IN RE APPLICATION OF CLIFTON LAMAR CANNON III

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
In re Application of
CLIFTON LAMAR CANNON, III,
Petitioner.
Case No.: 3:26mc10/MCR/ZCB
_____________________________/
ORDER
Petitioner Clifton Cannon initiated this action by filing an ex parte1
application under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to conduct discovery in the Northern
District of Florida for use in a foreign proceeding. 	(Doc. 1). 	For the
reasons below, Petitioner’s application will be granted.
I. 	Background
Petitioner is a party to judicial proceedings in Costa Rica (“Costa
Rican Action”). 	In the Costa Rican Action, Petitioner is suing Maverick
Manufacturing, S.R.L., and Maverick Yacht Holdings, LLC, regarding
1 Section 1782 applications are frequently resolved ex parte. 	See In re
Braga, 272 F.R.D. 621, 625 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (“[M]ost § 1782 applications
. . . are filed and decided ex parte.”); see also In re Sociedad Militar Seguro
de 	Vida, 	985 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	1375, 	1381 	(N.D. 	Ga. 	2013) 	(“Ex 	parte
applications are typically justified by the fact that the parties will be
given adequate notice of any discovery taken pursuant to the request and
will then have the opportunity to move to quash the discovery or to
participate in it.” (cleaned up)).
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the construction and delivery of a luxury fishing vessel. 	Petitioner is a
resident of Florida. 	Maverick Yacht, the party from whom discovery is
sought, is a business incorporated in Florida with its principal place of
business located in Destin, Florida. (Doc. 1-11 at 2, 5-6).
Petitioner 	seeks 	from 	Maverick 	Yacht 	financial 	documents,
communications between Maverick Yacht and Maverick Manufacturing,
and other evidence related to the vessel at issue in the Costa Rican
Action. 	(Doc. 1-11 at 6-7). 	Petitioner contends Maverick Yacht has no
physical presence in Costa Rica and its documents and witnesses are,
therefore, not within the Costa Rican court’s jurisdiction. 	Petitioner
argues this application is necessary because Maverick Yacht and its
management are located in Destin (in the Northern District of Florida),
and neither Petitioner nor the Costa Rican court can compel Maverick
Yacht to engage in discovery in Costa Rica. (Id. at 5-7). Petitioner argues
he has satisfied the four statutory requirements of § 1782, as well as the
four discretionary factors established by the Supreme Court in Intel
Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004). (Id. at 8-14).
II. 	Discussion
“Section 1782 is the product of congressional efforts . . . to provide
federal-court 	assistance 	in 	gathering 	evidence 	for 	use 	in 	foreign
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tribunals.” 	Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 247. 	Thus, § 1782(a) permits a
“district court to grant assistance to a foreign or international tribunal in
obtaining evidence for use in a foreign proceeding.” 	In re Pons, 614 F.
Supp. 3d 1134, 1140 (S.D. Fla.), aff’d, 835 F. App’x 465 (11th Cir. 2020).
Four statutory requirements must be met for a district court to
grant a § 1782(a) application: “(1) the request must be made by a foreign
or international tribunal, or by any interested person; (2) the request
must seek evidence, whether it be the testimony or statement of a person
or the production of a document or other thing; (3) the evidence must be
for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal; and (4) the
person from whom discovery is sought must reside or be found in the
district of the district court ruling on the application for assistance.” 	In
re Clerici, 481 F.3d 1324, 1331-32 (11th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).
Even if the four statutory requirements are met, “a district court is
not required to grant a § 1782(a) discovery application . . . .” 	Id. at 1334.
Instead, the decision is discretionary. 	Id. 	The Supreme Court has
identified four factors to guide a district court in determining whether to
exercise its discretion under § 1782(a): 	“(1) whether the person from
whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding,
because the need for § 1782(a) aid generally is not as apparent as it
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ordinarily is when evidence is sought from a nonparticipant; (2) the
nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway
abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or
agency abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance; (3) whether the §
1782(a) 	request 	conceals 	an 	attempt 	to 	circumvent 	foreign 	proof-
gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United
States; and (4) whether the request is otherwise unduly intrusive or
burdensome.” 	Id. (cleaned up).
A. Petitioner’s 	application 	satisfies 	the 	four 	statutory
requirements of § 1782(a).
