LOPEZ v. CITY OF PENSACOLA et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
RAFAEL LOPEZ,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 3:25cv2408-MCR-HTC
CITY OF PENSACOLA, et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Rafael Lopez, proceeding pro se, filed a second amended complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the Defendants violated his First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights when he attempted to serve a legal document at Defendant
Escambia County School Board’s (“ECSB”) administrative building. 	Doc. 10.
Upon consideration of the Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 27 & 35), Lopez’s
responses in opposition (Docs. 29, 30, & 37), and the relevant law, the undersigned
recommends the motions be GRANTED, and the claims against Defendants be
DISMISSED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In the second amended complaint, Lopez sues four (4) Defendants: (1) the
City of Pensacola (the “City”); (2) Pensacola Police Department (“PPD”) Detective
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Hendrick Martinez in his individual and official capacity1; (3) the ECSB; and (4)
Gary Marsh,2 the ECSB’s Chief Investigator, in his individual capacity. 	The
undersigned takes the following factual summary from Lopez’s second amended
complaint as true for purposes of this report and recommendation.
On October 15, 2025, Lopez entered ECSB’s administrative building to serve
a writ of mandamus. The receptionist refused service. Lopez returned to his vehicle
to retrieve documents and when he re-entered the building, he began recording “for
evidentiary purposes.” ECSB staff and a uniformed security guard ordered Lopez
to leave. 	The guard threatened to have him removed from the premises. 	Lopez
asserted his “lawful right to serve a court-issued writ,” explained the law, and the
guard ceased further confrontation. 	Because ECSB refused service, Lopez called
911 for assistance and he “had just retrieved his minor son from the courthouse,
teaching him lawful civic procedure.”
1 Lopez’s official capacity claims against Martinez are duplicative of the claims against the City.
See Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[W]hen an officer is sued under
Section 1983 in his or her official capacity, the suit is simply ‘another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’”) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
165 (1985)).
2 Lopez has failed to timely serve Defendant Gary Marsh. The Court granted Lopez’s motion for
an extension of time to complete service and Lopez had until March 20, 2026, to do so. See Doc.
42. Thus, the claims against Marsh should be dismissed without prejudice for failure to comply
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) and because he fails to state a claim against Marsh for
the reasons set forth herein. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); see also Bilal v. Benoit, 2025 WL 3240264,
at *8 (11th Cir. 2025) (explaining a dismissal against an unserved defendant should be without
prejudice); Smith v. Miami-Dade, 2026 WL 247042, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2026) (dismissing
claims against unserved defendants without prejudice).
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After Lopez left the ECSB building, ECSB staff communicated with PPD
officers privately and off-camera, and these statements were undocumented and
misrepresented 	Lopez’s 	“lawful 	conduct.” 	ECSB 	also 	disclosed 	nonpublic
information about Lopez’s minor son, including his full name, age, and school.
Martinez conducted an “off-camera investigation,” did not interview Lopez or
review his recording, and instead relied exclusively on ECSB’s “undocumented
statements.” Martinez also accessed “nonpublic child information without a lawful
basis,” and “escalated” the matter into an intelligence bulletin, “INT-25-024.” INT-
25-024 labeled Lopez a “First Amendment Auditor,” falsely portrayed Lopez as a
threat, and included private information about Lopez’s minor child. PPD internally
disseminated the intelligence bulletin, entered it into the PPD’s “RMS system,” and
it potentially entered other intelligence databases.
At some point, UWF Police refused to help Lopez “with lawful service” and,
after UWF contacted the Escambia County Sheriff’s Office (“ECSO”), the ESCO
also refused to respond to Lopez’s 911 call.
On November 27, 2025, Lopez attempted to personally serve Martinez with
this lawsuit. Martinez initially told Lopez he would “never” personally serve him,
but subsequently emailed Lopez saying he would accept service.
Lopez contends the intelligence bulletin “is likely” present in the PPD’s RMS
system and other systems, ECSB continues to retain his personal data, and because
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his minor son is still enrolled in school in the county, there is risk of further
disclosure.
