John-Michael Cohan, Interested Party

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
www.flmb.uscourts.gov
In Re:
Verified Motion for Recusal and
Disqualification of Judge Jason A.
Burgess Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a),
Misc. Pro. No. 2:26-mp-00001-FMR
/
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING
VERIFIED MOTION FOR RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION
OF JUDGE JASON A. BURGESS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)
Before the Court is the Verified Motion for Recusal and Disqualification
of Judge Jason A. Burgess Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (“Disqualification
Motion”)1 filed by John Micheal Cohan (“Mr. Cohan”).
1 MP Doc. No. 1. References to documents entered in this miscellaneous proceeding shall be
referred to as “MP Doc. No. __.” References to documents entered in the bankruptcy case of
In re Genie Investments NV Inc., Case No. 3:24-bk-00496-BAJ, shall be referred to as “Doc.
No. __.”
ORDERED.
Dated: September 25, 2026
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Mr. Cohan and Intervenor David Hughes (“Mr. Hughes”)2 seek to
disqualify the Honorable Jason A. Burgess, United States Bankruptcy Judge
(“Judge Burgess”), from further proceedings in In re Genie Investments NV
Inc., Case No. 3:24-bk-00496-BAJ (the “Main Case”), and in all related
adversary proceedings.3 They contend that Judge Burgess’s rulings on their
papers in the Main Case reveal “a pattern of judicial conduct that would cause
a reasonable observer to question the Court’s impartiality.”4 They also assert
that the alleged appearance of impropriety is heightened because Akerman
LLP (“Akerman”), counsel to the Chapter 7 Trustee, has employed Judge
Burgess’s former law clerk.5 The United States Trustee and Aaron R. Cohen,
the Chapter 7 Trustee, oppose the motion.6
Given the seriousness of Mr. Cohan’s allegations, Judge Burgess referred
the Disqualification Motion—and all directly related issues—to this Court for
2 The Court grants David Hughes’ Motion to Intervene & Brief for a Limited Purpose, to
Participate in the Recusal Proceeding, and for Immediate Limited Discovery (MP Doc. No. 38).
The Court permitted Mr. Hughes to intervene in this contested matter because he has a claim
that shares a common question of law or fact with Mr. Cohan’s claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
24(b)(1)(B) (a court may permit an interested party to intervene where he “has a claim or
defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact”).
3 MP Doc. No. 1 ¶ 74; MP Doc. No. 38 at 1.
4 Id. ¶ 1.
5 Id. ¶ 71 (asserting “[t]he appearance of impropriety is compounded by the fact that the
Trustee’s counsel, Akerman LLP has now employed Judge Burgess’s former law clerk”).
6 See generally Response to Verified Motion for Recusal and Disqualification of Judge Jason
A. Burgess Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (MP Doc. No. 18), Response to Brief in Support of
Motion to Disqualify Judge Burgess (MP Doc. No. 44), and Response to John Michael Cohan's
Supplemental Briefing in Support of Motion for Recusal (MP Doc. No. 45).
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adjudication.7
The Court held a hearing on the Disqualification Motion on August 12,
2026.8 At its conclusion, the Court authorized Mr. Cohan and Mr. Hughes to
file supporting briefs, and invited responses from other interested parties.9 The
Court then took the matter under advisement.10
For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes Mr. Cohan and
Mr. Hughes lack Article III standing to seek Judge Burgess’s recusal. And even
if they had standing, recusal would not be warranted: the Disqualification
Motion identifies only adverse rulings and routine case-management decisions,
not an extrajudicial source of bias or the deep-seated favoritism or antagonism
7 Order: 1) Providing for Judge Rivera to Preside Over a Contested Matter, 2) Directing Clerk
to Open a Miscellaneous Proceeding for this Matter, and 3) Directing All Future Filings
related to that Matter be Filed in the New Proceeding for this Case (MP Doc. No. 2).