Petitioner argues that his application meets the four statutory
requirements of § 1782(a) because he is an interested person in the Costa
Rican 	Action, 	the 	application 	seeks 	discovery 	in 	Maverick 	Yacht’s
possession, the discovery is for use in foreign proceedings, and Maverick
Yacht is found in the Northern District of Florida. (Doc. 1-11 at 8). The
Court agrees that Petitioner has met the four statutory requirements.
First, Petitioner—as the plaintiff in the Costa Rican Action—is an
“interested person” for § 1782(a) purposes. Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1331. “No
doubt litigants are included among, and may be the most common
example of, the interested persons who may invoke § 1782[.]” Intel Corp.,
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542 U.S. at 256. 	Thus, Petitioner’s application is one made by an
“interested person” in the Costa Rican Action. See In re Sociedad Militar
Seguro de Vida, 985 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (“[A]s the
plaintiff in the Curaçao action, SMSV is an ‘interested person.’”).
Second, Petitioner’s application seeks “evidence” in the form of the
“testimony or statement of a person” or the “production of a document or
other thing[s].” 	Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1331-32 (cleaned up). 	Petitioner’s
application requests documentary evidence from Maverick Yacht as well
as to depose it regarding the vessel at issue in the Costa Rican Action.
(Doc. 1-11 at 6-7, 9; Doc. 1 at 2). 	Petitioner, therefore, has satisfied §
1782’s second statutory requirement. See Sociedad Militar, 985 F. Supp.
2d at 1379 (“[T]he application seeks evidence in the form of testimony
and the production of documents.”).
Third, the evidence sought is for use in the pending Costa Rican
Action, which is a “proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal[.]”
Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1332. The Costa Rican Action is a judicial proceeding
in the Costa Rican Civil Court of Puntarenas. 	(Doc. 1-1 at 2-3). 	And
Petitioner asserts that any documents obtained from Maverick Yacht will
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be used in the Costa Rican Action. 	(Doc. 1-11 at 9). 	Accordingly,
Petitioner has satisfied the third statutory requirement.2
Fourth, the entity “from whom discovery is sought”—Maverick
Yacht—“reside[s] or [is] found in” the Northern District of Florida.
Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1332. Petitioner asserts that Maverick Yacht has its
principal place of business in Destin, Florida—a city in Okaloosa County
which is within the Northern District of Florida. 	(Doc. 1-11 at 10). 	As
such, Petitioner has satisfied the fourth statutory requirement. See In re
Glozman, No. 25-MC-24525, 2026 WL 291008, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 4,
2026) (“[T]he entities from which Applicant seeks the evidence reside or
are found in this District. As the Application notes, the Discovery Targets
conduct business and have offices in this District, specifically principal
offices in Miami. And when a company has an office and does business in
Miami, it is found in the Southern District of Florida for purposes of §
1782.” (cleaned up)).
2 Admissibility of any documents obtained by Petitioner is an issue for
the Costa Rican court. 	See In re Pons, 614 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1146-47
(S.D. Fla.) (“AMKE’s arguments go to the admissibility of the evidence,
which is an issue for the Ecuador Family Court to decide.” (collecting
cases)), aff’d, 835 F. App’x 465 (11th Cir. 2020).
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Because Petitioner has satisfied the four statutory requirements of
§ 1782, the Court has authority to grant Petitioner’s application. Clerici,
481 F.3d at 1333. 	The Court, however, is not required to grant the
application. 	Id. at 1334. Instead, the Court must consider the four Intel
factors to determine whether it should exercise its discretion and grant
Petitioner’s application. 	Id.
B. Petitioner has satisfied the four discretionary factors of §
1782(a).
Petitioner states that the 	four 	Intel 	factors weigh 	in 	favor of
granting his application. (Doc. 1-11 at 10-14). The Court agrees.
The first Intel factor asks “whether the person from who discovery
is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding, because the need for
§ 1782(a) aid is generally not as apparent . . . when evidence is sought
from 	a 	nonparticipant[.]” 	Clerici, 	481 	F.3d 	at 	1334 	(cleaned 	up).
Petitioner asserts Maverick Yacht is a party to the Costa Rican Action
but is not participating in the case and is beyond the enforcement power
of the Costa Rican court due to its location in Florida. (Doc. 1-11 at 11).