Based on the foregoing, Lopez alleges the following claims: (1) First
Amendment Retaliation against Martinez and the City, (2) Interference with Court
Access against Martinez and the City; (3) Fourteenth Amendment Stigma-Plus
against Martinez and the City; (4) “Informational Privacy (Minor Child)” violations
against Martinez, ECSB, and Marsh; (5) Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process violations against ECSB and Marsh arising out of Lopez’s “parental liberty
interest”; and (6) two Monell3 claims—one against the City and one against ECSB.
As relief, Lopez seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory
and injunctive relief.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Id. 	The Court must liberally
construe Lopez’s pro se allegations, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972),
3 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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but conclusory allegations and legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are
not entitled to a presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681; Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Defendants Martinez and the City move to dismiss the second amended
complaint as a shotgun pleading, for failure to state a claim, and, regarding Martinez,
on the basis of qualified immunity. Doc. 27. Defendant ECSB separately moves to
dismiss on similar grounds, arguing the second amended complaint is a shotgun
pleading and fails to state a claim. 	Doc. 35. 	For the reasons set forth below, the
undersigned agrees the second amended complaint fails to state a claim against the
Defendants.4
A. 	First Amendment Retaliation Against Martinez
Lopez brings a First Amendment retaliation claim against Martinez for
“generating” INT-25-024.5 Doc. 10 at 5. 	To state a First Amendment retaliation
claim, a plaintiff must show three elements: (1) he “engaged in constitutionally
protected speech”; (2) “the defendant’s retaliatory conduct adversely affected that
4 The second amended complaint is also a shotgun pleading because, in each claim, Lopez
incorporates the preceding claim’s factual allegations and does not make clear which facts support
which claims. 	Moreover, he references paragraph numbers but the factual allegations are not
numbered. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015)
(defining four types of shotgun pleadings). Also, as discussed herein, the claims are premised
entirely on conclusory and vague allegations of wrongdoing without factual support. Id.
5 Lopez’s claims against the City are analyzed below in Section III(F).
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protected speech”; and (3) “a causal connection exists between the defendant’s
retaliatory conduct and the adverse effect on the plaintiff’s [protected] speech.”
Huggins v. Sch. Dist. Of Manatee Cnty., 151 F.4th 1268, 1281 (11th Cir. 2025).
Lopez asserts he engaged in protected speech activity that included “recording
officials, serving a writ, and calling 911.” Doc. 10 at 5. Assuming Lopez engaged
in protected speech,6 he has not alleged facts sufficient to show that Martinez
engaged in any retaliatory conduct. Instead, Lopez states in conclusory fashion that
“Martinez retaliated by generating INT-25-024.” Doc. 10 at 5. Such a conclusory
allegation is insufficient to state a claim; calling Martinez’s conduct retaliatory does
not make it so. In other words, the second amended complaint contains “no factual
allegations that would allow a reasonable inference that a causal connection existed”
between Lopez’s protected speech and Martinez’s alleged retaliation. 	Leonard v.
Monroe Cnty. Fla., 789 F. App’x 848, 851 (11th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal
because 	“Plaintiff 	made 	only 	a 	conclusory 	assertion 	that 	he 	was 	placed 	in
administrative confinement in retaliation for filing grievances”); see also Jordan v.
Oakes, 2025 WL 618819, at *2 (11th Cir. 2025) (affirming dismissal of First
Amendment 	retaliation 	claim 	because 	the 	record 	demonstrated 	plaintiff’s
6 While there is no constitutional right to serve a writ or call 911, the Eleventh Circuit has
recognized the First Amendment “protects the right to gather information about what public
officials[, including police officers,] do on public property.” See Smith v. City of Cumming, 212
F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases).
