ROBINSON v. UNITED WHOLESALE MORTGAGE LLC

4:25-cv-00014FlndDec 8, 2025

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Case No. 4:25cv14-RH-MJF
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
LATAVIUS ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,
v. 	CASE NO. 4:25cv14-RH-MJF
UNITED WHOLESALE MORTGAGE,
LLC,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Latavius Robinson filed this action as “private attorney general” and
tendered first, second, and third amended complaints as trustee of the Evander
Trust. The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation concluding the
action should be dismissed on two grounds: first, that as a layperson, Mr. Robinson
could not represent a trust, and second, that the original complaint—which
remained the operative pleading because leave had been denied to file the later
versions—failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Mr. Robinson
has objected. And he has filed successive motions for leave to file fourth, corrected
fourth, and fifth amended complaints.
Case 4:25-cv-00014-RH-MJF Document 34 Filed 12/08/25 Page 1 of 6
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Case No. 4:25cv14-RH-MJF
I. 	The complaint and the first, second, and third amended complaints
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), a district court must review de
novo issues raised by objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation to
dismiss an action. I have so reviewed Mr. Robinson’s objections. They are
unfounded. Mr. Robinson was not and is not entitled to go forward on the original
complaint or on the first, second, or third amended complaints.
As a pro se litigant, Mr. Robinson can assert only his own individual claims.
He cannot represent a trust, so he cannot proceed on the first, second, or third
amended complaints. Nor can he act only as a private attorney general, as he
attempted to do in the original complaint.
A pro se litigant could proceed as a private attorney general only in the
colloquial sense that, in asserting an individual civil rights claim or other claim
implicating the broader public interest, the pro se litigant might vindicate not only
his individual claim but also the broader public interest. This is not a case of that
kind—and even in a case of that kind, a pro se litigant could proceed first and
foremost only on an individual claim. That is also true of any other private litigant,
even when represented by an attorney.
In sum, Mr. Robinson cannot proceed on the original complaint, in which he
asserts a claim only as a private attorney general, and cannot proceed on the first,
second, or third amended complaints, in which he asserts claims of a trust.
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Case No. 4:25cv14-RH-MJF
II. The fourth, amended fourth, and fifth amended complaints
Without awaiting a ruling on the objections, Mr. Robinson, now acting as an
individual rather than as a private attorney general or trustee, has filed three more
motions for leave to amend. The three motions ask for leave to file a fourth
amended complaint, a corrected fourth amended complaint, and a fifth amended
complaint.
These come too late. Mr. Robinson ignored orders that gave him multiple
opportunities to amend to state an individual claim. He squandered those
opportunities. He sought to assert an individual claim only after entry of a report
and recommendation concluding that his recalcitrance, together with the failure to
correct identified deficiencies, warranted dismissal. This without more is a
sufficient basis for denying the new motions for leave to amend.
This order would deny the motions anyway. The three new versions of the
complaint—the fourth, corrected fourth, and fifth amended complaints—are
referred to in this order as the “new complaints.” They all arise from Mr.
Robinson’s execution of a note and mortgage. He apparently does not deny
receiving the proceeds of the note and mortgage and failing to make the specified
payments.
The new complaints allege a foreclosure action was filed in state court and is
still pending. See ECF No. 33 at 9 (referring to “litigation pending”). Publicly
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Case No. 4:25cv14-RH-MJF
available records, which could properly be judicially noticed, confirm this. See
United Wholesale Mortg. LLC et al. v. Latavius Robinson, Case No. 372024-CA-
0009651000-MX (Fla. Cir. Ct.). One defendant in this federal action, United
Wholesale Mortgage, apparently was the ostensible lender and mortgagee, and the
other defendants apparently had a role in demanding payment or pursuing the
state-court action, perhaps as, or on behalf of, an assignee of the note and
mortgage.
The new complaints fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
The fourth and amended fourth amended complaints assert claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment for denial of procedural due process (count 1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for denial of fair judicial process (count 2), the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (count 3), the Truth in Lending Act (count 4), and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (count 5).
Counts 1 and 2 fail because the defendants are not state actors. The
Fourteenth Amendment constrains government action, not private action, and
§ 1983 applies to action under color of law, not to private plaintiffs or other private
actors. The complaints do not allege facts suggesting the defendants acted under
color of law. It bears noting, too, that state courts are fully capable of affording
litigants due process, and the complaints allege nothing suggesting that is not true
for the foreclosure action pending there.
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Case No. 4:25cv14-RH-MJF
Counts 3, 4, and 5 fail because they are long on conclusions but short on
facts. They conclusorily allege violations of statutes but do not indicate how any
specific act violated any specific statutory provision or which defendant allegedly
committed the act. Count 5 is especially deficient; a plaintiff does not plausibly
allege a RICO violation by asserting nothing more than an allegedly improper
attempt to collect a single debt.
These same principles are fatal to the fifth amended complaint. It apparently
asserts an overriding RICO claim based on eight underlying claims, each against a
different defendant, and each arising from the single note and mortgage that are the
subject of the state-court foreclosure action. The eight claims, like the claims in the
fourth and corrected fourth amended complaints, are conclusory; they do not
indicate how any specific act violated any specific statutory provision. And the
alleged efforts to collect on a single note are not sufficient to state a RICO claim.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons and those set out in the report and recommendation,
IT IS ORDERED:
1. The report and recommendation, ECF No. 26, is accepted and adopted as
the court’s opinion with the additional analysis set out in this order. The
defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 11, is granted.
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2. The motions, ECF Nos. 29, 30, and 32, for leave to file amended
complaints are denied.
3. The clerk must enter judgment stating, “This action is dismissed for
failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.”
4. The clerk must close the file.
SO ORDERED on December 8, 2025.
s/Robert L. Hinkle
United States District Judge
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