear, 	Plaintiff’s 	administrative
remedies were exhausted when his grievance was appealed to, and subsequently
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rejected by, the Central Office. See ECF No. 45-1 at 14. Because Plaintiff seeks a
preliminary injunction specific to the period of time required for him to exhaust his
administrative remedies, ECF No. 3 at 5, ECF No. 10 at 5, the Court is no longer able to
grant the relief he requests. On these grounds, Plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration,
ECF Nos. 55, 70, are denied as moot.
3. 	Plaintiff’s Motions for Reconsideration
Although the time-bound nature of Plaintiff’s relief is sufficient to deny his
reconsideration motions as moot, Plaintiff also raises a host of other issues in support of
his argument that the Court erred in denying his motion for a preliminary injunction. See
generally ECF Nos. 55, 70.3 Construing his pleadings liberally, as the Court must for a
pro se plaintiff,4 Plaintiff does not appear to argue any intervening change in controlling
law, or that new evidence available. Instead, the basis for each of Plaintiff’s arguments
appears to be that the Court’s preliminary injunction order contains errors of fact and law.
3 Among his many arguments, Plaintiff contends that the Court “erred [in] finding that [Plaintiff’s] requested
relief is disfavored and thereby warrants a heightened standard of proof.” ECF No. 55 at 17. Although the
Court disagrees, such a finding is immaterial. Even if his requested relief is not disfavored, establishing the
threat of irreparable harm still requires that Plaintiff “demonstrate ‘a significant risk that [he] will experience
harm that cannot be compensated after the fact by money damages.’” See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Peace &
Just. Ctr. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 18-cv-01017-PAB, 2018 WL 3772864, at *5 (D. Colo.
Aug. 9, 2018) (citing Fish v. Kobach, 840 F.3d 710, 751 (10th Cir. 2016)). As discussed in greater detail
below, Plaintiff cannot do that here.
4 In his second motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff argues that the Court erred because “it failed to liberally
construe the claims raised in the operative complaint, the relief sought, and the request for preliminary
injunction, when determining whether [Plaintiff] stated a cause of action.” ECF No. 70 at 1. The Court
disagrees. Although the order on Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction does not explicitly reference
the liberal standard utilized to assess pro se filings, it was indeed applied. And while liberal construction
permits the Court to “overlook technical formatting errors and other defects in the Plaintiffs use of legal
terminology and proper English,” Smith Bey v. Gibson, No. 04-cv-01050-MSK-PAC, 2007 WL 778626, at
*1 (D. Colo. Mar. 9, 2007), the Court must still assess a pro se plaintiff’s filings based on the information
presented, as it did in its preliminary injunction order. See Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173–
74 (10th Cir. 1997) (when assessing a pro se plaintiff’s filings, the court “will not supply additional factual
allegations to round out [his] complaint or construct a legal theory on [his] behalf”).
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Upon review of Plaintiff’s arguments, the Court is not persuaded that a different
conclusion is necessary.
Granting a preliminary injunction requires that the moving party “establish that he
is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence
of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is
in the public interest.” Denver Homeless, 32 F.4th at 1277 (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). “An injunction can issue only if each factor is
established.” Id. (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 23–24). Thus, if the moving part fails to
establish all four factors, it is not entitled to injunctive relief.
As noted above, Plaintiff takes issue with the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff was
seeking monetary damages and argues that his request for injunctive relief did not
explicitly seek a reimbursement of funds. ECF No. 55 at 18 n.3. Plaintiff contends that
this determination led the Court to improperly conclude that Plaintiff failed to meet the
“irreparable harm” criterion. Id. at 27. The Court rejects this argument.
As an initial matter, the Court finds that it properly concluded that Plaintiff’s alleged
injuries could be satisfied by monetary damages because the pleadings indicate that
Plaintiff’s “primary concern is requiring Defendant to reimburse money that he believes
was improperly taken from his trust fund account.” ECF No. 48 at 7–8 n.7 (citing ECF No.