8 Hearing Proceeding Memo (MP Doc. No. 23).
9 Scheduling Order (MP Doc. No. 25). On August 19, 2026, Mr. Cohan mailed his
Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion for Recusal (MP Doc. No. 33), and Mr. Hughes
mailed his Motion to Intervene & Brief for a Limited Purpose, to Participate in the Recusal
Proceeding, and for Immediate, Limited Discovery (MP Doc. No. 38).
On August 31, 2026, the United States Trustee filed a response to Mr. Cohan’s supplemental
brief (MP Doc. No. 44), and the Chapter 7 Trustee filed a separate response (MP Doc. No. 45).
That same day, Mr. Cohan submitted the following unauthorized supplemental filings, which
the Court has nevertheless considered:
• Notice of Filing in Related Bankruptcy Case and Request for Judicial Notice (MP Doc.
No. 46);
• Notice of Supplemental Authority in Support of Recusal Motion, Misc. Doc 1, 31, 32
and in Support of Response to Trustee’s Motion for Protective Order Filed
Contemporaneously Herewith (MP Doc. No. 47);
• Amended Notice of Supplemental Briefing in Support of Motion for Recusal (MP Doc.
No. 56); and
• Amended Notice of Supplemental Authority in Support of Recusal Motion, Misc.
Doc. 1,31,32 and in Support of Response to Trustee's Motion for Protective Order, filed
Contemporaneously Herewith (MP Doc. No. 57).
10 MP Doc. No. 25.
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required to establish disqualifying partiality. This memorandum opinion
constitutes the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law under Federal
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052, as made applicable to this contested
matter by Rule 9014.
I. Background11
Mr. Hughes, Mr. Cohan, and Caleb Davis founded Genie Investments
NV, Inc. (“Debtor”).12 Before bankruptcy, the Debtor operated as a “financial
small business lending firm,”13 offering prospective borrowers low interest,
nonrecourse loans known as Business Expansion Lines of Credit.14
The Debtor later alleged that Josh Wearmouth and Velanos Principal
Capital, Inc. defrauded it of a $9 million investment in Velanos.15 After
customers sued the Debtor and its brokers to recover prepaid fees,16 the Debtor
filed a voluntary petition under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code17 on
February 21, 2024.18 Under the Court’s blind-draw assignment system, the
Clerk randomly assigned the case to Judge Burgess.19
11 These facts and background are undisputed and drawn from the record.
12 Chapter 11 Case Management Summary, at 1 (Doc. No. 44).
13 Id.
14 Examiner’s Report at 7 (Doc. No. 146).
15 Doc. No. 44, 1-2.
16 Id.
17 11 U.S.C. § 101 - 1532 (the “Bankruptcy Code” or the “Code”). Unless otherwise
indicated, all statutory references are to the Bankruptcy Code.
18 Doc. No. 1.
19 See M.D. Fla. L. R. 1073-1 (requiring the Clerk to “assign cases to an individual judge using
a blind draw system to ensure the random assignment of cases”).
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Early in the case, the United States Trustee moved to appoint a
chapter 11 trustee, alleging—based on interviews with eighteen small-
business owners—that the Debtor had orchestrated a fraudulent loan
scheme.20 Following a two-day trial, Judge Burgess granted the motion in part
and denied it in part.21 Rather than appoint a trustee, he directed the
appointment of an examiner under § 1104(c) to investigate the alleged fraud.22
After investigating the Debtor’s financial affairs, the examiner concluded
that appointing an independent fiduciary was necessary and would best serve
creditors’ interests.23 Against that backdrop, and at the United States
Trustee’s request,24 the Court converted the case to chapter 7 on August 9,
2024.25 The United States Trustee then appointed Aaron R. Cohen as interim
trustee of the Debtor’s estate, and he later became the permanent Chapter 7
Trustee by operation of 11 U.S.C. § 702(d).26
Soon after conversion to chapter 7, Mr. Cohan and Mr. Hughes began
filing motions against the Chapter 7 Trustee, Akerman, and the United States
20 See generally Doc. No. 20.
21 Doc. No. 60.
22 Id. ¶ 2-3.
23 See generally Doc. No. 146.
24 United States Trustee’s Second Motion to Appoint Chapter 11 Trustee, Dismiss Case, or
Convert to Chapter 7 (Doc. No. 154).
