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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 21-CV-60457-SMITH/VALLE
CHRISTINE MARY GROVE,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK BISIGNANO,1
Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration,
Defendant.
______________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISTRICT JUDGE
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 23) and Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 24) (together, the
“Motions”). This case has been referred to the undersigned for a ruling on all pre-trial, non-
dispositive matters and for a Report and Recommendation on any dispositive matters. (ECF No. 2).
After due consideration of the administrative record and the Motions, including Defendant’s
Response (ECF No. 25), Plaintiff’s Reply (ECF No. 26-1), and being otherwise fully advised on the
matter, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be
DENIED, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED, and the Administrative Law
Judge’s Decision (the “ALJ’s Decision”) be AFFIRMED for the reasons set forth below.
1 Frank Bisignano was named Commissioner of the Social Security Administration in May 2025.
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Frank Bisignano is
substituted for Martin O’Malley as Defendant in this suit. No further action is necessary to continue
this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In July 2019 and November 2019, respectively, Plaintiff filed applications for social security
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”) and under Title II
and Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., alleging disability
beginning June 17, 2019. (R. 15, 144-50).2 Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and again
upon reconsideration. (R. 53, 64, 75, 88). Subsequently, Plaintiff requested a hearing, which was
held on September 23, 2020, before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Sylvia H. Alonso. (R. 30,
124-29). Plaintiff, accompanied by counsel, and a Vocational Expert (“VE”) testified at the hearing.
(R. 30-52). On October 7, 2020, the ALJ issued her Decision denying Plaintiff’s applications and
finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act from the alleged disability onset
date through the date of the Decision. (R. 15-25).
Thereafter, Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ’s Decision. (R. 141-43). On December 31,
2020, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, rendering the ALJ’s Decision the
Commissioner’s “final decision.” (R. 1-8); see Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir.
1986). Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ’s Decision. (ECF No. 1); see 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). Both parties have moved for summary judgment, and the Motions are ripe for adjudication.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of the ALJ’s Decision is limited to whether there is substantial evidence in
the record as a whole to support the ALJ’s finding and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal
standards in making her determination. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019); Carson
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 440 F. App’x 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
2 All references are to the record of the administrative proceeding. See (ECF No. 16).
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person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154 (quoting
Consol. Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Carson, 440 F. App’x at 864 (quoting
Crawford v. Comm’r, 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)); accord Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007,
1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance”). A court, however, “may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or
substitute [its] judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176,
1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Even if evidence preponderates against the ALJ’s Decision,
the Court must affirm “if the decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler,
703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Within this narrow role, however,
courts do not act as automatons. MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986),
abrogated on other grounds by Harner v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 38 F.4th 892 (11th Cir. 2022).
Rather, they “must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable
and supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citation omitted).
To qualify for benefits, a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of the Act. See
42 U.S.C. § 423 (standard for DIB); 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (standard for SSI). A claimant is disabled if
she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),
1382c(a)(3)(A). A “physical or mental impairment” is one that “results from anatomical,
physiological or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D).
To determine eligibility, the ALJ employs a five-step sequential evaluation:
(1) Is the person presently unemployed?
(2) Is the person’s impairment severe?
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(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific
impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart. P, Appendix 1 (the
“Listings”)?
(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation?
(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy?
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (evaluation for DIB); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) (evaluation for SSI).
An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next question or, in Steps 3
and 5, to a finding of disability. McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). A
negative answer to any question, other than Step 3, leads to a determination of “not disabled.” Id.
Importantly, the burden of proof rests on the claimant through Step 4. Phillips v. Barnhart,
357 F.3d 1232, 1241 n.10 (11th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,
Comm’r, No. 22-CV-10507, 2022 WL 3448090 (11th Cir. 2022). At Step 4, the ALJ must consider:
(i) the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (ii) the claimant’s ability to return to her
past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). The regulations define RFC
as that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by her impairments.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). The ALJ will “assess and make a finding about [the
claimant’s RFC] on all the relevant medical and other evidence” in the case. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The RFC assessment is used to determine whether the claimant can return
to her past relevant work under Step 4, and if so, “the ALJ will conclude that the claimant is not
disabled.” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238 (citations omitted). If a claimant cannot return to her past
relevant work, then the ALJ proceeds to Step 5. Id.
At Step 5, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience to
determine whether the claimant “can make an adjustment to other work.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239. The ALJ must determine if there
is other work available in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.