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“allegations were conclusory and speculative”). Instead, the allegations show that
the ECSB called Martinez because Lopez would not leave the building and after
speaking to ECSB, Martinez authored the internal bulletin. 	Because Lopez’s
“unsupported conclusory assertion about a retaliatory motive is not enough to state
a plausible claim for relief,” the First Amendment retaliation claim against Martinez
should be dismissed. Leonard, 789 F. App’x at 851 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
B. 	Interference with Court Access
Lopez alleges Martinez and the City interfered with his access to the courts in
violation of his First Amendment rights when Martinez “obstructed” his attempt to
serve process and when PPD’s “false intelligence caused other agencies to refuse
assistance.” Doc. 10 at 5. The constitutional right to access the courts is grounded
in Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, as well as the First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. 	Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12 (2002).
Access to the courts must be adequate, effective, and meaningful, but to establish a
violation of the right, plaintiffs must show they have been prevented from pursuing
a nonfrivolous underlying cause of action. 	Cunningham v. Dist. Att’y’s Off. for
Escambia Cnty., 592 F.3d 1237, 1271 (11th Cir. 1010).
To state a claim arising from a denial of access to courts, the plaintiff must
establish an actual injury by demonstrating his “efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous
claim were frustrated or impeded” by the complained of conduct. Barbour v. Haley,
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471 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006). Additionally, the plaintiff must describe the
underlying cause of action in specific enough terms to show that the underlying
claim 	is 	“arguable” 	and 	“nonfrivolous.” 	Christopher, 	536 	U.S. 	at 	415-16
(explaining that “the underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an
element that must be described in the complaint, just as much as allegations must
describe the official acts frustrating the litigation”). 	Here, Lopez’s allegations do
not show he has been prevented from pursuing a nonfrivolous underlying cause of
action. 	For example, while Lopez contends he was unable to serve a writ of
mandamus on the ECSB, he provides no information about the nature of the
underlying cause of action and does not allege that such inability prevented him from
pursuing a claim. 	Moreover, although Lopez sues the City, the second amended
complaint alleges no facts showing how the City (versus the PPD) prevented service.
Similarly, Lopez’s initial inability to serve Martinez with this suit did not
interfere with his access to courts because (1) Lopez admits Martinez agreed to
accept service; (2) Martinez has been served and responded; and (3) as the Court
previously noted in its December 16 Order, Lopez cannot also act as a process server
when he is a party. See Doc. 21 at 2; Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2) (“Any person who is at
least 18 years old and not a party may serve a summons and complaint.”) (emphasis
added). Lopez fails to state a claim for lack of access to the courts and this claim
should be dismissed. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2003)
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(affirming dismissal of access to courts claim and noting plaintiffs did not allege
“the Defendants’ actions would have made such a suit inadequate, ineffective, or not
meaningful”).
C. 	Fourteenth Amendment “Stigma-Plus”
Lopez brings a Fourteenth Amendment “Stigma-Plus” claim against Martinez
and the City for publishing “false, stigmatizing information” about him, which then
altered his “legal status.” Doc. 10 at 5. To bring a “stigma-plus” claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must pass the test from Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693 (1976), which requires a showing of defamation by the government plus a
violation of “some more tangible interest” before a plaintiff may “invoke the
procedural protections of the Due Process Clause.” 	Cannon v. City of West Palm
Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that defamation alone is “not a
constitutional deprivation”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
“To establish a cause of action for defamation, a plaintiff must show: ‘(1)
publication; (2) falsity; (3) actor must act … at least negligently on a matter
concerning a private person; (4) actual damages; and (5) statement must be
defamatory.’” Montgomery v. McNeil, 2021 WL 3609325, at *3 (N.D. Fla. July 14,
2021) (quoting Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1106 (Fla. 2008)).
The “more tangible interest” part of a Fourteenth Amendment stigma-plus claim
generally includes a deprivation of a recognized property or liberty interest, such as
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termination of employment or diminution in salary. 	See Smith ex rel. Smith v.
Siegelman, 322 F.3d 1290, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003).
