Button et al v. McCawley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 0:24-CV-60911-LEIBOWITZ/AUGUSTIN-BIRCH
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
This cause comes before the Court on Defendant Sigrid McCawley’s Motion for Attorneys’
Fees. DE 71. The Honorable David S. Leibowitz, United States District Judge, referred the Motion
to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation. DE 72.
Plaintiffs Dusty Button and Mitchell Taylor Button filed a response, DE 73, and Defendant filed a
reply. DE 74. Having carefully considered the record and the briefing and being otherwise fully
advised, the Court RECOMMENDS GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
Defendant’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees [DE 71].
I. Background
This lawsuit stemmed from statements Defendant made in reference to litigation pending
against Plaintiffs in Nevada. On July 28, 2021, Defendant’s clients filed a lawsuit against Plaintiff
Mitchell Button in Nevada and later added Plaintiff Dusty Button to that lawsuit. See DE 13. While
representing her clients, Defendant made various statements concerning the Nevada litigation, and
Plaintiffs specifically highlighted fourteen of those statements as defamatory in their Amended
Complaint. See id. at 49–77. Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, and
DUSTY BUTTON and MITCHELL
TAYLOR BUTTON,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SIGRID MCCAWLEY,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
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Judge Leibowitz dismissed Plaintiffs’ defamation count as to the majority of the statements with
prejudice and dismissed Plaintiffs’ defamation count as to the remaining statements without
prejudice for Plaintiffs to seek leave to amend. DE 50 at 21. Plaintiffs thereafter sought leave to
amend their Amended Complaint, and Judge Leibowitz denied Plaintiffs’ request and dismissed
this matter, ruling that Plaintiffs’ attempt to amend was futile. DE 63. Subsequently, Defendant
filed the present Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, wherein she seeks to recover her attorney’s fees
pursuant to Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute. DE 71.
II. Whether Attorney’s Fees are Warranted Under Florida’s Anti-SLAPP Statute
Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute, “SLAPP” standing for “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation,” provides that:
A person or government entity in this state may not file . . . any lawsuit . . . against
another person or entity without merit and primarily because such person or entity
has exercised the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public
issue . . . as protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and
s. 5, Art. I of the State Constitution.
§ 768.295(3), Fla. Stat. Violation of this provision entitles the prevailing party to recover
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. See id. § 768.295(4) (“The court shall award the prevailing
party reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with a claim that an action was
filed in violation of this section.”). To determine whether attorney’s fees are warranted here under
Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute, the Court must decide: (1) whether Plaintiffs’ lawsuit was without
merit, and (2) whether Plaintiffs primarily filed their lawsuit because Defendant exercised the
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue. See Bongino v. Daily Beast
Co., 477 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1322 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (“Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute prohibits a person
from filing a cause of action that is (a) ‘without merit’ and (b) ‘primarily’ because the person
against whom the suit was filed exercised the constitutional right of free speech in connection with
a public issue.”). The Court will address each factor in turn.
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A. Whether Plaintiffs’ Lawsuit was Without Merit
As mentioned above, Plaintiffs’ defamation count against Defendant was based on fourteen
statements Defendant made. In Judge Leibowitz’s Order on Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Judge
Leibowitz dismissed Plaintiffs’ defamation count as to eight of the fourteen statements since the
statute of limitations barred a defamation claim based on those eight statements. See DE 50 at 9.1
And when later denying Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend, Judge Leibowitz found that any
amendment to Plaintiffs’ defamation count for the remaining six statements would be futile since
those six statements were either pure opinion or statements referencing an ongoing legal
proceeding. DE 63 at 8–10.2 Because Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint was partially time barred
under the statute of limitations and otherwise failed to state a claim, Plaintiffs’ lawsuit was without
merit. See Clark v. State of Ga. Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 641 (11th Cir. 1990) (“The
expiration of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense the existence of which warrants a
dismissal as frivolous.”); Bongino, 477 F. Supp. 3d at 1322 (“Because Plaintiff’s suit fails to state
a claim for defamation, it was without merit under [Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute].”).