25 Order (I) Granting United States Trustee's Second Motion to Appoint Chapter 11 Trustee,
Dismiss Case, or Convert to Chapter 7; (II) Directing Clerk to Convert Case to Chapter 7; and
(III) Ordering Related Relief (Doc. No. 203).
26 Doc. No. 207.
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Trustee.27 Those motions alleged retaliation, abuse of process, and breaches of
fiduciary duty.28 From the conversion through March 27, 2025, they collectively
filed more than 28 papers in the Main Case.29
The volume of these filings, and the judicial resources required to
address them, prompted the Court to enter an Order to Show Cause on
March 27, 2025.30 The Order directed Mr. Cohan and Mr. Hughes to appear
and show cause why the Court should permit them to continue filing pro se
pleadings in the Main Case.31 After receiving rulings with which they
disagreed, they directed their allegations at Judge Burgess, asserting that his
“pattern of conduct and [ ] recent orders . . . demonstrate[d] a clear effort to
conceal fraud and obstruct justice by suppressing meritorious motions and
evidence.”32
27 See, e.g., Combined Motion for Sanction and Protective Order Against Chapter Trustee for
Retaliatory Conduct, Abuse of Process, and Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Doc. No. 274); Motion
to Compel Disclosure of Trustee Communications and Administrative Decisions (Doc.
No. 277); Motion For Sanctions Against Chapter 7 Trustee, Akerman LLP, Aaron Cohen, and
Ray Elliott for Bad Faith Litigation, Abuse of Process, Suppression of Exculpatory Evidence,
Retaliation, and Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Doc. No. 322); Motion For Sanctions for Violation
of the Automatic Stay under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(k). and Bad Faith Litigation Against Raye C.
Elliott & Akerman LLP (Doc. No. 325).
28 Id.
29 As of August 7, 2026, Mr. Cohan and Mr. Hughes had filed 88 pleadings and 9 notices of
appeal of various orders entered by the Court in the Main Case. MP Doc. No. 18 ¶ 6. As of
the same date, Mr. Cohan and Mr. Hughes had also filed 30 papers and 6 notices of appeal
in one of the relayed adversary proceedings. Id.
30 Order to Show Cause (Doc. No. 347).
31 Id. at 3.
32 Objection to Judicial Conduct and Suppression of Evidence (Doc. No. 426). See generally
Notice of Retaliatory Action and Procedural Irregularity (Doc. No. 476); Notice of Systemic
Docket Tampering, Ex Parte Communication, and Compromise of Judicial Integrity (Doc.
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Now, in the Disqualification Motion, Mr. Cohan advances two grounds
for Judge Burgess’s disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455. First, he argues
that Judge Burgess’s failure to rule on the Motion to Modify or Rescind Order
to Show Cause33 reflects “a pattern of judicial conduct that would cause a
reasonable observer to question the Court’s impartiality.”34 In his view:
A judge cannot preside over a case where he has systematically
suppressed a litigant's access to the courts, retaliated against the
litigant for reporting a crime, selectively enforced procedural rules, and
presided over a docket from which evidence of a verified crime was
removed without any motion, hearing, or court order. Recusal is
required.35
Second, Mr. Cohan contends that an appearance of impropriety arises from
Judge Burgess’s former law clerk, Taylor King (“Mr. King”), joining Akerman
in May 2026.36
The Chapter 7 Trustee and the United States Trustee oppose the
Disqualification Motion.37 They contend Mr. Cohan and Mr. Hughes lack
standing to seek Judge Burgess’s recusal and, in any event, that the motion
rests solely on adverse rulings and routine docket administration, which, as a
matter of law, do not give rise to a reasonable question about judicial
No. 477); and Notice of Thanksgiving Administrative Filing Irregularity in Poor Attempt to
Rebut Judicially-Verified 341 Meeting Criminal Act (Doc. No. 498).
