Mitrano v. A.A. Dority Company, Inc et al

73453722 v2
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
In re:
PETER PAUL MITRANO, Chapter 13
Case No.: 6:24-bk-02053-TPG
Debtor.
/
PETER PAUL MITRANO,
Plaintiff, Adv. Proc. No. 6:25-ap-00090-TPG
v.
A.A. DORITY COMPANY, INC., MARTIN J.
DRILLING, RYAN P. MARTIN, JAMES G.
LONG III, HAGAN HUFF-HARRIS LONG,
WILLIAM RAVEIS, KEVIN R. CONNELLY,
PATRICK W. STANTON, MATTHEW J.
MCDONOUGH, THE VILLAS AT KEENE
BROOK, LLC, JANE DOE, JOHN DOE, and
DENNIS S. MITRANO,
Defendants.
/
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON THE VILLAS AT
KEENE BROOK, LLC’S MOTION TO DISMISS ADVERSARY COMPLAINT FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED
Dated: October 07, 2026
ORDERED.
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THIS MATTER, having come before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Adversary
Complaint for Failure to State a Claim upon which Relief can be Granted (A.P. Dkt. No. 84) (the
“Motion”) filed by Defendant, The Villas at Keene Brook, LLC (“The Villas”) and the plaintiff,
Peter Paul Mitrano (the “Plaintiff”) having failed to file a response to the Motion or to appear at
the hearing on the Motion on September 2, 2026, the Court, having reviewed the Motion and being
otherwise fully advised in these premises, proposes the following findings of fact and conclusions
of law to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida in accordance with Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 52, applicable here pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052.
To the extent any finding of fact below is more appropriately construed as a legal conclusion or
vice-versa, such factual finding or legal conclusion should be considered accordingly.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff Commences Bankruptcy Case and Adversary Proceeding
1. On April 26, 2024 (the “Petition Date”), the Plaintiff commenced the above-
captioned bankruptcy case (Case No. 6:24-bk-02053-TPG) (the “Bankruptcy Case”) when he filed
a voluntary petition (the “Petition”) for relief pursuant to chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. See
(Bankr. Dkt. No. 1).1
2. On July 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) against The Villas
and numerous other Defendants, commencing the above-captioned Adversary Proceeding (the
“Adversary Proceeding”). See (A.P. Dkt. No. 1).
3. The Complaint generally pleads that it is “related to real property located at 934
Temple Street, Duxbury, Massachusetts.” (A.P. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 7).
1 Citations to filings in the above-captioned bankruptcy case appear herein as “Bankr. Dkt. No. ___,” while
citations to the above-captioned adversary proceeding appear as “A.P. Dkt. No. ___.”
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4. The Complaint further broadly contends that all named Defendants willfully and
intentionally violated the automatic stay and requests that the Court, among other relief, “award
sanctions, including but not limited to punitive damages, against the defendants, jointly and
severally, in the amount of fifty million dollars.” (A.P. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 8, 10).
B. Plaintiff Seeks Withdrawal of the Reference
5. On September 2, 2025, the Plaintiff moved to withdraw the reference when he filed
his Motion to Have any Ruling in this Court’s Above-Captioned Proceeding Heard by a District
Court Judge. (A.P. Dkt. No. 51) (the “First Motion to Withdraw the Reference”).
6. On September 9, 2025, the Bankruptcy Court issued its Order Staying Proceedings
Pending Resolution of Plaintiff’s Motion for Withdrawal, noting that that it “retains jurisdiction to
hear this proceeding while the motion for withdrawal is pending” but ultimately, in the interests
of judicial economy, decided in its discretion to stay the Adversary Proceeding “pending the
District Court’s resolution of the Motion [(A.P. Dkt. No. 51)].” See (A.P. Dkt. No. 58) (“Order
Staying Adversary Proceeding”).
7. On October 24, 2025, the Bankruptcy Court transmitted to the District Court the
Plaintiff’s First Motion to Withdraw the Reference. (A.P. Dkt. No. 68).
8. On June 16, 2026, the District Court denied the Plaintiff’s First Motion to Withdraw
the Reference. See (Case No. 6:25-mc-00035-AGM, District Court Dkt. No. 5).2
9. On July 30, 2026, the Plaintiff filed his second Motion to Have any Ruling in this
Court’s Above-Captioned Proceeding Heard by a District Court Judge (the “Second Motion to
Withdraw the Reference”), which currently remains pending. (District Court Dkt. No. 11).
2 All citations to filings in the District Court case appear herein as “District Court Dkt. No. ___.”
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10. The District Court having resolved the First Motion to Withdraw the Reference, the
Bankruptcy Court found that the adversary proceeding was no longer stayed pursuant to its prior
Order Staying Adversary Proceeding. The Bankruptcy Court further found that, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 5011(c), the Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Withdraw the
Reference “does not stay proceedings in a case or affect its administration.” Fed. R. Bankr. P.
5011(c).
C. Bankruptcy Court Annuls the Stay
11. Meanwhile, on October 23, 2025, Martin J. Drilling filed a Motion to Annul
Automatic Stay (Bankr. Dkt. No. 136) (the “Motion to Annul”) in the Bankruptcy Case.
