Beauford v. Denver Public Schools

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00590-SKC-SBP
ANTHONY BEAUFORD,
Plaintiff,
v.
DENVER PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AMEND
Susan Prose, United States Magistrate Judge
This matter comes before the court on the Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended
Complaint (the “Motion” or “Motion to Amend”) filed by Plaintiff Anthony Beauford. ECF No.
98. The court considers the Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the Order Referring Case
dated May 21, 2025 (ECF No. 46), and the Memorandum dated October 22, 2025 (ECF No. 99).
Upon review of the Motion and the related briefing, the entire docket, and the applicable law, the
Motion to Amend is GRANTED. 1
1 “Whether motions to amend are dispositive is an unsettled issue in the 10th Circuit.” Cano-
Rodriguez v. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 14, No. 19-cv-01370-CMA-KLM, 2020 WL 6049595,
at *1 n.2 (D. Colo. July 23, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 4593219 (D.
Colo. Aug. 11, 2020). Courts in this District have treated orders granting motions to amend as
nondispositive, but “many courts have held that a recommendation to deny a motion to amend
. . . should be viewed as a dispositive ruling because it precludes the filing of certain claims.”
Crocs, Inc. v. Effervescent, Inc., No. 06-cv-00605-PAB-KMT, 2021 WL 941828, at *2 n.1. (D.
Colo. Mar. 11, 2021) (quotation omitted); see also Bullock v. Daimler Trucks N. Am., LLC, No.
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BACKGROUND
The following facts are alleged in both Mr. Beauford’s Third Amended Complaint (ECF
No. 75), the currently-operative pleading, as well as in his proposed Fourth Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 98-1) that is the subject of the Motion to Amend.
Mr. Beauford, who is African American, initiated this employment discrimination case
against his former employer, Denver Public Schools (“DPS” or “Defendant”), on February 21,
2025. See ECF No. 1. In August 2022, Mr. Beauford reported to a DPS investigator that the
environment in the HVAC department where he worked was marked by “racial tension” and
“discriminatory comments,” including the use of the “n-word.” ECF No. 75 ¶ 7 (referencing
December 6, 2022 letter from Megan Bench, Designated Employee Complaint Officer, ECF No.
75 at 10-12). 2 The investigator concluded that Mr. Beauford’s complaints demonstrated “a
violation of law, DPS Administration Policy, and/or the DPS Employment Practices Manual.”
ECF No. 75 at 10. The investigator found that Mr. Beauford’s “supervisors subjected [him] to
retaliation for [his] protected activity”; that “no action was taken regarding [his] allegations of
08-cv-00491-PAB-MEH, 2010 WL 1286079, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 29, 2010) (observing that it
“makes good sense” to distinguish between allowing and denying an amendment in considering
whether to issue an order or recommendation as a magistrate judge). Because this court
concludes that the Motion to Amend should be granted, it proceeds by order rather than by
recommendation.
2 Mr. Beauford has incorporated the investigator’s report and other documents into the Third
Amended Complaint and attached them as exhibits to the pleading. See Gee v. Pacheco, 627
F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir. 2010) (court may consider “documents referred to in the complaint if
the documents are central to the plaintiff’s claim and the parties do not dispute the documents’
authenticity”) (quoting Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 2002)).
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discrimination”; that he “was “held to a different disciplinary standard than [his]
Caucasian/White peers”; and that DPS policies had been violated “based on race/color
discrimination due to the subsequent disciplinary actions taken against [Mr. Beauford], up to and
including his discharge on or about July 22, 2022.” Id. at 10-11.3
These findings, as against Mr. Beauford’s direct supervisors, were affirmed on appeal.
ECF No. 75 ¶ 12 (referencing July 24, 2023 letter from Rosalind R. Sullivan, Manager,
Employee Relations Investigations, ECF No. 75 at 14-23). Specifically, the reviewing official
found that the persons in Mr. Beauford’s supervisory chain were responsible for the following
actions:
(1) You subjected Mr. Beauford to a hostile work environment when you failed to
address race based comments of other employees.
