BROWN v. YOUNG et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
BRITTNEY BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No.: 4:25cv419-MW/MJF
ROGER A. YOUNG and
MELISSA TUCKER,
Defendants.
__________________________/
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
On September 10, 2025, Plaintiff weighed in on the online discourse about
Charlie Kirk’s murder when she re-posted a statement from a third-party’s account
as a story on her private Instagram account. Four days later, a user on X called “Libs
of TikTok” posted a screenshot of Plaintiff’s Instagram story alongside a screenshot
of her public LinkedIn profile that listed her employment at the Florida Fish and
Wildlife Conservation Commission (“FWC”). The “Libs of TikTok” account urged
swift retribution against Plaintiff for the message she shared on her Instagram story.
Within less than 24 hours, FWC terminated Plaintiff’s employment.
Plaintiff filed suit two weeks after her termination and promptly moved for a
preliminary injunction seeking reinstatement, arguing that FWC terminated her in
violation of the First Amendment. This Court held a hearing on Plaintiff’s motion
for preliminary injunction on November 10, 2025.
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I
A district court may grant a preliminary injunction if the movant shows: (1) it
has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) it will suffer irreparable
injury unless the injunction issues, (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs
whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party, and (4) if
issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Siegel v. LePore,
234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A “preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary and drastic remedy.” United States v. Jefferson Cnty., 720 F.2d 1511,
1519 (11th Cir. 1983). It should only be granted if “the movant ‘clearly carries the
burden of persuasion’ as to the four prerequisites.” Id. (quoting Canal Auth. v.
Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1974)).
This Court’s analysis focuses on the merits because, typically, if a plaintiff
cannot “establish a likelihood of success on the merits,” this Court “need not
consider the remaining conditions prerequisite to injunctive relief.” Johnson &
Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir.
2002).
Plaintiff’s motion is based on her claim that FWC terminated her employment
in retaliation for speech protected by the First Amendment. But the First Amendment
is not absolute. In the public-employment context, “the State’s interest as an
employer in regulating the speech of its employees differs significantly from those
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it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.”
Labriola v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 142 F.4th 1305, 1309 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Cook
v. 	Gwinnett 	Cnty. 	Sch. 	Dist., 	414 	F.3d 	1313, 	1318 	(11th 	Cir. 	2005)). 	“To
accommodate the dueling interests of employee and employer,” this Court applies a
four-step test that the Eleventh Circuit has derived from Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of
Township High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138 (1983). Id. Plaintiff must show (1) that her speech involved a matter of public
concern, (2) that her free speech interests outweighed Defendants’ interest in
effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities, and (3) that her speech
played a substantial part in her termination. If Plaintiff satisfies her burden on these
three steps, the burden shifts to Defendants to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that they would have made the same decision even in the absence of
Plaintiff’s protected speech. This Court will address each step, starting with whether
Plaintiff spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.
A
As to this first step, Defendants raise several arguments as to why Plaintiff’s
re-post is not private speech on a matter of public concern. But it’s not a close call.
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First, it is no answer that Plaintiff’s Instagram post, itself, is not original
content.1 Courts have long recognized that re-posting memes or other content from
other creators, without further comment, is akin to one’s own speech. See Noble v.
Cincinnati & Hamilton Cnty. Public Library, 112 F. 4th 373, 381 (6th Cir. 2024)
(holding 	that 	individual 	who 	re-posted 	an 	offensive 	meme 	without 	further
commentary spoke on a matter of public concern inasmuch as “[h]is reposted meme
communicated his opposition to the BLM protests, which were active throughout the
nation at that time.”).
1 More specifically, Plaintiff re-posted an Instagram post from the @awhalefact account
on Instagram. Among other content, the @awhalefact account posts satirical social commentary
from the perspective of a whale. The post that Plaintiff re-posted on her Instagram story said the
following:
ECF No. 8-1.
