CUNNINGHAM v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
MARGHERITA CUNNINGHAM, as
personal representative of the estate of
RAY CUNNINGHAM, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 4:21-cv-414-AW-MAF
CENTURION OF FLORIDA, LLC,
Defendant.
_______________________________/
FINAL ORDER
Plaintiff’s amended complaint against Centurion of Florida, LLC, alleges
deliberate indifference toward Ray Cunningham’s hepatitis and bone spurs.1 ECF
No. 80. Centurion moved to dismiss, and Plaintiff responded. ECF Nos. 82, 88. The
magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation concluding, among other
things, that Plaintiff has not stated a claim and that the statute of limitations bars any
claim. ECF No. 89. Plaintiff filed objections, to which Centurion responded. ECF
1 The operative complaint names Ray Edward Cunningham, Jr., as the
plaintiff. But because Ray Cunningham is deceased, see ECF No. 80 ¶ 41, and as
Centurion notes, “it is unclear why the [operative complaint was] not brought by his
estate’s personal representative, as was the prior complaint,” ECF No. 82 at 1 n.2.
Plaintiff responds that this was a scrivener’s error. ECF No. 88 at 14. Because both
sides proceed as though the estate were the plaintiff, I will do the same.
The operative complaint also lists the Florida Department of Corrections in
the case style. ECF No. 80 at 1. But this too is a scrivener’s error. The court
dismissed claims against DOC, and the operative complaint does not include any
new claims against it.
Case 4:21-cv-00414-AW-MAF Document 94 Filed 12/23/25 Page 1 of 6

2
Nos. 90, 92. Having considered the matter de novo, I now dismiss for three
independent reasons.
As to the statute of limitations, Plaintiff does not dispute that the operative
complaint came more than four years after the cause of action accrued.2 Plaintiff’s
argument is that the claim relates back to the 2021 complaint. ECF No. 90 at 6; see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). “Relation back is a legal fiction employed to salvage
claims that would otherwise be unjustly barred by a limitations provision.” Caron v.
NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 910 F.3d 1359, 1368 (11th Cir. 2018). This applies only when
the facts in the earlier complaint “put the defendant on notice that the new claims . . .
might be asserted.” Id. Here, the earlier complaint did not put Centurion on notice
of the newly asserted claim. Instead, the new claim “involved separate and distinct
conduct.” Moore v. Baker, 989 F.2d 1129, 1132 (11th Cir. 1993); see also Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B) (stating the amendment must relate to the same “conduct,
transaction, or occurrence”).
2 The latest date Plaintiff’s claim could have accrued is January 2018 for
hepatitis C and February 2018 for the bone spurs. See ECF No. 80 ¶ 38 (stating when
Ray Cunningham began Epclusa); id. ¶ 48 (stating when doctor decided not to treat
bone spurs); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (holding statute of
limitations begins to run when “the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of
action.”). The operative complaint was filed in May 2025, well after the four-year
statute of limitations. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003)
(noting that Florida’s four-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims arising
in Florida).
Case 4:21-cv-00414-AW-MAF Document 94 Filed 12/23/25 Page 2 of 6

3
Although the general legal theory (deliberate indifference) is the same, the
claim is not. The earlier complaint claimed deliberate indifference to Ray
Cunningham’s breathing issues (which the VA diagnosed as pneumonia), ECF No.
1-1 ¶¶ 24-25, but the amended complaint concerns hepatitis C and bone spurs—
different health issues with different treatment standards. Cf. United States v.
Ciampi, 419 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating that one “type of ineffective
assistance” does not relate back to a later asserted ineffective assistance claim “based
upon an entirely distinct type of attorney misfeasance”).
In objecting to the report and recommendation, Plaintiff contends Centurion
had actual notice of the hepatitis C claim because it received a “Notice of Claim.”
ECF No. 90 at 6. But Rule 15(c) is not concerned with actual notice. See Moore, 989
F.2d at 1131 (“The critical issue in Rule 15(c) determinations is whether the original
complaint gave notice to the defendant of the claim now being asserted.” (emphasis
added)). The statute of limitations bars the claim.
Second, and as an independent reason to dismiss, the operative complaint does
not state a claim for deliberate indifference. A deliberate-indifference claim requires
a showing of (1) a deprivation that is, “objectively, sufficiently serious,” and (2)
“subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law.” Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th
1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (cleaned up).
Case 4:21-cv-00414-AW-MAF Document 94 Filed 12/23/25 Page 3 of 6