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Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239. If the claimant can make the adjustment to other work, the ALJ will
determine that the claimant is not disabled. Id. Conversely, if the claimant cannot make the
adjustment to other work, the ALJ will determine that the claimant is disabled. Id. The ALJ may
determine whether the claimant is able to adjust to other work in the national economy by either: (1)
applying the Grids (contained within 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2); or (2) using a VE,
who can opine on whether someone with the claimant’s limitations can obtain other employment in
the national economy. Id. at 1239-40.
III. THE ALJ’S DECISION
In October 2020, after reviewing the evidence and conducting the sequential analysis, the
ALJ concluded that Plaintiff “has not been under a disability within the meaning of the [Act] from
June 17, 2019, through the date of this [D]ecision.” (R. 16, 25).
At Step 1, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since June 17, 2019, Plaintiff’s alleged onset date. (R. 17).
At Step 2, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had severe impairments of congestive heart failure
and hypertension. (R. 18). Conversely, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s obesity was a non-severe
impairment and Plaintiff’s anxiety was not a medically determinable impairment. Id.
At Step 3, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of any one of the Listings. Id.
At Step 4, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform sedentary work, as
defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a), with additional exertional and environmental
limitations. (R. 19). More specifically, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to: (i) occasionally climbing ramps
and stairs; (ii) never climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (iii) occasionally balancing, stooping,
kneeling, crouching, and crawling; (iv) occasional exposure to extreme cold, heat, wetness, and
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humidity; and (v) no exposure to hazards. Id. Based on this RFC, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff
could not perform her past relevant work (“PRW”) as a seafood specialist. (R. 24). Thus, the ALJ
proceeded to Step 5 of the sequential analysis.
At Step 5, the ALJ found that based on Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC,
there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform,
such as a call out operator, food and beverage order clerk, and addresser, all sedentary unskilled jobs
with an SVP of 2. (R. 24-25). Thus, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is capable of making a
successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.
(R. 25). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been under a disability from the alleged
onset date through the date of the Decision. Id.
IV. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversible error in: (i) weighing the
medical opinion of Dr. Anju B. Sood, resulting in an RFC assessment not supported by substantial
evidence; and (ii) assessing Plaintiff’s subjective statements regarding the severity of her symptoms.
See generally (ECF No. 23). For the reasons discussed below, however, the undersigned finds that
the ALJ applied the proper legal standards and that her Decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Accordingly, the ALJ’s Decision should be affirmed.
A. The ALJ Properly Weighed the Opinion of Dr. Sood
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly evaluate the medical opinion of her primary
care physician, Dr. Sood, resulting in an RFC assessment that is not supported by substantial
evidence. Id. at 11-18. More specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred when she discounted
Dr. Sood’s July 2020 Medical Source Statement (“MSS”) in that she failed to properly address the
supportability and consistency of Dr. Sood’s opinion. Id.
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1. Standard for Weighing Medical Opinions
Social Security regulations require the ALJ to consider and evaluate all evidence, including
all medical opinions. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a), 416.913(a). Medical opinions are statements “from
a medical source about what [a claimant] can still do despite [her] impairment(s) and whether [the
claimant] ha[s] one or more impairment-related limitations or restrictions” regarding her ability to
perform physical demands (such as sitting, standing, walking, reaching, and handling, among others)
and mental demands of work activities (such as understanding, remembering, and maintaining
concentration, persistence, and pace). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a)(2), 416.913(a)(2). Where there are
conflicting medical opinions, it is the ALJ’s duty to weigh the evidence. Milner v. Barnhart, 275 F.
App’x 947, 948 (11th Cir. 2008).
While a medical source’s treatment relationship is a factor to be considered in assessing the
persuasiveness of a medical source opinion, the opinion of a treating source is not entitled to
controlling weight or deferential treatment. See Ramos v. Kijakazi, No. 20-CV-23478, 2021 WL
5746358, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 5743332
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2021); Bonilla v. Saul, No. 19-CV-25323, 2020 WL 9048787, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct.
23, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1198296 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2021).
