David Anthony Vranicar

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION
In re:
DAVID ANTHONY VRANICAR, 	Case No. 25-19564-PDR
Chapter 7
Debtor.
_____________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
MOTION TO ENFORCE DISCHARGE INJUNCTION
This case begins with a creditor who was given no formal notice of a bankruptcy
that directly threatened his rights. He was not listed on the schedules. He was not
notified by the Bankruptcy Court. The litigation he was actively prosecuting against
Peter D. Russin, Judge
United States Bankruptcy Court
_____________________________________________________________________________
ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on May 22, 2026.
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the Debtor was not disclosed in the Statement of Financial Affairs. Those omissions
were serious, and they were the Debtor's fault.
But one day after the petition was filed, a Suggestion of Bankruptcy appeared
in that very litigation. It identified this as a Chapter 7 case and provided the
bankruptcy case number. The creditor and his counsel received it nearly three
months before the deadline fixed by Rule 4007(c) to file a complaint seeking a
determination of nondischargeability.
Under § 523(a)(3)(B) and controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent, that was
enough.1 Actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case imposed a duty to inquire and act.2
The creditor did neither. The debt was discharged.
That result may feel harsh to the creditor whose lack of formal notice traces
entirely to the Debtor's own omissions. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the
harshness in Alton and applied the rule anyway. This Court is bound to do the same.
The Court reaches a different conclusion on sanctions. The Debtor's omissions
— from the schedules, from the Statement of Financial Affairs, and through later
amendments — created a fair ground of doubt about whether the discharge injunction
applied to the creditor's claim. That doubt does not save the claim. But under the
Supreme Court's standard in Taggart v. Lorenzen, it forecloses contempt.3
1 See In re Alton, 837 F.2d 457 (11th Cir. 1988).
2 See id. at 459-61; TL90108 LLC v. Ford, 147 F.4th 1351, 1361-62 (11th Cir. 2025).
3 Taggart v. Lorenzen, 587 U.S. 554, 561-62 (2019).
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I. Background
The Debtor filed this Chapter 7 case on August 18, 2025. The Court issued its
notice of commencement of case, established the first date set for the § 341 meeting
of creditors, and fixed November 17, 2025 as the deadline for filing complaints to
determine dischargeability under Rule 4007(c).
The 	Debtor 	filed 	his 	schedules 	and 	Statement 	of 	Financial 	Affairs 	on
September 8, 2025.4 The schedules listed numerous creditors and reflected liabilities
exceeding one million dollars. They also disclosed other litigation-related obligations.
Cheley was not listed as a creditor.
At the time of the bankruptcy filing, Cheley was actively prosecuting claims
against the Debtor in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida.5 The litigation was pending, active, and directly involved the Debtor.
The Debtor also omitted the District Court litigation from the Statement of
Financial Affairs, notwithstanding the separate requirement to disclose it. Later
amendments likewise did not add Cheley as a creditor. 6 The omission therefore
appeared in more than one place and persisted beyond the original filing.
At the hearing, Debtor’s counsel candidly acknowledged that Cheley should
have been scheduled and that the District Court litigation should have been disclosed
in the Statement of Financial Affairs. Counsel further stated that the omission
4 Dkt. No. 13.
5 Cheley v. Vranicar et al., Case No. 0:24-cv-62206-EA (S.D. Fla.).
6 Dkt. No. 29.
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resulted from counsel’s error, not from any decision by the Debtor to conceal Cheley.
The Court appreciates counsel’s candor, but counsel’s statement is not evidence. The
Court also notes that the Debtor signed the schedules and Statement of Financial
Affairs under penalty of perjury. Whether the Debtor’s omission was innocent,
negligent, reckless, or intentional remains an open question. The Court, however,
need not decide that issue because, for the reasons explained below, the answer would
not change the legal result on the motion before the Court.
On August 19, 2025, one day after the bankruptcy petition was filed, a
Suggestion of Bankruptcy was filed in the District Court action.7 The Suggestion
identified the bankruptcy case, identified it as a Chapter 7, and provided the
bankruptcy case number.
There 	is 	no 	genuine 	dispute 	that 	Cheley 	and 	his 	counsel 	received 	the
Suggestion. There is likewise no genuine dispute that the Suggestion was filed nearly
three months before expiration of the Rule 4007(c) deadline to file a complaint seeking
a determination of nondischargeability.