33 Doc. No. 347.
34 MP Doc. No. 1 ¶ 1.
35 Id. ¶ 2.
36 Id. ¶ 71.
37 See generally MP Doc. Nos. 18, 44 & 45.
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impartiality.38 Relying on Liteky v. United States,39 they argue that judicial
rulings, case-management decisions, and ordinary courtroom administration
support recusal only when they reveal deep-seated favoritism or antagonism
that would make fair judgment impossible—ordinarily based on an
extrajudicial source.40
The Trustee and the United States Trustee also contend that Judge
Burgess reasonably and thoughtfully addressed the burdens created by
Mr. Cohan’s and Mr. Hughes’s extensive filings.41 As to the argument based on
Mr. King’s employment with Akerman, the Chapter 7 Trustee responds that
Mr. King has been properly screened in compliance with Rule 4-1.12 of the
Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.42 The Trustee further argues that, even if
they had not complied, any resulting disqualification would apply to
Akerman—not Judge Burgess.43
II. Legal Standard for Disqualification
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge must disqualify himself from any
proceeding in which his “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”44
Section 455 thus requires recusal when the circumstances create an
38 MP Doc. No. 18, at 6.
39 Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 127 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1994).
40 Id. at 5.
41 MP Doc. No. 44. ¶ 9-11.
42 MP Doc. No. 45, at 1-2.
43 Id.
44 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
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appearance of impropriety or when one of the specific grounds in § 455(b)
establishes actual partiality.45 The statute protects public confidence in the
judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety.46
The governing question is whether “an objective, disinterested, lay
observer fully informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal
was sought would entertain a significant doubt about the judge’s
impartiality.”47 The inquiry is objective and fact-specific; § 455 does not require
recusal based on conjecture, suspicion, or “unsupported, irrational or highly
tenuous speculation.”48 Nor does a party’s request for disqualification, standing
alone, require the judge to recuse.49
Ordinarily, disqualifying bias must be personal and stem from an
extrajudicial source.50 Thus, adverse rulings, case-management decisions, and
views formed during the proceedings generally do not warrant recusal under
45 United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003) (describing § 455’s “two primary
reasons for recusal”).
46 Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865, 108 S. Ct. 2194, 100 L. Ed.
2d 855 (1988) (“The very purpose of § 455(a) is to promote confidence in the judiciary by
avoiding even the appearance of impropriety whenever possible.”).
47 Patti, 337 F.3d at 1322.
48 United States v. Cerceda, 188 F.3d 1291, 1292 (11th Cir. 1999).
49 Johnson v. Stein Mart, Inc., No. 306-CV-341-J-34TEM, 2009 WL 1424214, at *1 (M.D. Fla.
May 20, 2009) (“[A] presiding judge is strongly encouraged not to recuse or disqualify himself
at the mere request of a party.”).
50 See Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 780 (11th Cir. 1994) (“For a bias to be personal,
and therefore disqualifying, it must stem from an extra-judicial source.”) (cleaned up); Liteky,
510 U.S. at 541 (The Supreme Court requires that a judge “cannot possibly show reliance
upon an extrajudicial source”).
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§ 455(a).51 The exception to this rule is narrow: when no extrajudicial source
exists, recusal is warranted only if the judge’s words or conduct reveal such
deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that fair judgment is impossible.52
United States v. Torkington53 illustrates the exceptional circumstances
necessary to establish disqualifying partiality without an extrajudicial
source.54 There, after an earlier remand, the trial judge converted a defense
motion for mistrial into a motion for judgment of acquittal and dismissed the
prosecution at the outset of trial.55 The judge also repeatedly disparaged the
prosecution, calling it “silly,” a waste of taxpayer funds, and a Rolex “vendetta”
against the defendant.56 The combination of this extraordinary ruling and
those disparaging remarks created the appearance of partiality requiring
reassignment.57
51 See Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1103 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Precedent clearly holds that
adverse rulings alone do not provide a party with a basis for holding that the court's
impartiality is in doubt.”).