Rather, the persuasiveness of any medical source’s opinion (whether treating, examining, or
reviewer) depends on whether the opinion is: (i) supported by objective medical evidence and the
source’s explanation of his opinion; and (ii) consistent with other evidence in the medical record.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(2), 416.920c(c)(1)-(2). These factors, referred to as “supportability”
and “consistency,” are the “most important factors” in the ALJ’s evaluation of medical opinion
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evidence.3 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2); Bonilla, 2020 WL 9048787, at *4; Matos
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-11764, 2022 WL 97144, at *4 (11th Cir. Jan. 10, 2022). Additional
factors include treatment relationship with the claimant, area of specialization, and “other factors
that tend to support or contradict a medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding.”
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(3)-(5), 416.920c(c)(3)-(5). Furthermore, although the ALJ must
articulate how she considered medical opinions from all medical sources, the ALJ need only explain
her consideration of the supportability and consistency factors. Bonilla, 2020 WL 9048787, at *5;
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2).
2. The ALJ Properly Evaluated Dr. Sood’s MSS Opinion
After Plaintiff’s June 2019 defibrillator implant surgery, Plaintiff established primary care
with Dr. Sood at the Heart and Health Institute in August 2019. (ECF No. 23 at 5, 6); (R. 21, 391-
93, 409-11). Between August 2019 and July 2020, Plaintiff saw Dr. Sood five times for wellness
visits and follow-up appointments.4
On July 14, 2020, Plaintiff’s last visit, Dr. Sood completed the challenged MSS. (R. 489-
90). In the MSS, Dr. Sood diagnosed Plaintiff with dilated congestive cardiomyopathy and
hypertrophic cardiomyopathy. (R. 489). In the MSS, under diagnostic criteria and indicia of
impairment, Dr. Sood checked boxes reflecting Plaintiff’s reports of: (i) fatigue on exertion;
(ii) dyspnea on mild exercise; (iii) recurrent arrhythmias; (iv) peripheral edema; (v) angina pain;
(vi) palpitations; (vii) inability to carry on any physical activity; and (viii) marked limitation of
3 “Supportability” refers to the relevance of “the objective medical evidence and supporting
explanations presented by a medical source to support his or her” opinion.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). “Consistency” looks to whether “the evidence from
other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim” are consistent with the medical opinions
presented. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2).
4 Dr. Sood treated Plaintiff on 8/15/19 (R. 391-93, 409-11); 9/16/19 (R. 420-26, 476-82); 12/17/19
(R. 471-75); 2/19/2020 (R. 469-70); and 7/14/2020 (R. 465-68).
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physical activity, as demonstrated by fatigue, palpitation, dyspnea, or angina discomfort on ordinary
physical activity, even though the individual is comfortable at rest. Id. Ultimately, Dr. Sood opined
that Plaintiff could not work, stand, or sit for any amount of time and could not lift any weight. Id.
After comparing the medical evidence with Dr. Sood’s disabling opinion in the MSS, (R. 20-
22), the ALJ found Dr. Sood’s opinion in the MSS “not persuasive.” (R. 22). The ALJ explained:
Dr. Sood opined that [Plaintiff] had an inability to carry on any physical activity; she
had marked limitation of physical activity, as demonstrated by fatigue, palpitation,
dyspnea, or angina discomfort on ordinary physical activity, even though [Plaintiff]
was comfortable at rest; and [Plaintiff] could not for any hours during the workday,
nor could she stand, sit, or lift (Exhibit 9F). The undersigned finds that Dr. Sood’s
opinion was not persuasive because it was overstated and extreme, and it was not
consistent with the objective evidence, his treatment notes or the overall record. For
example, Dr. Sood opined that [Plaintiff] could lift and carry “none” on neither an
occasional nor a frequent basis, whereas [Plaintiff] reported she could lift and carry
up to 20 pounds (See Exhibit 11E, p. 3). Further, [Plaintiff] was independent in her
activities of daily living. In addition, in February 2020, Dr. Sood performed a return
to work letter for [Plaintiff] based on her statement that she wanted to work 10 hours
a week, which was inconsistent with the extreme limitations he provided in his
opinion (See Exhibit 8F, p. 6).
Id.
Having reviewed the ALJ’s Decision and the medical record, the undersigned finds
Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to consider the supportability and consistency factors in
evaluating Dr. Sood’s MSS to be without merit. Rather, the ALJ’s Decision reflects the ALJ’s
fulsome consideration of the entire medical record, including Dr. Sood’s treatment notes, in
addressing these two factors. The ALJ wrote:
[Plaintiff] received treatment from Anju Sood, M.D., at Heart and Health Institute
from August 14, 2019 through December 18, 2019, following her defibrillator
implantation in June 2019. During the treatment period, [Plaintiff] was assessed with
essential hypertension, chronic systolic heart failure, dyslipidemia, cardiomyopathy
due to hypertension, presence of automatic (implantable) cardiac defibrillator,
anemia, and history of noncompliance. Despite [Plaintiff]’s impairments,
[Plaintiff]’s physical examinations and mental status examination during the period
were generally unremarkable. She was alert and oriented, her mood and affect were
appropriate, she had no slurred speech, she had full range of motion in all extremities,
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and she had normal gait. In addition, [Plaintiff]’s overall treatment was conservative.
