BRYANT v. DIXON

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
EFIDARIUS G. BRYANT,
Petitioner,
v. 	Case No. 3:25-cv-736-TKW-MJF
RICKY D. DIXON,
Respondent.
_______________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Efidarius Bryant, proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 1. Respondent (“the State”)
answered and provided relevant portions of the state-court record. Doc.
8. Bryant replied. Doc. 10. The undersigned concludes that no evidentiary
hearing is required, and that Bryant is not entitled to habeas relief.
BACKGROUND
On February 19, 2019, Bryant conspired with Crystal Clausell and
Keandra Smith to rob the Quick Fill gas station and convenience store in
Pensacola, Florida. During the robbery, Bryant shot and killed the store
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clerk, Govardhan Kotha. Doc. 8-2, Ex. 2 (Indictment), Ex. 3 (Trial Tr.),
Ex. 6 (Verdict).1
In Escambia County Circuit Court Case No. 2019-CF-1153, Bryant
was convicted of First-Degree Murder with a Firearm (Count 1) and
Conspiracy to Commit Robbery with a Firearm (Count 2). Ex. 7 (J. &
Sentence on Count 1); Ex. 9 (J. & Sentence on Count 2). The trial court
sentenced Bryant to imprisonment for life on Count 1 and to 15 years of
imprisonment on Count 2. Id. The Florida First District Court of Appeal
(“First DCA”) affirmed the judgments on February 24, 2021, without a
written opinion. Bryant v. State, 312 So. 3d 471 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)
(Table) (copy at Ex. 17).
On March 30, 2022, Bryant filed a pro se motion for postconviction
relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Ex. 19. The state
circuit court denied the motion. Ex. 26. The First DCA affirmed without
a written opinion. Bryant v. State, 408 So. 3d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025)
(Table) (copy at Ex. 34). The mandate issued May 2, 2025. Ex. 37.
1 Hereafter, all citations to the state-court record are to the exhibits filed
at Doc. 8-2.
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Bryant filed his federal habeas petition on May 27, 2025. Doc. 1.
The petition raises four claims: one claim of insufficient evidence and
three claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The State asserts
that Bryant is not entitled to habeas relief because (1) the insufficient-
evidence claim is procedurally defaulted; and (2) Bryant fails to satisfy §
2254(d)’s demanding standard as to his remaining claims. Doc. 8.
RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	The Federal Habeas Exhaustion Requirement
“To respect our system of dual sovereignty, the availability of
habeas relief is narrowly circumscribed.” Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366,
375 (2022) (citations omitted). One such constraint is the exhaustion
requirement and corollary principle of procedural default. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b); Shinn, 596 U.S. at 375-79.
Section 2254 “requires state prisoners to ‘exhaust the remedies
available in the courts of the State’ before seeking federal habeas relief.”
Shinn, 	596 	U.S. 	at 	377 	(alteration 	adopted) 	(quoting 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
2254(b)(1)(A)). “To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner
must have fairly presented the substance of his federal claim” to the
state’s highest court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review.
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Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277–78 (1971); Castille v. Peoples, 489
U.S. 346, 351 (1989).
A petitioner “fairly” presents the substance of his federal claim to
the state courts when he describes the claim “such that the reasonable
reader would understand each claim’s particular legal basis and specific
factual foundation.” Green v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 28 F.4th 1089, 1135
(11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Kelley v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317,
1344–45 (11th Cir. 2004)).
When a petitioner fails to exhaust his federal claim and the state
court 	remedy 	no 	longer 	is 	available, 	that 	failure 	to 	exhaust 	is 	a
procedural default. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839–40 (1999);
see also Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 1999).
Together, exhaustion and procedural default promote
federal-state 	comity. 	Exhaustion 	affords 	States an 	initial
opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of
prisoners’ 	federal 	rights, 	and 	procedural 	default 	protects
against the significant harm to the States that results from
the failure of federal courts to respect state procedural rules.
Ultimately, 	it would be 	unseemly in 	our dual system of
government for a federal district court to upset a state court
conviction without giving an opportunity to the state courts to
correct a constitutional violation, and to do so consistent with
their own procedures.
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Shinn, 596 U.S. at 378–79 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted, alteration adopted).