Lopez claims Martinez “falsely portrayed [Lopez] as a threat” and labeled him
a “First Amendment Auditor” in the intelligence bulletin, even though Lopez has
“never identified as such.” Doc. 10 at 3. Those allegations, however, are insufficient
to establish a claim for defamation. 	First, despite Lopez claiming that Martinez
“falsely portrayed” him as a threat, Lopez admits the ECSB called Martinez,
presumably, because they felt he was a threat when he refused to leave. Thus, any
reference by Martinez to Lopez being a threat was not false but based on his
investigation. 	Second, while Lopez may be unhappy with being labeled a “First
Amendment Auditor,” nothing in that statement shows that it was defamatory.
Indeed, it is unclear what the term means and it could simply be a reference to
Lopez’s assertion of his First Amendment rights.
Also, even if either of those statements were defamatory, because the bulletin
was 	disseminated 	only 	internally, it was 	not 	“published” for purposes 	of a
defamation claim. See, e.g., Washington v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 2019 WL 7049931,
at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 23, 2019) (“The publication prong [of defamation] is not met
as a matter of law where communications are between governmental employees and
agencies.”); see also TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 434 n.6 (2021)
(explaining that “plaintiffs’ internal publication theory circumvents a fundamental
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requirement of an ordinary defamation claim—publication”) (citing Chalkley v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 150 Va. 301, 326-328 (1928)) (collecting cases). And
Lopez’s speculation that the bulletin may have been more widely disseminated is
insufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss. 	To have a defamation claim, the
defamatory communication must have been published to a third party. 	See Astro
Tel, Inc. v. Verizon Fla., LLC, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 2013)
(defamation claim does not lie when third party publication only involves internal
corporate communications because “the essential element of publication to a third
party is lacking”).
Regardless, Lopez has not stated how the bulletin caused him actual harm. To
the extent Lopez alleges the bulletin harmed his reputation, “[d]amage to reputation
alone is insufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment [stigma-plus] claim.” Rehberg
v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 852 (11th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 566 U.S. 356 (2012); see also
Paul, 424 U.S. at 701 (“[T]his line of cases does not establish the proposition that
reputation alone … is either ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ by itself sufficient to invoke the
procedural protection of the Due Process Clause.”). Therefore, Lopez’s stigma-plus
claim should be dismissed.
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D. 	Fourteenth Amendment: Informational Privacy of a Minor Child
In Count IV, Lopez accuses Martinez,7 the ECSB, and Marsh of accessing and
disclosing non-public information about his minor child. 	However, as this Court
previously told Lopez, he cannot pursue a claim on behalf of his minor son. 	See
Doc. 4; see also FuQua v. Massey, 615 F. App’x 611, 612 (11th Cir. 2015) (affirming
district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s case, in which she sought to represent her
minor daughter, and finding “[t]he right to appear pro se … is limited to parties
conducting 	‘their 	own 	cases,’ 	and 	does 	not 	extend 	to 	non-attorney 	parties
representing the interests of others”). Regardless, as the Defendants point out, Lopez
has not identified a legal basis for this claim.
E. 	Fourteenth Amendment: Parental Liberty
In 	Count 	V, 	Lopez 	contends 	that 	the 	ECSB 	and 	Marsh 	violated 	his
“fundamental right to protect his child’s privacy.” Doc. 10 at 5-6. To the extent this
is a different claim than the informational privacy claim analyzed above, Lopez still
fails to state a claim. As an initial matter, although Lopez attempts to cast this claim
as something other than a claim for a violation of substantive due process, his
argument is nonsensical. 	A claim “grounded in the fundamental parental liberty
7 Martinez also argues that Lopez’s claims against him are barred by qualified immunity. Because
the undersigned finds that Lopez has failed to state a cause of action against Martinez, the Court
need not address the qualified immunity argument.
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interest,” (Doc. 37 at 5) is, as the Defendants posit, “a poorly-worded one for a
substantive due process violation” (Doc. 35 at 14).