For example, on December 18, 2019, [Plaintiff] was seen in a follow up. She denied
chest pain, shortness of breath, and palpitation. [Plaintiff]’s physical examination
showed that she had a body mass index of 34.78, meaning that she was obese, but
was otherwise unremarkable. Her lungs were clear, her heart was regular, she had
full range of motion in all extremities, she had no edema, clubbing, or cyanosis in the
extremities, she was alert and oriented, her mood and affect were appropriate, and
she had normal gait and normal sensation. [Plaintiff] was assessed with dyslipidemia,
essential hypertension, cardiomyopathy due to hypertension, and presence of
automatic (implantable) cardiac defibrillator. [Plaintiff]’s treatment was
conservative. Throughout the period, [Plaintiff] showed that [she] had a history of
noncompliance (Exhibits 2F; 3F; 4F; 5F; and 8F, pp. 8-24).
***
Dr. Sood [also] treated [Plaintiff] during the period February 19, 2020 through July
14, 2020. On February 19, 2020, [Plaintiff] was evaluated for return to work letter.
The notes indicated that she wanted to work 10 hour per week. Dr. Sood’s physical
examination on [Plaintiff] was unremarkable. [Plaintiff] was alert and cooperative,
her lungs were clear, and her chest showed normal shape and expansion. The notes
indicated that [Plaintiff] [was] independent with ambulation. [Plaintiff] was assessed
with cardiomyopathy due to hypertension, her essential hypertension, dyslipidemia,
and presence of automatic (implantable) cardiac defibrillator. On July 14, 2020,
Dr. Sood saw [Plaintiff] for her six-month follow up. The notes indicated [Plaintiff]
was doing well and without complaints and she was stable. [Plaintiff] complained
about palpitations and shortness of air with one flight of stairs. [Plaintiff] denied
chest pain, dizziness, leg edema, orthopnea, paroxysmal nocturnal dyspnea, and
syncope. Dr. Sood’s physical examination on [Plaintiff] was generally unremarkable.
[Plaintiff] was alert and cooperative, her lungs were clear, her heart showed regular
rate and rhythm, her chest had normal shape and expansion, and her musculoskeletal
was negative for edema. [Plaintiff] was assessed with LVH (left ventricular
hypertrophy), essential hypertension, and presence of automatic (implantable)
cardiac defibrillator. [Plaintiff]’s treatment was conservative (Exhibit 8F, pp. 2-7).
(R. 21-22).
As detailed above, as to supportability, the ALJ found that Dr. Sood’s opinion was not
supported by his own notes and Plaintiff’s conservative treatment. (R. 21, 22). For example, the
ALJ discussed Dr. Sood’s physical examinations of Plaintiff, noting generally unremarkable
findings. (R. 21). Indeed, at Plaintiff’s four-week follow-up on September 16, 2019, Plaintiff was
“doing well and without complaints, at [her] baseline, stable.” (R. 420); see (R. 21) (citing Exh. 4F).
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Additionally, the ALJ noted that at Plaintiff’s follow-up on December 18, 2019, Plaintiff denied,
among other things, chest pain, shortness of breath, and palpitations. See (R. 21) (citing Exh. 4F);
(R. 420). Similarly, the ALJ discussed Dr. Sood’s treatment notes from Plaintiff’s six-month follow-
up on July 14, 2020, see (R. 22) (citing Exh. 8F at 2-7), which indicate that Plaintiff was “doing well
and without complaints, at [her] baseline, stable.” (R. 465). Notably, this visit post-dates Plaintiff’s
June 2020 echocardiogram revealing a 30% ejection fraction. See (R. 21) (citing Exh. 7F); (R. 461).
The ALJ further noted that, although Plaintiff reported experiencing shortness of breath upon
climbing one flight of stairs, she otherwise denied chest pain, dizziness, leg edema, orthopnea,
paroxysmal nocturnal dyspnea, and syncope. See (R. 22) (citing Exh. 8F at 2-7); (R. 465).
