Derhem v. Bay House Miami Condominium Association et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 20-22318-Civ-WILLIAMS/TORRES
KANAYO DERHEM and
MOJTABA E. KOOSEJ,
Plaintiff,
v.
BAY HOUSE MIAMI CONDOMINIUM
ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS’
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
This cause comes before the Court on Defendants’, Sean Zahniser’s (“Mr.
Zahniser”), Mike Desimone’s (“Mr. Desimone”), Bay House Miami Condominium
Association’s (“the Association”), James Pinkert’s (“Mr. Pinkert”), Joshua Paul’s (“Mr.
Paul”), 	and 	Alejandro 	Enrique 	Utrera 	Badenes’ 	(“Mr. 	Utrera”) 	(collectively,
“Defendants”) Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs against Plaintiffs
(“Plaintiff-Derhem” and “Plaintiff-Koosej”; collectively, “Plaintiffs”). [D.E. 386]. The
Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.1 After review of the briefing
and relevant authorities, and for the reasons set forth below, we recommend that
Defendants’ Motion be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
1 On December 3, 2024, the Honorable Kathleen M. Williams referred this Motion to
the Undersigned Magistrate Judge for disposition. [D.E. 376].
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 1 of 26

2
I. 	BACKGROUND
In a previous Order, this Court determined that Defendants are entitled to
attorneys’ fees for having prevailed on Counts II, III, and IV of Plaintiffs’ Second
Amended Complaint, and are entitled to costs as to Counts I, II, III, IV, and VI. [D.E.
384]. The Court also held that Defendants are not entitled to fees for Counts I, V and
VI; consequently, the Court ordered Defendants to file this Supplemental Motion to
adjust their requested-fee award (to exclude time entries related to Counts I, V and
VI).
In the pending Motion, Defendants seek $290,399.41 in attorneys’ fees for
1,406.37 hours of billed time, and $6,677.07 in costs. In response, Plaintiff-Derhem
asserts a plethora of broad objections, which include arguments that: Defendants
employed an unnecessarily large team of attorneys; block-billed and inadequately
described their time entries; and caused extensive and unnecessary litigation.
Separately, Plaintiff-Koosej argues that the Court should limit his liability
because he was not a named Plaintiff until the Second Amended Complaint. Thus, all
fees incurred before January 28, 2022, Plaintiff-Koosej asserts, should be paid by only
Plaintiff-Derhem. And the same goes for an attorneys’ fees motion filed after two
Defendants’ success on Plaintiff-Derhem’s First Amended Complaint (to which
Plaintiff-Koosej was not a party), Plaintiff-Derhem’s pro se filings, and disciplinary
complaints filed by Plaintiff-Derhem.
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 2 of 26

3
II. 	APPLICABLE LAW AND PRINCIPLES
A. Attorneys’ Fees
In determining an appropriate fee award, we employ the lodestar method. See
City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992) (“The ‘lodestar figure has, as its
name suggests, become the guiding light of our fee-shifting jurisprudence. We have
established a ‘strong presumption’ that the lodestar represents the ‘reasonable’ fee”).
This method allows for a reasonable estimate of the value of an attorney’s service
because the movant submits evidence “supporting the hours worked and rates
claimed.” 	Hensley 	v. 	Eckerhart, 	461 	U.S. 	424, 	433 	(1983). 	If 	the 	movant’s
documentation of hours worked is inadequate, “the district court may reduce the
award accordingly.” Id.
The lodestar method requires the Court to first determine an attorney’s
reasonable hourly rate, and to multiply that rate by the number of hours reasonably
expended. See, e.g., Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994); Norman
v. Housing Auth. Of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988); see also
Harbaugh v. Greslin, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2005). Following the
Court’s calculation, “the court must next consider the necessity of an adjustment for
results obtained.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302. Accordingly, when awarding fees, the
Court must allow meaningful review of its decision and “articulate the decisions it
made, give principled reasons for those decisions, and show its calculation.” Id. at
1304 (citation omitted).
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 3 of 26