A 	petitioner 	seeking 	to 	overcome 	a 	procedural 	default 	must
“demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the
alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider
the claim[ ] will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman
v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Lucas v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 682
F.3d 1342, 1352–53 (11th Cir. 2012).
A petitioner establishes “cause” by showing that an objective factor
external to the defense impeded an effort to properly raise the claim in
the state court. Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 892 (11th Cir.
2003). 	A 	petitioner 	establishes 	“prejudice” 	by 	showing 	at 	least 	a
reasonable probability that the proceeding’s result would have been
different. Id. at 892.
To satisfy the miscarriage of justice exception, the petitioner must
show 	that 	“a 	constitutional 	violation 	has 	probably 	resulted 	in 	the
conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,
327 (1995). The Schlup standard is very difficult to meet:
a substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the
conviction of an innocent person is extremely rare. To be
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credible, such a claim requires [a] petitioner to support his
allegations 	of 	constitutional 	error 	with 	new 	reliable
evidence—whether 	it 	be 	exculpatory 	scientific 	evidence,
trustworthy 	eyewitness 	accounts, 	or 	critical 	physical
evidence—that that was not presented at trial.
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.
B. 	Section 2254 Standard of Review
A federal court “shall not” grant a habeas corpus petition on any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state
court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The United States Supreme Court explained the
framework for § 2254 review in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).2
Justice O’Connor described the appropriate test:
Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court
may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion
opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or
if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has
on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the
2 Unless otherwise noted, references to Supreme Court’s Williams case
are to the majority holding, written by Justice Stevens for the Court
(joined by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) in
parts I, III, and IV of the opinion (529 U.S. at 367–75, 390–99); and
Justice O’Connor for the Court (joined by Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy,
Thomas, and—except as to the footnote—Scalia) in part II (529 U.S. at
403–13). The opinion of Justice Stevens in Part II was joined by Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
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“unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may
grant 	the 	writ 	if 	the 	state 	court 	identifies 	the 	correct
governing 	legal 	principle 	from 	this 	Court’s 	decisions 	but
unreasonably 	applies 	that 	principle 	to 	the 	facts 	of 	the
prisoner’s case.
529 	U.S. 	at 	412–13 	(O’Connor, 	J., 	concurring). 	In 	applying 	the
“unreasonable application” clause, the federal court defers to the state
court’s reasoning unless the state court’s application of the governing
legal principle was “objectively unreasonable” in light of the record before
the state court. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 409; Holland v. Jackson, 542
U.S. 649, 652 (2004).
Section 2254(d) also allows habeas relief for a claim adjudicated on
the merits in state court where that adjudication “resulted in a decision
that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(2). As with the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1),
the federal court applies an objective test. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537
U.S. 322, 340 (2003).
“The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes
the 	state 	court’s 	determination 	was 	incorrect 	but 	whether 	that
determination 	was 	unreasonable—a 	substantially 	higher 	threshold.”
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Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) (citing Williams, 529 U.S.
at 410). AEDPA also requires federal courts to “presume the correctness
of state courts’ factual findings unless applicants rebut this presumption
with ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473–74
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).
A federal court may conduct an independent review of the merits of
a petitioner’s claim only if it first finds that the petitioner satisfied §
2254(d). See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 954 (2007). Even then,
however, the writ will not issue unless the petitioner shows that he is in
custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws and treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
D ISCUSSION
Ground One 	“The 	State 	Produced 	Legally 	Insufficient
Evidence 	That 	Appellant 	Was 	the 	Person
Who Killed Mr. Kotha” Doc. 1 at 9.
Bryant alleges that there was insufficient evidence on the element
of identification, i.e., that it was Bryant who killed Mr. Kotha. Doc. 1 at
9. In support, Bryant alleges:
No testimony was provided that Appellant ever entered the
quickfill, to see Appellant with a gun at the scence [sic], to
hearing gunshots and no forensic evidence placed Appellant
in the quickfill.
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Doc. 1 at 9.
