Schroeder v. Heart of the Rockies Regional Medical Center et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney
Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-00117-CNS-NRN
WILLIAM ROBERT SCHROEDER, DO, MCDB,
Plaintiff,
v.
HEART OF THE ROCKIES REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
ROBERT MORASKO, former HRRMC CEO,
HEATHER ROBERTS, RN Vice President of Clinical Operations,
DR. BRODY, MD, Full Legal Name Unknown,
KOZAK & GAYER, PA, HRRMC Institutional Legal Counsel,
JOHN TUCKER, Current HRRMC CEO/President,
DR. JOSHUA VISATACION, MD, HRRMC Chief of Staff,
SARAH MCMAHON, HR Director HRRMC,
COMPUGROUP MEDICAL INC.,
DOLLY CHAMNESS, Director of IT Services, HRRMC,
AUBREY PAVLACKA, P.A., HRRMC Pain Management Department,
DR. ANDREW EMMERMAN, MD, Locum Tenens Physician,
DR. RICHARD WOLKOWITZ, MD, HRRMC Pain Management,
DR. ERIC DJENGE, MD, HRRMC Internal Medicine, and
JOHN DOES 1-10 (Unknown employees, agents, or third-party contractors of HRRMC
involved in record management, billing, or administration),
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court are the HRRMC Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), see ECF No. 65 at 1 (defining
HRRMC Defendants), and Defendant CompuGroup Medical, Inc.’s (CompuGroup’s)
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Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), ECF No. 107.1
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS both motions. In doing so, it presumes
familiarity with this case’s factual and procedural background, the allegations in Plaintiff’s
operative complaint, ECF No. 27, and the legal standards governing the Court’s analyses.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
I. 	SUMMARY FOR PRO SE PLAINTIFF
Defendants move to dismiss your claims against them. As for the HRRMC
Defendants, many of your claims are barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act
because you fail to allege that you provided these defendants with adequate notice.
Explained below, the Court dismisses those claims without prejudice, but gives you only
one more chance to allege facts sufficient to satisfy the CGIA’s requirements. Regarding
your remaining claims, the Court dismisses those as well. You cannot assert False Claims
Act retaliation claims against the individual HRRMC Defendants, and moreover you have
not alleged sufficient facts to sustain your contract-based claims. Moreover, your briefing
in response to the HRRMC Defendants’ motion is cursory and inadequate, which means
you waived virtually all arguments against their request to dismiss your claims.
As for CompuGroup, dismissal of your claim against it is proper because you have
failed to adequately allege that CompuGroup engaged in any extreme and outrageous
conduct, which you are required to do under the law.
1 Defendants Dr. Brody—whose full legal name Plaintiff represents is “unknown”—and Kozak & Gayer,
P.A., have not yet appeared in this action. In his reply brief, Plaintiff represents that he has now identified
Dr. Brody as “Dr. Boyd.” ECF No. 84 at 2. Plaintiff must amend the operative complaint to properly assert
a claim against “Dr. Boyd”—Plaintiff’s “intended party.” Id. The Court will not on its own amend Plaintiff’s
operative complaint for him. The Court further notes that summons were issued to Kozak & Gayer, P.A. on
October 7, 2026. ECF No. 117.
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II. 	ANALYSIS
A. HRRMC Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
The HRRMC Defendants urge dismissal on several grounds. The Court considers
them below, agreeing with the HRRMC Defendants that dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims
against them is proper.
i. 	The CGIA
a. 	The CGIA applies to the HRRMC Defendants.
First, 	the 	Court 	agrees 	with 	the 	HRRMC 	Defendants 	that 	the 	Colorado
Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA) applies to them. See ECF No. 65 at 3; ECF No. 65-
1 at 2; C.R.S. § 24–10–103; C.R.S. § 24–10–106. This includes both Defendant HRRMC
as a health service district, see ECF No. 65-1 at 2, and the individual HRRMC Defendants,
see ECF No. 65-2. See also § 24–10–103(4)(a).2
b. Many of Plaintiff’s claims against the HRRMC
Defendants are subject to the CGIA.
Second, the Court agrees with the HRRMC Defendants that the CGIA applies to—
and explained below, bars—Plaintiff’s claims for defamation per se, tortious interference
with contractual and professional relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
(IIED). See ECF No. 65 at 4–5 (collecting cases explaining how the CGIA applies to such
2 Plaintiff argues in his response brief that the HRRMC Defendants have improperly submitted “extrinsic
evidence” in support of this argument. ECF No. 84 at 6. Yet the Court may consider such attachments,
given that the HRRMC Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Peoples v. Long, No. 1:20–cv–02116–RBJ–NYW, 2021 WL 7159900, at *7 (D. Colo.