(2) Your issuance of the Letter of Expectation on September 1, 2020 is retaliation
for having engaged in the protected activity of complaining about racism.
(3) Your request that an armed and uniformed Security Officer be present at the
September 27, 2021 meeting was based on Mr. Beauford’s protected classes and or
in retaliation for having engaged in protected activity.
(4) Mr. Beauford’s 2022 discipline and discharge were based on his protected class
and/or in retaliation for engaging in protected activity.
See, e.g., ECF No. 75 at 20-21 (cleaned up); see also id. at 20 (finding “a clear connection
between the protected activity and the employment action”).
3 In the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint, Mr. Beauford alleges that there was “a termination
attempt on July 22, 2022, based on pretextual reasons including ‘Apparent False Reporting of
Vehicle Incident’ and ‘Bid Shopping.’” ECF No. 98-1 ¶ 12. Mr. Beauford “was reinstated on
August 19, 2022, but was immediately placed on paid administrative leave pending completion
of the Discrimination Prevention and Response investigation.” Id.
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Mr. Beauford also alleges that a Caucasian co-worker named Jeff Tagg “engaged in
egregious racist conduct.” ECF No. 75 ¶ 12. A complaint from Mr. Beauford resulted in a
finding that Mr. Tagg’s actions violated DPS “Administration Policy G.” Id. (referencing April
1, 2024 letter from Olga Knight, Investigator, Employee Relations, Designated Employee
Compliance Officer, ECF No. 75 at 24-25); id. at 25 (concluding that “it is more likely than not
that [Mr. Tagg] violated Administration Policy G”). Mr. Beauford alleges that Administration
Policy G was used as the basis for his own eventual termination, yet Mr. Tagg “received no
comparable discipline.” Id. ¶ 12. “This stark racial disparity in enforcement,” Mr. Beauford
contends, “highlights Defendant’s discriminatory practices.” Id.
Furthermore, Mr. Beauford alleges that he was “repeatedly denied . . . promotions,”
including to the HVAC supervisor position in December 2023, “despite [his] extensive
qualifications and experience.” Id. ¶ 13. The person ultimately selected for the position was a 26-
year-old African American man who, in Mr. Beauford’s view, “had unverified education and
work experience[.]” Id. Mr. Beauford asserts that Keith Weston, the hiring manager who chose
the candidate, “lacked training on how to hire.” Id. Mr. Beauford then took it upon himself to
make his own inquiry into the selected candidate’s qualifications, which he avers “constituted
protected activity as an opposition to perceived discriminatory hiring practices.” Id. ¶ 19. For this
conduct, Mr. Beauford was placed on administrative leave on February 6, 2024, and ultimately
terminated on February 28, 2024. Id.
Based on these allegations, Mr. Beauford raises the following claims in the Third
Amended complaint: (1) race discrimination and hostile work environment under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq., and the Colorado
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Anti-Discrimination Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-34-402 et seq. (“CADA”), id. ¶¶ 5-14; (2) a
retaliation claim under § 1981, Title VII, and CADA, id. ¶¶ 15-24; (3) a claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and CADA, id. ¶¶ 25-31;
and (4) a claim under § 1981 and CADA based on alleged “due process violations/denial of
union representation,” id. ¶¶ 32-39.
On July 7, 2025, this court entered a Scheduling Order, setting August 21, 2025, as the
deadline for joinder of parties and amendment of pleadings. ECF No. 68 at 7. Exactly two
months after the amendment deadline, on October 21, 2025, Mr. Beauford filed the instant
Motion to Amend. ECF No. 98. Mr. Beauford seeks leave to amend his pleading by expanding
his second and fourth claims for relief to encompass a municipal liability claim pursuant to
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), based on a
ratification theory. See ECF No. 98 at 24 ; see also ECF No. 98-1 ¶¶ 21-23; id. ¶ 38 (alleging that
“[t]he arbitrary decision making and subsequent ratification by final policymakers (as alleged in
Count II) establishes the Monell elements of municipal liability for the due process violations”).