The State asserts that to the extent Bryant’s claim liberally can be
construed as raising a federal constitutional claim—as opposed to a state-
law claim—the federal claim is procedurally defaulted because Bryant
did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on federal due process
grounds in his direct appeal. Doc. 8 at 12–20, 30. Additionally, even if the
District Court were to conclude that Bryant’s direct-appeal brief raised a
federal sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, Bryant still is not entitled to
relief because the First DCA’s decision was neither contrary to, nor an
unreasonable application of, the Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)
standard. Doc. 8 at 30–44.
A. 	Bryant Procedurally Defaulted Ground One
Bryant procedurally defaulted a federal constitutional challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence. On direct appeal, Bryant argued that the
State “failed to present competent, substantial evidence that [Bryant]
was the individual who shot and killed Mr. Kotha.” Ex. 14 at 10. Bryant
relied exclusively on state-law cases, including a Florida Supreme Court
case holding that Florida’s “competent, substantial evidence” rule applied
to circumstantial-evidence cases in Florida. Id. at 11–15. Bryant (1) did
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not rely on or cite to a single federal case, (2) never mentioned the United
States Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
and (3) did not cite to or even mention the standard from Jackson v.
Virginia, for assessing constitutional sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims.
Ex. 14 at 11–15. Bryant’s briefing did not even hint that he was raising
a federal constitutional claim.
A habeas petitioner does not exhaust his state remedies by merely
(1) going through the state courts; (2) presenting to the state courts all
the facts necessary to support the federal claim; or (3) presenting to the
state courts “a somewhat similar state-law claim.” McNair v. Campbell,
416 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); see also See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004).
Because 	Bryant 	failed 	to 	fairly 	present 	a 	federal 	sufficiency-of-the-
evidence claim to the state court, he did not exhaust his state-court
remedies. See Preston v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 785 F.3d 449, 451, 456-
462 (11th Cir. 2015); see also, e.g., Snyder v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 2024 WL
4867047, at *1 (11th Cir. Nov. 22, 2024); Gallagher v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of
Corr., 2024 WL 3289639 (11th Cir. July 3, 2024); Cascante v. Florida, 816
F. App’x 429, 430–31 (11th Cir. 2020).
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Bryant now is procedurally barred from returning to the state
courts to present a federal constitutional challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b), (c), (h). Thus, Ground One is
procedurally defaulted.
Bryant has not made any of the requisite showings to excuse his
procedural 	default. 	Bryant’s 	allegation 	that 	appellate 	counsel’s
ineffectiveness caused the procedural default is unavailing. See Doc. 10
at 	2–3. 	Bryant 	did 	not 	raise 	an 	ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-
counsel claim in state court. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 447,
450–51 (2000); Dowling v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 275 F. App’x 846, 847
(11th Cir. 2008). Bryant’s procedural default bars federal habeas review
of Ground One.
Ground Two 	“Trial 	Counsel’s 	Failure 	To 	Object 	To
Introduction Of Surveillance Video.” Doc. 1
at 11.
Bryant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to admission of surveillance video footage from the Quick Fill store.
Bryant alleges that counsel should have objected on these grounds:
The surveillance video was edited with no testimony as to why
and who did the editing. No password was needed for the
video equipment. No testimony was provided for the se[cur]ity
of the equipment.
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Doc. 1 at 11.
The parties agree that Bryant presented this claim to the state
courts as “Ground One” of his Rule 3.850 motion, and that the state
courts adjudicated the claim on the merits. Doc. 1 at 11–12; Doc. 8 at 44–
46. The State asserts that Bryant is not entitled to habeas relief because
he fails to satisfy § 2254(d)’s demanding standard.
A. 	The State Court’s Decision
The state circuit court summarily denied relief. The court identified
Strickland as the controlling legal standard, Ex. 26 at 908 in ECF, and
denied the claim as follows:
Ground I: Failure to object to the surveillance video
Defendant argues that trial counsel erred when he failed
to object to a line of questioning leading to the admittance of
a Quick Fill surveillance video. Defendant asserts that trial
counsel 	should 	have 	objected 	to 	a 	portion 	of 	the 	State’s
questioning of Investigator Tatum and Investigator Tatum’s
answer. Specifically, the State asked, “Is it an accurate copy
of the surveillance video and what happened that night.?”