Dec. 13, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:20–cv–02116–RBJ–NYW, 2022 WL 92983 (D.
Colo. Jan. 10, 2022) (“The court has wide discretion on Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss to consider
evidence outside the pleadings where the factual basis for subject matter jurisdiction is challenged.”). And
as explained by the HRRMC Defendants in their reply brief, the Court may likewise consider the
employment agreement attached to their motion. See ECF No. 93 at 8 (explaining such agreement is central
to the operative complaint’s allegations and collecting cases in support of such explanation).
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claims). Further, the Court agrees with the HRRMC Defendants that, under the reasoning
of several Colorado cases, it follows from these cases that the CGIA also appears to bar
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim under the Colorado False Claims Act (CFCA). See id. at 5;
Castillo v. Denver Health & Hosp. Auth., 2022 WL 22926722, at *2 (Colo. App. Jan. 6,
2022) (unpublished) (“[C]laims arising from retaliation for whistleblowing lie in tort.”); State
Pers. 	Bd. 	v. 	Lloyd, 	752 	P.2d 	559, 	565 	(Colo. 	1988) 	(concluding 	claims 	under
whistleblower statute were subject to CGIA); Bakes v. Denver Health & Hosp. Auth., 572
P.3d 146, 152 (Colo. App. 2025) (reaching same conclusion as to claim under the Health
Care Worker Protection Act).3
c. 	Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing he
complied 	with 	the 	CGIA, 	and 	so 	the 	Court
dismisses his claims without prejudice.
Third, and as indicated above, even accepting Plaintiff’s allegations in the
operative complaint as true and providing them with a liberal construction based on his
pro se status, the Court agrees with the HRRMC Defendants that the CGIA bars Plaintiff’s
claims because he has not satisfied its notice requirement. Compliance with CGIA’s
notice requirement is jurisdictional in nature. See, e.g., ECF No. 65 at 6; First Nat’l Bank
of Durango v. Lyons, 349 P.3d 1161, 1168 (Colo. App. 2015) (“[S]tatutory notice is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to an action under the CGIA.” (citation modified)); Scott v. Cary,
No. 18–cv–610–WJM–SKC, 2019 WL 5957295, at *4 (D. Colo. Nov. 12, 2019), aff’d, 829
3 The HRRMC Defendants cite no case that has explicitly determined retaliation claims under the CFCA
are subject to the CGIA. Cf. ECF No. 65 at 3. But even if the reasoning of these cases was inapplicable to
Plaintiff’s CFCA retaliation claim, as explained further below, dismissal of Plaintiff’s CFCA claim on
alternative or additional plausibility grounds is proper, particularly in light of the inadequacies and
perfunctory nature of Plaintiff’s arguments in his response brief.
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F. App’x 334 (10th Cir. 2020) (“Compliance with section 24–10–109(1) of the CGIA, which
requires that notice be filed within 182 days, is ‘a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit that
therefore requires strict compliance with its terms.’ Litigants filing claims subject to the
CGIA must plead compliance with subsection (1) in order to survive a motion to dismiss.”
(quoting Finnie v. Jefferson City Sch. Dist. R-1, 79 P.3d 1253, 1256 (Colo. 2003)).
Plaintiff presents no allegations demonstrating any efforts to comply with the
CGIA’s 	notice 	requirement. 	Notably, 	Plaintiff 	does 	not 	respond 	to 	the 	HRRMC
Defendant’s notice argument, essentially conceding it and waiving any argument to the
contrary. See ECF No. 84 at 5 (resisting the HRRMC Defendant’s CGIA argument solely
because Plaintiff has “pleaded willful and wanton misconduct . . . and the CGIA cannot
bar federal FCA claims” (citation modified)); Coulter v. Butler, No. CIV–24–835–R, 2025
WL 1942415, at *2 (W.D. Okla. July 15, 2025) (“[A] lack of response to a party’s
substantive argument a waiver of the issue.” (citation modified)).4 Yet even providing
Plaintiff’s allegations with a liberal construction, at the absolute most Plaintiff alleges that
he provided some form of notice in August 2025 in the form of “submission of settlement
offers.” ECF No. 26-3 at 4; ECF No. 27 at 55. Assuming this could even count as sufficient
notice under the CGIA, it is dated more than 182 days after his dismissal, and even after
the alleged December 25, 2024, “retaliatory complaint.” ECF No. 84 at 5; ECF No. 26-3
4 Despite Plaintiff’s argument that he alleges the HRRMC Defendants’ conduct was willful and wanton, and
thus that they are “not immune” under the CGIA, ECF No. 84 at 5, Plaintiff must still comply with the CGIA’s
notice requirement. See BNC Metro. Dist. No. 1 v. BNC Metro. Dist. No. 3, 573 P.3d 129, 138 (Colo. App.
