BERROCAL v. GOOGLE et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
HENRY B. BERROCAL, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-00850 (UNA)
)
)
GOOGLE, et al,, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On June 12, 2026, the Court ordered Plaintiff Henry B. Berrocal to comply with D.C. Local
Civil Rule 5.1(c)(1) and file a notice with his full residence address, or something similar. See
Order, ECF No. 6. 	Plaintiff has since complied with that directive, see Notice, ECF No. 7.
Accordingly, the Court may now review Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and
his Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The Court grants the
IFP Application (as to Berrocal only), and for the reasons explained below, it dismisses this matter
without prejudice.
Plaintiff sues two Defendants, Google and Fiverr. See Compl. at 6. The latter is “an online
professional marketplace used by Plaintiff for business communications, client relationships, and
commercial transactions.” 	See id. at 7. 	Plaintiff alleges that both Defendants have unfairly
restricted his access to his personal Gmail account and a Gmail account associated with his non-
profit organization, and his Fiverr account, respectively, and that they have both demanded
“repeated verification” of his accounts by requesting information that he considers “excessive,
contradictory, irrelevant, or impossible.” See id. at 7–9. 	He asserts that his restricted access to
these accounts, and his inability to access the information stored therein, has caused him to suffer
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“economic damages, loss of intellectual property value, business interruption, emotional distress,
and the ongoing risk of permanent data loss.” See id. at 9. 	He brings conversion, contract and
pseudo-contract, and copyright infringement claims, and he seeks damages and equitable relief.
See id. at 9–11.
At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff attempts to bring this matter on behalf of his
non-profit, Humanity for Wisdom, see id. at 1, 6–7, which he may not do, because “[i]n all courts
of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel[,]”
and he is not licensed counsel, see 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Greater Southeast Cmty. Hosp. Found., Inc.
v. Potter, 586 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Nor may an entity proceed IFP, because a non-individual
cannot proceed under the IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); the Supreme Court has interpreted
that provision as applicable “only to individuals” or “natural persons,” not “artificial entities.”
Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201–07 (1993).
In any event and where Berrocal sues on his own behalf, he has nonetheless failed to state
a claim. To sufficiently state a claim upon which relief can be granted, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). A complaint is plausible on its face
“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id; see Baker v. Dir., U.S. Parole Comm’n,
916 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (authorizing sua sponte dismissal for failure to
state a claim). 	Further, the IFP statute requires dismissal of a case “at any time” the court
determines that a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 	Here, even in affording Plaintiff “the benefit of all inferences that can be
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derived from the facts alleged,” Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir.
1994), his Complaint fails to state an actionable claim.
First, Plaintiff has failed to state a conversion claim. 	He alleges only that he has been
denied access to accounts that contain his information––he does not allege that Defendants have
exerted “ownership, dominion, or control” over that information. 	See O’Callaghan v. Dist. of
Columbia, 741 F. Supp. 273, 279 (D.D.C. 1990) (citing Duggan v. Keto, 554 A.2d 1126, 1137
(D.C.1989)); see also, e.g., Croy v. Google LLC, No. 23-12106, 2024 WL 4251907, at *2 n.3 (E.D.
Mich. Aug. 21, 2024) (finding that the plaintiff failed to state a conversion claim against Google
where 	he 	alleged 	that 	Google 	was 	“preventing 	him 	from 	accessing 	his
Referralrewards@gmail.com account ‘by secretly disabling [his] access’ to the account, not that
Google ha[d] actually taken or used the alleged “Bitcoin information” contained therein.”), R&R
adopted, 2024 WL 4349185 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 30, 2024).
Second, Plaintiff’s contract and quasi-contract claims also fall short. 	The Complaint
contains only conclusory allegations, failing to sufficiently establish that either Defendant was
contractually prohibited from restricting access to the accounts. 	See Baker v. Google LLC, No.
23-2013, 2024 WL 3551878, at *4 (D.D.C. 2024) (dismissing substantially claims against Google
where the plaintiff submitted only conclusory statements that Google breached their contract by
disabling her account and noting that Google’s terms of service do not guarantee access to an
account and, in fact, allow the company to suspend or terminate services for variety of reasons),
aff’d, No. 24-7115, 2025 WL 817424 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 14, 2025) (per curiam); Wescott v. Google,
LLC, No. 24-cv-01513, 2024 WL 3849345, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2024) (same). And, per
Plaintiff’s own admission, he did not follow the processes offered by the Defendants to recover
the accounts at issue.
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Finally, Plaintiff has failed to state a copyright infringement claim. “To plead copyright
infringement, a plaintiff must allege plausible facts establishing his ownership of a registered
copyright and ‘that the defendant has taken enough original elements protected by that copyright
to create a substantially similar copy.’” Gill v. Fontana, No. 25-03131, 2025 WL 377679, at *1
(D.D.C. Dec. 29, 2025) (quoting Nichols v. Club for Growth Action, 235 F. Supp.3d 289, 293
(D.D.C. 2017)). Plaintiff has not pleaded any such facts against either Defendant.
Accordingly, for all of the stated reasons, the Complaint, and this case, are dismissed
without prejudice. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
TREVOR N. McFADDEN
Date: October 14, 2026 	United States District Judge
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