Investigator Tatum responded, “Yes, sir; it is.”FN2 Defendant
contends 	that 	had 	trial 	counsel 	objected, 	it 	would 	have
prevented the admittance of the evidence under the pictorial
testimony method as “investigator Tatum was not a witness
to the events as required.”
FN2 Attachment 2, Trial Transcript, p. 234, lines
2-4.
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Further, 	Defendant 	argues 	that 	the 	Quick 	Fill
surveillance 	video 	was 	not 	admissible 	under 	the 	silent
witness theory either. Defendant claims, “No testimony was
provided 	whether 	the 	video 	could 	be 	altered 	from 	the
recording device itself,” “the condition or capability of the
equipment in relation to accuracy and reliability,” or “the
security of the equipment used to produce the photographic
product, 	including 	the 	security 	of 	the 	product 	itself.”
Defendant contends that the “surveillance video equipment
was in a open unlocked office where anyone could have access
to and no password was needed,” and “the time was off
according 	to 	Investigator 	Tatum 	showing 	it 	hadn’t 	been
serviced.” Therefore, Defendant claims that if counsel had
objected, “the highly prejudice video would not have been
shown to the jury and created reasonable doubt.”
The 	silent 	witness 	theory 	of 	admittance 	requires
consideration of five factors.FN3
(1) evidence establishing the time and date of the
photographic evidence;
(2) any evidence of editing or tampering;
(3) the operating condition and capability of the
equipment producing the photographic evidence
as it relates to the accuracy and reliability of the
photographic product;
(4) the procedure employed as it relates to the
preparation, testing, operation, and security of the
equipment 	used 	to 	produce 	the 	photographic
product, 	including 	the 	security 	of 	the 	product
itself; and
(5) testimony identifying the relevant participants
depicted in the photographic evidence.
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Bryant v. State, 810 So. 2d 532, 536 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
(citing Wagner v. State, 707 So. 2d 827, 831 (Fla. 1st DCA
1998)). Investigator Tatum testified to where the cameras
were located, that the surveillance system was located “in the
office of the store,” and that it had a timestamp that “was
approximately an hour and seven to eight minutes” fast. The
State thereby admitted evidence in support of the first and
fourth factors allowing the judge to reach a determination in
favor of admissibility under the silent witness method.
FN3 Unlike elements, factors do not need to be
affirmatively 	proven 	but 	are 	instead 	areas 	of
inquiry a court must consider when making a
determination regarding an issue.
FN4 See Trial Transcript, pp. 232-233.
The Court finds that because the surveillance video was
admissible under the silent witness theory, no prejudice exists
for 	counsel’s 	failure 	to 	object 	to 	the 	admission 	of 	the
surveillance video into evidence. Therefore, Defendant is not
entitled to relief on this claim.
Ex. 26 at 908–09 in ECF. The First DCA affirmed without explanation.
Ex. 34.
The First DCA’s summary affirmance is an “adjudication on the
merits” of Bryant’s claim and, therefore, is reviewed under § 2254(d)’s
deferential standard. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011).
Because the First DCA’s decision is unexplained, this court presumes
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that the First DCA rejected Bryant’s claim for the reasons provided by
the state circuit court. See Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018).
B. 	Clearly Established Federal Law
The 	Supreme Court 	follows a two-pronged test 	for evaluating
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner must show (1)
his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, and (2) the
deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 	668, 	687 	(1984). 	“First, 	petitioner 	must 	show 	that 	‘counsel’s
representation 	fell 	below 	an 	objective 	standard 	of 	reasonableness.’
Second, petitioner must show that ‘there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.’” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184 (1986)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
The inquiry under 	Strickland’s performance prong is “whether
counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Trial counsel is “strongly presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the
exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 690. The burden to
overcome that presumption and to show that counsel’s performance was
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deficient “rests squarely on the defendant.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12,
22-23 (2013).
Strickland’s prejudice prong requires a defendant to establish a
“reasonable probability” of a different trial outcome. See Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is one that sufficiently undermines
confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694. “The likelihood of a different result
must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112.
When a district court considers a habeas petition, the state court’s
findings of historical facts in the course of evaluating an ineffectiveness
claim 	are 	subject 	to 	the 	presumption 	of 	correctness, 	while 	the
performance and prejudice components are mixed questions of law and
fact. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698. “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar
is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
“Establishing 	that 	a 	state 	court’s 	application 	of 	Strickland 	was
unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult.” Richter, 562 U.S.
at 105 (citations omitted).