Plaintiffs’ arguments in their response fail to persuade the Court otherwise. In their
response, Plaintiffs contend that “dismissal alone does not warrant fees.” DE 73 at 2. As support
for their position, they quote Parekh v. CBS Corp., 820 F. App’x 827, 836 (11th Cir. 2020), as
stating: “Dismissal based on a legal defense does not equate to frivolity.” However, Parekh says
no such thing. The other cases Plaintiffs cite as supporting their proposition are inapposite and
1 Judge Leibowitz also dismissed without prejudice the other counts Plaintiffs raised in their Amended Complaint
based on Florida’s “Single Publication/Single Action Rule.” See DE 50 at 17–20. Under that rule, “courts dismiss
concurrent counts for related torts based on the same publication and underlying facts as the failed defamation count.”
Klayman v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d. 1240, 1256 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
2 Judge Leibowitz also denied Plaintiffs’ leave to amend their other counts, again finding that Florida’s Single
Publication/Single Action Rule prohibited those counts. DE 63 at 12.
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unpersuasive. See DE 73 at 2–3 (citing cases where attorney’s fees were awarded under Florida’s
Anti-SLAPP statute).
This brings the Court to another matter: it appears that Plaintiffs’ response contains
numerous AI-hallucinated citations. The false attribution of a quote to Parekh is not the only such
false attribution; Plaintiffs also falsely attribute quotes to other cases. For instance, Plaintiffs quote
Florida Bar v. Adorno, 60 So. 3d 1016, 1031 (Fla. 2011), as stating “[a]ttorneys must avoid
conflicts not only of interest, but of duty––particularly where client communications or
proceedings in one case may affect rights or conduct in another.” DE 73 at 10–11. Adorno,
however, does not include this quoted language. As one last example, Plaintiffs quote In re Shell
Oil Refinery, 152 F.R.D. 526, 531 (E.D. La. 1989), as stating: “It is impermissible for counsel to
act in a behind-the-scenes capacity in multiple related cases while shielding their identity and
depriving the opposing party of full adversarial awareness.” DE 73 at 11. In re Shell Oil Refinery
does not include this quoted language.
In addition to falsely attributing quotes to cases, Plaintiffs also cite non-existent cases. For
example, Plaintiffs cite “Harris v. City of Auburn, 2018 WL 3329858, at *3 (M.D. Ala. July 6,
2018),” DE 73 at 8, but that is the incorrect caption for that Westlaw citation. The case at that
Westlaw citation is Mali v. British Airways, No. 17 CIV. 685 (KPF), 2018 WL 3329858 (S.D.N.Y.
July 6, 2018). Harris v. City of Auburn is a real case, but, as far as the Court can determine, it is a
case from the Central District of Illinois that was appealed to the Seventh Circuit, not a Middle
District of Alabama case. See Harris v. City of Auburn, 27 F.3d 1284 (7th Cir. 1994). Plaintiffs
also cite “Avery v. Ward, 2014 WL 4748452, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 23, 2014),” DE 73 at 8, but
no case exists at that citation. As one final example, Plaintiffs cite “Lopez v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
No. 14-cv-2524, 2016 WL 4131149, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2016),” DE 73 at 11, but no case
exists at that citation either.
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Defendant points out these ostensibly AI-hallucinated citations in her reply and asserts that
the inclusion of fake, hallucinated cases is an “independent reason to require [Plaintiffs] to pay the
fraction of [Defendant’s] total attorneys’ fees sought here.” DE 74 at 16. While the Court does not
condone Plaintiffs’ inclusion of potentially AI-hallucinated 	citations, the Court does not
recommend imposing sanctions on Plaintiffs at this juncture. As far as the Court can determine,
this is the first time in this case that Plaintiffs have had their citations called into question as being
fake, hallucinated case citations. The Court also recognizes that Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se
and may have been unaware that their citations and quotations did not exist. Going forward,
Plaintiffs must ensure that all of their caselaw quotations and citations are accurate.
B. Whether Plaintiffs’ Lawsuit was Brought Primarily Because Defendant Exercised the
Constitutional Right of Free Speech in Connection with a Public Issue
Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute defines “Free speech in connection with public issues” as
meaning “any written or oral statement that is protected under applicable law” and is either “made
before a governmental entity in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
governmental entity” or “made in or in connection with a play, movie, television program, radio
broadcast, audiovisual work, book, magazine article, musical work, news report, or other similar
work.” § 768.295(2)(a), Fla. Stat.
