Universa Investments L.P. v. Borodich et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO.: 18-cv-24286-DPG/DSW
UNIVERSA INVESTMENTS L.P.,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALEXANDER BORODICH, and
UNIVERSA CORPORATION LTD.
Defendants.
_____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE FINAL DEFAULT JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Motion to Vacate Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(4) and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (the “Motion”), and an accompanying
declaration, filed by Defendants Alexander Borodich (“Borodich”) and Universa Corporation Ltd.
(“Universa Corp,” and, collectively with Borodich, “Defendants”) [ECF Nos. 35, 35-1]. This case
was referred to the undersigned by the Honorable Darrin P. Gayles, United States District Judge,
for ruling on all pretrial non-dispositive matters and a report and recommendation on all dispositive
matters [ECF No. 41]. Plaintiff Universa Investments L.P. (“Universa”) filed a Response and
supporting declaration, [ECF Nos. 39, 39-1]. Defendants did not file a Reply. Upon consideration
of 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	and 	supporting 	declaration, 	Plaintiff’s 	Response 	and 	supporting
declaration, and a review of the record, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Defendants’
Motion be GRANTED, as set forth below.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Defendants contend that the Final Default Judgment, [ECF No. 20], is void and should be
vacated under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) for insufficient service of process and lack
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of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. See generally [ECF No. 35]. Plaintiff initiated this
action in October 2018 asserting claims under the Lanham Act arising from Defendants’ alleged
use of the “UNIVERSA” name and related branding in connection with Defendants’ online
activities and domain names. [ECF No. 1]. The dispute stems in part from trademark applications
Borodich filed in early 2018 seeking to register “UNIVERSA” marks in the United States. [ECF
No. 1 ¶ 13–15]. Plaintiff opposed the trademark applications at the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (“USPTO”) before Defendants later withdrew the applications. [ECF No. 1 ¶ 16]. Plaintiff
asserts that the Defendants continue to improperly use the UNIVERSA mark in connection with
their business of providing blockchain software services and related financial services, in their
domain name at www.universa.io, and in all their social media profiles. [ECF No. 1 ¶ 15].
In its Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that, upon information and belief, Defendant Borodich
was a Russian citizen residing in the Russian Federation. 	[ECF No. 1 ¶ 2]. 	With respect to
Defendant Universa Corp, Plaintiff alleged that its place of incorporation was unknown and that,
upon information and belief, its principal office was in Lithuania. [ECF No. 1 ¶ 3].
Plaintiff sent the Summons and Complaint to Defendants via Federal Express International
Priority to a Moscow address identified as Petrozavodskaya 24-1-56, Moscow, Russian Federation
125414. [ECF Nos. 10, 11]. This is the same address that Plaintiff contends Defendant Borodich
provided to the USPTO in connection with his trademark application for the UNIVERSA mark at
issue in this matter. [ECF No. 39 at 18]. Plaintiff also emailed “courtesy copies” of the Summons
and 	Complaint 	to 	email 	addresses 	Plaintiff 	attributes 	to 	Borodich
(alexander.borodich@gmail.com) and Universa Corp (support@universa.io). [ECF Nos. 10, 11,
39 at 5]. Defendants did not appear or respond to the Complaint. 	Plaintiff later sent follow-up
emails to Defendants regarding their failure to appear. 	[ECF No. 39 at 5]. 	As a result of
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Defendants’ failure to appear, Plaintiff obtained a Clerk’s default, [ECF Nos. 12, 13], and later
moved for final default judgment. [ECF Nos. 16–18]. On February 26, 2019, the district court
entered a Final Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction against Defendants (“Final Default
Judgment”) [ECF Nos. 19, 20]. 	On March 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Enforce Final
Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction (“Motion to Enforce”), in which it asserted that
Defendants violated the Final Default Judgment. [ECF No. 22]. Plaintiff served the Motion to
Enforce on Defendants by Courier Service Express, a Russian-based international courier service,
with delivery confirmed, to the same Moscow address used to serve the Complaint. [ECF No. 25].
Plaintiff again provided courtesy copies of the motion papers to email addresses that it believed to
be associated with Defendants. Id. at 4. Following a hearing held on December 12, 2024, at which
Defendants did not appear, the district court entered an order granting Plaintiff’s Motion to
Enforce. [ECF No. 30].