12. On November 20, 2025, after notice and a hearing and having considered the
parties’ arguments, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Order Granting the Motion to Annul
Automatic Stay (the “Annulment Order”), finding in pertinent part that “[t]he automatic stay is
annulled as to the sale of 934 Temple Street, Duxbury, Massachusetts 02332, on June 2, 2025.”
(Bk. Dkt. No. 158, ¶ 2).
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which applies in an adversary proceeding pursuant
to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7008, requires a pleading to contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (emphasis
added); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7008. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which also
applies in an adversary proceeding pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012(b), a
party may assert the defense of “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” by
motion. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(b).
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“Rule 8(a) is premised on the notion that a defendant must be given fair notice of what ‘the
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” In re Zalloum, No. 6:17-bk-02329-KSJ, Adv. No.
6:17-ap-00068-KSJ, 2019 WL 965098, at *7 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2019) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). “[T]he pleading
standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusations.” Id. (emphasis added)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed. 2d 868 (2009)).
“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Twombley, 550 U.S. at 555).
In other words, “[f]or a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, it must contain enough
factual matter to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” In re Zalloum, 2019 WL
965098, at *7 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–78). Facial plausibility is present only “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
677–78).
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Necessarily, “[i]ndividuals seeking damages for stay violations have the burden of proof
to establish that the wrongdoer violated the automatic stay and the violation was willful.” In re
Rose, 645 B.R. 253, 259 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2022) (citation omitted). As a preliminary matter, the
Plaintiff must plead facts establishing which provision of section 362 he contends The Villas
violated. The Complaint fails to plausibly state a claim for violation of the automatic stay or for
damages related thereto.
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The Eleventh Circuit has long held that section 362(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides
that the stay may be annulled on request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing. In re
Albany Partners, Ltd., 749 F.2d 670, 675-76 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that a bankruptcy court may
grant retroactive relief from the automatic stay, thereby annulling the stay and violation, “so as to
validate action taken during the pendency of the stay.”); see also Williford v. Williford, 294 F.
App’x 518, 521-22 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that, pursuant to § 362(d)(1), the bankruptcy court
may annul the automatic stay, providing relief retroactively to validate actions in violation of the
stay); see also Rajesh C. Patel v. Rishi M. Patel, 142 F.4th 1313, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2025)
(affirming order annulling the automatic stay “for cause” under § 362(d)(1)).
The Bankruptcy Code does not define “party in interest” for purposes of section 362(d)(1),
but courts have held that “a ‘party in interest’ can include any party that has a pecuniary interest
in the matter, that has a practical stake in the resolution of the matter or that is impacted by the
automatic stay.” In re Cruz, 516 B.R. 594, 602 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Moreover,
the Eleventh Circuit has held that an entity sued in federal court for sanctions and contempt for
allegedly violating the stay had Article III standing in bankruptcy court to seek annulment of the
stay, because the lawsuit was the injury traceable to the debtor and the order granting relief from
the automatic stay would redress that injury. Baker v. Bank of Am., N.A., 837 F. App’x 754, 758
(11th Cir. 2020).
Accordingly, Martin J. Drilling is a party in interest, directly impacted by the automatic
stay, because he was appointed by the Massachusetts state court to sell the property located at 934
Temple Street, Duxbury, Massachusetts (the “Property”) and Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks damages
for violating the stay related only to that sale of the Property. As a party in interest, Martin J.
Drilling properly sought annulment of stay retroactive to the date of the sale of the Property.
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(Bankr. Dkt. No. 136). The Court then annulled the stay as to the sale of the Property. (Bankr. Dkt.
No. 158).
An order annulling the automatic stay validates an act against the property of the estate,
and actions for damages for violating the automatic stay should be dismissed. Matter of Patel, 642
B.R. 187, 199 n.9 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2022), subsequently aff'd sub nom. In re Patel, 142 F.4th 1313
(11th Cir. 2025) (“As the Court finds cause to annul the stay, the Court need not consider any
evidence presented regarding Debtor's entitlement to damages, including punitive damages.”); In
re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569, 573 (9th Cir. 1992).
The entire foundation of the Complaint is that the defendants, including The Villas,
violated the automatic stay by participating in the sale of the Property. But since this Court has
retroactively annulled the stay as to that sale, the automatic stay is deemed not to have applied,
and the sale of the Property is validated. As a matter of law, the actions of which the Plaintiff
complains, cannot constitute violations of section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. Albany Partners,
Ltd., 749 F.2d at 675-76 (recognizing bankruptcy courts’ authority to grant retroactive relief from
the automatic stay by annulling it).
Accordingly, because the Court’s Annulment Order retroactively eliminates the stay as to
the Property, the Complaint for damages for violating the automatic stay fails to state a plausible
claim for relief and is due to be dismissed with prejudice.
Dana L. Robbins-Boehner is directed to serve a copy of this order on interested parties who do not
receive service by CM/ECF and to file a proof of service within three days of entry of this order.
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