Here, the statements that Plaintiffs contended were defamatory were either statements that
Defendant made to news organizations about the Nevada litigation and appeared in news reports
and articles, see DE 13 at 49–77 (claiming that statements made to the New York Times, the
Boston Globe, CNN, The Daily Star, Law.com, Cosmopolitan Magazine, Good Morning America,
The Bleacher Report/NBC News/Yahoo.com, The Daily Mail/Meaww.com, Cosmopolitan Online
Magazine, NBC Miami, Fox News, and the Washington Post were defamatory), or statements
about the Nevada litigation contained within Defendant’s biography on her law firm’s website. Id.
at 74. Thus, all statements that Plaintiffs frivolously claimed were defamatory arose from
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Defendant’s “Free speech in connection with a public issue.” See § 768.295(2)(a), Fla. Stat.
(defining “Free speech in connection with public issues” as protected statements made in a news
report, magazine article, or “other similar work”); cf. Vibe Ener v. Duckenfield, No. 20-CV-22886-
UU, 2020 WL 6373419, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2020) (finding that the defendant news
organization’s news report concerning a publicly filed lawsuit constituted “free speech in
connection with a public issue”). Accordingly, Plaintiffs primarily brought their lawsuit against
Defendant because she exercised the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public
issue. Defendant is thus entitled to recover her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under Florida’s
Anti-SLAPP statute.
The Court also recommends ruling on Defendant’s Motion despite Plaintiffs’ pending
appeal. The pendency of an appeal does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to award attorney’s
fees. See Domond v. PeopleNetwork APS, 750 F. App’x 844, 847 (11th Cir. 2018) (“After a notice
of appeal has been filed, the district court retains jurisdiction to rule on motions that are collateral
to the merits, including motions for attorney’s fees.”). And the Court is afforded discretion to rule
on Defendant’s Motion while the appeal is pending. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2) advisory
committee’s note to 1993 amendment (“If an appeal on the merits of the case is taken, the court
may rule on the claim for fees, may defer its ruling, or may deny the motion without prejudice,
directing . . . a new period for filing after the appeal has been resolved.”).
III. Reasonable Attorney’s Fees
Having concluded that Defendant is entitled to her reasonable attorney fees under Florida’s
Anti-SLAPP statute, the remaining inquiry for the Court is to determine Defendant’s reasonable
attorney fees. To do so, the Court must employ the “lodestar” method. See Norman v. Hous. Auth.
of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988). The first step of the lodestar method
is determining a reasonable hourly rate. Id. After determining a reasonable hourly rate, the second
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step of the lodestar method is to arrive at the total hours reasonably expended. Id. at 1301. The last
step of the lodestar method is to calculate the lodestar amount, which “is determined by
multiplication of a reasonable hourly rate times hours reasonably expended.” Id. at 1302. The
Court will address these steps in turn.
A. Reasonable Hourly Rate
“A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for
similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Id. at
1299. The attorney moving to receive his or her fees bears the burden of justifying the
reasonableness of the requested rate. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984) (“In
seeking some basis for a standard, courts properly have required prevailing attorneys to justify the
reasonableness of the requested rate or rates. To inform and assist the court in the exercise of its
discretion, the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to the
attorney’s own affidavits––that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the
community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and
reputation.”). Moreover, courts are considered experts on the matter of reasonable hourly rates for
attorneys and may rely on their own knowledge and experience when determining a reasonable
hourly rate. Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994).
Here, Defendant seeks to recover attorney’s fees for five attorneys: (1) Attorney Jason
Hilborn, (2) Attorney Lindsey Ruff, (3) Attorney Kelly Waldo, (4) Attorney Julia Bevan, and (5)
Attorney Naomi Hardin. DE 71 at 17. Attorney Hilborn billed at a discounted hourly rate of $660,
Attorney Ruff billed at a discounted hourly rate of $550, Attorney Waldo billed at a discounted
hourly rate of $500, and Attorneys Bevan and Hardin billed at a discounted hourly rate of $420.
Id. All of these hourly rates are excessive and unreasonable.
