DEES v. ESCAMBIA COUNTY JAIL et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
PAUL JERMAINE DEES,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 3:25cv735-LC-HTC
ESCAMBIA COUNTY JAIL,
CHRISTOPHER POWELL,
Defendants.
_____________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Paul Jermaine Dees, a pretrial detainee at the Escambia County Jail
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this action by filing a complaint
seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the living conditions at the Jail. Doc. 1;
Doc. 8. After reviewing the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 8),1 the Court found it
failed to state a claim for relief – namely the conditions complained of did not give
rise to a constitutional violation – and gave Dees an opportunity to more carefully
craft his claims in a second amended complaint. 	Doc. 22. 	Dees has now filed a
Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 23), in which he seeks to assert entirely new
claims and omit his original claims altogether. 	This is clearly improper as it is
intended to evade the filing fee requirement enacted by Congress as part of the Prison
1 Dees was directed to file a First Amended Complaint because his original complaint was not on
this Court’s approved forms.
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Litigation Reform Act. Moreover, even if the Court were to consider the new claims
in this action, they are either unexhausted or fail to state a cause of action. 	Thus,
this action should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Because Dees is a pretrial detainee seeking relief against a governmental
entity and is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to review his
complaint, identify cognizable claims, and dismiss the second amended complaint,
or any portion thereof, if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 	28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A(b). 	To survive
dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	In
reviewing Dees’s complaint, the Court must read the allegations in a liberal fashion.
See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972). However, courts “are not bound
to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555, and conclusory allegations are not entitled to a presumption of truth.
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680-81.
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II. 	BACKGROUND
Dees’s First Amended Complaint contained an assortment of claims about the
conditions of confinement at the Jail, including the presence of black mold; a leaking
toilet; a leaking shower; cold food; a leaking cell which is “very stinking”; and the
presence of ants and rats. Doc. 8 at 5. He also complained that he “wrote a request
on the tablet” but received no response and that a nurse at the Jail denied him a
wheelchair and that he was assigned to a top bunk. Id. In his Statement of Claims,
he simply listed the following: “unsanitary living conditions / over crowded living
leaking shower leaking roof leaking toilet not working to provide clean black mold
in vents pain and suffering.” 	Id. at 7. 	As relief, Dees sought “immediate release
from incarceration” and his charges “to be dropped” as well as unspecified monetary
damages. Id.
The undersigned informed Dees that these claims were deficient because,
among other reasons, the conditions complained of did not rise to the level of
constitutional violations and being released from custody is not a type of relief
available under § 1983. 	Doc. 22. 	Because he was proceeding 	pro se, the
undersigned gave Dees a chance to file a second amended complaint or a notice of
voluntary dismissal. Id.
In 	the 	Second 	Amended 	Complaint, 	Dees 	abandons 	his 	conditions 	of
confinement claim and, in its place, adds entirely new claims for injuries he received
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from two separate slip and fall incidents. 	Specifically, Dees seeks monetary
damages for falls that occurred on December 9, 2024, and on May 16, 2025, when
he slipped on a puddle of water on the floor. 	Dees claims that although he was
provided a wheelchair after the December 9 incident, he was not provided one after
the May 16 incident. He also claims there was no “wet floor” sign in either instance.2
Finally, Dees alleges that Nurse Stephne, who told him there was no wheelchair
(when there was) was “real nasty” and “refuse[d] medical.” 3 Doc. 23 at 5.
2 Dees contends that the puddle on December 9 came from a leaking toilet in his cell. He does not
allege where the water came from that caused the May 16 fall.
3 Neither the last paragraph of the Statement of Facts nor the Statement of Claims makes sense. In
those paragraphs, Dees states as follows:
No swelling noted + Rum 1 foot / R foot. X Ray have been done. This has become a
chronic issue chronic pain issue are not treated at Jail. Fracture 1.54 supervision, care,
custody. And control fell to do.
1.23 fMJS
1.24 certified medical inspector
3.9
Nurse Stephne Refuse Medical Treatment
Statement of Claims:
Christopher Powell
33 The fMJS 3.5 inspection evaluation process
A. Serious violation 1 Serious Violation are any violation to these standards or other
conditions. 2. When a facility inspector observes a serious violation he/she
3.10 inspection Methodology A. inspection to the Standards
B. interview staff and inmate 1.24 Health Authority
Nurse Stephne – Refuse my medical treatment
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III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Avoiding the PLRA Filing Fee Requirement
As an initial matter, the Second Amended Complaint is, in essence, an entirely
new action and should have been filed as such with the payment of a new filing fee.
Dees cannot avoid that fee by disguising those new claims as an amendment here.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996)
(“PLRA”), was enacted in “an effort to stem the flood of prisoner lawsuits in federal
court.” Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Hubbard v.