Mr. Beauford argues that the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint will serve to “clarify and
specify the allegations of executive ratification of retaliatory conduct [that is] crucial for Monell
liability[.]” Id. To that end, the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint includes new allegations
4 Mr. Beauford also states that he wishes to amend his pleading based on “significant, material
events” that have occurred since he filed the Third Amended Complaint, including his
“termination from employment with the Defendant on or about March 8, 2024,” and the “denial
of his “post-termination administrative appeal on or about March 27, 2024.” ECF No. 98 at 1-2.
This aspect of Mr. Beauford’s rationale is not supported by the record, since both events long
predate the filing of this lawsuit and, indeed, seem to have served as the impetus for it.
Accordingly, the court understands the addition of a Monell claim to be Mr. Beauford’s primary
justification for seeking leave to file an amended complaint.
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purporting to show “executive promotions and ratification” and “confirmed facts proving pretext
and executive ratification.” ECF No. 98-1 ¶¶ 22-23. Mr. Beauford alleges that “[e]very person
who was a part of the adverse employment actions taken against Plaintiff from January 6, 2020,
to March 8, 2024, received no meaningful discipline and, in fact, was promoted, demonstrating
the Defendant’s policy of sanctioning unlawful conduct and that these individuals directedly
benefited from the adverse action taken against the Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 22.
In the Motion to Amend, Mr. Beauford asserts that he could not have apprehended this
new theory of liability earlier:
Diligence and New Theory (Monell): The claims related to executive ratification
and municipal liability (Monell) are complex and required discovery to identify the
final policymakers (Lawrence Garcia and Rich Archuletta) and their roles. This
theory was not fully formed until the discovery process advanced. These facts could
not have been reasonably discovered earlier despite Plaintiff’s diligence during the
initial discovery stage, thus establishing Rule 16’s threshold requirement[.]
ECF No. 98 ¶ 8. DPS vigorously disagrees. It asserts that the Motion should be denied because
Mr. Beauford has failed to establish “any justification for the more than eight (8) week delay in
filing his Motion to Amend.” ECF No. 108 at 3. DPS maintains that Mr. Beauford’s argument
that the facts about “purported final policymakers Lawrence Garcia and Rich Archuletta . . .
could not have been discovered earlier is meritless, as this information was not only available
and known to him during the events leading to the termination of his employment, but this
information was specifically listed and/or disclosed to Beauford in the District’s initial
disclosures.” Id. at 4-5; see also Defendant’s Amended Initial Disclosures dated July 23, 2025,
ECF No. 108-1 at 3 (disclosing Archuletta, but not Garcia, as a person with discoverable
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information DPS may use to support its defenses). DPS contends that it is prejudiced by the
amendment, which it asserts must also be denied on futility grounds. ECF No. 98 at 5-15.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Because Mr. Beauford filed the Motion to Amend after the expiration of the deadline for
amendment of pleadings, this court considers the Motion pursuant to a two-step inquiry. First,
the court reviews whether Mr. Beauford, as the moving party, can demonstrate good cause for
amendment pursuant to Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Gorsuch, Ltd.,
B.C. v. Wells Fargo Nat’l Bank Assoc., 771 F.3d 1230, 1242 (10th Cir. 2014); SIL-FLO, Inc. v.
SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 1507, 1518 (10th Cir. 1990). Next, the court weighs whether the
amendment should be allowed pursuant to Rule 15(a). Gorsuch, 771 F.3d at 1242. Under both
Rules, whether to allow amendment is within the court’s sound discretion. See id. at 1240; see
also Minter v. Prime Equip. Co., 451 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2006).
Rule 16(b) provides that a scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause and
with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). “In practice, this standard requires the
movant to show the ‘scheduling deadlines cannot be met despite [the movant’s] diligent
efforts.’” Gorsuch, 771 F.3d at 1240 (citing Pumpco, Inc. v. Schenker Int’l, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 667,
668 (D. Colo. 2001)). As pertinent here, this burden may be satisfied “if a plaintiff learns new
information through discovery[.]” Id. The inquiry under Rule 16 “focuses on the diligence of the
party seeking leave to modify the scheduling order to permit the proposed amendment.” XY, LLC
v. Trans Ova Genetics, LC, No. 17-cv-00944-WJM-NYW, 2022 WL 2716550, at *9 (D. Colo.