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Starting with Attorney Hilborn, the Court could not locate any prior fee awards where a
court determined a reasonable hourly rate for Attorney Hilborn, and Defendant has not provided
the Court with any cases either.3 Nonetheless, Attorney Hilborn’s Florida Bar profile indicates that
he graduated from law school in 2016, meaning he has nine years of legal experience. See Jason
Hilborn, 	Member 	Profile, 	THE 	F LORIDA 	B AR , 	https://www.floridabar.org/directories/find-
mbr/profile/?num=1008829 (last visited Nov. 21, 2025). Given Attorney Hilborn’s nine years of
experience, his discounted rate of $660 per hour is excessive. A review of hourly rates awarded to
other attorneys of comparable experience reveals that attorneys with around ten years of
experience are normally awarded between $425 and $495 per hour. See, e.g., Mt. Hawley Ins. Co.
v. Roebuck, No. 17-CV-80213, 2020 WL 5664949, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2020) (finding $430
hourly rate reasonable for attorney with ten years of experience), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 17-CV-80213, 2020 WL 5658719 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2020); Fam. First Life, LLC
v. Rutstein, No. 22-CV-80243-AMC, 2023 WL 4207790, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 7, 2023) (finding
$460 and $495 hourly rates reasonable for attorney with over ten years of experience), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 22-80243-CIV, 2023 WL 4202726 (S.D. Fla. June 27, 2023);
Hayden v. Urvan, No. 21-CV-82051, 2025 WL 826697, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2025) (reducing
hourly rate of $525 to $425 for attorney with roughly ten years of experience). Accordingly, $475
is a reasonable hourly rate for Attorney Hilborn. This defamation case was not particularly
3 Defendant does provide cases where a court awarded certain hourly rates to attorneys at her counsel’s law firm. See,
e.g., DE 71 at 18 (citing Glob. Digit. Sols., Inc. v. Grupo Rontan Electro Metalurgica, S.A., No. 18-80106-CV, 2021
WL 7630524 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2021)). However, the Order Defendants cite from Global Digital did not list the
experience of those attorneys, and, as far as the Court can discern, none of the attorneys involved in this case were
attorneys of record in Global Digital. Defendant also cites out-of-District cases where attorneys at her counsel’s law
firm have been awarded substantially higher hourly rates, such as cases from New York and California. See DE 71 at
19. A reasonable hourly rate, however, is determined by evaluating the “prevailing market rate in the relevant legal
community.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. The relevant legal community here is South Florida, not New York or
California.
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complex or unique so as to warrant a higher hourly rate for Attorney Hilborn or any of the other
attorneys who worked on this matter.
Turning to Attorneys Ruff and Waldo, Defendant states that Attorneys Ruff and Waldo
have six years of legal experience. DE 71 at 17–18. As with Attorney Hilborn, the Court could not
locate any prior fee awards where a court determined a reasonable hourly rate for Attorney Ruff
or Waldo, and Defendant has not provided the Court with any cases either. Given Attorneys Ruff
and Waldo’s six years of experience, their discounted hourly rates of $550 and $500, respectively,
are excessive. A review of hourly rates awarded to other attorneys of comparable experience
reveals that attorneys with six years of experience are generally awarded an hourly rate between
$285 and $400. See Mitsubishi HC Cap. Am., Inc. v. Aerospace Asset Trading, LLC, No. 22-20074-
CIV, 2025 WL 1433769, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2025) (“Hourly rates between $285.00–$400.00
have been awarded for attorneys with five or more years of experience in this District.”); Collazo
v. Progressive Select Ins. Co., No. 1:23-CV-22953-KMM, 2025 WL 2816883, at *7 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 11, 2025) (“Based on the Court’s experience and review of reasonable rates throughout this
District, the Court finds that a reasonable rate for these attorneys with four to six years of
experience is $350.00”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-22953-KMM, 2025
WL 2816881 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 26, 2025). Accordingly, $400 is a reasonable hourly rate for
Attorneys Ruff and Waldo.
Finally, Attorneys Bevan and Hardin recently graduated from law school, and each has one
year of experience. DE 71 at 18. As with all other attorneys thus far, the Court could not locate
any prior fee awards where a court determined a reasonable hourly rate for Attorneys Bevan or
Hardin, and Defendant has not provided the Court with any cases either. Given Attorneys Bevan
and Hardin’s one year of experience, their discounted hourly rate of $420 is excessive. “A rate of
$300.00 per hour is in line with rates for newly licensed attorneys . . . .” Nimbus Boat Rental, Corp.