Haley, 262 F.3d 1194, 1196 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that Congress’s “intent in
promulgating the PLRA was to curtail abusive prisoner tort, civil rights and
conditions of confinement litigation”). 	Part of this effort includes requiring
prisoners to pay the full filing fee for filing a civil suit,4 requiring courts to screen
the complaint before service, and prohibiting prisoners from proceeding in forma
pauperis if they have filed three or more actions that have been dismissed for certain
reasons, including for failing to state a claim or as frivolous, unless they are able to
show they are under imminent threat of physical injury. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915; 1915A.
4 While a prisoner may be allowed to proceed without paying the full filing fee at the time of filing,
the PLRA sets forth a payment schedule for prisoner-plaintiffs which requires them to pay an
initial partial filing fee and then monthly payments of 20% of the preceding month’s income until
the filing fee is paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
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In the Court’s October 22 Order directing Dees to file a second amended
complaint, the undersigned specifically explained that Dees had two options: Dees
could (1) “more carefully craft” the allegations of his complaint to state a cause of
action or (2) file a notice of voluntary dismissal if Dees did not believe he could state
a claim. Doc. 22 at 1, 9.
Despite these instructions, Dees no longer seeks relief for the conditions of
the Jail. 	Rather, he sues Defendants based upon completely different factual
circumstances,5 including a fall that did not occur until after the lawsuit was filed.
In other words, the Second Amended Complaint is now an entirely new lawsuit, with
different causes of actions, different relief requested, and different legal theories.
However, allowing Dees to proceed with the claims he now seeks to assert in
this action would undermine the purpose of the PLRA. 	See George v. Smith, 507
F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Unrelated claims against different defendants belong
in different suits ... to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees.”). 	By
omitting the conditions of confinement claim, Dees has tacitly conceded that his
original claims failed to state a plausible claim for relief. To avoid payment of the
filing fee for commencing a new lawsuit, Dees seeks to assert new claims in this
5 Although Dees alleged in the First Amended Complaint that Nurse Stephne Slip failed to provide
him a wheelchair, he did not seek any relief for that claim and did not identify her in the case style.
Regardless a claim based on conditions of confinement and a claim for medical deliberate
indifference would not be properly joined. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20.
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action under the guise of an “amended complaint.” Dees should not be permitted to
evade the PLRA’s requirements. See id. at 607 (explaining duty of court to prevent
prisoners from abusing pleading process “to ensure that prisoners pay the required
filing fees” and to ensure prisoners do not dodge the PLRA’s rule limiting the
number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment
of the required fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 	Rather, if he seeks to initiate
another civil action, he must pay the filing fee or seek leave to proceed in forma
pauperis in that action and pay any initial partial filing fee imposed. 	“Because
federal 	courts 	cannot 	permit 	litigants 	to 	evade 	statutory 	requirements, 	the
undersigned 	respectfully 	recommends 	that 	this 	action 	be 	dismissed 	without
prejudice.” 	Anderson v. Fla. Dep't of Corr. Sec'y, No. 5:21-CV-91-RV/MJF, 2022
WL 1667573, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2022), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 5:21-CV-91-RV/MJF, 2022 WL 1663097 (N.D. Fla. May 25, 2022).
Moreover, this case should be dismissed without prejudice for Dees’ failure
to comply with this Court’s October 22 Order. The Court’s Order notified Dees of
the various deficiencies found in his complaint. 	The Court also explicitly warned
Dees that this civil action would be dismissed if he did not file an amended complaint
that corrected the noted deficiencies. 	Doc. 22. 	As set forth above, Dees has not
complied with that Order. 	Accordingly, this case should be dismissed without
prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Loc. R. 41.1; Hanna v. Florida, 599 F. App’x
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362, 363 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may
dismiss a case when the plaintiff fails to comply with procedural rules or a court
order. ... A federal district court has the inherent power to dismiss a case sua sponte
under Rule 41(b).”) (first citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); then citing Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 48-49 (1991)).
B. 	Failure to State a Claim
Even if these new claims were proper amendments, the Second Amended
Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim and failure to exhaust. As
stated above, Dees seeks damages for injuries received from two falls. One of those
falls, however, the May 16, 2025 fall, occurred after this action was filed and thus
could not have been exhausted.6 See Smith v. Terry, 491 F. App’x 81, 83 (11th Cir.
2012) (making clear that a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies before
filing suit and holding that a supplemental complaint cannot cure an exhaustion
defect); see also Leao v. Hartman and Tyner, Inc., 2014 WL 12603171 *1 (S.D. Fla.
Mar. 17, 2014) (denying plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend to state a claim of
retaliation based upon filing suit because the facts upon which the claim were based
did not occur until after the original complaint was filed and finding that “the better
practice for proceeding with this type of claim ... is to proceed with a second,
6 Although the complaint was docketed on May 28, 2025, the date the clerk in the Southern District
received the complaint, the complaint is dated and signed by Dees on May 12, 2025. Doc. 1 at 3.
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separate lawsuit”). Because Dees has not exhausted his claims as to the May 2025
fall, he cannot amend the complaint to add those claims to this suit. Thus, that claim
is subject to dismissal.