52 See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 (noting judicial rulings “cannot possibly show reliance upon an
extrajudicial source; and can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of
favoritism or antagonism required”).
53 United States v. Torkington, 874 F.2d 1441 (11th Cir. 1989).
54 Id. at 1447.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 See id. (“We conclude both that the trial judge has demonstrated great difficulty in putting
aside his prior conclusions about the merits of this prosecution and that reassignment is
necessary to preserve the appearance of impartiality.”).
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By contrast, unfavorable rulings alone do not establish disqualifying
bias.58 Even rulings denying counsel or dismissing claims, though adverse to a
party, do not by themselves cause a reasonable observer cause to question the
Court’s impartiality.59 Nor may recusal rest on bare accusation alone. Even
when properly pleaded facts are accepted as true, they must persuade a
reasonable person that bias exists.60 “[C]onjecture and speculation,” without
competent factual support, do not justify disqualification.61
III. Analysis
A. Mr. Cohan Lacks Standing
Before reaching the merits, the Court must determine whether the
movants have standing.62 Standing must be present “at every stage of
litigation.”63
To establish Article III standing, a movant must show “(1) an actual (or
58 Byrne, 261 F.3d at 1103 (“[A]dverse rulings alone do not provide a party with a basis for
holding that the court's impartiality is in doubt.”).
59 See United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Berger's recusal
argument has no merit under § 455(a) because Berger's only evidence of bias is the district
court's adverse ruling denying him counsel, which is insufficient to form a basis for recusal.”).
60 See Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (“To warrant recusal . . ., the
moving party must allege facts that would convince a reasonable person that bias actually
exists.).
61 Cerceda, 188 F.3d at 1293.
62 See United States v. Ross, 963 F.3d 1056, 1062 (11th Cir. 2020) (noting standing “is a
threshold jurisdictional question which must be addressed prior to and independent of the
merits of a party's claims”); Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 974 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“In the absence of standing, a court is not free to opine in an advisory capacity about the
merits of a plaintiff's claims.”).
63 Corley v. Long-Lewis, Inc., 965 F.3d 1222, 1233 (11th Cir. 2020) (“To have a case or
controversy, a litigant must establish that he has standing, which must exist 'throughout all
stages of litigation, including on appeal.”).
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imminent), concrete, and particularized injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable
to the defendant’s challenged action and (3) that is likely to be redressable by
a favorable decision.”64
Section 1109(b) permits a party in interest, including an equity security
holder, to raise issues and be heard in a chapter 11 case.65 But that statutory
right does not exist in chapter 7.66 And, in any event, it does not itself establish
Article III standing.67 Even in bankruptcy, the movant must still show a
concrete and particularized injury—typically a direct pecuniary interest in the
outcome—that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and likely to be
redressed by the requested relief.68
Here, Mr. Cohan and Mr. Hughes lack standing to seek Judge Burgess’s
recusal. As equity security holders, Mr. Cohan and Mr. Hughes have no
pecuniary interest in the estate because there is no reasonable prospect of a
64 In re Breland, 989 F.3d 919, 922 (11th Cir. 2021).
65 See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (“A party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors’
committee, an equity security holders’ committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or
any indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under
this chapter”).
66 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 701-784.
67 See Westwood Cmty. Two Ass'n v. Barbee (In re Westwood Cmty. Two Ass'n, Inc.), 293 F.3d
1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[M]ere participation in a hearing on the approval of a settlement
or compromise in an adversary proceeding does not constitute de facto intervention: The fact
that the appellants were given an opportunity to be heard in the bankruptcy court does not
provide a basis for standing on appeal.”).