4
As to hepatitis, the complaint does not allege facts showing Centurion was
subjectively aware that its conduct could put Cunningham at substantial risk of
serious harm. In fact, the operative complaint does not even show that Centurion
acted unreasonably. Cf. id. at 1255 (stating that a defendant “cannot be found liable
under the Eighth Amendment” if the defendant “responds reasonably”). As the
magistrate judge recognized, there are “no allegations that Centurion refused to
provide treatment or delayed necessary treatment.” ECF No. 89 at 20. The complaint
acknowledges that Centurion monitored Cunningham’s medical condition,
prescribed medication, and discussed disease management. ECF No. 80 ¶¶ 24, 27-
28, 34-36, 38. “[A] simple difference in medical opinion between the prison’s
medical staff and the inmate as to the latter’s diagnosis or course of treatment fails
to support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment.” Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of
Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1272 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d
1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991)) (cleaned up). Although Hoffer makes clear that cost is
not an excuse for providing deficient care, see id. at 1277, there are no well-pleaded
factual allegations showing Cunningham received inadequate care or that his care
was dictated by cost.
And as to the bone spurs—which I will assume for now constitutes a serious
medical need—the complaint likewise fails to plausibly allege deliberate
indifference. No well-pleaded allegations plausibly show Centurion acted with
Case 4:21-cv-00414-AW-MAF Document 94 Filed 12/23/25 Page 4 of 6

5
subjective recklessness. Cunningham complained of intense pain to his right heel
and requested sick calls. ECF No. 80 ¶¶ 44-47. After a sick call, the prison doctor
“told him there was nothing that could be done to treat the bone spur problem.” Id.
¶ 48. No allegations plausibly suggest this lack of treatment was constitutionally
inadequate.
There is yet another independent reason why Plaintiff’s claim fails. Centurion
can be liable only if a policy or custom caused Cunningham’s injuries. See Buckner
v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of
N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)). Here, there is no plausible allegation of any policy
or custom. The complaint does include conclusory references to an “unofficial policy
and practice of delaying and denying treatment to save the company money.” ECF
No. 80 ¶ 26. For instance, the complaint offers examples of other prisoners in other
prisons whose treatment was allegedly deficient because of Centurion’s cost
concerns. This is not enough.
First, considering cost is not, by itself, unconstitutional. See Hoffer, 973 F.3d
at 1276-77. Second, Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded any connection between
cost and treatment generally, see, e.g., ECF No. 80 ¶ 9 (stating, without any
supporting factual allegations, that medical staff decided not to provide life-saving
medical intervention because Centurion wanted “to keep the related cost down”), or
Cunningham’s situation specifically. The complaint simply asserts the treatment
Case 4:21-cv-00414-AW-MAF Document 94 Filed 12/23/25 Page 5 of 6

6
decisions were “heavily influenced by Centurion’s unofficial policy” of saving
company money. Id. ¶ 26. This is too conclusory. There is, in short, no plausible
claim of harm based on a Centurion policy.
The report and recommendation (ECF No. 89) is adopted to the extent
consistent with this order. The motion to dismiss (ECF No. 82) is GRANTED. The
clerk will enter a judgment that says, “Plaintiff’s claim is dismissed on the merits for
failure to state a claim and based on the statute of limitations.” The clerk will then
close the file.
SO ORDERED on December 23, 2025.
s/ Allen Winsor
Chief United States District Judge
Case 4:21-cv-00414-AW-MAF Document 94 Filed 12/23/25 Page 6 of 6