Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
MARC LAMONIER,
Petitioner,
vs. Case No. 4:26-cv-225-AW-MAF
ALLAN CROSBY,
JAIL ADMINISTRATOR,
LIBERTY COUNTY JAIL, et al.,
Respondents.
__________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner, an immigration detainee being held at the Liberty County
Jail, filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2241 through counsel on
May 11, 2026. ECF No. 1.1 Petitioner alleges that his current detention
without a bond hearing violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)
and the Due Process Clause.2 He seeks immediate release on conditions as
well as fees and costs.
1 It took Petitioner multiple attempts to properly redact protected information contained in
the petition. See ECF Nos. 5, 7, 10. By the time he filed the properly redacted third
amended petition, ECF No. 10, the Court had already corrected the issue by sealing the
unredacted exhibit and requiring Respondent answer the second amended petition, ECF
No. 7. See ECF No. 8. Therefore, the Court will refer to ECF No. 7 as the operative petition
(hereinafter “petition”).
2 Because the Court recommends granting relief on Petitioner's INA claim, the Court will
not address Petitioner's Fourth Amendment and APA claims. See Banks v. Dretke, 540
U.S. 668, 689 n.10 (2004) (declining to address an additional claim in a habeas petition
after granting relief on another claim because “any relief [petitioner] could obtain on that
claim would be cumulative”).
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Shortly before the petition was filed, the Eleventh Circuit published its
decision in Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, No. 25-
14065, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 1243395, at *1 (11th Cir. May 6, 2026).
Respondents contend “Petitioner is not in the same factual or legal situation
as the petitioners in Hernandez Alvarez” because Petitioner originally
entered the United States as an arriving alien in 2024 and was paroled,
before being detained by law enforcement in Florida two years later. ECF
No. 9 at 3-4. Respondents consider Petitioner subject to mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C § 1225.
The § 2241 Petition
Petitioner is a citizen and national of Haiti. ECF No. 7 at 1. He entered
the United States in July 2024 through the Ft. Lauderdale, Florida port of
entry. ECF No. 9 at 2. He was denied admission but paroled through June
12, 2025 and lived in the United States. Id. at 2; ECF No. 7-1. Ultimately, the
program he was paroled under terminated. Id. at 10. On March 24, 2026,
Petitioner was encountered by law enforcement during a traffic stop in
Florida as a passenger in the vehicle. Id. at 10-11. He was taken into
immigration detention and transported to the Liberty County Jail in Bristol,
Florida, where he has remained. He has not had a bond hearing before an
immigration judge.
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Analysis
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Hernandez Alvarez is binding on this
Court.3 Mandatory detention under Ҥ 1225 applies to arriving aliens seeking
entry at the border, whereas [discretionary detention under] § 1226 applies
to aliens unlawfully in the interior.” Hernandez Alvarez, 2026 WL 1243395,
at *14. Where and when someone is apprehended matters. If they “were not
applying for entry in any literal sense when they were detained” and were
simply “present in the country,” § 1226(a) controls, not § 1225. Id. at *8.
Petitioner was not an “arriving alien” who was “seeking admission” on
March 24, 2026 when he was detained, as required for mandatory detention
under § 1225; instead, he was a passenger in a car in Florida that was
stopped for a traffic violation. See Id. at *1 (holding § 1225’s no bond
provision did not apply because “neither petitioner was seeking lawful entry
into the United States after inspection by an immigration officer when he was
arrested…in fact, neither petitioner was pursuing any object, let alone lawful
3 On May 13, 2026, the issuance of the mandate was withheld. See ECF No. 76 of case
25-14065. This does not impact the opinion’s binding precedential effect. See Martin v.
Singletary, 965 F.2d 944, 945 n.1 (11th Cir. 1992) (a published opinion “is the law in this
circuit unless and until it is reversed, overruled, vacated, or otherwise modified by the
Supreme Court of the United States or by [the Eleventh Circuit] sitting en banc,” and a
stay of the mandate “in no way affects the duty of...the courts in this circuit to apply now
the precedent established by” the published opinion “as binding authority”); 11th Cir.
IOP—Cir. R. 36.2 (“Under the law of this circuit, published opinions are binding precedent.
The issuance or non-issuance of the mandate does not affect this result.”).
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entry, when he was detained following a traffic stop”).
The fact that Petitioner originally presented himself at a border
crossing and sought lawful entry to the United States does not change the
outcome. An immigration officer denied him admission two years ago and he
was released on parole to live in the United States pending immigration
proceedings. He is no longer “an arriving alien seeking entry at the border”—
that ship has sailed. Instead, he was apprehended “within the interior” of the
United States. These facts still fall squarely under Hernandez Alvarez. See,
e.g., Mendes v. Ripa, et al., No. 3:26-CV-118-JEP-PDB, 2026 WL 1396160,
at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 19, 2026) (“While [Hernandez Alvarez] did not
specifically address the circumstance of an individual…who had been
paroled into the country and whose parole had since expired, the reasoning
of the opinion is equally applicable to Petitioner”); Garcia v. Warden, S. Fla.
Det. Facility, No. 2:26-CV-1143-KCD-NPM, 2026 WL 1345914, at *3 (M.D.
Fla. May 14, 2026) (same).
Respondents’ arguments are foreclosed by the Eleventh Circuit.
Because Petitioner is subject to discretionary detention under § 1226, and
not mandatory detention under § 1225, he is entitled to an individualized
bond hearing. The petition for writ of habeas corpus should be granted in
part. Petitioner should also be allowed to separately move for reasonable
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attorney’s fees and costs by filing a motion with supporting documentation in
accordance with the Equal Access to Justice Act, 8 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
Recommendation
For the reasons discussed, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that the
28 U.S.C § 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 7, be GRANTED
in part and Respondents be required to provide Petitioner with an
individualized bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a) before an Immigration
Judge within seven (7) days or, in the alternative, release Petitioner. It is
further RECOMMENDED that this case should be closed without prejudice
for Petitioner to move for fees and costs in accordance with 8 U.S.C §
2412(d)(1)(B).
IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida on May 28, 2026.
s/ Martin A. Fitzpatrick
MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific
written objections to these proposed findings and recommendations.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A copy of the objections shall be served upon
all other parties. A party may respond to another party’s objections
within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Any different deadline that may appear on the
electronic docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not
control. If a party fails to object to the Magistrate Judge’s findings or
recommendations as to any particular claim or issue contained in this
Report and Recommendation, that party waives the right to challenge
on appeal the District Court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual
and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
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