HOLT v. HARTLINE et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
JOSHUA HOLT,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No.: 3:25cv567/LC/ZCB
J. HARTLINE, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP)
in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	After performing its
screening duties under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(a)-(b), the
Court 	identified 	several 	deficiencies 	in 	Plaintiff’s 	second 	amended
complaint (Doc. 13) and ordered Plaintiff to correct those deficiencies by
filing a third amended complaint. 	(Doc. 15). 	Plaintiff has now filed a
third amended complaint. (Doc. 16).
The Court is statutorily required to screen Plaintiff’s complaint to
determine whether it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune. 	28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(a)-(b). 	Upon review,
several 	of 	the 	claims 	and 	allegations 	in 	Plaintiff’s 	third 	amended
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complaint 	fail 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	on 	which 	relief 	may 	be 	granted.
Accordingly, those claims should be dismissed and the case recommitted
to the undersigned for further proceedings on the remaining claims.
I. The Allegations in the Third Amended Complaint1
A. The October 8, 2024, incident.
Plaintiff names seven Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC)
officials from the Walton Correctional Institution as Defendants: 	(1)
Lieutenant J. Hartline; (2) Sergeant Coffman; (3) Captain Lawrence; (4)
Sergeant Robson; (5) Officer Sellers; (6) Sergeant O’Brien; and (7) Officer
N. Johnson. 	(Doc. 16 at 3-5). 	Plaintiff sues all Defendants in their
individual capacities. (Id.).
On October 8, 2024, Plaintiff “declared a psychological emergency”
to Defendant Coffman. 	(Doc. 16 at 7). 	Defendant Coffman handcuffed
Plaintiff and contacted Defendant Lawrence via radio. (Id.). Defendant
Coffman then took Plaintiff to the prison’s medical department for a
psychological 	evaluation. 	(Id.). 	After 	arriving 	at 	the 	medical
department, Defendant Coffman “encouraged” Defendant Lawrence to
1 At this stage, the Court assumes the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations.
DeVillier v. Texas, 601 U.S. 285, 288 n.1 (2024). And because Plaintiff is
proceeding pro se, the Court “liberally construe[s] his pleadings.” 	Roy v.
Ivy, 53 F.4th 1338, 1346 (11th Cir. 2022).
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“gas [Plaintiff] for playing games[.]” (Id.). Defendant Lawrence “agreed
to 	spray 	[Plaintiff] 	with 	chemical 	agents 	without 	any 	penological
justification.” 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff claims he was not “violating any prison
rules” when Defendant Coffman “encouraged” Defendant Lawrence to
gas Plaintiff. 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff states he was also “denied a psychological
evaluation” by Defendants Coffman and Lawrence. (Id.).
Defendant Lawrence then called Defendant Robson to take Plaintiff
back to the confinement unit. 	(Id. at 7-8). 	Defendant Lawrence told
Defendant Robson to keep Plaintiff handcuffed and place him in the
confinement 	shower until 	Defendant 	Lawrence 	arrived. 	(Id. 	at 	8).
Defendant Lawrence allegedly said to Defendant Robson that he was
going to 	“gas [Plaintiff] in 	the 	shower for playing games[.]” 	(Id.).
Following Lawrence’s instructions, Defendant Robson locked Plaintiff in
the confinement shower with Plaintiff’s hands cuffed behind his back.
(Id.). 	After being locked in the shower, Plaintiff continued declaring a
psychological emergency to Defendant Robson “who ignored [Plaintiff’s]
calls for psychiatric treatment[.]” (Id.).
“A little while later,” Defendant Lawrence came to the confinement
shower with cans of chemical agents. 	(Id. at 8-9). 	Plaintiff continued
“declaring a psychological emergency” to Defendants Lawrence, Robson,
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and Coffman but they “ignored” Plaintiff’s request for treatment. (Id. at
9). 	Defendants Lawrence and Robson allegedly responded to Plaintiff’s
request 	for 	treatment 	by 	saying 	“so 	what, 	motherfu**er.” 	(Id.).
Defendant Lawrence then allegedly sprayed Plaintiff’s face, head, and
neck with chemical agents while Plaintiff remained handcuffed. 	(Id.).