Defendants now contend the Final Default Judgment and any subsequent orders predicated
upon it are void. Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s attempted service of process on
them in Russia via international courier service does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(f) because Russia does not permit service by mail in international disputes. See [ECF
No. 35 at 2–4]. Moreover, Defendants further contend that, at the time of alleged service, they
were not present at, and did not have any connection to, the Russian address that Plaintiff used to
serve them. Id.; see also [ECF No. 35-1 at 1–2]. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff was required
to seek court authorization under Rule 4(f)(3) to effect “alternative service” on them. [ECF No. 35
at 4–8].
Plaintiff maintains that it properly served Defendants under Rule 4(f)(2)(A), which permits
service “as prescribed by the foreign country’s law” when there is no internationally agreed means.
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[ECF No. 39 at 12]. Plaintiff claims that it properly served Defendants via international courier
service in Russia under Rule 4(f)(2)(A), without obtaining court permission under Rule 4(f)(3),
because the Russian Federation does not acknowledge service of process under the Hague
Convention, and because “service by mail is authorized by the Code of Civil Procedure of the
Russian Federation, Articles 113 and 115.” See [ECF Nos. 10 and 11]. According to Defendants,
however, Plaintiff relied on the wrong section of the Russian Code, because Article 11(4)—and
not Article 113 or 115—governs here. See [ECF No. 35 at 7].
Defendants also argue that the Final Default Judgment violates due process because the
district court did not obtain jurisdiction over them under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).
[ECF No. 35 at 10-11]. They also insist that the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over them does not
comport with due process because they have no meaningful ties with the United States and have
not purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of United States law. Id. at 11. Plaintiff
responds that the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Defendants comports with due process
because (1) Defendants’ allegedly infringing conduct was directed at Plaintiff, a resident of this
District, (2) Defendants sought protection of the United States’ trademark laws, (3) Defendants
own and operate a website that is available in English in the United States by which they market
their services to United States citizens, and (4) Defendants utilize the service of a domain registrar
based in the United States. [ECF No. 39 at 19].
Defendants’ final claim is that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction
under 	the 	Lanham 	Act, 	because 	the 	conduct 	that 	Plaintiff 	complains 	of 	here 	occurred
“substantially” outside the United States, and the Lanham Act does not apply extraterritorially.
[ECF No. 35 at 9–10].
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows a party to obtain relief from a final judgment
under a limited set of circumstances, including if the judgment is void. A federal court must have
both subject matter jurisdiction (the authority to decide the matter before it) and personal
jurisdiction (the authority over the parties before it) before the court can enter final judgment.
See Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 580 U.S. 82, 95 (2017) (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon
Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583–585 (1999)). “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in
any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function
remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Steel Co. v. Citizens
for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868)).
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Federal question jurisdiction “enables federal courts to decide cases founded on federal
law.” Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 26 (2025). “The Lanham Act
explicitly provides federal courts with original jurisdiction over lawsuits alleging violations of its
provisions. GS Holistic, LLC v. Tran, No. 8:22-CV-2518-KKM-CPT, 2025 WL 2230926, at *3
(M.D. Fla. July 2, 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. GS Holistic, LLC v.
Mellowmood Smokeshop, No. 8:22-CV-2518-KKM-CPT, 2025 WL 2229965 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 5,
2025) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1121(a)).
B. Personal Jurisdiction
It is well established that “the issue of whether personal jurisdiction is present is a question
of law,” and “[a]n in personam judgment entered without personal jurisdiction over a defendant is
void as to that defendant.” Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir.
2009) (quoting Sloss Indus. Corp. v. Eurisol, 488 F.3d 922, 924 (11th Cir. 2007)). “A plaintiff
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seeking to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant ‘bears the initial burden of
alleging in the complaint sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction.’” Louis
Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1350 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting United Techs.
Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009)). “Once the plaintiff pleads sufficient
material facts to form a basis for in personam jurisdiction, the burden shifts to the defendant to
challenge plaintiff’s allegations by affidavits or other pleadings.” Carmouche v. Carnival Corp.,
36 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1388 (S.D. Fla. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc.,
789 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2015). A defendant challenging personal jurisdiction must present
evidence to counter the plaintiff’s allegations. Internet Sols. Corp. v. Marshall, 557 F.3d 1293,
1295 (11th Cir. 2009). “Where . . . the Defendant submits affidavit(s) to the contrary, the burden
traditionally shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction.” Alston v.
www.calculator.com, 476 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1308 (S.D. Fla. 2020).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) concerns jurisdiction over federal claims that are
outside state court jurisdiction. “To wield Rule 4(k)(2) against a foreign defendant, a plaintiff must
show: (1) its claim ‘arises under federal law,’ (2) ‘the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in
any state’s courts of general jurisdiction,’ and (3) ‘exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the
United States Constitution and laws.’” Jekyll Island-State Park Auth. v. Polygroup Macau Ltd.,
140 F.4th 1304, 1315 (11th Cir. 2025) (citations omitted).
C. Service of Process
“[I]nsufficient service of process under Rule 60(b)(4) implicates personal jurisdiction and
due process concerns. Generally, where service of process is insufficient, the court has no power
to render judgment, and the judgment is void.” In re Worldwide Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 1291,
1299 (11th Cir. 2003). “Before a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant,
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the procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied.” Schrier v. Qatar Islamic
Bank, 632 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2022) (citing Omni Cap. Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff &
Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987)). “In other words, ‘before a court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a defendant, there must be . . . a basis for the defendant’s amenability to service of summons.
Absent consent, this means there must be authorization for service of summons on the defendant.’”
Id. at 1345–46. Defendants are not required to litigate in federal court until they are officially
notified by formal process of the action pending against them under a court’s authority. Prewitt
Enters., Inc. v. Org. of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 353 F.3d 916, 925 (11th Cir. 2003).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f) governs service of process outside the United States.
Under Rule 4(f)(2)(A), if there is no internationally agreed means of service, then a plaintiff may
give notice “as prescribed by the foreign country’s law for service in that country in an action in
its courts of general jurisdiction.” 	The United States and Russia are both signatories to the Hague
Convention.1 Because Plaintiff seeks to obtain personal jurisdiction over Defendants via service
of process in Russia, the Hague Convention applies in this matter. Although Russia is a signatory,
it refuses to transmit service of process through its Central Authority, as required under Hague
Convention. See World Media All. Label, Inc. v. OOO "Izdatelstvo Jam", No. 20-21626-CV, 2020
WL 6781523, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 4, 2020) (citing Kuklachev v. Gelfman, No. 08-CV-2214 (CPS),
2008 WL 5068860, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2008)). And significantly, here, Russia objected to
1 	See Status Table: Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, HCCH,
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=17 (last visited Feb. 17,
2026) (listing current contracting states).
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Article 10 of the Hague Convention which permits service by mail.2 As such, Russia does not
allow international service of process via mail or international courier services. See, e.g., AMTO,
LLC v. Bedford Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. 14-cv-9913, 2015 WL 3457452, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 29,
2015) (“Courts have held . . . that service of documents by international courier constitutes service
through ‘postal channels,’ and accordingly this method of service in insufficient in light of Russia's
objection to Article 10.”); Advanced Aerofoil Techs., AG v. Todaro, No. 11-cv-9505, 2012 WL
299959, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2012) (characterizing service by international courier as
tantamount to service through postal channels, and therefore unavailable in countries that have
expressly objected to Article 10).
D. DISCUSSION
A. The Final Default Judgment is Void for Insufficient Service of Process
Plaintiff contends that it had unilateral authority to serve Defendants by mail in Russia
under Rule 4(f)(2)(A) because Russia refuses to comply with the Hague Convention, meaning that,
in essence, there is no “international agreed means of service.” [ECF No. 39 at 12–13]. This Court
disagrees. 	While it may be true that Russia’s stance frustrates the anticipated ease of service
intended by the Hague Convention, Plaintiff cannot simply overstep Russia’s prerogative as a
signatory to decline to accept service by mail. 	The Hague Convention applies to this case, and
therefore this Court must recognize that service by mail in Russia is prohibited. Plaintiff’s reliance
on Microsoft Corp. v. Doe, Civil Action No. 1:13cv139, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48398 (E.D. Va.