68 Id. at 2 (“White-Lett's argument that § 504 created a cause of action does not call into
question the district court's determination that she had no redressable injury. And we
conclude, for the reasons set forth in the district court's decision, that White-Lett did not have
an injury that would be redressed by a favorable decision regarding the validity of RRA's
claim. Accordingly, we affirm.”).
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surplus distribution after creditors are paid.69 Nor does the Disqualification
Motion identify a concrete injury to any personal right arising from Judge
Burgess’s challenged conduct; its generalized due-process assertions are not
enough.70
The claimed injury is also not redressable. Recusal will not restore
Mr. Cohan or Mr. Hughes to their former positions with the Debtor or
otherwise alter their right to a distribution from the estate.71 They therefore
lack Article III standing to pursue disqualification.
Finally, although Judge Burgess permitted Mr. Cohan and Mr. Hughes
to be heard in the main proceeding, that opportunity did not confer Article III
standing.72 Without a concrete, redressable injury, Mr. Cohan and Mr. Hughes
lack standing to seek recusal.
69 United States v. Day, 215 F. App'x 975, 976 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Because there was no pending
action before the district court in which Day's rights were at issue, Day did not have standing
to seek recusal.”). Here, Schedule E/F – signed by Mr. Cohan under penalty of perjury –
admits roughly $10.7 million in unsecured claims. Doc. No. 39, at 16-41. And as of the filing
of the Disqualification Motion, over $39 million in claims have been filed in the Main Case.
See generally Claims Register. Yet, as of March 31, 2026, the Chapter 7 Trustee has recovered
a mere $1,581,689.05 for the payment of claims in the case. Interim Report for Period Ending
March 31, 2026 (Doc. No. 573). Under these circumstances, the Court concludes there is no
reasonable prospect of a surplus distribution after creditors are paid.
70 See generally MP Doc. No. 1.
71 See Day, 215 F. App'x at 976 (“Because there was no pending action before the district court
in which Day's rights were at issue, Day did not have standing to seek recusal.”); see also In
re White-Lett, No. 24-13053, 2025 WL 2528783, at *2 (11th Cir. Sept. 3, 2025) (an injury must
be “redressable”).
72 See supra note 67.
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B. Even if Mr. Cohan and Mr. Hughes had Standing,
Recusal is Still Unwarranted
Even if Mr. Cohan and Mr. Hughes had standing to seek Judge Burgess’s
recusal in the Main Case – which they do not – the Disqualification Motion and
the hearing proffers would not warrant recusal. Their claim rests on actions
Judge Burgess allegedly took, or declined to take, while presiding over the
Main Case.73 They point principally to: the absence of a final ruling on the
Order to Show Cause;74 the purported “Retaliatory Bar Order” entered in
connection with approval of a compromise among the Chapter 7 Trustee,
Christopher D. Warren, P.C., Warren Law Group, PLLC, and Scott Oh;75 the
striking of papers filed in violation of the Order to Show Cause;76 and the grant
of the Trustee’s contempt motion against Mr. Cohan and Mr. Hughes in a
related adversary proceeding.77
At the hearing, Mr. Cohan and Mr. Hughes focused principally on
Judge Burgess’s decisions to strike Mr. Cohan’s filings, which they contend
denied him an opportunity to be heard.78 Mr. Cohan and Mr. Hughes also
challenged Akerman’s ethical screen for Mr. King and speculated that off-the-
73 MP Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 13 – 27, 43 - 59.
74 Id. ¶ 13-19.
75 Id. ¶ 20-24.
76 Id. ¶ 25-27.
77 Id. ¶ 46 -52. The remaining allegations concern the conduct of others involved in the Main
Case —including the United States Trustee, the Chapter 7 Trustee, and Akerman—not
conduct by Judge Burgess. Id. ¶ 28- 42.
78 MP Doc. No. 23. (Mr. Cohan: “My claims were extinguished by Burgess, and I was silenced
by Burgess, strike after strike after strike, after strike, by Burgess”).
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record communications may have occurred.79 But the record does not support
either contention.