Plaintiff alleges the chemical agents caused him burns and severe pain
“without 	any 	penological 	justification.” 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff 	states 	that
Defendants Lawrence, Coffman, and Robson “all agreed” to turn on the
shower so hot pepper spray would run down Plaintiff’s entire body. (Id.).
Plaintiff claims the pepper spray ran down his body to his genitals
causing severe pain in those areas. (Id. at 9-10).
At some point, medical staff examined Plaintiff while he continued
declaring a psychological emergency. 	(Id. at 10). 	Plaintiff states that
medical 	staff 	ignored 	his 	psychological 	emergency 	and 	refused 	to
document his injuries at the direction of Defendant Lawrence. 	(Id.).
Defendant Lawrence told Plaintiff if he continued declaring psychological
emergencies 	then 	he 	would 	keep 	getting 	gassed 	repeatedly. 	(Id.).
Defendant Lawrence also allegedly told Plaintiff “the best thing for you
black ass to do is lay the fu** down and shut the fu** up. If you don’t you
get gassed again, you better comply.” (Id.).
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B. The October 11, 2024, incident.
Three days later, on October 11, 2024, Plaintiff declared another
psychological emergency in the presence of Defendant Johnson. (Doc. 16
at 10). 	Defendant Johnson then “questioned and threatened” Plaintiff
with more gassing. 	(Id. 	at 10-11). 	Plaintiff states that Defendant
Lawrence instructed Defendants Johnson and O’Brien to spray Plaintiff
with 	chemical 	agents 	if 	Plaintiff 	continued 	declaring 	psychological
emergencies. (Id. at 11). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Johnson “complied”
by informing Defendant O’Brien of Plaintiff’s psychological emergency.
(Id.).
Defendant Johnson returned to Plaintiff’s cell and told Plaintiff
“O’Brien doesn’t care nothing about your mental condition. He only cares
about gassing your ass for declaring a psychological emergency.” 	(Id.).
Defendant Johnson then left Plaintiff’s cell for unspecified period of time.
(Id.). 	After 	returning 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	cell, 	Defendant 	Johnson 	found
Plaintiff hanging from a sheet around his neck. (Id.).
Defendant 	Johnson 	immediately 	called 	for 	assistance 	before
spraying Plaintiff with chemical agents. 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff claims he
struggled to breathe after being sprayed. 	(Id. 	at 12). 	Defendants
Hartline, 	O’Brien, 	and 	Sellers 	arrived 	at 	Plaintiff’s 	cell 	and 	gave
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Defendant Johnson their chemical agents to continue spraying Plaintiff.
(Id.).
After the second use of chemical agents, Defendants Johnson,
O’Brien, Hartline, and Sellers entered Plaintiff’s cell and pulled Plaintiff
to the floor. 	(Id.). 	Once Plaintiff was on the floor and while he was
burning and struggling to breathe, the four officers “punched, kicked, and
stomped” Plaintiff on his body, face, and head “without any penological
justification[.]” 	(Id.). 	The four officers then took Plaintiff to the shower
for 	decontamination 	“but 	refused” 	Plaintiff 	a 	post 	use 	of 	force
examination by medical and mental health staff. (Id. at 13).
After the October 11, 2024, incident, Plaintiff was transferred to a
different prison and treated for head and facial burns and black spots,
flakes and bumps, soreness, bruises, and headaches. (Id.). 	At the other
prison, Plaintiff received mental health treatment and medication “for
mental disorders stemming from him being attacked” by Defendants.
(Id.).
Against all Defendants, Plaintiff brings claims under the Eighth
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, First Amendment
retaliation 	claims, 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	due 	process 	claims, 	and
conspiracy claims. (Doc. 16 at 15-16). Plaintiff also appears to bring an
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Eighth 	Amendment 	failure 	to 	intervene 	claim 	against 	Defendants
Coffman, Robson, O’Brien, Sellers, and Hartline for their alleged failure
to 	correct 	Defendant 	Lawrence’s 	and 	Defendant 	Johnson’s 	“illegal
actions.” 	(Id. at 16). 	For relief, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that his
rights were violated, as well as damages. (Id. at 17).