Jan. 6, 2014), for the proposition that service by mail in Russia is sufficient, is misplaced. Plaintiff
2 	See Declaration/Reservation/Notification, HCCH,
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/notifications/?csid=418&disp=res
dn (last visited Feb. 17, 2026) (“Service of documents by methods listed in Article 10 of the
Convention is not permitted in the Russian Federation.”).
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ignores case law from this district “that despite Russia’s noncompliance with the Hague
Convention, service by international mail does not suffice as adequate service.” World Media,
2020 WL 6781523, at *2 (citing Bidonthecity.com LLC v. Halverston Holdings Ltd., No. 12 Civ.
9258(ALC)(MHD), 2014 WL 1331046, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014)). Rule 4(f)(2)(A) only
applies in cases where the Hague Convention does not apply. Plaintiff’s attempted service on
Defendants by international courier service to an address in Moscow, Russian Federation was
therefore insufficient.3
Defendants correctly argue that the proper means for Plaintiff to serve them in Russia was
to obtain a court order under Rule 4(f)(3) to effect service via a means that is not prohibited by
international agreement. Plaintiff concedes that it did not seek permission and did not intend to
pursue service under Rule 4(f)(3). Plaintiff suggests, however, that the courtesy emails that it sent
to Defendants provided sufficient notice to overcome any service defects. 	[ECF No. 39 at 19].
Plaintiff’s informal service by email without a court order is not sufficient. 	“Due process . . .
requires that ‘before a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant . . . [t]here also
must be a basis for the defendant’s amenability to service of summons. Absent consent, this means
there must be authorization for service of summons on the defendant.’” Prewitt, 353 F.3d at 924–
25 (citing Omni Cap. Int’l, 484 U.S. at 104 (emphasis added)). Under the circumstances here,
where Russia has not objected to service by email, the district court had discretion under Rule
4(f)(3) to approve formal service by email. “[T]he decision to issue an order allowing service by
alternate means lies solely within the discretion of the district court.” Chanel, Inc. v. Individual,
3 	Defendants also assert, supported by a declaration, that Plaintiff’s service by mail is
defective because at the time of service, Defendants were not present or connected to the Moscow
address that Plaintiff used to effectuate service. See [ECF Nos. 35 at 2; 35-1].
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P’ship, or Unincorporated Ass’n, No. 17-62441-CIV, 2017 WL 8794733, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec.
13, 2017) (citing Prewitt, 353 F.3d. at 921). However, Plaintiff did not seek such approval.4 In
the absence of such a court order, service by “courtesy copy” email is improper. See Licht v.
Watson, No. 12-62197-CIV, 2013 WL 12382965, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2013) (“[E]mail
service is not available absent a Rule 4(f)(3) court decree.”) (citing Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l
Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002)).
Because Plaintiff’s service of process by international mail courier to Defendants in Russia
is not proper service under Rule 4(f)(2)(A), and because Plaintiff did not seek court approval for
alternative service under Rule 4(f)(3), the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over
Defendants. Therefore, the Final Default Judgment is void and, along with enforcement orders,
must be vacated under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 60(b).
B. Plaintiff Did Not Rely on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) to Establish
Jurisdiction Over Defendants
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) “allows courts to exercise personal jurisdiction
over foreign defendants who have enough contacts with the United States, but not with a single
state, to support personal jurisdiction.” Jekyll-Island, 140 F.4th at 1315. 	Defendants assert that
the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over them under Rule 4(k)(2) violates due process
because they did not purposefully avail themselves of the benefits of the laws of the United States.
4 	Plaintiff advised the district court in its Motion for Default Judgment that it sent courtesy
email notices to Defendants. [ECF No. 16 at 6–7]. Plaintiff did not, however, ask the district court
to approve the email notices as formal service of process under Rule 4(f)(3). See id. Court approval
under Rule 4(f)(3) is not a mere technicality. When presented with a motion to approve alternative
service, the court can make appropriate findings to determine if the requested method is reasonably
calculated 	to 	give 	the 	required 	notice 	to 	satisfy 	due 	process. 	See, 	e.g.,
Louis 	Vuitton 	Malletier 	v. 	Louisvuittonbagsonline.com, 	No. 	22-CV-61165-RS, 	2022 	WL
22985630, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2022) (authorizing service of defendants located in Russia by
email and internet publication under Rule 4(f)(3)); adidas AG v. adidasbestonline.com, No. 19-
62774-CIV, 2020 WL 5027562, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 7, 2020) (same).