The asserted bias arises entirely from Judge Burgess’s conduct in
presiding over the Main Case: his case-management decisions, conduct at
hearings, and rulings adverse to Mr. Cohan and Mr. Hughes. The Motion
identifies no personal or extrajudicial source of bias. It does not allege that
Judge Burgess acted because of a personal, familial, professional, or financial
relationship; that a personal contact participated in the Main Case; or that
Judge Burgess engaged in ex parte communications or private discussions
concerning issues before him.80 Nor does the Motion identify any statement by
Judge Burgess evidencing favoritism toward one party or antagonism toward
another.81
At most, Mr. Cohan and Mr. Hughes challenge Judge Burgess’s
administration of the Main Case and rulings with which they disagree. Those
are ordinary judicial acts, not evidence of disqualifying bias.82 The Court’s
79 Id. (Mr. Cohan: “I would agree that it is usually routine and that they do have the
procedures in place in order to prevent that, but that is for on the record activity. We don’t
know what’s going to happen off the record. We don’t know what Mr. King has told Akerman.
We don’t know what Mr. King knows personally from this case. We have no idea”)
80 See generally MP Doc. No. 1.
81 See United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 738 (11th Cir. 1989) (Extra judicial sources
includes public or private conversations between the judge and personal contacts, that put
the judge in an “awkward position”); Torkington, 874 F.2d at 1447 (“Rather, we respond to
the appearance of a lack of neutrality and act to preserve in the public mind the image of
absolute impartiality and fairness of the judiciary.”).
82 Byrne, 261 F.3d at 1103; Hoffman v. Jimenez, No. 2:25-CV-00131-KCD-DNF, 2026 WL
139259, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2026) (“Administrative decisions, like managing the docket
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decisions to strike noncompliant filings and to enter rulings adverse to
Mr. Cohan and Mr. Hughes may be subject to review through appropriate
procedures, but they do not, without more, establish a basis for recusal.83 The
record likewise does not show that Judge Burgess distorted a party’s filing to
dispose of a claim at the first opportunity or otherwise deprived a litigant of a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.84
The allegation concerning Mr. King fares no better. Mr. King served as
Judge Burgess’s law clerk from May 2022 through May 2026, after which he
joined Akerman, counsel to the Chapter 7 Trustee. 85 Although Mr. Cohan and
Mr. Hughes acknowledge that Mr. King attempted to “self-cure [the] potential
conflict of interest,” they contend that his employment at Akerman creates an
appearance of impropriety because of unspecified off-the-record
communications.86 Speculation about communications that might have
or determining who may access the electronic filing system, are standard exercises of judicial
discretion, not evidence of prejudice.”) (citing In re Walker, 532 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir.
2008)).
83 Hoffman, 2026 WL 139259, at *1 (“Administrative decisions, like managing the docket or
determining who may access the electronic filing system, are standard exercises of judicial
discretion, not evidence of prejudice.”) (citing In re Walker, 532 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir.
2008)).
84 Compare Doc. No. 347 (“The Court’s handling of this Case clearly reflects that the Court
has taken great strides to liberally construe the pleadings filed by the Interested Parties’ pro
se filings. However, the Interested Parties are still bound to follow the rules of procedure and
evidence.”), with Torkington, 874 F.2d at 1447.
85 MP Doc. No. 1 ¶ 71.
86 Id.
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occurred, however, is not evidence that any such communication occurred or
that it concerned this case.
The undisputed record establishes that Akerman timely screened
Mr. King from the Main Case.87 Akerman notified the Court and interested
parties of the screen, 88 and represented that Mr. King was not staffed on the
matter, had no access to Akerman’s electronic case files, and had no
involvement in the Main Case.89 Mr. Cohan and Mr. Hughes identified no
specific improper communication, conversation, or act by Mr. King—either in
the Motion or at the hearing. 90
Moreover, a law clerk’s views ordinarily are not attributed to the judge.91
When a clerk has a potential conflict or is aware of a disqualifying
87 See Notice of Ethical Screening Pursuant to Florida Bar Rule of Professional Conduct 4-
1.12 ¶ 3 (Doc. No. 613) (“Akerman has implemented a timely and effective ethical screen to
prohibit Mr. King from any participation in this matter.”).