11 at 17). Statements in Plaintiff’s reconsideration motions further reiterate that the
ultimate relief he seeks is monetary. See, e.g., ECF No. 55 at 25 (stating that Plaintiff is
“trying to get money back from federal officials”); id. (stating that if injunctive relief is
denied, Plaintiff’s request would “become one for compensatory relief,” where he is
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“seeking relief from the government[’]s Department of Treasury”); id. at 27 (stating that if
his preliminary injunction is denied, Plaintiff’s remaining claims “would operate against
the Treasury Department”). Taken together, these representations suggest that the
ultimate relief that Plaintiff hopes to recover is monetary. It is that ultimate relief that the
Court must consider when assessing whether plaintiff has met each criterion for a
preliminary injunction. See, e.g., K-MAR Indus., Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Def., No.
CV-10-0984-F, 2011 WL 13308323, at *2 n.1 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 10, 2011) (assessing “the
likelihood of success on the merits criterion” requires “look[ing] at plaintiff's ability to show
at the time of the motion that plaintiff is likely to obtain, at a later stage, the ultimate relief
sought in the action”) (emphasis added). Thus, even though Plaintiff’s motion for a
preliminary injunction seeks injunctive relief and not monetary damages, that is not the
ultimate relief the Court must consider. Indeed, as the name suggests, such relief is only
preliminary. Accordingly, when determining whether Plaintiff has met each of the
preliminary injunction factors, the Court considers the final ultimate relief requested.
Second, because the Court is satisfied that the ultimate relief Plaintiff seeks is
monetary in nature, it did not err in finding that Plaintiff failed to establish irreparable harm
in the absence of a preliminary injunction. As noted in the Court’s order, and as Plaintiff
has previously acknowledged, “a loss of income or money generally does not rise to the
level of irreparable harm because a plaintiff can be made whole if the plaintiff is the
prevailing party.” ECF No. 48 at 9 (citing ECF No. 10 at 16). Moreover, it is “well settled
that simple economic loss usually does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm
[because] such losses are compensable by monetary damages.” ECF No. 48 at 10 (citing
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Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1267 (10th Cir. 2004)). Thus, any harm Plaintiff
may suffer while awaiting the resolution of his case would be resolved if and when he is
awarded compensatory relief.5 Because “[a]n injunction can issue only if each factor is
established,” Denver Homeless, 32 F.4th at 1277 (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 23–24),
Plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration are denied.6
III. 	CONCLUSION
Consistent with the above analyses, because Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden
of demonstrating that I am unable to preside over this case impartially, Plaintiff’s Motions
for Recusal, ECF Nos. 65, 68, are DENIED. Additionally, because Plaintiff’s requested
injunctive relief is moot and because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate irreparable harm
as outlined above, Plaintiff has failed to meet the standard for reconsideration and his
Motions for Reconsideration, ECF Nos. 55, 70, are DENIED.
5 Although Plaintiff argues that he would ultimately be unable to recover the money that Defendants
allegedly owe him because his suit against government officials for monetary damages would be barred,
see ECF No. 55 at 25–27, the Court again notes that Plaintiff still continues to seek money damages under
Bivens and the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 in his proposed second amended complaint. See ECF
No. 45-1 at 3–4 (seeking $10 million in compensatory damages and another $10 million in punitive
damages). Such claims further support the Court’s finding that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate irreparable
harm that could not be remedied by the award of monetary damages at the conclusion of trial.
6 As discussed, the Court previously found that Plaintiff is unlikely to demonstrate success on the merits of
his claims. While a failure to demonstrate irreparable harm is, standing alone, sufficient to deny his motion
to reconsider the Court’s preliminary injunction order, Plaintiff’s inability to establish that he is likely to prevail
on the merits of his claims also supports the denial of his motions for reconsideration. See Denver
Homeless, 32 F.4th at 1277.
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DATED this 10th day of November 2025.
BY THE COURT:
________________________________
Charlotte N. Sweeney
United States District Judge
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