It 	is 	true 	that 	a “foreign 	tribunal has jurisdiction 	over those
appearing before it, and can itself order them to produce evidence.” Intel
Corp., 542 U.S. at 264. 	But “nonparticipants in the foreign proceeding
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may be outside the foreign tribunal’s jurisdictional reach; hence, their
evidence, available in the United States, may be unobtainable absent §
1782(a) aid.” Id. The latter situation exists here given Maverick Yacht’s
presence in the United States and its purported lack of participation in
the Costa Rican Action. 	Thus, the first Intel factor weighs in favor of
granting the application.
The second Intel factor considers “the nature of the foreign tribunal,
the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of
the foreign government or court or agency abroad to U.S. federal-court
judicial assistance.” 	Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1334. 	Petitioner asserts that
any evidence obtained through the present application can be used in the
Costa 	Rican 	Action, 	and 	he 	further 	asserts 	that 	there 	is 	a 	strong
presumption that foreign tribunals will be receptive to any such evidence.
(Doc. 1-11 at 11-12). 	Those assertions are supported by the declaration
of a Costa Rica attorney that Petitioner has provided in support of his
application. (Doc. 1-1).
Nothing before the Court suggests that the Costa Rican court would
not accept this Court’s assistance. 	(Doc. 1-1 at 20-22). 	See In re
Application of MTS Bank, No. 17-21545-MC, 2017 WL 3276879, at *8
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2017) (noting that courts look for “authoritative proof
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that a foreign tribunal would reject evidence obtained with the aid of a §
1782” application). 	Given the lack of anything in the record suggesting
that Costa Rica would be unreceptive to this Court’s aid (Doc. 1-1 at 20-
22), the Court finds this factor is neutral or weighs in favor of granting
Petitioner’s application. 	See Sociedad Militar, 985 F. Supp. 2d at 1380
(“[T]he undersigned is aware of nothing to suggest that the Court of First
Instance in Curaçao would not be receptive to judicial assistance from
this 	Court. 	This 	factor 	thus 	weighs 	in 	favor 	of 	granting 	SMSV’s
application.”); see also In re Application of PQ Corp., No. 6:13mc9-ORL-
36KRS, 2013 WL 3270407, at *6 (M.D. Fla. June 26, 2013) (finding the
second Intel factor weighed in favor of § 1782 applicant where an attorney
licensed to practice in the foreign jurisdiction averred that it was likely
the foreign court would welcome the evidence sought by the application).
The third Intel factor asks whether “the § 1782(a) request conceals
an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other
policies of a foreign country or the United States[.]” 	Clerici, 481 F.3d at
1334. 	Petitioner asserts that its application does not offend any Costa
Rican proof-gathering restrictions because Costa Rica allows parties to
submit any means of evidence to pursue their case. Petitioner also argues
that evidence being discoverable in the Costa Rican Action is not required
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under § 1782 and that he does not have to exhaust all proof-gathering
avenues in Costa Rica to obtain § 1782 assistance. (Doc. 1-11 at 12-13).
The Eleventh Circuit has held that “there is no requirement to first
seek discovery from the non-US tribunal or exhaust other options before
applying to a district court for § 1782 discovery[,]” even “when the
requested documents may be available in the foreign jurisdiction[.]” 	In
re: Application of Bracha Found., 663 F. App’x 755, 765 (11th Cir. 2016).
Other courts in this circuit have also determined that the “relevant
question for the third Intel factor is not whether” the foreign court “would
order the requested discovery if it had jurisdiction over” the discovery
target, but whether there are foreign “proof-gathering restrictions that
are akin to privileges that would prohibit the acquisition or use of the
items sought.” 	See In re Application of Salem, No. 23cv23186, 2024 WL
4464288, at *12 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 28, 2024) (cleaned up), adopted, 2024 WL
4314771 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2024).
Nothing before the Court suggests that Costa Rica has proof-
gathering restrictions akin to privileges regarding the discovery sought
by 	Petitioner. 	Nor 	is 	there 	anything 	suggesting 	that 	Petitioner’s
application is an attempt to otherwise circumvent Costa Rican proof-
gathering 	restrictions. 	(Doc. 	1-1 	at 	22). 	Instead, 	Petitioner 	is
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understandably using the § 1782 application “to overcome the practical
impossibility of obtaining evidence located in the United States and held
by a United States entity through Costa Rican procedural mechanisms.”