II. Statutory Screening Standard
To survive dismissal at the screening phase, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	The plausibility standard is
met only where the facts alleged enable “the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Id.
Plausibility means “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” 	Id. 	“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely
consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between
possibility 	and 	plausibility 	of 	entitlement 	to 	relief.” 	Id. 	(internal
quotation marks omitted).
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III. Discussion
A. Plaintiff 	fails 	to 	plausibly 	allege 	a 	violation 	of 	the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Plaintiff 	asserts 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	due 	process 	claims
against all Defendants. 	(Doc. 16 at 15-16). 	Plaintiff, however, fails to
plausibly state any due process claims here.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause encompasses
two components, a substantive component and a procedural component.
Maddox 	v. 	Stephens, 	727 	F.3d 	1109, 	1118 	(11th 	Cir. 	2013) 	The
substantive 	component 	of 	the 	Due 	Process 	Clause 	protects 	only
“fundamental” rights. 	See McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th
Cir.1994) (en banc) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
Fundamental rights are “protected against certain government actions
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.”
McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556 (cleaned up).
Because Plaintiff asserts substantive due process claims for the
alleged uses of force and indifference to his medical needs, Plaintiff’s
claims must be analyzed under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause rather than the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause. 	See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7
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(1997) (“[I]f a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional
provision, such as the . . . Eighth Amendment, the claim must be
analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not
under the rubric of substantive due process.”). And in any event, Plaintiff
is already asserting Eighth Amendment claims based on excessive force
and indifference to his requests for mental health treatment—making
any substantive due process claims duplicative. See Manning v. Carnival
Corp., No. 12-22258-CIV, 2012 WL 3962997, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 11,
2012) (“Duplicative claims are those that stem from identical allegations,
that are decided under identical legal standards, and for which identical
relief is available.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s substantive due process claims based on the
alleged uses of force and indifference to his medical needs should be
dismissed.2 See Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996)
2 	The same is true as to Plaintiff’s failure to intervene claims and
retaliation claims since they are also covered by the Eighth and First
Amendments, respectively. See Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1205-06
(11th Cir. 2019) (“Additionally, an officer who is present at the scene and
who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s
use of excessive force can be held personally liable for his nonfeasance.”)
(cleaned up); Martin v. Mitchell, No. 520CV01297RDPNAD, 2023 WL
4724704, at *8 (N.D. Ala. June 28, 2023) (“Martin’s failure to intervene
claim is analyzed under the Eighth Amendment standards explained
above.”), adopted, 2023 WL 4712303 (N.D. Ala. July 24, 2023); Hall v.
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(“Claims involving he mistreatment of arrestees or pretrial detainees in
custody are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause 	instead 	of 	the 	Eighth 	Amendment’s 	Cruel 	and 	Unusual
Punishment 	Clause, 	which 	applies 	to 	such 	claims 	by 	convicted
prisoners.”) (emphasis added); Lanier, 520 U.S. at 272 n.7; Manning,
2012 WL 3962997, at *2 (“To promote judicial economy, a court should
dismiss claims that are duplicative of other claims.”).
To the extent Plaintiff asserts procedural due process claims for the
alleged uses of force and indifference to his medical needs, Plaintiff has
failed 	to 	plausibly 	allege 	any 	“constitutionally 	inadequate 	process”
necessary 	to 	state 	a 	procedural 	due 	process 	claim 	for 	the 	alleged
detention. 	See Cryder v. Oxendine, 24 F.3d 175, 177 (11th Cir. 1994)
(stating that a procedural due process claim requires (1) a deprivation of
a liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally
inadequate process); Newman v. Garcia, No. 3:16-CV-137-J-PDB, 2016
WL 8939133, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2016) (“A procedural due process
violation is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide due
Merola, 	67 	F.4th 	1282, 	1294 	(11th 	Cir. 	2023) 	(noting 	a 	prisoner’s
allegations of guards using chemical agents on him in retaliation for
protected speech and stating “battery can be part of a First Amendment
retaliation claim”).