4
In awarding attorneys’ fees, “courts are not authorized to be generous with the
money of others, and it is as much the duty of courts to see that excessive fees and
expenses are not awarded as it is to see that an adequate amount is awarded.” ACLU
of Georgia v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 428 (11th Cir. 1999). Courts, however, have
considerable discretion when determining whether a party to a case should receive a
fee award. See Cullens v. Georgia Dept. Of Transp., 29 F.3d 1489, 1492-1493 (11th
Cir. 1994) (emphasizing that the district court is “empowered to exercise discretion
in determining whether an award is to be made and if so its reasonableness.”).
An award must be reasonable and must fall within the guidelines for fee
awards promulgated by the Eleventh Circuit. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299-1302. It
is consequently within a court’s ultimate discretion to adjust the fees to an amount it
deems proper according to the Eleventh Circuit’s parameters. See, e.g., Columbus
Mills, Inc. v. Freeland, 918 F.2d 1575, 1580 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he Norman Court
left to the discretion of the district court the decision of whether to prune excessive
hours”); Cullens, 29 F.3d at 1492 (“[W]e reemphasize that the district court has
discretion in determining the amount of a fee award. This is appropriate in view of
the district court’s superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of
avoiding 	frequent 	appellate 	review 	of 	what 	essentially 	are 	factual 	matters.”)
(quotation omitted).
B. Costs
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1), a prevailing party is entitled to recover costs as
a matter of course unless directed otherwise by a court or statute. A strong
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 4 of 26

5
presumption exists in favor of awarding costs. Id. A court may tax as costs those
expenses enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons,
Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987) (absent explicit statutory or contractual authorization,
federal courts are bound by the limitations set out in § 1920). “To defeat the
presumption and deny full costs, a district court must have a sound basis for doing
so.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1039 (11th Cir. 2000).
Pursuant to section 1920, a court may award the following costs:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily
obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any
materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the
case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; and
(6) Compensation 	of 	court 	appointed 	experts, 	compensation 	of
interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special
interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.
III. 	ANALYSIS
We will first assess Defendants’ hourly rate and requested fee amount, before
turning to taxable costs.
A. Reasonable Hourly Rate
This rate is defined as the “prevailing market rate in the relevant legal
community 	for 	similar 	services 	by 	lawyers 	of 	reasonably 	comparable 	skills,
experience and reputation.” Laranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299). The relevant market is “the place where the case
is filed.” ACLU of Georgia, 168 F.3d at 427 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). The relevant legal community here is South Florida.
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 5 of 26

6
Several factors may be considered in arriving at that prevailing market rate,
as set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 488 F.2d 714, 717-719 (5th
Cir. 1974). The movant is required to submit to the Court satisfactory evidence to
establish that the requested rate accurately reflects the prevailing market rate. See
Duckworth v. Whisenant, 97 F.3d 1393, 1396 (11th Cir. 1996); Norman, 836 F.2d at
1299 (finding that the burden lies with fee applicant “of producing satisfactory
evidence that the requested rate is in line with prevailing market rates” and
“satisfactory evidence necessarily must speak to rates actually billed and paid in
similar lawsuits.”). Ultimately, the Court remains an expert on the issue of hourly
rates in its community and may properly consider “its own knowledge and experience
concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent judgment either
with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.” Loranger, 10 F.3d at 781 (quoting
Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303).
Here, Defendants seek the following hourly rates for their attorneys:
• 	Evelyn Greenstone Kammet (Managing Attorney): $225.00 to $235.00
• 	Waynice Green-Musgrove (Associate): $185.00 to $225.00
• 	Stefano Rainelli (Associate): $185.00
• 	Daniel Davis (Associate): $185.00
• 	Miguel Espinosa (Associate): $185.00
• 	Mark Erdman (Associate): $235.00
As an initial matter, we note that Plaintiffs have not meaningfully objected to
any of 	Defendants’ proffered rates. 	Against that backdrop, we too find to be
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 6 of 26

7
reasonable the attorney rates between $185.00 and $235.00 for this condominium
discrimination dispute. Indeed, numerous courts in this Circuit have found even
higher rates to be reasonable in several types of landlord/tenant disputes, and none
of those rates are patently unreasonable in this market. See, e.g., Friedel v. Sun
Communities, Inc., No. 19-14394-CIV, 2022 WL 17669933, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 3,
2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 19-CV-14394, 2022 WL 17668290
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2022) (finding to be reasonable rates between $200 and $250 for
partners and associates in a landlord/tenant housing dispute); Julian Depot Miami
LLC v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 19-22838-CIV, 2020 WL 9460232, at *3 (S.D.
Fla. May 13, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 9460224 (S.D. Fla.
June 3, 2020) (finding the following hourly rates to be reasonable in a landlord/tenant
dispute: “(1) $350 for partners at Gurley & Associates, (2) $425 to $515 for partners
at Seyfarth Shaw, (3) $295 for counsel and associates at Gurley & Associates, (4) $300
to $375 for associates at Seyfarth Shaw, and (5) $150 for paralegals at Gurley &
Associates”).
Thus, Defendants should be entitled to their requested attorneys’ rates.
Defendants also seek $75 per hour2 for two paralegals in this case. We find
ample support to award a reasonable hourly rate of $75.00 for the paralegals. See
Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Legion Media, LLC, No. 8:24-CV-1459-JLB-AAS, 2025 WL
2 In their Motion, Defendants seek $95.00 to $105.00 per hour for their paralegals.
But in the attached, sworn affidavit (which describes Defendants’ rates and time
entries), Defendants seek only $75.00 per hour. In her response, Plaintiff points out
this 	discrepancy. 	Defendants 	fail 	to address 	this 	inconsistency 	in 	their 	reply.
Accordingly, the Court will award the lower-requested rate.
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 7 of 26