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Nor can Defendants immunize themselves by recharacterizing Plaintiff’s
speech as mere “association” with another’s speech. Plaintiff spoke when she re-
posted the third-party’s speech as her own on her Instagram story. Full stop.
Likewise, there is no contention that Plaintiff’s Instagram story amounts to
unprotected government speech that owed its existence to her job at FWC or was
even remotely related to the work she performed. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S.
410, 421–22 (2006) (“Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public
employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee
might have enjoyed as a private citizen.”). Plaintiff’s unrebutted declaration
demonstrates that her work at FWC focused on monitoring imperiled shorebirds and
seabirds, and she primarily performed these duties independently in the field. ECF
No. 8-2 ¶¶ 4–5. For good reason, Defendants do not contend that Plaintiff’s work as
a biological scientist required that she post about current events generally, or Charlie
Kirk specifically, on her personal Instagram account.
Relatedly, Plaintiff didn’t post from an FWC phone or make her statement at
work. Instead, she re-posted a post from her personal phone, on her private Instagram
account, on the weekend, while she was on vacation out of state. When Plaintiff
spoke by re-posting the post on her Instagram story, she was as far away from work
as one could be, literally and figuratively. In short, Plaintiff was speaking as a private
citizen and not a government employee when she posted the Instagram story.
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Defendants also contend that Plaintiff’s Instagram story did not touch on a
matter of public concern because it conveyed only “personal disdain” and did not
contain any “civic commentary.” But speech addresses a matter of public concern
when it can “be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community.” 	Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. To the extent
Defendants suggest speech communicating “personal disdain” falls outside the
realm of speech on a matter of public concern, they are mistaken. A public
employee’s negative opinion about a public figure who has nothing to do with their
job is generally not the sort of speech touching on a “personal interest” that garners
no protection under the Pickering framework. Compare Rankin v. McPherson, 483
U.S. 378, 386–87 (1987) (holding that employee was speaking on a matter of public
concern when she told a coworker that if another attempt was made on the
president’s life, she “hope[s] they get him”) with Barr v. Tucker, 662 F. Supp. 3d
1353 (S.D. Ga. 2023) (denying motion for preliminary injunction and holding that
substitute teacher who was terminated after opposing her children’s participation in
read-aloud program involving a book that included same-sex couples was speaking
on a matter of personal interest—namely, concerns regarding her children—rather
than a matter of public concern).
It is also no answer that Plaintiff’s speech was arguably satirical, sarcastic, or
insensitive. “Humor, satire, and even personal invective can make a point about a
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matter of public concern.” De Ritis v. McCarrigle, 861 F.3d 444, 455 (3d Cir. 2017).
Indeed, “[t]he inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to
the question whether it deals with a matter of public concern.” Rankin, 483 U.S. at
387.
Ultimately, considering the content, form, and context of Plaintiff’s speech—
a re-post on her private Instagram account that satirically criticized Charlie Kirk’s
position regarding gun control by juxtaposing his murder with the murder of children
in school shootings—Plaintiff has plainly met her burden to demonstrate that she
spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Next, this Court considers whether
this speech played a substantial part in Plaintiff’s termination.
B
As to the third step, again, it’s an easy call. Defendants try to twist the
explanation for Plaintiff’s termination, claiming they fired her based on the public’s
reaction to her speech and not because of her speech.2 But that dog won’t hunt.
2 Relatedly, Defendants also argue that the termination had nothing to do with Plaintiff’s
“viewpoint.” ECF No. 21 at 8–9. But this assertion is belied by the record, particularly the
following two posts on X.com where FWC first noted that Plaintiff’s “hateful sentiment” would
not be “tolerated,” and then FWC doubled down the following day, explaining that Plaintiff’s
speech was contrary to the agency’s “values.”
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Defendants do not identify a basis, independent of Plaintiff’s speech, on which to
base her termination. The public’s reaction to Plaintiff’s speech only exists because
ECF No. 8-4.
ECF No. 8-5.