2025) (“[N]otice is required under the CGIA regardless of whether the alleged injury resulted from a public
employee’s willful and wanton conduct.” (citation modified)). So too does Plaintiff’s argument that the
HRRMC Defendants are “equitably estopped” from arguing they lacked CGIA notice fail. Compare ECF No.
84 at 5, with Mesa Cnty. Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51 v. Kelsey, 8 P.3d 1200, 1206 (Colo. 2000).
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at 4; ECF No. 93 at 4. Thus, because Plaintiff has failed to allege that he submitted any
kind of notice to the HRRMC Defendants within the CGIA’s 182-day timeframe, dismissal
of his claims due to this failure is proper. See, e.g., Bakes, 572 P.3d at 149 (“When a
claim falls within the scope of the CGIA, the claimant must provide notice of the claim to
the public entity within 182 days of discovering the injury.” (citation modified)); Handy v.
City of Sheridan, No. 12–cv–01015–WYD–KMT, 2013 WL 1232211, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar.
26, 2013) (explaining the same).
Because Plaintiff has failed to allege or even argue that he submitted any adequate
CGIA notice within the applicable time frame, the Court lacks jurisdiction over his claims
due to his failure to comply with this notice requirement. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Univ. of
Colorado Hosp. Auth., No. 23–cv–02451–NYW–MDB, 2024 WL 3713835, at *5 (D. Colo.
July 12, 2024), aff’d sub nom. Timken v. S. Denver Cardiology Assocs., P.C., 155 F.4th
1227 (10th Cir. 2025) (“[T]he CGIA . . . requires the plaintiff to provide notice of tort claims
to the public entity or public employee within 182 days of discovering the tort injury and
before filing an action in court.” (citation modified)). The Court reaches the same
conclusion even if it liberally construes Plaintiff’s alleged settlement notices and assumes
such notices are adequate under the CGIA, given that such notices fall outside the
statute’s time frame for providing notice to the HRRMC Defendants.
Since dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims that are subject to the CGIA and its notice
requirement is proper, the Court must decide whether these claims should be dismissed
with or without prejudice. The Court disagrees with the HRRMC Defendants that dismissal
with prejudice is proper. See ECF No. 65 at 6. Dismissal on jurisdictional grounds is
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typically without prejudice. See Jackson v. Beston, No. 24–cv–02129–RMR–KAS, 2025
WL 3242526, at *2 n.1 (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2025). And there is nothing on the face of the
operative complaint demonstrating that amendment would be wholly futile. Cf. Sweeney,
2024 WL 3713835, at *5 n.7. For instance, Plaintiff could allege—should there actually
be a factual basis for doing so—that he provided notice prior to August 2025. However,
the Court notes that such an allegation must demonstrate “strict compliance” with the
CGIA and its notice requirement. Mostellar v. City of Colorado Springs, 587 P.3d 168,
172 (Colo. 2026) (“[S]trict compliance with the statute is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
any action brought under the CGIA.” (citation modified)). Failure to clearly and plainly
allege that such adequate notice was provided will subject any amended complaint to
summary 	dismissal.5 	Given 	that 	this 	order 	provides 	Plaintiff 	with 	a 	crystal 	clear
explanation of why the operative complaint’s allegations are deficient, failure to cure the
deficiencies identified above will result in dismissal of claims subject to the CGIA with
prejudice. See, e.g., Reed v. Sandoval, No. 24–cv–03564–PAB–CYC, 2026 WL 835778,
at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 26, 2026) (“Although the Federal Rules permit and require liberal
construction and amendment of pleadings, the Rules do not grant the parties unlimited
rights of amendment.” (citation modified)).