July 13, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 4298400 (D. Colo. Sept. 19,
2022) (quoting Colo. Visionary Acad. v. Medtronic, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 684, 687 (D. Colo. 2000)).
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“A party’s delay in performing the pretrial preparation necessary to recognize a claim or defense
does not satisfy Rule 16(b)(4)’s good cause standard.” Sher v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 722 F. Supp.
3d 1176, 1181 (D. Colo. 2024), reconsideration denied, 2024 WL 4504565 (D. Colo. Oct. 16,
2024) (citing Colo. Visionary Acad., 194 F.R.D. at 688).
To warrant amendment, the court must also find that the requirements of Rule 15(a) are
satisfied. Pumpco, 204 F.R.D. at 668. Rule 15(a) embodies a more liberal standard for
amendment than Rule 16(b)(4), providing that “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice
so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Under Rule 15, “[a] general presumption exists in favor of
allowing a party to amend its pleadings, and the non-moving party bears the burden of showing
that the proposed amendment is improper.” Doe by & through Roe v. Cherry Creek Sch. Dist.,
No. 24-cv-00687-NYW-TPO, 2024 WL 4581161, at *2 (D. Colo. Oct. 25, 2024) (cleaned up)
(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s
Inv. Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 859 (10th Cir. 1999)); accord, e.g., Corporate Stock Transfer,
Inc. v. AE Biofuels, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061 (D. Colo. 2009). Indeed, the purpose of
Rule 15(a) is “to provide litigants ‘the maximum opportunity for each claim to be decided on its
merits rather than on procedural niceties.’” Minter, 451 F.3d at 1204 (quoting Hardin v.
Manitowoc-Forsythe Corp., 691 F.2d 449, 456 (10th Cir. 1982)). However, the court may refuse
leave to amend “upon a showing of undue delay, undue prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith
or dilatory motive, failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, or futility of
amendment.” Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1365 (10th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
Informed by these standards, the court turns to the parties’ arguments for and against the
proposed amendment that would allow Mr. Beauford to pursue a claim against DPS based on a
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Monell ratification theory.
ANALYSIS
I. 	Mr. Beauford Has Shown Good Cause Under Rule 16(b)(4)
The court finds that Mr. Beauford has demonstrated good cause for modification of the
scheduling order under Rule 16(b)(4).
Recall that Mr. Beauford’s explanation for missing the amendment deadline in the
scheduling order by approximately eight weeks is that he needed some discovery in order to
plead a Monell claim. He argues that the executive ratification theory on which his Monell claim
hinges is “complex and required discovery to identify” Mr. Garcia and Mr. Archuletta as the
“final policymakers.” ECF No. 98 ¶ 8. DPS counters that these names were made known to Mr.
Beauford during the process that culminated in his termination and that, in any event, they were
identified in DPS’s July 23, 2025 disclosures pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1)—although, in fact, Mr.
Garcia’s name was not specifically disclosed in that document. See ECF No. 108-1; see also
ECF No. 108 at 4-5.5 The court respectfully finds that denial of the Motion to Amend on the
grounds DPS advances is not required under the precedent interpreting Rule 16(b)(4) and would
not serve the interest of justice.
First, an understanding that Mr. Garcia and Mr. Archuletta were involved in the events
leading to Mr. Beauford’s termination does not by definition equate to an immediate appreciation
that their conduct might support a Monell claim based on a ratification theory. To hold Mr.
Beauford to such a standard would oblige him to act with a kind of prescience even a trained
lawyer may not possess. Second, Mr. Beauford has averred that he came to the conclusion that
5 It may be that Mr. Garcia’s name appears in one or more of the documents DPS disclosed.
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he had a supportable Monell claim after reviewing discovery, which satisfies the good cause
standard, see Gorsuch, 771 F.3d at 1240, and DPS has not meaningfully disputed that contention.