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[ECF No. 35 at 13]. Thus, Defendants have no meaningful contacts with the United States, and
Plaintiff’s claims do not arise out of or relate to any such ties with the United States. Id. In response,
Plaintiff argues that Defendants have sufficient meaningful contacts with the United States such
that jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) would not violate due process. 	Plaintiff, however, does not
rely on Rule 4(k)(2) in its Complaint to establish jurisdiction over Defendants. Significantly,
Plaintiff did not allege that Defendants are not subject to jurisdiction in any state—as is required
for Rule 4(k)(2) to apply. To the contrary, Plaintiff alleges in its Complaint that “[d]efendants are
subject to personal jurisdiction in [Florida], have conducted business in [Florida], and have
committed acts of infringement in [Florida].” [ECF No 1 ¶ 5].
As such, the relevant inquiry for evaluating the district court’s personal jurisdiction over
Defendants is whether Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts5 in the Complaint to establish (1) general
or specific jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute and (2) that Defendants had sufficient
contacts with Florida to comport with due process. See Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare
Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000). The due process analysis under Rule 4(k)(2) and the
Florida long-arm statute are similar, but they are not identical. The “difference is that where Rule
4(k)(2) applies, the court weighs the defendant’s contacts with the United States as a whole, rather
than with a single state.” Jekyll-Island, 140 F.4th at 1316. Because Rule 4(k)(2) does not apply
here, the parties’ debate over the sufficiency of Defendants’ contacts with the United States is not
dispositive on the question of whether the district court’s jurisdiction over Defendants comports
with due process. As such, this Court does not find that the Final Default Judgment is void for
lack of due process based on Defendants’ contacts – or lack thereof – with the United States.
5 Conclusory allegations of the existence of jurisdiction are not enough. See Catalyst
Pharms., Inc. v. Fullerton, No. 16-25365-CIV, 2017 WL 6558397, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2017)
(citing Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1318 (11th Cir. 2006)).
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C. The Final Default Judgment is Not Void for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Defendants contend that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this
matter based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic Int'l, Inc., 600
U.S. 412, 419 (2023) prohibiting the application of the Lanham Act over infringement conduct
outside of the United States. [ECF No. 35 at 9–10]. Defendants’ reliance on Abitron is misplaced.
“A complaint alleging a colorable federal cause of action confers district court jurisdiction even if
the complaint is ultimately dismissed for failure to state a claim.” Advanced Bodycare Sols., LLC
v. Thione Intern. Inc., 524 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89) (failure to
state a claim does not defeat subject matter jurisdiction unless clearly frivolous or made only to
allege federal jurisdiction). Defendants overlook the “distinction between two sometimes confused
or conflated concepts: federal-court ‘subject-matter’ jurisdiction over a controversy; and the
essential ingredients of a federal claim for relief.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 91. 	Contrary to
Defendants’ argument, “Abitron is a merits decision.” 	Slush Puppies Ltd. v. ICEE Co., 792 F.
Supp. 3d 834, 846 (S.D. Ohio 2025). 	As such, even assuming—without deciding—that
Defendants are correct that the Abitron ruling defeats Plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim on the merits,
it does not defeat the court’s subject matter jurisdiction and does not implicate the validity of the
Final Default Judgment.
D. 	RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated 	herein, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the
Defendants’ Motion to Vacate should be GRANTED and the Final Default Judgment and all
subsequent orders predicated on it should be deemed void.
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E. 	OBJECTIONS
Within seven (7) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation,
any party may serve and file written objections to any of the above findings and recommendations
as provided by the Local Rules for this district. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any response shall be filed
within seven (7) days of the objections. The parties are hereby notified that a failure to timely
object waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to
factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report and Recommendation. 11th Cir. R. 3-1
(2016); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 18th day of February 2026.
DETRA SHAW-WILDER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc: 	The Honorable Darrin P. Gayles
All Counsel of Record
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