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process. 	Only when the state refuses to provide a process sufficient to
remedy 	the 	procedural 	deprivation 	does 	a 	constitutional 	violation
actionable under section 1983 arise.”) (cleaned up). 	Thus, because
Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege any constitutionally inadequate
process, any procedural due process claims asserted by Plaintiff should
be dismissed.
B. Plaintiff’s 	conspiracy 	claims 	are 	barred 	by 	the 	intra-
corporate conspiracy doctrine.
Plaintiff also claims that Defendants conspired to use excessive
force against Plaintiff for requesting medical treatment. (Doc. 16 at 16).
But 	Plaintiff’s 	conspiracy 	claims 	are 	barred 	by 	the 	intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine.
“A plaintiff may state a § 1983 claim for conspiracy to violate
constitutional rights by showing a conspiracy existed that resulted in the
actual denial of some underlying constitutional right.” 	Grider v. City of
Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1260 (11th Cir. 2010). 	“The plaintiff
attempting to prove such a conspiracy must show that the parties’
reached an understanding to deny the plaintiff his or her rights.” 	Id.
(cleaned up). 	“The conspiratorial acts must impinge upon the federal
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right; 	the 	plaintiff must 	prove 	an actionable 	wrong to 	support the
conspiracy.” 	Id.
The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, however, “bars conspiracy
claims against corporate or government actors accused of conspiring
together within an organization[.]” 	Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 854
(11th Cir. 2010). “Under the doctrine, a corporation cannot conspire with
its employees, and its employees, when acting in the scope of their
employment, cannot conspire among themselves.” 	Grider, 618 F.3d at
1261 (cleaned up).
Here, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims are aimed at FDOC employees.
(Doc. 16 at 3-5, 16). There are no allegations suggesting that anyone else
from outside FDOC was involved in the alleged conspiracy. 	See Denney
v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1190-91 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating “the
only two conspirators identified . . . are both City employees; no outsiders
are 	alleged 	to 	be 	involved” 	and 	concluding 	that 	the 	intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine 	barred plaintiffs’ 	conspiracy claims). 	And it 	is
apparent 	that 	Defendants 	were 	acting 	within 	the 	scope 	of 	their
employment as prison officials when they allegedly used force on Plaintiff
at the prison by spraying him with chemical agents. 	Id. at 1191 (“The
alleged subject of their conspiracy—non-criminal manipulation of the
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promotion 	process 	to 	deprive 	white 	employees 	of 	promotional
opportunities—relates to their performance of their official, not personal,
duties.”). 	Thus, 	Plaintiff’s 	conspiracy 	claims 	are 	barred 	by 	the
intracorporate 	conspiracy 	doctrine 	and 	should 	be 	dismissed. 	See
Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 855 (“The ‘conspiracy’ occurred only within a
government entity, and thus the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars
Count 10 against Paulk.”); Watson v. Edelen, 76 F. Supp. 3d 1332, 1372
n.16 (N.D. Fla. 2015) (discussing FDOC inmate’s conspiracy claims
against FDOC officials; stating “there is no disute that [the FDOC
defendants] were acting within the scope of their employment during
their encounters with 	[the 	prisoner-plaintiff]”; 	and stating that 	the
complaint did not state a plausible claim against the FDOC defendants
for their “allegedly planning the use of chemical agents” due to the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine).
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	Plaintiff’s 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	due 	process 	claims 	be
DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
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2. 	Plaintiff’s § 1983 conspiracy claims be DISMISSED under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim on
which relief may be granted.
3. 	This matter be recommitted to the undersigned for further
proceedings on the First Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims
asserted in Plaintiff’s third amended complaint (Doc. 16).
At Pensacola, Florida, this 18th day of November 2025.
/s/ Zachary C. Bolitho
Zachary C. Bolitho
United States Magistrate Judge
Notice To The Parties
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must
be 	filed 	within 	fourteen 	days 	of 	the 	date 	of 	the 	Report 	and
Recommendation. 	Any 	different 	deadline 	that 	may 	appear 	on 	the
electronic 	docket 	is 	for 	the 	court’s 	internal 	use 	only 	and 	does 	not
control. 	An objecting party must serve a copy of the objections on all
other parties. 	A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s
findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation
waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. 	See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28
U.S.C. § 636.
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