Furthermore, the ALJ noted that throughout Plaintiff’s appointments with Dr. Sood, Plaintiff’s lungs
were consistently clear, her heart was regular, she had full range of motion in all extremities, she
had no edema, clubbing, or cyanosis in the extremities, she was alert and oriented, her mood and
affect were appropriate, and she had normal gait and normal sensation. See (R. 21-22) (citing Exhs.
2F, 4F, 8F); (R. 391-92, 425, 467, 469, 473).
As to consistency, the ALJ noted that Dr. Sood’s opinion that Plaintiff could not lift or carry
any weight was contradicted by Plaintiff’s statements in her Supplemental Cardiac Questionnaire
that she could lift and carry “no more than 20 lbs.” See (R. 22) (citing Exh. 11E at 3); (R. 215).
Moreover, the ALJ highlights that Plaintiff’s request for a “return to work letter” from Dr. Sood, in
which she sought and received approval to work 10 hours per week, is inconsistent with Dr. Sood’s
extremely debilitating findings. See (R. 22) (citing Exh. 8F at 6); compare (R. 469), with (R. 489).
Accordingly, the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Sood’s MSS is supported by substantial evidence,
the ALJ appropriately addressed the supportability and consistency factors, and the ALJ’s Decision
should be affirmed.
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B. The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff’s Subjective Statements
Next, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s evaluation of her subjective complaints. See (ECF No.
23 at 18-21). More specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “did not account for the full record”
in discounting Plaintiff’s testimony and instead “cherry-picked” certain pieces of evidence “to
manufacture conflict with [Plaintiff]’s testimony.” Id. at 19, 20.
In considering a claimant’s symptoms, the ALJ must follow a two-step process. Step one is
to determine “whether the individual has a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably
be expected to produce the alleged symptoms.” Contreras-Zambrano v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 724 F. App’x 700, 703 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing SSR 16-3p). Step two is to evaluate “the
intensity and persistence of an individual’s symptoms, such as pain, and determine the extent to
which an individual’s symptoms limit her ability to perform work-related activities.” Id. at 703-04;
see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4), 416.929(c)(4). Additionally, the ALJ considers “whether there are
any inconsistencies in the evidence and the extent to which there are any conflicts between [a
claimant’s] statements and the rest of the evidence, including [claimant’s] history, the signs and
laboratory findings, and statements by [the claimant’s] medical sources or other persons about how
[her] symptoms affect [her].” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4), 416.929(c)(4). A claimant’s
“symptoms, including pain, will be determined to diminish [her] capacity for basic work activities
to the extent that [her] alleged functional limitations and restrictions due to symptoms, such as pain,
can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.”
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4), 416.929(c)(4).
When the ALJ discredits a claimant’s subjective statements, the ALJ must give “explicit and
adequate reasons for doing so.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1995); Whitmore
v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 855 F. App’x 641, 643 (11th Cir. 2021); see also Woodall v. Kijakazi,
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No. 20-CV-60822, 2023 WL 3161751, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2023), report and recommendation
adopted, 2023 WL 3168471 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 2023) (recommending remand for ALJ to “explain
his reasons for either accepting claimant’s testimony or articulate adequate reasons to reject it”).
“Failure to articulate the reasons for discrediting subjective testimony requires, as a matter of law,
that the testimony be accepted as true.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002)
(citing Cannon v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 1541, 1545 (11th Cir. 1988)). Nevertheless, the Court will not
disturb a clearly articulated finding about subjective complaints that is supported by substantial
evidence. Venturella v. Kijakazi, 21-CV-61838, 2022 WL 4110699 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2022), report
and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 4110339 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2022) (citing Whitmore, 855 F.
App’x at 643). Notably, it is not for this Court to determine whether the ALJ “could have reasonably
credited [the claimant’s] testimony, but whether the ALJ was clearly wrong to discredit it.” Werner
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 421 F. App’x 935, 939 (11th Cir. 2011).
Here, after referencing the proper legal standards (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929, and SSR
16-3p), and reviewing Plaintiff’s testimony and treatment history, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s
statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. (R. 22). The ALJ then
articulated the reasons for her decision:
The undersigned finds that [Plaintiff]’s testimony of the severity of symptoms not
generally consistent with the evidence. Despite [Plaintiff’s] subjective complaints,
the objective medical evidence showed that since her alleged onset date, [Plaintiff]
was not as limited as alleged, and that she was capable of performing basic work
activities at less than the full range of sedentary work as noted above in the residual
functional capacity in paragraph five.