Too, the timing alone, with Mr. Beauford seeking leave to amend two months after the joinder
deadline and three months into the discovery period, does not compel a finding of lack of
diligence on his part—the focus of this court’s inquiry under Rule 16(b)(4). See id.; see also
Minter, 451 F.3d at 1205 n.4 (noting the “rough similarity” between the good cause standard
under Rule 16(b) and the undue delay analysis under Rule 15).
Without question, a scheduling order “is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered,
which can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel without peril.” Washington v. Arapahoe Cty.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 197 F.R.D. 439, 441 (D. Colo. 2000) (quotation omitted). But the court has
discretion to view the request for amendment in light of the totality of the circumstances,
recognizing that “[a]lthough the scheduling order defines the boundaries of litigation and assists
parties in preparing for trial, the Tenth Circuit has encouraged district judges to remain flexible
in allowing amended pleadings.” ClearCapital.com, Inc. v. Computershare, Inc., No. 18-cv-
00817-RBJ, 2019 WL 1573300, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 11, 2019) (citing Summers v. Missouri Pac.
R.R. Sys., 132 F.3d 599, 604 (10th Cir. 1997)). When it comes to modifying a scheduling order,
“total inflexibility is undesirable.” Summers, 132 F.3d at 604.
Mr. Beauford’s actions here do not evince “the type of carelessness that the good cause
standard is meant to address.” Perkins v. Fed. Fruit & Produce Co., No. 11-cv-00542-REB-
KLM, 2011 WL 3820751, at *3 (D. Colo. Aug. 29, 2011) (citing Pumpco, 204 F.R.D. at 668).
Viewing the situation through the prism of hindsight, perhaps Mr. Beauford might have earlier
raised a Monell claim, but “the court’s focus is on diligence, not perfection.” See Schacht v.
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Collins, No. 23-cv-00709-PAB-SBP, 2025 WL 2778158, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2025); see
also Culver v. Saint Francis Health Sys., Inc., No. 24-CV-0078-CVE-MTS, 2025 WL 2848493,
at *3 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 8, 2025). The court concludes that Mr. Beauford has shown that he
exercised diligence and thus has demonstrated that good cause exists to amend the Scheduling
Order. The court therefore turns to the parties’ arguments under Rule 15.
II. 	DPS Has Not Shown that Leave Should Be Denied Under Rule 15(a)
While Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so
requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), the court may deny leave to amend upon a showing of futility,
bad faith, undue delay, or undue prejudice. Frank, 3 F.3d at 1365. As the non-moving party, DPS
bears the burden of demonstrating that amendment is not warranted under Rule 15. Moody’s, 175
F.3d at 859. DPS contends that the amendment must be denied on grounds of prejudice and
futility. The court is respectfully unpersuaded by DPS’s arguments, on either point.6
A. 	Prejudice
DPS argues that it would be prejudiced by the court’s acceptance of the proposed
amendment because it raises “a new legal theory of municipal liability that would “expand[] the
scope of [DPS’s] defenses[.]” ECF No. 108 at 14. Perhaps true, on some level, but not of
significant consequence to the court’s analysis here in light of the consistency in the subject
matter between the current claims and the claim Mr. Beauford seeks to add.
“Courts typically find prejudice only when the amendment unfairly affects the defendants
‘in terms of preparing their defense to the amendment.’” Minter, 451 F.3d at 1208 (quoting
6 Neither would the record here support a finding of undue delay or bad faith, had DPS raised
those arguments.
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Patton v. Guyer, 443 F.2d 79, 86 (10th Cir. 1971)). “Most often, this occurs when the amended
claims arise out of a subject matter different from what was set forth in the complaint and raise
significant new factual issues.” Id. (citations omitted). Here, DPS offers little explanation as to
how it would be prejudiced, in light of the similarities in the factual underpinnings between the
claims Mr. Beauford is currently raising and his proposed municipal liability claim. Indeed, if
Mr. Beauford has long known about Mr. Garcia’s and Mr. Archuletta’s involvement in his
termination process, see ECF No. 108 at 4-5, so has DPS, thus negating the existence of
“significant new factual issues” attendant on the addition of a Monell claim. Minter, 451 F.3d at
1208.
DPS emphasizes that it has already responded to significant written discovery, ECF No.