8
1195544, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025
WL 1195906 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2025) (noting that the court “typically award[s] an
hourly rate of $100.00 for paralegal services); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Student Debt Dr.
LLC, No. 17-61937-CIV, 2018 WL 4922465, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2018), report and
recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 4922466 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2018) (finding to be
reasonable a “rate for paralegals at … $75.00 - $100.00 per hour”); Centennial Bank
v. M/V "Why Not", No. 22-CV-22883, 2024 WL 3072041, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2024),
report and recommendation adopted sub nom., No. 22-22883-CIV, 2024 WL 3070755
(S.D. Fla. June 20, 2024) (“find[ing] that hourly rates of $125.00 for paralegal Grubbs
and $100 for paralegals Hart and Baum to be more in-line with paralegal hourly rates
approved by Courts in this District”).
B. Hours Expended
Next, the lodestar analysis requires that we determine the reasonable number
of hours expended in the litigation. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301. The award must
exclude compensation for hours “that would be unreasonable to bill to a client and
therefore to one’s adversary irrespective of the skill, reputation or experience of
counsel.” ACLU of Georgia, 168 F.3d at 428 (quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301)
(emphasis in original). The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing that the
time for which compensation is sought was reasonably expended on the litigation and
must provide the Court with specific and detailed evidence that will allow for an
accurate determination of the amount of the fees to award. Id. If the fee applicant
fails to exercise required “billing judgment,” the Court is obligated to “[prune] out
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 8 of 26

9
those [hours] that are ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’” Id. The
Court is presumed to be an expert in reviewing the number of hours expended on
litigation for the purpose of attorney’s fees. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303.
The party opposing the fee application must satisfy his obligation to provide
specific and reasonably precise objections concerning hours that should be excluded.
ACLU of Georgia, 168 F.3d at 427. In the final analysis, however, “exclusions for
excessive or unnecessary work on given tasks must be left to the discretion of the
district court.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301.
For 	the 	most 	part, 	Plaintiff-Derhem’s 	objections 	are 	entirely 	too 	broad.
Plaintiff-Derhem even admits in her surreply that her “opposition” is “not solely a
line-by-line challenge to the hours billed, but rather a request for the Court to exercise
its equitable discretion to deny a fee award in its entirety due to Defendants’ alleged
misconduct.” [D.E. 393-1 at 5]. Indeed, Plaintiff-Derhem’s opposition is not a line-by-
line challenge at all; Plaintiff fails to identify any specific time entries to which she
objects. This practice, of course, is insufficient under Eleventh Circuit precedent. See
Barnes, 168 F.3d at 428 (quoting Norman, 836 F.3d at 1301) (“In order for courts to
carry out their duties in this area, ‘objections and proof from fee opponent’ concerning
hours that should be excluded must be specific and ‘reasonably precise.’”).
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 9 of 26