In terms of [Plaintiff’s] physical impairments, the evidence of record showed that
[Plaintiff] was diagnosed with congestive heart failure and hypertension, as noted
above. The medical records in evidence showed that [Plaintiff’s] subjective
complaints included numbness to right arm, shortness of breath and dyspnea,
wheezing, fatigue, chest pain, and dizziness (Exhibits 1F, pp. 1, 2, 11, 69, and 86; 6F,
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p. 2; and 8F, p. 7). [Plaintiff’s] physical examinations, however, were generally
unremarkable. Despite [Plaintiff’s] subjective complaints, her physical examinations
generally showed that she was well developed and well nourished, she was in no
acute distress, her cardiovascular and respiratory examinations were normal, her neck
was supple, her abdomen was normal, her extremities were normal, she had no motor
or neurologic deficit, and her gait was normal (Exhibits 1F, pp. 7, 14, 15, 24, 36, 72,
78, 94, and 109; 2F, pp. 1, 2, and 5; 3F, pp. 7, 10, 11, and 14; 4F, pp. 5, 6, and 9; 5F,
pp. 2, 6, 10, and 15; and 8F). In addition, except for [Plaintiff’s] defibrillator
implantation in on June 17, 2019, [her] treatment since then has been conservative
and showed that [Plaintiff] was doing well (See for example Exhibit 8F, p. 2).
The undersigned finds that the above were indications [Plaintiff’s] symptoms from
her physical impairments were not as limiting or severe as alleged. As such, the
undersigned finds that the adopted residual functional capacity reasonably
accommodated [Plaintiff] for her congestive heart failure and hypertension by
limiting her to sedentary work, with further postural and environmental restrictions,
as noted above in paragraph five.
(R. 22-23).
Against this backdrop, the undersigned finds that the ALJ provided “explicit and adequate
reasons” for discounting Plaintiff’s statements. These reasons included Plaintiff’s ability to perform
basic activities of daily living, her generally unremarkable physical examinations, and her
conservative treatment following defibrillator surgery. See id.; Venturella, 2022 WL 4110699, at *7
(ALJ properly evaluated claimant’s subjective complaints where ALJ considered the nature and
effectiveness of claimant’s treatment protocol and referenced medical records revealing no
significant physical abnormalities or neurological deficits); Gleicher v. Kijakazi, No. 21-CV-60014,
2022 WL 16829691, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL
4596706 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2022) (ALJ properly evaluated claimant’s subjective complaints where
ALJ “considered the record as a whole, including [claimant]’s treatment history, his statements to
medical providers that his [symptoms] were well-controlled with medication, and his activities of
daily living”).
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Given the ALJ’s thorough consideration and discussion of Plaintiff’s medical and treatment
history, Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ did not account for the medical record in assessing
Plaintiff’s subjective statements fails. See (ECF No. 23 at 19-20); Herron v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 649
F. App’x 781, 783 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005))
(“[T]here is no ‘rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence, so long
as the ALJ’s decision is not a broad rejection’ that leaves [the] Court with insufficient information
to conclude that the ALJ considered the claimant’s medical condition as a whole.”). Under these
circumstances, the undersigned will not disturb the ALJ’s clearly articulated finding regarding
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Venturella, 2022 WL 4110699, at *6. Accordingly, the ALJ’s
Decision should be affirmed.
V. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS
that Plaintiff’s Motion (ECF No. 23) be DENIED, that Defendant’s Motion (ECF No. 24) be
GRANTED, and that the ALJ’s Decision be AFFIRMED.
Within 14 days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation, any party
may serve and file written objections to any of the above findings and recommendations as provided
by the Local Rules for this District. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); S.D. Fla. Mag. R. 4(b). Subsequently,
within 7 days, a party may respond to any objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure
to timely object waives the right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report and Recommendation. 11th
Cir. R. 3-1 (2025); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
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Lastly, if counsel do not intend to file objections, they shall file a Notice of Non-Objection
within 7 days of this Report and Recommendation.
DONE AND ORDERED at Chambers, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida on November 21, 2025.
____________________________________
ALICIA O. VALLE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc: U.S. District Judge Rodney Smith
All Counsel of Record
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