(Id.). 	Accordingly, the Court finds the third Intel factor weighs in favor
of granting the application. 	See In re Fundo de Liquidacao Financeira,
No. 8:21mc110, 2021 WL 4392258, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2021)
(“Third, there is no evidence before this court suggesting FLF filed this
application to circumvent proof-gathering restrictions or other policies by
Brazil, and FLF alleges their discovery requests ‘would not violate any
restrictions in Brazil on evidence gathering.’”).
The last Intel factor asks whether “the request is otherwise unduly
intrusive 	or 	burdensome.” 	Clerici, 	481 	F.3d 	at 	1334 	(cleaned 	up).
“[U]nduly intrusive or burdensome requests may be rejected or trimmed.”
Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 265. Petitioner asserts his requested discovery is
not unduly intrusive or burdensome because the subpoena is temporally
limited and seeks evidence relevant to the issues in the Costa Rican
Action. 	Petitioner is willing to confer with Maverick Yacht to address
any scope or burden concerns that may arise. (Doc. 1-11 at 13-14).
As noted by Petitioner, once “discovery is authorized under § 1782,
the federal discovery rules, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-36, contain the relevant
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practices and procedures” for obtaining discovery. 	Clerici, 481 F.3d at
1336. Parties “may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the
needs of the case,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), and at “the discovery stage,
relevancy is broadly construed[,]” Smith v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 658 F.
Supp. 3d 1054, 1061 (N.D. Fla. 2023). “Courts treat the scope of discovery
under a subpoena the same as the scope of discovery under Rule 26.”
Exocel Bio, Inc v. EOC Analytics, LLC, 2024 WL 5264416, at *3 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 19, 2024). Essentially, “the scope of discovery is broad[.]” Id. at *4.
Here, nothing before the Court shows that the discovery sought by
Petitioner is unduly intrusive or burdensome. 	The discovery appears
relevant because Petitioner is seeking documents and other evidence
directly related to the vessel at issue and the parties involved in the Costa
Rican Action. (Doc. 1-1 at 23-25; Doc. 1-2). And the discovery request is
limited in that it seeks only evidence regarding the vessel at issue and
the transactions related to it during a specific time period—January 1,
2023, to today. 	(Doc. 1-2). 	Thus, the Court finds the fourth Intel factor
weighs in favor of granting Petitioner’s application. See In re Application
of Setraco Nigeria Ltd., No. 3:13mc16-32MCR, 2013 WL 3153902, at *3
(M.D. Fla. June 19, 2013) (“Finally, the Petition is narrowly tailored to
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the subject matter of Petitioner’s contemplated actions, and to documents
and information reasonably assumed to be within Bank of America’s
possession as the financial institution with which the U.S. Setraco
Entity, as controlled by Nehme and Karam, has maintained at least one
account, and is therefore not intrusive or burdensome.”).
III. 	Conclusion
Because Petitioner has satisfied the four statutory requirements of
§ 1782 and the four Intel factors weigh in favor of allowing Petitioner to
conduct 	the 	requested 	discovery, 	the 	Court 	will 	grant 	Petitioner’s
application.
For the reasons above, it is ORDERED that:
1. 	Petitioner’s ex parte § 1782 application (Doc. 1) is GRANTED.
Petitioner is authorized to serve its subpoena (Doc. 1-2) on Maverick
Yacht along with a copy of this order and its § 1782 application.3
2. 	Within the time specified in the subpoena or another date
agreed to by the parties, Maverick Yacht shall produce all documents
within its possession, custody, or control and provide all testimony about
3 Petitioner must comply with all notice requirements. 	See, e.g., In re
Martinez, 736 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1204 (S.D. Fla. 2024) (“Our [§ 1782]
Applicants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
namely Rule 45(a)(4).”).
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information 	in 	its 	possession, 	custody, 	or 	control 	responsive 	to 	the
subpoena.
3. 	Maverick Yacht is permitted to object or respond to the
subpoena consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
DONE AND ORDERED this 17th day of March 2026.
s/
Zachary C. Bolitho
Zachary C. Bolitho
United States Magistrate Judge
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