10
The Court, however, will nonetheless review several of Plaintiff-Derhem’s
broad objections to ensure Defendants do not receive a windfall.3 The Court will then
review Plaintiff-Koosej’s separate and distinct objections.
1. 	Volume of Attorneys
Plaintiff-Derhem first argues that it is unreasonable for Defendants to seek
fees for the work of six attorneys and two paralegals. In support, Plaintiff-Derhem
argues that this “suggest[s] an inefficient allocation of resources that would be
unreasonable to bill to a client, let alone an adversary.” [D.E. 389 at 2].
As an initial matter, we do not find the volume of professionals in this case to
be unreasonable. This case has included a torturous procedural history, with serial
filings, several amended complaints, and numerous stays and appeals. And without
the identification of specific time entries that indicate duplicative work, the Court
does not view Defendants’ team of attorneys as per se unreasonable—especially in
this voluminous, heavily-litigated, and procedurally-perplexing affair. See Johnson v.
Univ. Coll. of Univ. of Alabama in Birmingham, 706 F.2d 1205, 1208 (11th Cir. 1983)
(“The 	retaining 	of 	multiple 	attorneys 	in 	a 	significant, 	lengthy 	employment
discrimination case such as this one is understandable and not a ground for reducing
the hours claimed. The use in involved litigation of a team of attorneys who divide up
the work is common today for both plaintiff and defense work. While Johnson
3 We also note that several arguments raised in Plaintiff-Derhem’s opposition (and
sur-reply) address Defendants’ entitlement to fees. The Court, of course, already
addressed Defendants’ fee entitlement by separate Order (objections to which the
District Court may address after entry of this Report and Recommendation). [D.E.
384]. Consequently, the Court will not address those arguments here.
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 10 of 26

11
recognizes the possibility of unnecessary duplication for which double compensation
should not be granted … a reduction is warranted only if the attorneys are
unreasonably doing the same work. An award for time spent by two or more attorneys
is proper as long as it reflects the distinct contribution of each lawyer to the case and
the customary practice of multiple-lawyer litigation.”).
Further, Plaintiff provides the Court with no suggestion on how many hours
to reduce, which attorneys were unnecessary, which time entries should be removed,
or what amount of the fee award is unreasonable. Consequently, Plaintiff’s objection
is not only legally insufficient, but insufficient as a practical matter. See Apple Glen
Invs., L.P. v. Express Scripts, Inc., No. 814RCVR1527RTR33TGW, 2018 WL 2945629,
at *14 (M.D. Fla. May 25, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL
2937469 (M.D. Fla. June 11, 2018) (“The defendant has not identified any specific
hours that were expended on litigating the fees for fees issue, nor has it even stated
some general amount that should be excluded for work on that issue. Because the
defendant has not provided any basis for determining an amount that should be
reduced in connection with litigation for fees on fees, this failure constitutes an
additional reason why the … challenge is unavailing.”).
2. 	Short Entries and Block Billing
Plaintiff-Derhem next objects that “[t]he billing contains a high frequency of
very short entries” and includes “instances of block billing.” [D.E. 389 at 3]. But
Plaintiff fails to highlight any specific time entries, what amount of hours the Court
should deduct, or any other support to render Plaintiff’s objection sufficient. The
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 11 of 26

12
Court, meanwhile, will not rummage through 300 pages of exhibits to complete
Plaintiff’s work for her. This objection, then, should be overruled. See Rubinstein v.
Keshet Inter Vivos Tr., No. 17-61019-CIV, 2019 WL 8275157, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 17,
2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1445472 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 24,
2020) (quoting Shaw v. City of Selma, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1280 (S.D. Ala. 2017),
aff'd, 884 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 2018)) (noting that “the Court is ‘under no independent
obligation to rummage through the ... exhibits submitted ... in search of some excerpt
that might bolster [Plaintiffs’] point’”).
3. 	Vague, Insufficient, and Redacted Time Entries
Next, Plaintiff-Derhem argues that many of Defendants’ time entries “lack
sufficient detail” and thus are “unacceptably vague,” and that some billing entries are
impermissibly redacted.
Beginning first with Plaintiff’s objection for vagueness, she provides two
examples: 	“REVIEW 	AND 	ANALYSIS 	OF 	COMPLAINT” 	and
“CORRESPONDENCE WITH CLAIMS PROFESSIONAL.” [D.E. 389 at 3]. The
problem, however, is Plaintiff curiously omits critical portions of both time entries.
The first time entry, in actuality, reads “Review and analysis of Complaint for
determination of initial handling strategy (45 Pages, 10 Counts).” [D.E. 386 at 210].
The second, meanwhile, reads “Correspondence with claims professional regarding
retention and representation.” [D.E. 386-3 at 14]. Outside of these two doctored time
entries—which are not vague but that Plaintiff tampers with to make appear vague—
Plaintiff 	provides 	no 	other 	examples. 	Nor 	does 	the 	Court’s 	overall 	review 	of
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 12 of 26