C. 	Bryant Is Not Entitled to Habeas Relief
The First DCA’s decision is not “contrary to” clearly established
federal law, because the state court identified and applied the Strickland
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standard. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06 (interpreting § 2254(d)(1)).
Thus, to obtain habeas relief Bryant must show that the state court’s
decision 	involved 	an 	unreasonable 	application 	of 	the 	Strickland
standard. Bryant fails to make that showing.
Although the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is one of
constitutional dimension, the action Bryant faults counsel for failing to
take turns on a question of Florida law—whether the surveillance video
met Florida’s admissibility standard. The state court determined as a
matter of state law that the video was admissible; therefore, counsel was
not ineffective for failing to make Bryant’s proposed objections.
When the state courts already have answered the question of how
an issue would have been resolved under that state’s law had defense
counsel done what the petitioner argues counsel should have done,
“federal habeas courts should not second-guess them on such matters”
because “it is a fundamental principle that state courts are the final
arbiters of state law.” Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897, 932 (11th Cir.
2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); Pinkney v. Sec’y, DOC, 876
F.3d 1290, 1299 (11th Cir. 2017).
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Deferring to the state court’s determinations of state law—that the
surveillance video was admissible and that Bryant’s proposed objections
would not have succeeded—Bryant cannot show deficient performance or
prejudice from counsel’s failure to object. See Herring v. Sec’y, Dep’t of
Corr., 397 F.3d 1338, 1354–55 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Pinkney, 876 F.3d
at 1297; Callahan, 427 F.3d at 932.
The state court’s denial of relief on this claim was neither contrary
to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, the Strickland standard.
Bryant is not entitled to habeas relief on Ground Two.
Ground Three 	“Trial Counsel Failure To Call Investigator
Tatum As A Witness.” Doc. 1 at 13.
Investigator Tatum testified for the State, as did Bryant’s then-
girlfriend Tamiya Jefferson. Bryant alleges that counsel was ineffective
for failing to call Tatum as a defense witness to testify to pretrial
statements 	Jefferson 	made 	to 	him 	which 	Bryant 	believes 	were
inconsistent with Jefferson’s trial testimony. Bryant alleges that counsel
should have used Tatum to impeach Jefferson on these points:
Tamiya Jefferson told Investigator Tatum a different date
than the date testified to in front of the jury. Witness Tamiya
is the only witness to allege seeing Appellant with a gun on
the day of the murder.
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Doc. 1 at 13.
The parties agree that Bryant presented this claim to the state
courts as “Ground Two” of his Rule 3.850 motion; and that the state
courts adjudicated the claim on the merits. Doc. 1 at 13–14; Doc. 8 at 47–
53. The State asserts that Bryant is not entitled to habeas relief because
he fails to satisfy § 2254(d)’s demanding standard.
A. 	The State Court’s Decision
The state circuit court summarily denied this claim. The court
identified Strickland as the controlling legal standard, Ex. 26 at 908 in
ECF, and denied relief as follows:
Ground II: Failure to call Investigator Tatum as a witness
Defendant argues that trial counsel erred in failing to
call “Investigator Tatum as a witness to impeach Ms. Tamiya
Jefferson[’s] testimony at the defendant’s trial.” Defendant
argues that at trial, Ms. Jefferson testified that she and
Defendant “went to the defendant’s mother[’s] home earlier in
the day on February 19, 2019” and that Defendant “kept a gun
at [Ms. Jefferson’s] home and would put it in different places
around her home when he got home.” Defendant argues,
based on Investigator Tatum’s deposition, that Ms. Jefferson
told Investigator Tatum that she and Defendant were at
Defendant’s mother’s house on February 17, 2019, to fire his
guns, and that Ms. Jefferson “told Investigator Tatum that
the defendant[’s] guns were at defendant’s mother[’s] house.”
Defendant 	posits 	that 	counsel 	should 	have 	elicited 	this
testimony from Investigator Tatum and “it would have shown
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to 	the 	jury 	Ms. 	Jefferson 	was 	not 	credible 	and 	created
reasonable doubt.”