* * *
The Court provides the following summary of its CGIA analysis. The HRRMC
Defendants are entities and individuals covered by the CGIA. Thus, Plaintiff must comply
5 The Court notes that leave to amend is not an invitation to improperly fabricate allegations or to simply
reallege deficient facts in any unnecessarily long complaint. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
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with the CGIA’s requirements in order to bring those claims against the HRRMC
Defendants in this lawsuit. Plaintiff has failed to comply with the CGIA. Thus, the Court
dismisses his claims for defamation per se, tortious interference with contractual and
professional relations, IIED, and violation of the CFCA without prejudice. Although this
means that Plaintiff can file an amended complaint, failure to allege strict compliance with
the CGIA and its notice requirement will result in summary dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims.6
ii. 	Application of Rule 12(b)(6)
Next, the HRRMC Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s FCA and CFCA claims, as well
as his contract-based claims, are not plausible under Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 65 at 7.7
The Court agrees.
a. 	Plaintiff cannot state claims against individual
defendants under the FCA, and moreover he
has failed to plead plausible FCA and CFCA
claims.
First, the Court agrees with the HRRMC Defendants that Plaintiff’s FCA claims
against individual HRRMC Defendants must be dismissed. See ECF No. 65 at 8; United
States ex rel. Strubbe v. Crawford Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 915 F.3d 1158, 1167 (8th Cir. 2019)
(“Because Congress did not amend the FCA to impose individual liability, the FCA does
not impose individual liability for retaliation claims.”); Del Signore v. Nokia of Am. Corp.,
No. 20 C 4019, 2021 WL 12302271, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2021), aff’d, No. 23–1973,
2024 WL 503953 (7th Cir. Feb. 9, 2024) (“[An individual defendant] cannot be individually
6 For these reasons, the Court need not address the HRRMC Defendant’s arguments that these claims
must be dismissed as a matter of plausibility under Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., ECF No. 65 at 14.
7 The Court notes that the HRRMC Defendants do not move to dismiss Plaintiff’s federal FCA claim based
on the CGIA. See ECF No. 93 at 3 n.1.
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liable for whistleblower retaliation under the FCA, so plaintiff’s FCA claim against [that
defendant] is dismissed.”). Dismissal of these claims with prejudice is proper because no
amendment can cure such claims against the individual HRRMC Defendants, as they are
barred by law.
Second, the Court agrees with the HRRMC Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to
adequately plead that he engaged in protected activity and that the HRRMC Defendants
had notice of any such protected activity. See United States ex rel. Reed v. KeyPoint
Gov’t Sols., 923 F.3d 729, 764 (10th Cir. 2019) (“To state a claim of retaliation, a plaintiff
must meet her burden of pleading facts that prove (1) she engaged in protected activity,
(2) the defendant had been put on notice of that protected activity, and (3) the defendant
retaliated against the plaintiff because of that activity.” (citation modified)); ECF No. 65 at
8. See also ECF No. 93 at 5. Regardless, in resisting the HRRMC Defendants’ FCA
arguments, Plaintiff argues only this: “Pleading notice of crashing EMR software, chart
erasures, and billing hazards fully satisfies Rule 8(a).” ECF No. 84 at 6. This one-sentence
argument fails to address the HRRMC Defendants’ arguments which thoroughly explain
the pleading deficiencies as to Plaintiff’s FCA claim. Thus the Court may not only
disregard it but, also conclude from it that Plaintiff has waived any argument that the
HRRMC Defendants’ interpretation of the operative complaint and its FCA allegations are
incorrect. See, e.g., Adams v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 168 F.4th 1271, 1285 (10th Cir. 2026)
(observing that appellant “develop[ed] each claim perfunctorily, in only a sentence or two”
and that “a single sentence of argument does not adequately develop a distinct
[argument]” (citation modified)); Bertolo v. Raemisch, No. 17–cv–00773–RM–KLM, 2020
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WL 1502295, at *7 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2020) (stating that “cursory arguments, without
supporting analysis and case law, are waived” and that a court “may decline to consider
argument which is unsupported and inadequately briefed” and collecting cases in support
of these propositions).8
Similarly, Plaintiff offers no meaningful response to the HRRMC Defendants’
argument that the CFCA claim should be dismissed for the same reason. See ECF No.