13
Defendants’ time entries reveal patently-vague descriptions. Plaintiffs’ objection,
therefore, should once again be overruled.
As to the redacted entries, the Court’s review reveals sufficient descriptions
outside of the redactions. For example, one of the redacted entries reads, prior to the
redaction, “research regarding impact of notice on appearance of un-served client.”
[D.E. 386-1 at 9]. Another redacted entry reads “correspondence with board president,
C. Brumsted, re: resignation and [redacted].” [Id. at 12]. Several other entries read
similarly; i.e., while partially redacted, the Court remains able to meaningfully
review each time entry. Consequently, no deductions are appropriate on this score.
See Alper Auto., Inc. v. Day to Day Imports, Inc., No. 18-81753-CIV, 2022 WL
3904327, at *5 (S.D. Fla. July 26, 2022) (rejecting similar redaction argument because
the Court “[did] not find that the time entries in this case are so heavily redacted that
I cannot discern the legal work being done or accurately determine whether the time
is compensable or not. A review of the billing records shows that the redactions are
consistent with Local Rule 7.3(a) and do not impede meaningful review. Thus, I do
not find it reasonable to deduct those hours from the total hours billed.”); Meyrowitz
v. Brendel, No. 16-81793-CV, 2018 WL 4440492, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2018) (“In
sum, 	when 	considering 	the 	time 	entries 	that 	include 	redactions, 	but 	are 	not
completely redacted … the Court does not find that the entries are unacceptably
vague or too heavily redacted, and will not deduct those hours from the total time
billed.”).
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 13 of 26

14
4. 	Defendants’ Conduct
Plaintiff-Derhem also asserts that Defendants’ own conduct caused attorneys’
fees. For example, Plaintiff points to the difficulty she had in scheduling depositions
for Jose Vidal and Elizabeth Perez.
But by and large, throughout the harrowing procedural history of this case, it
was Plaintiff’s conduct that occasioned unnecessary litigation. Indeed, as this Court
noted in a prior order,
Plaintiffs 	have 	repeatedly 	failed 	to 	adhere 	to 	Court 	practices,
procedures, and deadlines and have been represented by various counsel
or appeared pro se. (See, e.g., DE 309; DE 266; DE 293). While the Court
affords more lenience to pro se plaintiffs, Plaintiffs consistent refusal to
adhere to procedures or Court orders has created a nearly unintelligible
record, requiring the Court to attempt to piece together Plaintiffs’
arguments and evidence through various disparate filings. As such,
inevitable inconsistencies exist. While the Court has attempted to
reconcile the various allegations, certain portions of the record remain
incomprehensible.
[D.E. 317 at 6].
Thus, if any party’s conduct caused unnecessary attorneys’ fees, it was
Plaintiffs. This objection, therefore, should also be overruled.
5. 	Fees for Non-Recoverable Claims
Lastly, Plaintiff-Derhem asserts that Defendants seek to implicitly recover
fees for the three claims for which the Court denied entitlement. Specifically, this
Court found (in a Report and Recommendation) that Defendants are entitled to
attorneys’ fees on counts II, III, and IV (all brought under Florida’s condominium
laws), but not Counts I, V, and VI.
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 14 of 26

15
In her opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendants fail to adequately segregate
the hours expended on the recoverable claims versus the non-recoverable claims. And
as a result, much of Defendants’ fee award should be reduced because it is impossible
to tell how many hours were expended on only the recoverable claims.
Defendants note in their initial Motion that each billing entry related to the
non-recoverable claims are highlighted in yellow and have been deducted from the
total fee award. But they do not at all address the thrust of Plaintiff’s objection in
their reply.
Upon review of Defendants’ billing records, Plaintiff’s position on this point is
well taken and a deduction is appropriate. Primarily, this case was one that centered
on discrimination (i.e., non-recoverable Count I). Thus, for much of the briefing,
correspondence, and overall activity (e.g., Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Motion for
Summary Judgment, and more), much of the work was concentrated, or at least
shared with, the non-recoverable claims.
In other words, much of Defendants’ time entries include work expended on
the non-recoverable claims. For example, there are a myriad of entries that refer
broadly to corresponding about, drafting, reviewing, and analyzing the motion to
dismiss. [D.E. 386-3 at 24, 27, 29, 30, 31]. The same goes for Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. [Id. at 77, 106, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133]. Meanwhile, a healthy
portion of the briefing for each of these motions was spent on the non-recoverable
claims. 	For 	example, 	the 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	contains 	nine 	pages
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 15 of 26