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Plaintiff spoke. Moreover, FWC admits in its own public posts on X that FWC fired
Plaintiff for her speech. See ECF Nos. 8-4 and 8-5.3
This is not a case like Oakes Farms where the employer had an alternative
basis for termination based on facts independent of the speech at issue. See Oakes
Farms Food & Distribution Servs., LLC v. Adkins, 154 F.4th 1338, 1346 (11th Cir.
2025) (“That Oakes’s speech alerted Adkins to the [food safety] concern does not
mean that he was being punished for his viewpoint, just like firing an employee after
he confesses to embezzlement is not the same as punishing him for his different
perspective on personal use of company funds.”). Instead, Plaintiff has clearly
3 Specifically, shortly after terminating Plaintiff, FWC explicitly stated that it terminated
Plaintiff after learning of her post on social media in the following post on X.com:
ECF No. 8-5.
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demonstrated that her speech played a substantial part in the termination decision.4
But this is not the end of the inquiry.
C
As discussed at length on the record at the hearing on Plaintiff’s motion, the
crux of this case comes down to whether Plaintiff has met her burden on the second
step—namely to show that her free speech interest outweighs FWC’s interest in the
effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities. As Plaintiff’s counsel
acknowledged on the record at the hearing, weighing both sides’ competing interests
involves a nuanced, fact-intensive determination. And while Plaintiff asserts the
record is sufficient to demonstrate that the scale tips in her favor at this juncture, this
Court is not persuaded given the extraordinary affirmative relief Plaintiff now
seeks—namely, reinstatement to her previous position. Martinez v. Mathews, 544
F.2d 1233, 1243 (5th Cir. 1976) (“Mandatory preliminary relief, which goes well
beyond simply maintaining the status quo pendente lite, is particularly disfavored,
and should not be issued unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party.”).
In essence, Plaintiff asks this Court to discount Melissa Tucker’s unrebutted
declaration submitted on Defendant Young’s behalf. In it, Defendant Tucker
4 Had Plaintiff met her burden as to each of the first three steps in this analysis, the burden
would shift to Defendants to demonstrate that the same decision would have been made even in
the absence of Plaintiff’s speech. However, Defendants have come forward with no evidence
demonstrating that the same decision would have been made to terminate Plaintiff in the absence
of her Instagram story.
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provides evidence that there was a swift and largely negative reaction from the public
concerning Plaintiff’s Instagram story which “disrupted agency operations, required
diversion of staff resources to manage responses, and raised legitimate concerns
about the agency’s credibility and public trust.” ECF No. 21-1 ¶ 5. While Plaintiff
understandably argues that this declaration is short on specifics and largely
conclusory, Plaintiff also chose not to seek expedited discovery to depose Defendant
Tucker or cross-examine her at the hearing to explore flaws in Defendants’ position.
Without more, this Court cannot conclude on this sparse record that the public’s
negative reaction was not disruptive enough to justify the action FWC took. See
Labriola, 142 F.4th at 1310 (describing the “ample evidence” demonstrating that the
public’s reaction to the employee’s speech “interfered with the regular operation of
the enterprise”); see also Moss v. City of Pembroke Pines, 782 F.3d 613, 622 (11th
Cir. 2015) (“The government’s legitimate interest in avoiding disruption does not
require proof of actual disruption. Reasonable possibility of adverse harm is all that
is required.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, on this limited record, Plaintiff has not
met her burden to demonstrate that her free speech interests outweigh her former
employer’s legitimate interests, and thus she has not demonstrated a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits at this early stage of this case.
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II
The First Amendment is not without limits. This case requires this Court to
determine, among other things, whether a public employee’s interest in free speech
outweighs her employer’s interests in effective and efficient fulfillment of its
responsibilities. At this early stage, Plaintiff has not yet demonstrated that her
interests tip the scales. Only time will tell if this changes on a more developed record.
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction,
ECF No. 8, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED on November 13, 2025.
s/Mark E. Walker
United States District Judge
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