Defendant does not allege that if Tamiya Jefferson was
asked about these statements, she would have denied them, a
requirement necessary to use extrinsic evidence to impeach a
witness. See § 90.614(b), Fla. Stat. (2019). Regardless, these
purported prior statements are not inherently contradictory
to Tamiya Jefferson’s trial testimony.
On 	the 	first 	allegedly 	impeachable 	statement,
Defendant contends that Tamiya Jefferson told Investigator
Tatum, she and Defendant were at his mother’s house on
February 17, 2019, and Defendant shot guns so they would
continue to work. Defendant points out that Tamiya Jefferson
testified that they were doing this same thing on February 19,
2019.FN5 However, nothing about Defendant shooting guns
at his mother’s place one day precludes him from doing the
same thing another day, absent any further evidence.
FN5 See Trial Transcript, pp. 358-359.
Regarding the second allegedly impeachable statement,
Tamiya Jefferson testified that Defendant did not bring his
gun home and place it in a usual place outside the reach of her
children, and that she did not see it that night.FN6 Therefore,
stating to an officer that the gun was at Defendant’s mother’s
place 	is 	not 	contradictory. 	Tamiya 	Jefferson’s 	purported
statement to Investigator Tatum was about guns, not a gun,
indicating Defendant had other guns which he stored at his
mother’s house.FN7 Because the statements are not clearly
contrary, trial counsel did not commit error in failing to
attempt 	to 	impeach 	Tamiya 	Jefferson 	with 	Investigator
Tatum’s deposition. Further, Defendant fails to allege that
Investigator Tatum would have testified to anything beyond
his deposition that would be grounds to impeach Tamiya
Jefferson. 	Consequently, 	counsel 	was 	not 	ineffective 	for
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failing 	to 	call 	Investigator 	Tatum 	for 	the 	purposes 	of
impeaching Tamiya Jefferson.
FN6 See Trial Transcript, p. 359, lines 13-24.
FN7 See Defendant’s Motion, Exhibit A.
Ex. 26 at 910–11 in ECF (alterations in original).
The state circuit court also denied a related claim, “Ground Four”
of Bryant’s Rule 3.850 motion:
Ground IV: Failure to impeach Tamiya Jefferson
Defendant argues that trial counsel erred in failing to
impeach 	Tamiya 	Jefferson 	with 	her 	prior 	statements 	to
investigators. 	Specifically, 	Defendant 	claims 	Tamiya
Jefferson stated, “The day before the murder at the quickfill
she was with the defendant at his parent’s house,”FN11 and
that is in contradiction to her trial testimony where she
testified they went to his parents’ house earlier on the day of
the murder. This argument is unsuccessful for the same
reasons it fails in Defendant’s argument under his second
ground.FN12 	Consistently, 	defense 	counsel 	was 	not
ineffective for failing to impeach Tamiya Jefferson nor was
Defendant prejudiced. Defendant is not entitled to relief on
this ground.
FN11 Defendant’s Motion, Exhibit D.
FN12 Supra, Ground II, p. 4-5.
Ex. 26 at 912 in ECF. The First DCA summarily affirmed. Ex. 34.
The First DCA’s summary affirmance is reviewed under § 2254(d)’s
deferential standard. Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. This court presumes that
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the First DCA rejected Bryant’s claim for the reasons provided by the
state circuit court. See Wilson, 584 U.S. at 125.
B. 	Bryant Is Not Entitled to Habeas Relief
The First DCA’s decision is not “contrary to” clearly established
federal law, because the state court identified and applied the Strickland
standard. Bryant, therefore, must show that the state court’s decision
involved an unreasonable application of the Strickland standard, or that
it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence in the state-court record. Bryant fails to make either showing.
The state court rejected Bryant’s claim for two reasons. First,
Bryant 	failed to allege that Jefferson would have denied the prior
statements, which was a necessary predicate to open the door to extrinsic
evidence of her prior statements, see 	Fla. Stat. § 90.614(b). Second,
Jefferson’s 	prior 	statements 	to 	Tatum 	were 	not 	inconsistent 	with
Jefferson’s trial testimony, see Fla. Stat. § 90.608(1).