16
dedicated to Count I, one page dedicated to Count V, and another four pages dedicated
to Count VI (all non-recoverable claims). [D.E. 213].
Consequently, it would be improper for Defendants to recover their full
requested amount, when a significant portion of that amount was spent on non-
recoverable claims. Because Defendants’ billing record is so voluminous (over 300
pages), and because it is too impractical to discern which precise time entries should
be stricken, an across-the-board cut is appropriate. See Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d
776, 783 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that where the billing record is voluminous, “the
district court need not engage in an hour-by-hour analysis[; r]ather, ... it may [ ]
reduce [the hours devoted to litigation] in gross if a review of the resubmitted fee
request warrants such a reduction”); see also Paguaga v. Pinnacle One Price Dry
Cleaning of Davie, LLC, No. 20-22694-CIV, 2023 WL 2388272, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Mar.
7, 2023) (“An across-the-board reduction is preferable here because, although the
Court reviewed the billing records submitted, the records are too voluminous to take
an hour-by-hour approach.”).
Here, a 40% reduction is appropriate. As already explained, the central claim
that dominated this litigation was Plaintiff’s federal housing discrimination claim
(Count I), with much of the substantive briefing (and its accompanying research,
strategy, and correspondences) and fact discovery geared toward that claim and its
theories. Granted, Defendants did make an effort to remove the time entries related
solely to the non-recoverable claims. But to award the entirety of the requested fee
amount would be to award a huge portion of fees related to non-recoverable claims.
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 16 of 26

17
In light of this, 40% is a fair reduction: it still awards Defendants with the bulk of its
fee award, but within a reasonable range of fairness given the need to deduct the
healthy portion of work that went towards the non-recoverable claims. See, e.g.,
Valdez v. Kalmd Home Care LLC, No. 6:24-CV-237-GAP-RMN, 2025 WL 1727265, at
*4 (M.D. Fla. June 4, 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub nom., 2025 WL
1726237 (M.D. Fla. June 20, 2025) (“After carefully reviewing the billing records, and
because I cannot determine the reasonableness of the hours requested because
counsel has not parceled out which hours were spent on only the claims she ultimately
prevailed on, I recommend reducing the claimed hours across-the-board by fifty
percent.”); Davenport v. City of Columbus, Ga., No. 4:06-CV-150 (CDL), 2009 WL
235253, at *5 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 30, 2009) (“With the exception of a handful of tasks
which Plaintiff appears to concede relate solely to unsuccessful claims (which
Plaintiff has already excluded), it would be difficult, if not impossible, to attribute the
time entries to ‘successful’ or ‘unsuccessful’ claims. The Court therefore concludes
that an across-the-board reduction of hours to account for unsuccessful claims is
appropriate, as Plaintiff suggests. … Accordingly, the Court concludes that a 50%
reduction is warranted to account for Plaintiff's separate and distinct unsuccessful
claims.”); cf. Otto v. City of Boca Raton, No. 24-10478 (11th Cir. Oct. 20, 2025)
(reversing and remanding an across-the-board cut where the district court’s decision
was “arbitrary and unwarranted,” because the court did not explain the calculation
of its deductions, and no “billing defect or excess … could account for such a large
reduction”).
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 17 of 26

18
Accordingly, we recommend that Defendants’ requested award of $290,399.41
be reduced by 40%, to $174,239.65.
C. Plaintiff-Koosej’s Objections
Next, we determine whether both Plaintiffs should be jointly and severally
liable for the entire fee award. Plaintiff-Koosej argues that, because he was not a
named Plaintiff until the Second Amended Complaint, all fees incurred prior to that
time should be paid exclusively by Plaintiff-Derhem (who has been a Plaintiff
throughout the entire litigation). Further, Plaintiff-Koosej seeks reductions for an
attorneys’ fees motion filed after dismissal of the First Amended Complaint (to which
Plaintiff-Koosej was not a party), motions filed by Plaintiff-Derhem as a pro se
litigant, and fees related to Plaintiff-Derhem’s Florida Bar and Department of
Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR) complaints. In response, Defendants
argue that joint and several liability between both Plaintiffs for the entire fee award
is proper.
1. 	Fees Incurred Before the Second Amended Complaint
“The default rule is that costs are to be imposed jointly and severally, and the
burden is on the party seeking to avoid that to introduce evidence justifying
apportionment and persuade the court to do that.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Silver Star Health & Rehab, 739 F.3d 579, 586 (11th Cir. 2013). “[E]quities favoring
apportionment include: (i) whether the court had consolidated cases on its own
initiative; (ii) whether costs can be easily split; and (iii) and unequal cost attribution.”
Akai Custom Guns, LLC v. KKM Precision, Inc., No. 20-CV-61469, 2025 WL 2663071,
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 18 of 26