108 at 15, but that does not establish that DPS will be prejudiced by the amendment. It appears
probable that the discovery previously produced would equally bear on Mr. Beauford’s new—
but in no respect wholly dissimilar—theory of liability.
On this record, then, the court cannot conclude that the proposed “amended claim[]
arise[s] out of a subject matter different from what was set forth in the [Third Amended
Complaint] and raise[s] significant new factual issues.” See Minter, 451 F.3d at 1208; see also
Gillette v. Tansy, 17 F.3d 308, 313 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding no evidence of prejudice when the
“Petitioner’s [amended] claims track the factual situations set forth in his [original] claims”);
Childers v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 676 F.2d 1338, 1343 (10th Cir. 1982) (finding that the district
court’s refusal to allow an amendment was “particularly egregious in this case because the
subject matter of the amendment was already alleged in the complaint”).
For these reasons, prejudice—the “most important factor” in assessing whether leave
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should be denied, see Minter, 451 F.3d at 1207—is absent here.
B. 	Futility
The primary justification for DHS’s opposition to the Motion to Amend is that the
proposed amendment is futile. See ECF No. 108 at 5-14. DHS offers a detailed explication of
what it asserts to be fatal pleading deficiencies in each claim, and argues that the additional
allegations in the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint either are already alleged (at least in
some form) in the Third Amended Complaint or do not repair the existing pleading defects so as
to enable Mr. Beauford to state any plausible claim for relief. See id. at 5 (“the FAC [proposed
Fourth Amended Complaint] still fails to state plausible race or age discrimination claims”); id.
at 7 (“The FAC adds no allegations to support a plausible hostile work environment claim.”); id.
at 8 (“Beauford’s FAC still fails to allege a plausible retaliation claim.”). As to the proposed
Monell claim, DHS submits a detailed, four-page analysis of the purported pleading deficiencies
in that new claim which, in DHS’s view, would compel its dismissal. Id. at 10-14.
The court is respectfully unpersuaded by DHS’s futility argument. The proposed
amendment is not so facially deficient as to prompt this court to exercise its discretion to
preemptively preclude its being filed, and its viability assessed, on more fulsome briefing in the
context of a dispositive motion.
“A proposed amendment is futile if the complaint, as amended, would be subject to
dismissal.” Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1218 (10th Cir. 1999). “The futility question is
functionally equivalent to the question whether a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state
a claim.” Id. (citation omitted). However, where a proposed amended complaint is not “patently
futile on its face,” judges in this District have expressed a disinclination—shared by this judicial
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officer—to deny a motion to amend on futility grounds. See, e.g., Combs v. Nordstrom, Inc., No.
22-cv-00150-RMR-NRN, 2022 WL 2865985, at *4 (D. Colo. July 21, 2022), objection
overruled, 2022 WL 17534122 (D. Colo. Aug 17, 2022); Electro-Mechanical Prods, Inc. v. Alan
Lupton Assocs., No. 22-cv-00763-PAB-SBP, 2023 WL 5152627, at *3 (D. Colo. July 10, 2023)
(“Denying a motion to amend based on futility is uncommon in this District and usually involves
claims that are facially unsupported in the proposed amendment.”).
Upon a careful review of the well-pleaded facts in the proposed Fourth Amended
Complaint, the court cannot conclude that Mr. Beauford’s proposed municipal liability claim is
“patently futile on its face.” See Combs, 2022 WL 2865985, at *4. This conclusion flows from
the court’s obligation to consider the contextual support for Mr. Beauford’s factual averments
provided by the documents he has chosen to incorporate into his pleading. See Gee, 627 F.3d at
1186. DHS’s futility argument does not fully acknowledge, let alone grapple with, the
implications of this record. Nor does it acknowledge the governing legal principle that, in
assessing whether to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept all
well-pleaded facts as true, view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Swint v. Dish Network, No. 23-4098, 2023 WL
8074820, at *1 (10th Cir. Nov. 21, 2023) (unpublished) (citing Brooks v. Mentor Worldwide
LLC, 985 F.3d 1272, 1281 (10th Cir. 2021)).
