HAMEED v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
HAROON I. HAMEED,
Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,
Defendants.
No. 25-cv-4117 (DLF)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Haroon Hameed, proceeding pro se, brings this suit against the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS), the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), and their
respective agency heads. 	Compl. 1, Dkt. 1. 	Before the Court is Hameed’s Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction. 	Pl.’s Mot., Dkt. 2. 	For the following reasons, the Court will deny the
motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The Court will highlight only the facts necessary for its ruling. 	Hameed works as a
physician in Maryland. 	Compl. ¶ 5. 	On September 10, 2025, the Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) issued a final Decision and Order revoking his registration,
which had allowed him to prescribe certain federally controlled substances. See Pl.’s Mot., Ex. H,
Dkt. 2-2; Defs.’ Opp’n 2 & n.1, Dkt. 10. Hameed appealed that revocation to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Compl. ¶ 20. Based on the revocation of his DEA registration, on
November 5, 2025, CMS issued a notice revoking Hameed’s Medicare billing privileges pursuant
to a Medicare regulation, id. ¶ 23; Defs.’ Opp’n, Ex. A, Dkt. 10-1, which provides that “CMS may
Case 1:25-cv-04117-DLF Document 15 Filed 01/08/26 Page 1 of 6

2
revoke a currently enrolled provider or supplier’s Medicare enrollment” when “[a] physician or
other eligible professional’s Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Certificate of Registration
to dispense a controlled substance is currently suspended or revoked or is surrendered in response
to an order to show cause,” 42 C.F.R. § 424.535(a)(13)(i).
The notice from CMS stated that Hameed’s Medicare billing privileges would be revoked
on December 5, 2025, and that he had the right to “request a reconsideration of this determination.”
Defs.’ Opp’n, Ex. A 1–2. That reconsideration would be an “independent review conducted by a
person not involved in the initial determination.” Id. at 2. In his reconsideration request, Hameed
was instructed to “[s]tate the issues or findings of fact with which you disagree and the reasons for
disagreement” and invited to “[s]ubmit additional information with the reconsideration that may
have a bearing on the decision.” Id. at 2–3. He submitted his reconsideration request the same
day he received the CMS notice on November 5, 2025. Compl. ¶ 26.
Having not received any confirmation from CMS that it had received his reconsideration
request, Hameed filed suit on November 24, 2025, id. at 1, along with a motion for a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction, Pl.’s Mot. 1.
He brings three claims, two under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and one under
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In the two APA counts, Hameed claims that CMS
violated the Administrative Procedure Act by (1) basing its revocation decision on a “nonfinal
DEA order”; (2) failing to process his reconsideration request; and (3) withholding a “formal
Acknowledgement Letter” for his reconsideration request. 	Compl. ¶¶ 27, 35, 36, 39. 	He also
claims that the defendants violated the Due Process Clause by (1) refusing to process his
reconsideration 	request 	in 	a 	timely 	fashion 	and 	(2) 	basing 	the 	revocation 	decision 	on
“unadjudicated allegations contradicted by state regulators.” Id. ¶¶ 37–38. Absent an injunction,
Case 1:25-cv-04117-DLF Document 15 Filed 01/08/26 Page 2 of 6

3
Hameed alleges that he will lose the ability to treat Medicare patients; his ability to practice will
be severely restricted; his professional reputation will be severely damaged; and he will suffer
financial losses. Id. ¶ 33.
In terms of relief, Hameed seeks (1) an order enjoining the defendants “from enforcing the
December 5, 2025 Medicare revocation until CMS issues a lawful reconsideration decision” and
maintaining his privileges until then; (2) a declaration that “CMS’s reliance on a nonfinal DEA
order is arbitrary and capricious”; and (3) an order requiring “CMS to promptly issue the
Reconsideration Acknowledgement Letter and process [his] appeal.” Id. at 7.
Since Hameed filed his suit and motion for preliminary relief, the facts have developed.
First, CMS agreed to delay the revocation of his Medicare billing privileges from December 5,
2025, until February 3, 2026. Defs.’ Opp’n 3–4. Next, on December 1, 2025, CMS sent Hameed
an email confirming receipt of his reconsideration request and noting that the agency had 90 days
to render a decision and that Hameed could continue to “submit additional information /
documentation until a decision is issued.” Defs.’ Opp’n, Ex. B, Dkt. 10-2; see Pl.’s Reply Br. 6,
Dkt. 12.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a
clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)). To prevail,
a party seeking preliminary injunctive relief must make a “clear showing that four factors, taken
together, warrant relief: likely success on the merits, likely irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, a balance of the equities in its favor, and accord with the public interest.”
League of Women Voters of the U.S. v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation modified).
Case 1:25-cv-04117-DLF Document 15 Filed 01/08/26 Page 3 of 6

