Caballero Ochoa v. Noem et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 26-cv-00968-PAB
MAURICIO CABALLERO OCHOA,
Petitioner,
v.
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
TODD BLANCHE, Acting U.S. Attorney General,
GEORGE VALDEZ, Denver Field Office Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, and
JUAN BALTAZAR, Warden of Denver Contract Detention Facility,
Respondents. 1
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on petitioner Mauricio Caballero Ochoa’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Docket No. 1]. Respondents filed a response.
Docket No. 10.
I. BACKGROUND 2
Petitioner is a Mexican citizen and national. Docket No. 1 at 5, ¶ 14. On June
12, 2009, petitioner lawfully entered the United States pursuant to a Border Crossing
Card. Id., ¶ 17. On September 15, 2009, petitioner was arrested and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) issued petitioner a Notice to Appear. Id. at 6, ¶ 18. On
1 Todd Blanche is substituted as a party for Pamela Bondi, George Valdez is
substituted as a party for Robert Guadian, Markwayne Mullin is substituted as a party
for Kristi Noem, and Juan Baltazar is substituted as a party for Dawn Ceja pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
2 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
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January 26, 2012, an immigration judge administratively closed petitioner’s removal
proceedings. Id. Petitioner filed a Form I-360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or
Special Immigrant, and Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or
Adjust Status, which remain pending. Id.
On August 2, 2025, petitioner was arrested and then detained at Washakie
County Jail in Worland, Wyoming. Id. at 5, ¶¶ 15-16. However, he was later released
after posting a $500 bond. Id., ¶ 16. On August 5, 2025, petitioner was taken into ICE
custody. Id. at 6, ¶ 19. On September 10, 2025, petitioner appeared before an
immigration judge and requested a custody redetermination. Id. at 6, ¶ 20. The
immigration judge found that the court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a custody
redetermination. Id. Petitioner is currently detained at the Denver Contract Detention
Facility in Aurora, Colorado. Id. at 6-7, ¶ 21.
On March 10, 2026, petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Id. Petitioner brings a claims for violation of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) (Count I); violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States (Count II); violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”) (Count III); violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment
(Count IV); violation of the Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution (Count
V); and violation of the doctrine of United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347
U.S. 260 (1954) (Count VI). Id. at 16-31.
II. ANALYSIS
Respondents argue that petitioner is not entitled to a bond hearing because he
has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Docket No. 10 at 5-6.
Respondents note that the immigration judge denied petitioner’s motion for custody
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redetermination because the court lacked jurisdiction to grant such relief and, in the
alternative, declined to grant bond. Id. at 5-6. Specifically, the immigration judge found
that, even if the court did have jurisdiction to consider petitioner’s motion for custody
redetermination, petitioner “did not establish that he is not a danger to people or
property if released from custody.” Docket No. 1-1 at 5. Respondents argue that
petitioner had an obligation to exhaust his administrative remedies by appealing the
immigration judge’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”). See
Docket No. 10 at 6. Furthermore, respondents concede petitioner is detained subject to
8 U.S.C. § 1226 and that petitioner may therefore request a bond hearing. See id.
Respondents contend that a “bond hearing is merely pending scheduling” by the
Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”). See id.
“The INA mandates exhaustion as to final orders of removal, but it contains no
exhaustion provision regarding challenges to preliminary custody or bond
determinations.” Francisco v. Dedos, 2026 WL 145456, at *7 (D.N.M. Jan. 20, 2026).
“When Congress does not require exhaustion in the statute then the district court has
discretion to decide if administrative exhaustion is required.” L.G. v. Choate, 744 F.
Supp. 3d 1172, 1181 (D. Colo. 2024).
The Court can excuse a party from exhausting administrative remedies where
doing so would be futile. See Pu Sacvin v. De Anda-Ybarra, 2025 WL 3187432, at *2
(D.N.M. Nov. 14, 2025). In Matter of Jonathan Javier Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec.
216, 228 (BIA 2025), the BIA held that any noncitizen arrested within the United States
and charged with being inadmissible – regardless of whether he or she was arrested at
a port of entry or after already residing in the United States – is subject to mandatory
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detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible for a bond hearing.
Thus, pursuant to Hurtado, the immigration judge lacked jurisdiction to provide petitioner
a bond hearing, “rendering any attempt to seek relief directly from the agency futile.”
See Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432, at *2. Because exhaustion would be futile, the
Court will excuse petitioner from exhausting his administrative remedies. See L.G., 744
F. Supp. 3d at 1182 (“The Court agrees with Petitioner that an appeal to the BIA would
be futile here considering the BIA’s prior decisions concerning detention under §
1226(a) require the noncitizen to carry the burden that he is not a flight risk and not a
danger to the community.”). Because the Court agrees that petitioner is detained
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226, petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing. 3
Respondents represent that, on March 3, 2026, petitioner filed a renewed motion
for custody redetermination and that petitioner’s “custody redetermination hearing is
awaiting scheduling by EOIR.” Docket No. 10 at 3. The fact that petitioner filed a
motion for a custody redetermination to seek a bond hearing does not mean that such a
hearing has been scheduled, and there is no evidence that a bond hearing will be
scheduled. At this stage, there is no evidence that the immigration judge would treat
petitioner’s renewed motion any differently than she treated petitioner’s original motion,
where she found that the court lacked jurisdiction under Hurtado. Accordingly, the
Court will order respondents to provide petitioner a bond hearing.
3 Respondents’ concession that petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1226 and is
thus entitled to a bond hearing does not change the fact that Hurtado has deprived the
immigration judge of jurisdiction to redetermine petitioner’s custody and that the
immigration judge has already found as much.
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Petitioner requests that the Court order respondents to provide “a constitutionally
adequate bond hearing at which DHS bears the burden of proving that Petitioner is a
danger to the community or risk of flight, or reasonable conditions of supervision.”
Docket No. 1 at 32. As respondents note, the Court has previously declined to shift the
burden of proof to the government. See De La Cruz v. Baltazar, No. 26-cv-00360-PAB,
2026 WL 439217, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 17, 2026). In De La Cruz, the Court noted that
courts have the authority to intervene if immigration judges are imposing
unconstitutional standards at bond hearings. See id. at *4 n.7. The Court declined to
do so in De La Cruz because there was no indication that immigration judges in this
district have been applying an inappropriate standard. See id. Here, however, the
immigration judge has evinced an intent to make petitioner bear the burden of proof at
the bond hearing. Although the immigration judge found that she lacked jurisdiction to
conduct a bond hearing, she further opined that, in the alternative, she would deny bond
because petitioner “did not establish that he is not a danger to people or property if
released from custody.” See Docket No. 1-1 at 5. Therefore, the Court finds it proper to
address whether petitioner bears the burden of proof. “[T]he weight of authority in this
District is clear: it is the Government’s burden to justify a noncitizen’s continued
detention at a bond hearing.” See Abanil v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-4029-WJM-STV, 2026
WL 100587, at *8 (D. Colo. Jan. 14, 2026 (internal quotation, alteration, and citation
omitted) (collecting cases); Arredondo v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03040-RBJ, 2025 WL
4083607, at *4 (D. Colo. Oct. 31, 2025) (“the Court sides with the majority of courts in
this District that have found that it is more appropriate for the government to bear the
burden of proof in this context”). Accordingly, the Court will order respondents to
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provide a bond hearing where the government shall bear the burden of proving that
petitioner’s continued detention is justified. 4
III. CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that petitioner Mauricio Caballero Ochoa’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus [Docket No. 1] is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction [Docket No. 2] is DENIED as moot. It is further
ORDERED that, within seven days of the date of this Court’s order, respondents
shall provide petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), where the
government shall bear the burden of proving that petitioner’s continued detention is
justified. It is further
4 Because the Court will order respondents to provide petitioner a bond hearing
on the basis of Count I, which alleges respondents’ violation of the INA, it will not
address petitioner’s other claims for relief. See Loa Caballero v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-
03120-NYW, 2025 WL 2977650, at *8 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2025) (“The Court will thus
grant the Petition with respect to Petitioner’s first claim. Since the Court's ruling on the
INA claim will afford Petitioner the entirety of the relief he seeks, the Court need not
address Petitioner's remaining arguments.”). Furthermore, the Court finds that
providing a bond hearing, rather than ordering petitioner’s immediate release, is the
proper remedy. See id. at *9 (“an immigration judge is better suited to consider whether
Petitioner poses a flight risk and a danger to the community in this instance, where
there is an insufficient record before this Court”). The Court will not consider petitioner’s
request for attorney’s fees because petitioner fails to comply with the Local Rules of the
District of Colorado. See Docket No. 1 at 32. A motion for attorney’s fees must be filed
in accordance with D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.3. See D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.3 (“Unless
otherwise ordered, a motion for attorney fees shall be supported by affidavit. . . . The
Motion shall include . . . for each person for whom fees are claimed: (1) a summary of
relevant qualifications and experience; and (2) a detailed description of the services
rendered, the amount of time spent, the hourly rate charged, and the total amount
claimed.”).
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ORDERED that within five days of petitioner’s bond hearing, the parties shall file
a status report indicating whether the bond hearing was held and whether bond was
granted or denied.
DATED April 10, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge
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