Cheley did not file any such complaint. Cheley also did not move to extend the
Rule 4007(c) deadline before it expired. The Chapter 7 trustee filed a report of no
distribution. No claims bar date was established because this was a no-asset case.
The Court later entered the Debtor’s discharge.
After entry of discharge, Cheley continued the District Court litigation and
obtained a verdict against the Debtor. The Debtor then filed the present motion
7 District Court Dkt. No. 93, Cheley v. Vranicar et al., Case No. 0:24-cv-62206-EA (S.D. Fla.).
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seeking enforcement of the discharge injunction, civil contempt, injunctive relief,
sanctions, damages, and attorneys’ fees.
II. Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157. This is a core
proceeding under § 157(b)(2)(I) and (O) because it requires the Court to determine
the scope and effect of the Debtor’s discharge, the applicability of the discharge
injunction, and whether contempt sanctions are appropriate for alleged violation of
that injunction. 8 The Court also has authority to interpret and enforce its own
discharge order.9
III. Legal Standard
A Chapter 7 discharge voids any judgment to the extent that judgment
determines the personal liability of the debtor on a discharged debt.10 The discharge
also operates as an injunction against any act to collect, recover, or offset a discharged
debt as a personal liability of the debtor.11 The discharge injunction is therefore
powerful, but it is not self-defining. Before the Court may enforce the injunction, it
must determine whether the debt at issue was discharged.
A. Section 523(a)(3)
8 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I), (O).
9 McLean v. Greenpoint Credit, LLC, 794 F.3d 1313, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2015).
10 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1).
11 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2).
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Section 523(a)(3) addresses debts that were neither listed nor scheduled in
time to permit a creditor to protect its bankruptcy rights. It contains two distinct
subparts.
Subsection (A) applies to debts not of the kind described in § 523(a)(2), (4), or
(6). It focuses on whether omission deprived the creditor of a timely opportunity to
file a proof of claim.12
Subsection (B) applies to debts of the kind described in § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6).
It protects not only the creditor’s opportunity to file a proof of claim, but also the
creditor’s opportunity to timely request a determination of nondischargeability. The
statute then contains a saving clause: the debt is discharged if the creditor had notice
or actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case in time to make the required filing and
request.13
That saving clause controls this case. Cheley contends that his claim is of the
kind described in § 523(a)(6), and that the debt therefore falls within § 523(a)(3)(B).
The Debtor need not defeat that characterization to prevail. Even assuming Cheley’s
claim is of a kind described in § 523(a)(6), § 523(a)(3)(B) itself provides that the debt
is discharged if Cheley had notice or actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case in time
to act.
B. Rule 4007(c)
Rule 	4007(c) 	fixes 	the 	deadline 	for 	filing 	a 	complaint 	to 	determine
dischargeability under § 523(c). The complaint must be filed no later than sixty days
12 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(A); In re McIntosh, 657 B.R. 279, 293-95 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2024).
13 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(B).
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after the first date set for the § 341 meeting of creditors.14 A motion to extend that
deadline must be filed before the deadline expires.15 The deadline is strict.
C. Alton and Ford
The controlling Eleventh Circuit authority is Alton. 16 There, the debtor
omitted a creditor from the schedules. The creditor received actual written notice of
the bankruptcy proceeding but did not receive formal notice from the bankruptcy
court of the creditors’ meeting or the deadline to file a dischargeability complaint.
After the deadline passed, the creditor sought an extension and argued that the
debtor’s own misleading conduct caused the missed deadline.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected that argument. It acknowledged that the facts
were harsh and that the debtor’s conduct was troubling. But the Court held that
actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceeding was sufficient to impose on the
creditor a duty to inquire further and timely act. The Court explained that mere
knowledge of a pending bankruptcy proceeding is sufficient to bar a later claim of
nondischargeability based on lack of formal notice.17
The Eleventh Circuit recently reaffirmed Alton in Ford. 18 Ford involved a
creditor that was not scheduled, did not receive formal notice of the Rule 4007(c)
deadline, but learned of the bankruptcy through a Suggestion of Bankruptcy filed in
14 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c).
15 Id.; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(3).
16 Alton, 837 F.2d at 458–59.
17 Id. at 459-61.
18 Ford, 147 F.4th at 1354–56.
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related litigation. The Eleventh Circuit held that Alton remains binding precedent,
that Rule 4007(c)’s deadline is not subject to equitable tolling, and that actual notice
of the bankruptcy proceeding satisfied due process.19 These decisions bind this Court.