19
at *8 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL
2659801 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2025) (citing Fernau v. Enchante Beauty Products, Inc.,
No. 18-CV-20866, 2021 WL 1923285, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 13, 2021)).
Here, we find that equity weighs in favor of reducing Plaintiff-Koosej’s fee
liability. While the presumption may be that costs are to be imposed jointly and
severally, Plaintiff-Koosej has presented a compelling argument to overcome that
presumption: he was not a party to this 2020 case until 2022. And Defendants have
provided no responsive authority that Plaintiff-Koosej should pay fees for litigation
to which he was not a party. Primarily, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs litigated this
case together (e.g., used the same discovery and shared in many joint filings), and
thus, Plaintiffs should bear the fee award together. While that proposition may be
true for the period in which Plaintiff-Koosej was actually a party to the case, it would
be nonsensical to conclude that, before Plaintiff-Koosej was even a party to the case,
Plaintiff-Koosej jointly litigated the case with Plaintiff-Derhem.
Further, the Court can easily and fairly determine Plaintiff-Koosej’s fee
liability, as Plaintiff-Koosej became a party upon the filing of the Second Amended
Complaint. Thus, January 28, 2022 (the date of the first time entry related to the
Second Amended Complaint) is the date from which Plaintiff-Koosej should be jointly
responsible for fees.
And to be clear, we agree that, from the point that Plaintiff-Koosej joined this
case, he should be jointly and severally liable for the fee award (except for Plaintiff-
Koosej’s below, discrete objections). But we find no basis to require Plaintiff-Koosej
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 19 of 26

20
to pay fees for litigation in which he did not participate. See Levin v. Levans, Inc., No.
08-61730-CIV, 2010 WL 1571192, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2010), report and
recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 1610417 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2010) (“There is no
basis for this Court to apportion the attorney's fees award between Defendant Levine
and a former Defendant who was not a party to the underlying settlement agreement
and, in fact, was dismissed from the lawsuit.”); see also Shelton v. Schar, No. 5:17-
CV-86-OC-PGBPRL, 2018 WL 6261485, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2018) (apportioning
fee award based on “a per-plaintiff basis”).
2. 	Fees Incurred for Defendant-Zahniser and Defendant-Desimone’s
Fees Motion
Moreover, Plaintiff-Koosej argues that he should not have to pay fees that
relate to Mr. Zahniser’s and Mr. Desimone’s motion for attorneys fees, because that
motion was filed after those Defendants prevailed on the First Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff-Koosej, meanwhile, did not become a party to this case until the Second
Amended Complaint. Thus, Plaintiff-Koosej has highlighted several time entries that
relate to the drafting of that motion.
Applying the same rationale as above, we agree that Plaintiff-Koosej should
not 	have 	to 	pay 	attorneys’ 	fees 	for 	litigation 	to 	which 	he 	was 	not 	a 	party.
Consequently, we recommend the deduction of $2,805.50; this represents the sum of
the time entries Plaintiff-Koosej identified that relate to Mr. Zahniser and Mr.
Desimone’s motion for attorneys’ fees, excluding any time entries that occurred before
January 28, 2022, because those time entries already are being excluded as to
Plaintiff-Koosej).
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 20 of 26

21
3. 	Pro Se Fees Incurred by Plaintiff-Derhem
Additionally, Plaintiff-Koosej argues that he should not be responsible for fees
that Plaintiff-Derhem filed as a pro se litigant. But the time entries highlighted by
Plaintiff-Koosej indicate only a motion for referral to the volunteer attorney program,
which was filed jointly by both Plaintiffs. Consequently, no reduction is appropriate
for filings that both Plaintiffs filed jointly and from which both Plaintiffs stood to
benefit.
4. 	Fees Incurred From Florida Bar and DBPR Complaints
Next, Plaintiff-Koosej seeks a reduction for fees incurred from Plaintiff-
Derhem’s rogue complaints to the Florida Bar and the DBPR. There is no evidence
that Plaintiff-Koosej joined in these complaints; that these complaints advanced
Plaintiff-Koosej’s interests in this litigation; that Plaintiff-Koosej stood at all to
benefit from these (unsuccessful) complaints; or that any equities weigh in favor of
importing these fees onto Plaintiff-Koosej. Consequently, we agree that a reduction
as to Plaintiff-Koosej’s fee liability is appropriate, in the amount of $7,270.50 (i.e., the
time entries related to Defendants’ defense against Plaintiff-Derhem’s Florida Bar
and DPBR complaints).
5. 	Fees for Defendants’ Foreclosure Suit
Lastly, Plaintiff-Koosej argues that he should not have to pay attorneys’ fees
for Defendants’ separate, state-court foreclosure action filed against Plaintiffs. On
this score, Plaintiff-Koosej argues that the foreclosure action was not related to
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 21 of 26