This court defers to the state court’s factual findings because they
are amply supported by the state-court record. See Ex. 3 at 354–67
(Jefferson Trial Test.); Ex. 19 at Ex. A (Tatum Dep.); see also Consalvo v.
Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 664 F.3d 842, 845 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing 28
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U.S.C. § 2254(e)); Whatley v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic and Classification
Ctr., 927 F.3d 1150, 1177 (11th Cir. 2019). Bryant has not rebutted any
factual finding with clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Based on the state court’s factual findings, a fairminded jurist could
agree with the state court’s conclusion that Bryant failed to establish a
Strickland violation. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 2017 WL
5237604, at *2 (11th Cir. Mar. 16, 2017) (state court’s factual finding—
that witness’s prior statements were not inconsistent with witness’s trial
testimony—was reasonable; thus, it was reasonable under Strickland to
conclude that counsel was not ineffective for failing to impeach witness
with prior statements); Sierra v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 2018 WL 11302064,
at *7 (11th Cir. July 5, 2018) (same); Conaway v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,
2017 WL 4708145, at *6 (11th Cir. Aug. 18, 2017) (same).
For all of the reasons set forth above, Bryant is not entitled to
habeas relief on Ground Three.
Ground Four 	“Trial 	Counsel 	Failure 	To 	Impeach 	Star
Witness Crystal Clausell.” Doc. 1 at 15.
Bryant’s final claim is that counsel was ineffective for failing to
impeach 	co-defendant 	Crystal 	Clausell 	with 	her 	prior 	deposition
testimony. Bryant alleges:
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Witness Clausell testified at trial that she brought a gun for
Appellant and gave it to him. At her deposition she testified
she 	never 	seen 	Appellant 	with 	a 	gun 	before. 	Also, 	that
Appellant was getting in the HHR [the getaway car] at the
same time she hea[r]d shots.
Doc. 1 at 15.
The parties agree that Bryant presented this claim to the state
courts as “Ground Three” of his Rule 3.850 motion; and that the state
courts adjudicated the claim on the merits. Doc. 1 at 16–17; Doc. 8 at 53–
55. The State asserts that Bryant is not entitled to habeas relief because
he fails to satisfy § 2254(d)’s demanding standard.
A. 	The State Court’s Decision
The state circuit court denied relief after identifying Strickland as
the controlling legal standard:
Ground III: Failure to impeach Crystal Clausell
Defendant 	claims 	that 	trial 	counsel 	was 	ineffective
because “counsel never impeached Ms. Clausel or pointed out
material 	inconsistencies 	in 	her 	testimony.” 	Defendant
specifically points to the failure to impeach Crystal Clausell
on four prior inconsistent statements, two in her deposition
and 	two 	in 	her 	discussions 	with 	investigators 	after 	the
incident. The failure to impeach Crystal Clausell on these
specific statements can hardly be viewed as prejudicial given
trial 	counsel’s 	successful 	impeachment 	of 	her 	overall
credibility.
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Crystal Clausell testified to defense counsel, on cross
examination, 	that 	she 	never 	contacted 	anyone 	about 	the
events, that she was upset at Defendant, she was expecting a
benefit from the State at her upcoming sentencing, and all she
really knew was that they stopped at the store the night of the
incident.FN8 	Near 	the 	conclusion 	of 	trial 	counsel’s 	cross
examination, he asked two questions, eliciting testimony from
Ms. Clausell in which she admitted to being a liar: “Q. But you
Lied. A. Correct. Q. So you’re a liar? A. Correct.”FN9 No less
than two times, Crystal Clausell agreed she was a liar.FN10
Because 	Crystal 	Clausell’s 	credibility 	was 	successfully
attacked on cross examination, defense counsel’s performance
was not deficient nor was Defendant prejudiced. Even if trial
counsel had taken the actions Defendant claims should have
been 	taken 	regarding 	the 	statements 	pointed 	to 	in
Defendant’s motion, there is no reasonable probability of a
different outcome. Consequently, Defendant is not entitled to
relief on this claim.
FN8 See Trial Transcript, pp. 282-89.
FN9 Trial Transcript, p. 289, lines 3-6.