10 at 17. Thus, even if the Court disregards persuasive authority that the CFCA contains
the same or materially similar requirements as the FCA for retaliation claims, Plaintiff has
waived any challenge to this argument from the HRRMC Defendants. See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Lovato v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc., No. 15–cv–02759–CMA–NYW, 2020
WL 9160872, at *5 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2020), report and recommendation adopted sub
nom. Colorado v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc., No. 15–cv–02759–CMA, 2021 WL 1085423
(D. Colo. Mar. 22, 2021) (observing that Colorado’s Medicaid False Claims Act contains
a “whistleblower protection provision that mirrors the FCA for any employees retaliated
against”); Coulter, 2025 WL 1942415, at *2; Adams, 168 F.4th at 1285.
8 Plaintiff argues elsewhere in his response brief that he engaged in protected activity by “reporting systemic
Electronic Medical Record (EMR) defects and data extraction barriers.” ECF No. 84 at 3. See also id. at 7
(arguing without reference or citation to operative complaint that “[r]eporting EMR compliance defects
directly implicates Medicare/Medicaid billing certifications”). Not only is this argument perfunctory, but it fails
to identify any supporting allegation—must less identify to whom or when Plaintiff made such alleged
reports. See Adams, 168 F.4th at 1285; ECF No. 27 at 10 (alleging “ongoing CMS non-compliance” related
to EMRs but failing to allege to whom Plaintiff made any reports as to such non-compliance). Regardless,
Plaintiff’s briefing is simply inadequate such that he has demonstrated that his claims survive dismissal.
See, e.g., Adams, 168 F.4th at 1285; Bertolo, 2020 WL 1502295, at *7.
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b. Plaintiff has failed to plead plausible claims for
breach of contract and breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.
The HRRMC Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to plead claims for breach
of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See ECF No. 65 at
11; W. Distrib. Co. v. Diodosio, 841 P.2d 1053, 1058 (Colo. 1992) (setting forth
requirements 	for 	breach 	of 	contract 	claim); 	New 	Design 	Constr. 	Co. 	v. 	Hamon
Contractors, Inc., 215 P.3d 1172, 1181 (Colo. App. 2008) (explaining requirements for
breach of good faith and fair dealing). The Court agrees. In any event, separate from the
HRRMC Defendants’ persuasive argument that the operative complaint fails to allege
facts sufficient to state either claim, Plaintiff’s briefing in response is, as with his other
arguments, perfunctory, and limited to a few sentences. As the HRRMC Defendants
observe, in resisting dismissal of his breach of good faith and fair dealing claim, Plaintiff
argues only that—and without citation to any allegations in the operative complaint—this
claim is plausible because “HRRMC breached [this duty] by conducting covert EMR
surveillance and fabricating administrative complaints.” ECF No. 84 at 6. Cf. ECF No. 93
at 2, 6–7. A lone sentence with no support is insufficient to advance an argument and
amounts to waiver of the HRRMC Defendants’ dismissal arguments. See, e.g., Adams,
168 F.4th at 1285; Bertolo, 2020 WL 1502295, at *7. Accordingly, these claims are
dismissed without prejudice, given that amendment of the operative complaint to plausibly
set forth such claims would not be categorically futile. However, the Court reiterates its
warnings set forth above that leave to amend is not an invitation for Plaintiff to add
numerous, unrelated allegations to what is already an overlong complaint.
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* * *
The parties have filed numerous briefs in this round of dismissal briefing. This is to
say nothing of the numerous other motions that Plaintiff has filed. Because the Court
dismisses all of Plaintiff’s claims, all of those pending motions are denied as moot. See,
e.g., Erbacher v. Albrecht, No. 1:11–cv–00096–RJS, 2013 WL 3049289, at *3 (D. Utah
June 17, 2013) (“All claims being dismissed, the remaining motions are moot.”).9
The Court makes one final observation. Judicial resources are scarce. And it is an
expenditure of judicial resources to resolve any motion, whether filed by a pro se plaintiff
or plaintiff represented by counsel. But it is a colossal expenditure of judicial resources to
resolve motions that pertain to inadequately pleaded complaints, coupled with perfunctory
arguments in response, as well as scattershot motions for injunctive relief and discovery
requests.
For these reasons, the Court invites Plaintiff to ask, should he choose to file
additional motions or an amended complaint, whether more is better. If it helps guide
Plaintiff’s thinking on this issue, it very often isn’t. And as indicated above, uncured
inadequacies in any amended complaint may result in summary dismissal of Plaintiff’s
claims.