The problem with Lopez’s claim is that while the Supreme Court has held that
“parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care, custody, and
management 	of 	their 	children,” 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	not 	recognized 	a
“fundamental right to protect a child’s privacy.” See Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d
1109, 1119-1120 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting “the Supreme Court ‘has always been
reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for
responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended’”).
Moreover, even if there was such a fundamental right, “plaintiffs face a high
bar when attempting to establish a substantive due process violation.” 	See id. at
1119. 	“[C]onduct by a government actor will rise to the level of substantive due
process violation only if the act can be characterized as arbitrary or conscience
shocking in a constitutional sense.” 	Id. (citing Waddell v. Hendry Cnty. Sheriff’s
Off., 329 F.3d 1300, 1305 (11th Cir. 2003)). 	“Even intentional wrongs seldom
violate the Due Process Clause,” and “only the most egregious official conduct can
be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense.” 	Id. (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
Here, the conduct Lopez takes issue with—the alleged disclosure of his son’s
identifying information to law enforcement—is neither egregious nor arbitrary.
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Indeed, it was Lopez who chose to make his son a witness to the events. Inclusion
of the son’s identifying information in an internal law enforcement bulletin is simply
not “conscience shocking.” See Waddell, 329 F.3d at 1305 (“Acts ‘intended to injure
in some way unjustifiable by any government interest’ are ‘most likely to rise to the
conscience-shocking level.’”) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
833 (1998)). Thus, Lopez fails to state a claim that Defendants violated his “parental
liberty” rights.
F. 	Monell Claims
Lopez alleges two Monell claims in his second amended complaint. The first
is against the City. 	Lopez alleges the City’s “customs, practices, and training
regarding 	‘First 	Amendment 	Auditors’ 	were 	the 	moving 	force 	behind 	the
constitutional violations.” Doc. 10 at 6 (Count VI). The second is against ECSB for
maintaining “a practice of sharing protected student/parent information with law
enforcement without statutory basis,” resulting in “customs and failures to train
[that] were the moving force behind the violations.” 	Doc. 10 at 6 (Count VII).
Neither claim passes muster.
“To prove a Monell claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional
rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted
deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom
caused the violation.” Andre v. Clayton Cnty., Georgia, 148 F.4th 1282, 1300 (11th
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Cir. 2025). 	To establish the second element, Lopez must identify either “(1) an
officially promulgated [municipal] policy or (2) an unofficial custom or practice.’”
Grech v. Clayton Cnty., 335 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003). 	“To establish the
existence of an unofficial custom or practice, the plaintiff must show that the practice
is longstanding, widespread, and ‘so settled and permanent that it takes on the force
of law.’” 	Flink v. City of Fort Walton Beach Police Dep’t, Case No. 3:22-cv-
8087/TKW-HTC, 2022 WL 19363792, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2022) (quoting
Marantes v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 649 F. App’x 665, 672 (11th Cir. 2016)).
As an initial matter, and as discussed above, neither Lopez’s First Amendment
rights nor his Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated. 	Thus, Lopez has
failed to allege facts sufficient to establish the first element of a Monell claim. See
Teel v. Lozada, 99 F.4th 1273, 1288 (11th Cir. 2024) (affirming district court’s grant
of summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff’s Monell claim “based on the first
element of Monell”); see also Aracena v. Gruler, 347 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1120 (M.D.
Fla. Nov. 14, 2018) (“Indeed, a Monell claim is derivative of—and thus requires—
an underlying constitutional violation.”).
And even if he could show a constitutional violation, Lopez has failed to
identify any specific policy, custom, or practice of the City or the ECSB which
resulted in a constitutional violation. Simply alleging that such policies, customs, or
practices exist is insufficient to state a claim. 	See e.g., Gutterman v. City of Lynn
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Haven, Case No. 5:25-cv-230/AW/MJF, 2025 WL 3900628, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 21,
2025) (“If a plaintiff could evade Monell with a generic allegation that some
municipal defendant ‘had a custom of allowing the type of conduct that caused my
harm,’ little would be left of the pleading standard.”).