IV. Analysis
A. Cheley’s Claim Was Discharged Under § 523(a)(3)(B)
The dispositive facts are not disputed. Cheley and his counsel received actual
knowledge of this Chapter 7 bankruptcy case through the Suggestion of Bankruptcy
filed in the District Court action. The Suggestion identified the bankruptcy case and
provided the case number. Cheley received that information nearly three months
before the Rule 4007(c) deadline expired.
Under Alton and Ford, that was enough.
Cheley argues that he did not receive formal notice of the deadline. While that
is true, it is not legally sufficient. Alton involved the same essential problem: an
omitted creditor who received actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceeding but not
formal notice of the relevant dates. The Eleventh Circuit held that actual knowledge
of the bankruptcy case imposed a duty to inquire further.20
Cheley also argues that the Debtor’s own omission caused the lack of formal
notice. That is also true. But it still does not change the result under Alton and Ford.
Alton expressly recognized that the debtor’s conduct may have been misleading,
19 Id. at 1358–62.
20 Alton, 837 F.2d at 459–61.
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whether inadvertent or intentional, and nonetheless held that the creditor’s actual
knowledge of the bankruptcy proceeding was sufficient to require timely action.21
Nor does the Court find a due process violation. Due process requires notice
reasonably calculated to apprise the creditor of the proceeding and afford an
opportunity to act. Binding Eleventh Circuit authority holds that actual written
notice of the bankruptcy proceeding, received in time to protect dischargeability
rights, satisfies that standard.22
Cheley 	had 	actual 	knowledge 	of 	the 	bankruptcy 	case 	in 	time 	to 	file a
dischargeability complaint or move to extend the deadline. He did neither. The
consequence under § 523(a)(3)(B), Rule 4007(c), Alton, and Ford is that the debt was
discharged.
B. McIntosh Does Not Require a Different Result
McIntosh addressed the common no-asset problem under § 523(a)(3)(A).23 In a
no-asset Chapter 7 case, no claims bar date is set unless assets are discovered. For
ordinary omitted debts governed by § 523(a)(3)(A), courts have reasoned that
omission may not prejudice the creditor’s proof-of-claim rights because there was no
claim deadline to miss.24
21 Id. at 459.
22 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Alton, 837 F.2d at 460-
61; Ford, 147 F.4th at 1361-62.
23 McIntosh, 657 B.R. at 293–95.
24 Id.
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That reasoning does not control the separate operation of § 523(a)(3)(B).
Subsection (B) concerns debts of the kind described in § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6), and
protects 	the 	creditor’s 	opportunity 	to 	timely 	seek 	a 	determination 	of
nondischargeability. That deadline exists in no-asset cases just as it exists in asset
cases. Rule 4007(c) does not disappear because the trustee files a report of no
distribution.
Thus, McIntosh and Alton occupy different spaces. McIntosh explains why
omission of an ordinary creditor in a no-asset case often does not affect discharge
under § 523(a)(3)(A). Alton explains what happens under § 523(a)(3)(B) when an
omitted creditor with a potentially nondischargeable claim has actual knowledge of
the bankruptcy case in time to act.
C. Paylan Does Not Create an Intent-Based Exception
Cheley relies on Paylan for the proposition that a debtor’s fraudulent or
intentional omission of a known creditor may matter under § 523(a)(3)(B). Paylan
does not carry the weight Cheley places on it.
In Paylan, the court set an evidentiary hearing on two issues: whether the
debtor’s failure to schedule the creditor resulted from fraud or intentional design, and
whether the creditor had actual notice of the bankruptcy case in time to file a
nondischargeability action.25 The second issue is critical. Paylan did not hold that
debtor intent defeats discharge even where the creditor had timely actual knowledge
of the bankruptcy case.
25 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Paylan (In re Paylan), 390 B.R. 432, 435–37 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2008).
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Later 	decisions 	applying 	the 	same 	statutory 	framework 	read 	the 	issue
consistently with Alton.26 Where the creditor has notice or actual knowledge of the
bankruptcy case in time to file a timely complaint, § 523(a)(3)(B) does not permit the
creditor to wait until after the deadline and then litigate nondischargeability.
The proper reconciliation is straightforward. Intent may matter where actual
knowledge is absent or genuinely disputed; if a debtor intentionally omits a creditor
and the creditor does not learn of the bankruptcy case in time to act, § 523(a)(3)(B)
may preserve that creditor’s right to seek a nondischargeability determination. But
where, as here, the creditor had actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case in time to
act, Alton and Ford control.