4
III. 	ANALYSIS
Hameed is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claims as alleged in his Complaint.
First, to the extent that he asks this Court to review the merits of the CMS revocation, the Court
likely lacks jurisdiction to do so at this stage. Hameed must first exhaust “the statutorily prescribed
administrative process” required by the Medicare Act before seeking judicial review of the
revocation of his billing privileges. Arriva Med. LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 239
F. Supp. 3d 266, 278 (D.D.C. 2017); see id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(h), 1395ii); see also
Porzecanski v. Azar, 943 F.3d 472, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“§ 405(h)’s bar on judicial review, as
modified by § 405(g), ‘demands the channeling of virtually all legal attacks through the agency.’”
(quoting Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000))); Robie v. Price,
17-cv-3089, 2017 WL 3188572, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. July 26, 2017) (“Federal courts are barred
from reviewing . . . the revocation of a physician’s Medicare billing privileges, unless there has
been a final decision by the Secretary.”). And despite his conclusory assertions to the contrary,
see Pl.’s Reply Br. 4–5, Hameed has not shown that judicial review is unavailable such that this
Court can exercise federal question jurisdiction, see Am. Chiropractic Assan, Inc. v. Leavitt, 431
F.3d 812, 816 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Arriva Med. LLC, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 278 (citing Council for
Urological Interests v. Sebelius, 668 F.3d 704, 707–08 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
The administrative process includes reconsideration of the initial determination, 42 C.F.R.
§§ 498.22–498.25, review by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), id. §§ 498.40–498.79, and
review of any ALJ decision by the Departmental Appeals Board, id. §§ 498.80–498.95. See also
Arriva Med. LLC, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 286–87 (reviewing pre- and post-deprivation procedural
safeguards). 	Only after exhausting this administrative process may Hameed seek review of the
revocation decision in federal court. 	See Porzecanski, 943 F.3d at 482 (“Postponing judicial
Case 1:25-cv-04117-DLF Document 15 Filed 01/08/26 Page 4 of 6

5
review would delay—but not deprive—Porzecanski of access to federal court.”). And “[i]f at any
time the revocation is reversed, [Hameed] will receive retroactive payment for claims [he]
submitted in the interim.” 	Arriva Med. LLC, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 287 (citing 42 C.F.R.
§ 424.545(a)(2)). Contra Compl. ¶ 33 (“Financial losses will not be recoverable due to sovereign
immunity.”).
Second, Hameed’s procedural due process claim is likely moot because the defendants are
already providing the process he seeks. To start, the Court likely has jurisdiction over a “collateral”
constitutional claim seeking additional pre-deprivation process under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976), and related cases. See Arriva Med. LLC, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 278–79. But even
if the Court construes Hameed’s Fifth Amendment claim as a collateral constitutional claim, the
claim appears to be moot. In his complaint and motion, Hameed’s allegations and arguments focus
on CMS’s lack of responsiveness to his request for reconsideration. He does not appear to contend
that the reconsideration process itself is inadequate, only that it is being withheld by the defendants.
Specifically, he alleges that “CMS has failed to provide due process by refusing to acknowledge
or process the Reconsideration Request.” Compl. ¶ 30. In support of his motion, Hameed contends
that “CMS’s failure to issue a Reconsideration Acknowledgement Letter—despite multiple
communications—denies [him] access to the mandatory ALJ appeal process, violating the Fifth
Amendment,” Pl.’s Mem. of Law 10, Dkt. 2-1, and that CMS violated his Fifth Amendment Due
Process rights by “refusing to process [his] reconsideration request,” id. at 16.
But as stated above, after Hameed filed his complaint and moved for preliminary relief,
CMS sent him an email confirming receipt of his reconsideration request and stating that it would
conduct the reconsideration process and issue a decision. See Defs.’ Opp’n, Ex. B. In other words,
the process Hameed seeks is now underway. Upon reconsideration, CMS might reverse its initial
Case 1:25-cv-04117-DLF Document 15 Filed 01/08/26 Page 5 of 6

6
determination, or it may not, in which case Hameed can promptly undertake the “ALJ appeal
process.” Pl.’s Mem. of Law 10.
Courts have consistently declined “to supplement the Medicare scheme with additional
pre-deprivation procedures.” 	Arriva Med. LLC, 239 F. Supp. at 287 (citing cases). 	But to the
extent Hameed seeks any additional process beyond that which he is being afforded now, he may
file a renewed motion. Should he do so, he will have to meet the D.C. Circuit’s “high standard”
for irreparable harm, id. at 281 (quoting Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d
290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006)), and provide evidentiary support for any alleged financial losses, see
id. at 281–83.
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that the plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Dkt. 2, is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED.
________________________
DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH
January 8, 2026 	United States District Judge
Case 1:25-cv-04117-DLF Document 15 Filed 01/08/26 Page 6 of 6