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v. Garcel, No. 1:22-CV-22645-KMM, 2024 WL 5397529, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 2024); see also
Collazo, 2025 WL 2816883, at *7 (“A rate of $300.00 is consistent with rates for newly licensed
attorneys previously approved in this Court.”). Accordingly, $300 is a reasonable hourly rate for
Attorneys Bevan and Hardin.
In summation, the Court recommends a $475 hourly rate for Attorney Hilborn, a $400
hourly rate for Attorneys Ruff and Waldo, and a $300 hourly rate for Attorneys Bevan and Hardin.
B. Reasonable Hours Expended
Although Defendant could recover attorney’s fees for all of the work her attorneys
performed in this case, Defendant elects only to seek attorney’s fees for the work her attorneys
performed on her response to Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend. See DE 71 at 20 (“Ms.
McCawley seeks only reimbursement for the 62.5 hours billed in connection with Ms. McCawley’s
opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint.”); Corsi v.
Newsmax Media, Inc., No. 20-CV-81396-RAR, 2022 WL 18586842, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2022)
(rejecting a reading of Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute’s fee provision that concluded the prevailing
party could only recover fees incurred for drafting the motion to dismiss and instead ruling that
Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute entitles the prevailing party to all fees and costs incurred during the
lawsuit). Accordingly, the Court will evaluate the reasonableness of the 62.5 hours Defendant’s
attorneys expended on her response to Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend.
Starting with Attorney Hilborn, Attorney Hilborn billed a total of 12.8 hours. DE 71-2 at
2. Specifically, Attorney Hilborn billed 1.0 hour to analyze Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend
and proposed amendment and 11.8 hours to research and draft Defendant’s response. Id. Attorney
Ruff billed a total of 18.9 hours. Id. at 2–3. Specifically, Attorney Ruff billed 1.4 hours to analyze
Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint, 9.8 hours to research and outline Defendant’s response,
1.9 hours to correspond with Attorney Hilborn and other attorneys and to revise the draft of
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Defendant’s response, 2.7 hours to cite-check and review Defendant’s response, 1.5 hours to
discuss with Attorney Hilborn and conduct additional research, and 1.6 hours to revise and finalize
Defendant’s response. Id. Attorney Waldo billed a total of 6 hours, and all 6 hours were for legal
research for Defendant’s response. Id. at 4. Attorney Bevan billed a total of 14.3 hours. Id. at 4–5.
Specifically, Attorney Bevan billed 4 hours to review Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend and
write a summary, 2.7 hours to conduct legal research for Defendant’s response, 3.4 hours to cite-
check Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend, and 3.4 hours to cite-check Defendant’s response. Id.
Lastly, Attorney Hardin billed a total of 10.5 hours. Id. at 5. Specifically, Attorney Hardin billed
2.7 hours to conduct legal research and 7.8 hours to proofread and cite-check Defendant’s
response. Id.
The 62.5 hours Defendant’s attorneys expended on her response to Plaintiffs’ motion for
leave to amend are excessive and unreasonable. As evidenced above, Defendant’s five attorneys
all billed for essentially the same work: reviewing Plaintiffs’ motion and proposed amendment,
performing legal research, drafting Defendant’s response, and proofreading Defendant’s response.
While there is nothing “inherently unreasonable about a client having multiple attorneys,” a fee
applicant can only receive an award for time spent by two or more attorneys if the fee applicant
can demonstrate that “the time spent by those attorneys reflects the distinct contribution of each
lawyer to the case and is the customary practice of multiple-lawyer litigation.” Am. C.L. Union of
Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 432 (11th Cir. 1999); see also McDonough v. City of Homestead, No.
1:21-CV-21538-KMM, 2024 WL 4464282, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2024) (“While a client may
retain multiple attorneys, the Court may not award time incurred by multiple attorneys without
determining the unique, nonduplicative work performed by each.”), report and recommendation
adopted sub nom. McDonough v. City of Homestead, Fla., No. 1:21-CV-21538-KMM, 2024 WL
4296907 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2024). Defendant has not demonstrated that all of the time spent by
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all five of her attorneys represents their distinct and non-duplicative contribution to her response.