9 To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to assert additional claims in his response brief, such as a claim under
the Colorado Wage Claim Act, the Court agrees with the HRRMC Defendants that doing so is improper.
See ECF No. 93 at 2; Andreassen v. Health Care Serv. Corp., No. CIV–21–313–SLP, 2022 WL 22895726,
at *6 (W.D. Okla. July 14, 2022) (“Plaintiff cannot, however, amend her pleading by adding new factual
allegations or claims in her response brief.”). The Court’s conclusion is bolstered as well by its
determination, set forth below, that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege facts supporting his IIED claim
against CompuGroup.
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B. CompuGroup’s Motion to Dismiss
Based on the allegations and claims in the operative complaint, Plaintiff brings one
claim against CompuGroup. This claim is for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
See ECF No. 27 at 52 (asserting claim against “all Defendants”).
Reading the allegations of the operative complaint, and even providing them with
a liberal construction, the Court agrees with CompuGroup, see, e.g., ECF No. 107 at 4,
that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts demonstrating that CompuGroup engaged
in extreme or outrageous conduct, which is a required element of any IIED claim, see,
e.g., Stalder v. Colorado Mesa Univ., 551 P.3d 679, 686 (Colo. App. 2024) (explaining
that IIED liability “can be sustained only when the defendant’s conduct toward the plaintiff
was ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community’” and that the “level of outrageousness required” to bring an IIED claim is
‘extremely high’” (quoting Green v. Qwest Servs. Corp., 155 P.3d 383, 385 (Colo. App.
2006)). At most, as CompuGroup observes, see ECF No. 107 at 3, Plaintiff alleges that
CompuGroup maintained a records “blockade,” hijacked sensitive information, and
initiated “sham investigations,” ECF No. 57 at 52. These allegations, even if accepted as
true, do not rise to the level of extreme or outrageous conduct. Cf. Green, 155 P.3d at
386.10
10 While Plaintiff has not yet filed a response brief, it is obvious from the face of the operative complaint that
Plaintiff has failed to allege facts supporting an IIED claim against CompuGroup. See D.C.COLO.LCivR
7.1(d) (observing that “nothing” in Local Rules “precludes a judicial officer from ruling on a motion to any
time after it is filed”); Preston v. Cap. One Auto Fin., Inc., No. 10–cv–00073–ZLW–KLM, 2010 WL 2004697,
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III. CONCLUSION
Consistent with the above analysis, the Court GRANTS the HRRMC Defendant’s
motion to dismiss, ECF No. 65, and CompuGroup’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 107. With
the exception of Plaintiff’s FCA claims against the individual HRRMC Defendants, which
are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, Plaintiff’s remaining claims are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff may—only if he believes he can cure the pleading
deficiencies identified above—file an amended complaint. Given that Plaintiff has
amended his complaint numerous times, and now has the benefit of the Court’s analysis,
such an amended complaint MUST BE FILED within seven calendar days of this order.
The Court reiterates that failure to cure the deficiencies identified above may result in
summary dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims.
Because the Court dismisses all of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court DENIES AS MOOT
Plaintiff’s other pending motions. ECF No. 44; ECF No. 62; ECF No. 72; ECF Nos. 79–
83; ECF No. 85; ECF No. 89; ECF No. 96; ECF No. 109; ECF Nos. 120–21. For the
same reason, the Court likewise dismisses any pending motions filed by Defendants.
ECF No. 90; ECF No. 123.
at *1 (D. Colo. May 19, 2010), report and recommendation adopted as modified, No. 10–cv–00073–ZLW–
KLM, 2010 WL 2574131 (D. Colo. June 23, 2010). To the extent Plaintiff has filed any response to the
motion, it is in a motion to strike the motion to dismiss as ‘procedurally improper,” ECF No. 109, but there
is nothing in the record to indicate that CompuGroup’s motion was improperly filed. See generally ECF No.
113. Moreover, Plaintiff’s motion to strike proceeds from the premise that CompuGroup is in default. See
ECF No. 109 at 3. CompuGroup persuasively explains why this is not the case, thus undermining the
arguments that Plaintiff advances in his motion to strike. See generally ECF No. 114.
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The Court further reiterates that filing such motions is not only time-consuming for
everyone in this case, but must only be filed if there is a non-frivolous basis for filing such
motions.
DATED this 14th day of October 2026.
BY THE COURT:
________________________________
Charlotte N. Sweeney
United States District Judge
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