Lopez’s 	failure 	to 	allege 	any 	specific 	facts 	showing 	a 	persistent 	and
widespread practice undermines his Monell claim. “This threshold identification of
a custom or policy ‘ensures that a municipality is held liable only for those
deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or
of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality.’”
McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bd. of County
Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997)). Relevant here, “[t]his prevents
the imposition of liability based upon an isolated incident,” McDowell, 392 at 1290.
Thus, Counts VI and VII should be dismissed.
G. 	Additional Amendments are Unwarranted
In response to the motions to dismiss, Lopez concedes some of his claims may
be deficient but argues the deficiencies are “curable through amendment” and “such
a defect is precisely the type contemplated by Rule 15’s liberal amendment policy.”
Doc. 29 at 2; see also Doc. 37 at 3. However, in granting leave to amend under Rule
15(a)(2), “it is appropriate for the court to consider judicial economy and the most
expeditious way to dispose of the merits of the litigation.” 	Dussouy v. Gulf Coast
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Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1981). Ultimately, the “decision whether to
grant leave to amend is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court,” Shipner
v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 86 F.2d 401, 406 (11th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted).
Here, the undersigned finds that allowing an additional amendment would not
promote judicial efficiency. First, Lopez has already filed two amendments, as well
as a “notice (Doc. 30) that improperly attempts to supplement his second amended
complaint with additional facts. However, even considering those additional facts,
Lopez still cannot state a claim against the Defendants. Second, Lopez sought leave
to file a third amended complaint, and as set forth in the Court’s order denying that
request, the proposed third amended complaint contained no new facts, no new
causes of action, and added no new defendants. Doc. 21.
At the end of the day, Lopez is unhappy with the investigation a PPD officer
conducted in response to a call from ECSB regarding Lopez’s refusal to leave the
premises. 	None of the conduct described by Lopez rises to the level of a
constitutional violation. 	Despite several opportunities to more carefully craft his
allegations, the second amended complaint continues to fabricate causes of action
that do not exist and rely on vague, conclusory, and speculative allegations of
wrongdoing. 	A fourth opportunity to amend to add additional facts is unlikely to
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result in a complaint that is sufficient to be served. Thus, the Court should exercise
its discretion to deny any further amendments and dismiss this action.8
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Lopez fails to state a claim under any theory he
advances. Thus, Defendants’ motions to dismiss should be granted.
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	Defendants City of Pensacola and Hendrick Martinez’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 27) be GRANTED and Lopez’s claims as to these defendants be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2. 	Defendant Escambia County School Board’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
35) be GRANTED and Lopez’s claims as to this defendant be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
3. 	Lopez’s remaining claims against Defendant Marsh be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for Lopez’s failure to timely serve Marsh under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) and for failure to state a claim.
4. 	The clerk close the file.
8 Although the second amended complaint purports to set forth nine causes of action, the last two
counts, Count VIII and Count IX, are not causes of action, but claims for damages and equitable
relief. 	Because Lopez has failed to state a claim against the Defendants, he is not entitled to
damages and regardless, there is no such thing as a standalone claim for damages. Similarly, Lopez
is not entitled to a declaratory judgment to adjudicate the legality of past conduct. See Hitchcock
v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 6:18-cv-1986-Orl-28EJK, 2020 WL 364600, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22,
2020).
Case 3:25-cv-02408-MCR-HTC Document 46 Filed 03/26/26 Page 18 of 19

Page 19 of 19
Case No. 3:25cv2408-MCR-HTC
At Pensacola, Florida, this 26 th day of March, 2026.
/s/ Hope Thai Cannon
HOPE THAI CANNON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within
fourteen (14) days of the date of the Report and Recommendation. Any different
deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only
and does not control. An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections upon all
other parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
Case 3:25-cv-02408-MCR-HTC Document 46 Filed 03/26/26 Page 19 of 19