The court finds, exercising its discretion, that DHS’s legal arguments concerning the
viability of the proposed Monell claim would be more efficiently raised in a dispositive motion.
Such a motion might take the form of a renewed motion to dismiss. But it strikes the court that
DHS’s arguments go more to the merits of the proposed claim than to whether it can withstand a
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motion to dismiss. In these circumstances, and given the substantial progress of discovery in this
matter, DHS’s position likely would be more efficiently presented in a motion for summary
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Put otherwise, “[r]ather than forcing a . . .
motion for summary judgment argument into a response to the Motion to Amend, [DHS] is
better served by having an opportunity to fully brief the merits of the allegations upon
appropriate motion.” Swanson v. N. Light Specialty Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-03778-RMR-NRN, 2022
WL 500294, at *5 (D. Colo. Feb. 18, 2022), objections overruled, 2022 WL 22826787 (D. Colo.
Mar. 31, 2022); see also, e.g., Fuller v. REGS, LLC, No. 10-cv-01209-WJM-CBS, 2011 WL
1235688, *3 (D. Colo Mar. 31, 2011) (“The matter is better addressed in a motion to dismiss or
motion for summary judgment, not here in the context of Rule 15(a).”); Carefusion 213, LLC v.
Professional Disposables, Inc., No. 09-2616-KHV-DJW, 2010 WL 4004874, *6 (D. Kan. Oct.
12, 2010) (“Defendants’ arguments are better suited for resolution on a motion for summary
judgment than a motion to amend.”). Irrespective of how DHS’s arguments are ultimately
presented, this court finds it inappropriate to conduct a merits analysis in connection with Mr.
Beauford’s Motion to Amend.
For these reasons, the court respectfully disagrees with DPS that, at this juncture, Mr.
Beauford’s proposed amendment would necessarily be futile. Accordingly, the court will grant
the Motion to Amend.7
7 The court takes note of DHS’s assertion that the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint “add[s]
allegations to support a claim for punitive damages against the District,” and that “[i]t is well
established . . . that punitive damages are unavailable against a school district under Colo. Rev.
Stat[.] 24-10-114(4) or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” ECF No. 108 at 14 (citing Brammer-Hoelter v.
Twin Peak Charter Academy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1101 (D. Colo. 2000)). However, Mr.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully ORDERED that:
(1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended Complaint (ECF No. 98) is
GRANTED;
(2) Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint (ECF No. 98-1) shall be the operative
complaint in this matter; and
(3) Within seven days of the date of this Order, Plaintiff shall file as a separate docket
entry all exhibits referenced in the Fourth Amended Complaint, which are found in other
places in the docket but which are not separately appended to the Fourth Amended Complaint.8
Beauford also claims entitlement to punitive damages in the Third Amended Complaint, ECF
No. 75 at 9 (seeking an award of “punitive damages to deter Defendant from similar conduct in
the future”), and DHS did not mention the punitive damages issue in its motion to dismiss that
complaint. See generally ECF No. 78. While DHS may be correct in its assessment of the
punitive damages issue, this court has located no case other Brammer-Hoelter on this point, and
the plaintiffs in that matter conceded that exemplary damages were not available. See 81 F. Supp.
2d at 1101. Having determined that the Motion to Amend will be granted, the court deems it
appropriate for all challenges to the Fourth Amended Complaint—including any concerning the
availability of exemplary damages—to be addressed in the context of a dispositive motion.
8 Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that within fourteen (14) days after
service of a Magistrate Judge’s order or recommendation, any party may serve and file written
objections with the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.
28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A), (B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), (b). Failure to make any such objection
will result in a waiver of the right to appeal the Magistrate Judge’s order or recommendation. See
Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. A & B Builders, Ltd., 989 F.3d 747, 783 (10th Cir. 2021) (firm waiver
rule applies to non-dispositive orders); but see Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1119,
1122 (10th Cir. 2005) (firm waiver rule does not apply when the interests of justice require
review, including when a “pro se litigant has not been informed of the time period for objecting
and the consequences of failing to object”).
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DATED: March 9, 2026 	BY THE COURT:
______________________________
Susan Prose
United States Magistrate Judge
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