Claims 	against 	Warden 	Powell 	and 	Nurse 	Stephne 	arising 	out 	of 	the
December 2024 fall should also be dismissed for failure to state a claim.7 To state a
claim for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must
allege facts sufficient to establish the following three (3) elements: (1) that he had
an objectively serious medical need; (2) that the defendant acted with deliberate
indifference to that need; and (3) that the deliberate indifference caused the
plaintiff’s injury. 	Mann v. Taser, Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir.
2009). To show defendants acted with deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must allege
facts sufficient to show the defendant (1) had subjective knowledge of a risk of
serious harm; (2) disregarded that risk; and (3) engaged in conduct that amounts to
subjective recklessness.8 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836-40 (1994).
Dees, however, has alleged no facts to establish any of these elements.
7 As the Court already advised Dees, the Jail, who Dees continues to name as a defendant, is not
an entity that is subject to suit under § 1983. Doc. 22 at 5 (citing Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210,
1214 (11th Cir. 1992) (Ҥ 1983 liability can only be imposed against an entity that is capable of
being sued” as “determined by the law of the state in which the district court is held.”); Avant v.
Rice, 1992 WL 359633, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 1992) (holding that county jail is not an
actionable legal entity because, under Florida law, it does not enjoy a separate legal existence
independent of the county or the sheriff’s office)).
8 In Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit further
refined the meaning of subjective recklessness as requiring (1) “that the defendant actually knew
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First, other than contending he is in pain, Dees has not alleged any facts
showing that he had a serious medical need. 	Second, Dees alleges no facts at all
against Warden Powell. There are thus no facts showing the Warden was aware of
the puddle of water, was involved in any way in causing Dees’s fall, or was involved
in any way with the medical treatment Dees received after his fall. Similarly, Dees
does not allege Nurse Stephne was aware of the water, or was involved with his fall.
And his sole factual allegation against Nurse Stephne, that she did not provide him
with a wheelchair,9 relates solely to the second fall, which as set forth above, is a
claim that is not exhausted. 	Without sufficient allegations on the elements of
deliberate indifference and causation, Dees fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim
against Defendants for a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Douglas v. Yates,
535 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2008) (dismissing claims against prison officials
because prisoner’s complaint failed to allege facts associating any of the officials
with the alleged constitutional violation); see also Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d
734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010) (dismissing prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claims against
that his conduct – his own acts or omissions – put the plaintiff at substantial risk of harm” and (2)
that the defendant acted with “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law.” Id. at 1253,
1261.
9 Dees’s allegation that the Nurse was “nasty” and he did not get medical treatment are vague and
conclusory and insufficient to state a claim. See Rosa v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 522 F. App’x 710,
715 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that “vague and conclusory allegations” were “insufficient to
state a claim for relief”).
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two prison officials because prisoner’s complaint alleged no facts describing how
either official was deliberately indifferent to prisoner’s health or safety).
Finally, in his request for relief, Dees seeks monetary damages merely for
“noncompliance with the Florida Model Jail Standards.” 	Doc. 23 at 7. 	However,
Dees cannot bring a § 1983 claim based solely on alleged violations of Florida law.
“Section 1983 does not create a remedy for every wrong committed under the color
of state law, but only for those that deprive a plaintiff of a federal right.” Knight v.
Jacobson, 300 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). 	Thus, Dees
cannot base a § 1983 claim on alleged violations of the Florida Administrative Code
or Florida’s Model Jail Standards. See Woodard v. Gaylord, No. 3:20-cv-775-BJD-
MCR, 2020 WL 5747110, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2020) (alleged “violat[ion] [of]
a provision of the Florida Administrative Code” “is not actionable under § 1983”);
Melendez v. Head, No. 8:10-cv-537-SDM-TGW, 2010 WL 1645059, at *1 (M.D.
Fla. Apr. 21, 2010) (“[Plaintiff’s] claim that the defendants violated the ‘Florida
Model Jail Standards’ fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
As set forth above, this action should be dismissed without prejudice for
several reasons. First, the Second Amended Complaint contains entirely new claims,
which should have been filed in a separate action. Second, Dees failed to comply
with the Court’s October 22, 2025 deficiency order. Third, even if the Court were
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to consider the new claims as proper amendments in this case, the claims are either
unexhausted or fail to state a cause of action against the Defendants.
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED:
1. 	That this case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
2. 	That the clerk be directed to close the file.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 3 rd day of December, 2025.
/s/ Hope Thai Cannon
HOPE THAI CANNON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations may be filed within 14
days of the date of this Report and Recommendation. 	Any different deadline that
may appear on the electronic docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not
control. A copy of objections shall be served upon the Magistrate Judge and all other
parties. 	A 	party 	failing 	to 	object 	to 	a 	Magistrate 	Judge’s 	findings 	or
recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the
district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th
Cir. R. 3-1.
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