88 See generally Doc. No. 613.
89 See MP Doc. No. 23 (Ms. Ray: “Law firms routinely hire law clerks from judges and there
is a procedure to screen those clerks away from any cases they worked on. My firm has done
that in this case. I don’t have any contact with Mr. King in this case. Our files are all digital
and there is actually a wall put up where he can’t even access the digital files in this case”).
See also Doc. No. 613 ¶ 3-4 (describing screening procedures and confirming “Mr. King will
have no involvement whatsoever” in the Main Case).
90 See MP Doc. No. 1, at p. 16, ¶71 (“The issue is the appearance created by the structure of
the representation . . . The undersigned fears what may occur or has occurred ‘off-the-record’.
The appearance of impropriety is unavoidable.”); MP Doc. No. 23 (Mr. Cohan: “I would agree
that it is usually routine and that they do have the procedures in place in order to prevent
that, but that is for on the record activity. We don’t know what’s going to happen off the
record. We don’t know what Mr. King has told Akerman. We don’t know what Mr. King knows
personally from this case. We have no idea”).
91 Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1525 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litig., 614 F.2d 958, 968 (5th Cir. 1980)) (“[T]he views of [a] judge’s law
clerk cannot be attributed to that judge.”).
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circumstance, the appropriate remedy is ordinarily to disqualify the clerk, not
the judge.92 An ethical concern may arise if a former law clerk worked on a
particular matter, learned the judge’s confidential views about that matter,
and then represents a party in the same matter.93 That is not this case. The
record contains no evidence that Mr. King participated in the Main Case after
joining Akerman, received confidential information bearing on the matters
before Judge Burgess, or engaged in any improper communication.94 His
former clerkship and subsequent employment at Akerman therefore do not
create a reasonable basis to question Judge Burgess’s impartiality.
IV. Conclusion
Mr. Cohan and Mr. Hughes lack Article III standing to seek Judge
Burgess’s recusal because, as equity security holders with no reasonable
prospect of a surplus distribution, they have neither a concrete, redressable
injury nor a pecuniary interest in the estate. Their asserted interest in an
opportunity to be heard in the Main Case does not alter that conclusion.
Even if they had standing, recusal is unwarranted. The Disqualification
Motion identifies adverse rulings and routine case-management decisions, not
92 See Parker, 855 F.2d at 1525 (“[W]hen a judge's law clerk has a possible conflict of interest
or knows of other disqualifying factors it is the clerk, not the judge, who must be disqualified.”
(internal citations omitted)).
93 Brown v. Brock, 169 F. App'x 579, 583 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n ethical danger exists only if
the law clerk knows the judge's thoughts about a specific matter and the law clerk
subsequently represents one of the parties to the matter before the judge.”).
94 See supra note 80.
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an extrajudicial source of bias, deep-seated favoritism or antagonism, or
evidence that Mr. King participated in the Main Case after joining Akerman
despite the firm’s undisputed ethical screen. The Disqualification Motion will
therefore be denied.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
1. The Motion for Recusal and Disqualification of Judge Jason A.
Burgess Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (MP Doc. No. 1) is DENIED.
2. David Hughes’ Motion to Intervene & Brief for a Limited Purpose,
to Participate in the Recusal Proceeding, and for Immediate, Limited Discovery
is GRANTED to the extent that Mr. Hughes was permitted to intervene and
participate in this Miscellaneous Proceeding.
3. All other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
4. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter a copy of this order on the docket
in the case of In re Genie Investments NV Inc., Case No. 3:24-bk-00496-BAJ,
and close this miscellaneous proceeding.
The Clerk’s office is directed to serve a copy of this order on interested parties
via CM/ECF.
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