To adapt an old adage: “[j]ust as there can be too many cooks in the kitchen, there can be too many
lawyers on a case.” Guckenberger v. Bos. Univ., 8 F. Supp. 2d 91, 101 (D. Mass. 1998).
For example, on March 25, 2025, Attorney Hilborn billed 3.8 hours to “Research and draft
Opposition to Motion to Amend.” DE 71-2 at 1. On that same day, Attorney Ruff billed 4.9 hours
to “Conduct legal research and draft opposition to motion for leave to file second amended
complaint in McCawley matter,” Attorney Bevan billed 2 hours to “Conduct legal research for the
Opp. To Mot. For leave to amend in the McCawley action,” and Attorney Hardin billed 1.5 hours
to “Conduct legal research for Button v. McCawley re: conspiracy to defame requirements.” Id. at
2–5. As such, on March 25, 2025, Defendant’s attorneys billed 12.2 hours to perform research and
draft Defendant’s response, all apparently at the same time.
As another example, Attorney Hardin billed 7 hours on March 26, 2025, to proofread and
cite-check Defendant’s response, which, in and of itself, appears excessive. Id. at 5. On the same
day, Attorney Bevin billed 3.2 hours to cite-check Defendant’s response. Id. at 4. And on the
following day, Attorney Bevin billed another .8 hours to cite-check Defendant’s response, and
Attorney Ruff billed 2.7 hours to cite-check and proofread Defendant’s response. Id. at 3, 5. Thus,
three different attorneys billed a total of 13.7 hours to proofread Defendant’s response.
As one final example, Attorney Hilborn billed 1.0 hour on February 27, 2024, to analyze
Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend and their proposed amended complaint. Id. at 2. On that same
day, Attorney Bevan billed 1.3 hours to review the motion for leave to amend, and on the following
day Attorney Bevan billed 3.7 hours to review and write a summary on Plaintiffs’ proposed
amended complaint. Id. at 4. Then, almost a month later, Attorney Ruff billed 1.4 hours to review
Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint. Id. at 2. Thus, three different attorneys billed a total of
7.4 hours to review Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend and proposed amended complaint.
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Having determined that the number of hours Defendant’s attorneys billed is unreasonable,
the Court is faced with two choices: either conducting an hour-by-hour analysis of the claimed
hours or utilizing an across-the-board cut. See Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350
(11th Cir. 2008) (“When a district court finds the number of hours claimed is unreasonably high,
the court has two choices: it may conduct an hour-by-hour analysis or it may reduce the requested
hours with an across-the-board cut.”). Given the duplicative nature of the hours billed, the Court
recommends utilizing a 50% across-the-board cut to Defendant’s attorneys’ billing hours.
Applying this 50% across-the-board cut reduces Attorney Hilborn’s total hours to 6.4, Attorney
Ruff’s total hours to 9.45, Attorney Waldo’s total hours to 3, Attorney Bevan’s total hours to 7.15,
and Attorney Hardin’s total hours to 5.25.
C. Lodestar Amount
After determining a reasonable hourly rate and the number of hours reasonably expended,
the last step of the lodestar method is to multiply the two. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302. The Court
utilizes the following table to calculate the lodestar amount:
Hourly Rate 	Reasonable Hours 	Total
Attorney Hilborn 	$475 	6.4 	$3,040
Attorney Ruff 	$400 	9.45 	$3,780
Attorney Waldo 	$400 	3 	$1,200
Attorney Bevan 	$300 	7.15 	$2,145
Attorney Hardin 	$300 	5.25 	$1,575
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IV. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART Defendant’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees [DE 71] and awarding Defendant
$11,740 in attorney’s fees.
Within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation,
any party may serve and file written objections to any of the above findings and recommendations.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); S.D. Fla. Mag. R. 4(a). The parties are hereby notified that a failure to
timely object waives the right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report and Recommendation.
11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2014).
DONE AND SUBMITTED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 2nd day of
December, 2025.
_______________________________ 	_
PANAYOTTA AUGUSTIN-BIRCH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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