FN10 Crystal Clausell also admitted to lying to
police 	earlier 	in 	her 	cross 	examination. 	Trial
Transcript, p. 283, lines 3-9.
Ex. 26 at 911–12 in ECF.
The First DCA summarily affirmed. This court presumes that the
First DCA rejected Bryant’s claim for the same reasons as the state
circuit court. Wilson, 584 U.S. at 125.
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B. 	Bryant Is Not Entitled to Habeas Relief
Again, to obtain habeas relief Bryant must show that the state
court’s decision involved an unreasonable application of the Strickland
standard, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence in the state-court record.
This court defers to the state court’s factual findings because they
are amply supported by the state-court record (the trial transcript), and
because Bryant has not rebutted any finding with clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. Consalvo, 664 F.3d at 845; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e).
Based on the state court’s factual findings, a fairminded jurist could
agree with the state court that Bryant failed to establish prejudice under
Strickland. 	During 	cross-examination, 	trial 	counsel 	successfully
impeached Clausell’s credibility by attacking it on several fronts: (1)
Clausell’s motive to “help the State” in order to get a lenient sentence in
her own criminal case; (2) Clausell’s motive to lie because she was upset
with Bryant for two-timing her with Jefferson, and (3) Clausell’s prior
inconsistent statements to police about what Bryant was wearing the
night of the murder. Ex. 3 at 282–89. Counsel also elicited Clausell’s
admissions that she (1) did not see Bryant with a gun at the Quick Fill
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on the night of the murder, (2) “didn’t make any real observations” at the
Quick Fill, and (3) “d[id]n’t know much about what happened” at the
Quick Fill. Id. at 284–87, 89. Additionally and most significantly, counsel
got Clausell to admit—twice—that she was a liar. Id. at 289.
Given counsel’s extensive and successful impeachment of Clausell’s
credibility—and the fact that the additional questions Bryant proposes
would have provided, at most, cumulative impeachment of Clausell’s
testimony—the state court reasonably concluded that Bryant failed to
establish deficient performance and prejudice under 	Strickland. 	See
Green, 28 F.4th at 1154.
The 	state 	court’s 	rejection 	of 	Bryant’s 	claim 	was 	based 	on 	a
reasonable 	determination 	of 	the 	facts 	and 	involved 	a 	reasonable
application of the Strickland standard. Bryant, therefore, is not entitled
to habeas relief on Ground Four.
A CERTIFICATE OF A PPEALABILITY IS N OT WARRANTED
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts provides: “[t]he district court must issue or deny a
certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the
applicant.” If a certificate is issued, “the court must state the specific
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issue 	or 	issues 	that 	satisfy 	the 	showing 	required 	by 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
2253(c)(2).” 	28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11(a). A timely notice of appeal must
still be filed, even if the court issues a certificate of appealability. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11(b).
“[Section] 2253(c) permits the issuance of a COA only where a
petitioner 	has 	made 	a 	‘substantial 	showing 	of 	the 	denial 	of 	a
constitutional right.’” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)). “At the COA stage, the only question is whether the applicant
has shown that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s
resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the
issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.” Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115 (2017). “When the district court
denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the
prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the
prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (emphasis added). Here, Petitioner has not made the
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requisite demonstration. Accordingly, the court should deny a certificate
of appealability in its final order.
“Before entering the final order, the court may direct the parties to
submit arguments on whether a certificate should issue.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254 Rule 11(a). If there is an objection to this recommendation, the
relevant party shall file such an objection with the District Court.
C ONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully
RECOMMENDS that the District Court:
1. 	DENY the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Doc. 1.
2. 	DENY a certificate of appealability.
3. 	DIRECT the clerk of court to close this case file.
At Panama City, Florida, this 2nd day of January, 2026.
/s/ Michael J. Frank
Michael J. Frank
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
The District Court referred this case to a magistrate
judge to make recommendations regarding dispositive
matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Objections to
these proposed findings and recommendations must be
filed within fourteen days of the date of the report and
recommendation. 	Any 	different 	deadline 	that 	may
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appear 	on 	the 	electronic 	docket 	is 	for 	the 	court’s
internal use only. A party must serve a copy of any
objections on all other parties. A party who fails to
object to this report and recommendation waives the
right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order
based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.
See 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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