D. No Evidentiary Hearing on Intent Is Necessary
The Court considered whether an evidentiary hearing might be necessary to
determine why Cheley was omitted from the schedules and Statement of Financial
Affairs. After further review of the governing law, the Court concludes that no such
hearing is necessary.
An evidentiary hearing is required only if a disputed fact could affect the
outcome. The disputed fact Cheley identifies is intent: whether the omission resulted
from counsel error, debtor negligence, reckless disregard, or intentional design.
However, that factual dispute would not change the result under Alton and
Ford because Cheley had actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case in time to act.
Alton expressly contemplated misleading debtor conduct, whether inadvertent or
26 See, e.g., Ford, 147 F.4th at 1361–62.
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intentional, and still imposed the duty to inquire upon the creditor once actual
knowledge existed.27 Ford reaffirmed that rule.28
The Court therefore makes no finding regarding the Debtor’s intent. The Court
does not find that the omission was innocent. The Court does not find that it was
intentional. The Court holds only that, on the motion before it, intent is not outcome
determinative because timely actual knowledge is undisputed.
E. The District Court Litigation Cannot Continue Against the Debtor
Personally
The consequence of discharge is clear. Because the Cheley debt was discharged,
§ 524(a)(1) voids any judgment to the extent it determines the Debtor’s personal
liability on that debt. Section 524(a)(2) also enjoins any act to collect or recover the
debt as a personal liability of the Debtor.
This Court does not vacate the District Court’s findings or purport to disturb
matters beyond the effect of the bankruptcy discharge. But the discharge controls
personal liability. As to David Anthony Vranicar personally, Cheley may not obtain
entry 	of 	judgment, 	enforce 	any 	judgment, 	proceed 	with 	collection 	activity, 	or
otherwise pursue the discharged claim.
This ruling determines only the effect of the Debtor’s discharge on the claims
against Vranicar personally. Whatever else may remain in the District Court action
as to other parties or issues is for that court to determine. But as to the Debtor’s
27 Alton, 837 F.2d at 459.
28 Ford, 147 F.4th at 1361–62.
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personal liability to Cheley on the discharged claim, the bankruptcy discharge ends
the matter.
F. Sanctions Are Not Appropriate
The Debtor also seeks contempt sanctions, punitive damages, compensatory
damages, and attorneys’ fees. That relief is denied.
A court may impose civil contempt sanctions for violation of the discharge
injunction only where there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the creditor’s
conduct was lawful.29 Stated differently, civil contempt is inappropriate if there is an
objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor’s conduct might be
lawful.
Cheley’s position was incorrect, but it was not unreasonable. The Debtor
omitted Cheley from the schedules. The Debtor omitted the District Court litigation
from the Statement of Financial Affairs. The omission persisted despite later
amendments. Debtor’s counsel acknowledged that Cheley should have been listed.
Section 523(a)(3)(B) is not intuitive, and its interaction with Rule 4007(c), no-asset
Chapter 7 practice, and actual knowledge requirement presents a substantial legal
issue.
Those facts created a fair ground of doubt regarding whether the discharge
injunction applied. That doubt does not defeat the discharge. But it does defeat
contempt. The Debtor is entitled to enforcement of the discharge injunction, not
sanctions.
29 Taggart, 587 U.S. at 561-62.
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V. Ruling
Accordingly, the Court ORDERS:
1. 	The Motion [Dkt. No. 90] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
2. 	Cheley’s claim against David Anthony Vranicar was discharged in the
Debtor’s Chapter 7 case.
3. 	Any judgment entered in the District Court action is void under § 524(a)(1)
to the extent it determines or permits enforcement of personal liability
against 	David 	Anthony 	Vranicar 	on 	the 	discharged 	claim. 	Cheley 	is
enjoined 	under 	§ 	524(a)(2) 	from 	collecting, 	recovering, 	enforcing, 	or
attempting to collect, recover, or enforce the discharged claim or any
judgment based on that claim as a personal liability of David Anthony
Vranicar.
4. 	The request for civil contempt, punitive damages, compensatory damages,
attorneys’ fees, costs, or other monetary sanctions is DENIED.
5. 	Within two business days after entry of this Order, counsel for the Debtor
shall file a notice in the District Court action attaching a copy of this Order,
so that the District Court may take whatever action it deems appropriate
consistent with this Court’s determination of the effect of the discharge.
###
Copies To:
All Parties in Interest.
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