22
Defendants’ success on the recoverable claims in this case and thus, any fees incurred
should not be recoverable.
It is not apparent why Defendants would recover fees for a separate state-court
foreclosure action. Further, Defendants make no effort to demonstrate why such costs
should be recoverable, and/or how the state-court foreclosure action sufficiently
relates to the recoverable claims. Consequently, a $423.00 deduction is appropriate.
D. Costs
Lastly, Defendants also request $6,677.07 in costs. These costs are comprised
of: $242.00 for service of summons and subpoena; $4,980.00 for transcripts; $1,441.78
for printing; and $13.29 for other costs. Plaintiff has not meaningfully opposed any of
these costs. But while unopposed, the Court will still conduct a review of each request.
1. 	Service of Summons and Subpoena
“[P]rivate process server fees may be taxed pursuant to §§ 1920(1) and 1921.”
U.S. E.E.O.C. v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 624 (11th Cir. 2000). Those costs are
typically “limited to $65.00, the standard hourly rate that the U.S. Marshals Service
charges for serving a document.” Garcia v. A K S Cartage Corp., No. 17-22099-CIV,
2018 WL 11406251, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 28, 2018).
Here, Defendants provide invoices for serving both Plaintiffs for a total amount
of $242.00: $22.00 for service of Plaintiff-Derhem, and $220.00 for service ($110.00
for service and $110.00 for a rush fee) of Plaintiff-Koosej. As to the $22.00 for service
of Plaintiff-Derhem, Plaintiff has not objected and the Court’s review reveals no
barrier to entitlement. Thus, Defendants should be awarded that $22.00.
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 22 of 26

23
But Defendants do not demonstrate why we should award $110.00, rather than
the standard $65.00, for service of Plaintiff-Koosej. Further, Defendants do not
demonstrate why they should be awarded an additional $110.00 rush fee. See James
v. Wash Depot Holdings, Inc., 242 F.R.D. 645, 650 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (holding that “a
‘rush fee’ … is not compensable” and reducing bill of costs); Garcia v. A K S Cartage
Corp., No. 17-22099-CIV, 2018 WL 11406251, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 28, 2018) (“Rush
fees are not recoverable and are therefore disallowed [from the bill of costs].”).
Consequently, only $65.00 of the $220.00 sought for service of Plaintiff-Koosej should
be awarded.
In sum, then, Defendants should be awarded $87.00 for service of process:
$22.00 for Plaintiff-Derhem, and $65.00 for Plaintiff-Koosej.
2. 	Transcripts
Next, Defendants seek to tax $4,980.00 for the depositions of both Plaintiffs,
for which Defendants provide exhibits detailing the costs. “Costs for deposition
transcripts are taxable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2) so long as the transcripts were
‘necessarily obtained for use in the case.’” Katz v. Chevaldina, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1285,
1292 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (E.E.O.C., 213 F.3d at 620–21).
Here, the depositions of both Plaintiffs were undoubtedly necessary to this fact-
laden 	case. 	Further, 	Plaintiffs 	have 	not 	lodged 	an 	objection 	to 	these 	costs.
Accordingly, we recommend $4,980.00 in costs be awarded for these transcripts. See
Monelus v. Tocodrian, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (awarding
“costs incurred with respect to Plaintiff's deposition” under section 1920).
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 23 of 26

24
3. 	Printing
Defendants 	further 	seek 	$1,400.00 	for 	printing. 	There 	are 	no 	exhibits,
however, that corroborate this amount, nor do Defendants provide any substantive
argument as to what was printed and why the cost is recoverable. Consequently,
$1,400.00 should be deducted from the Bill of Costs.
4. 	Other Costs
As to this category, Defendants seek $13.29 for, apparently, parking near the
courthouse for an October 4, 2022 status conference. Defendants make no effort to
demonstrate why or how this would be compensable. Consequently, this cost—
especially absent any explanation by Defendants—should not be awarded. See
Duckworth v. Whisenant, 97 F.3d 1393, 1399 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (“Upon
further inspection, Plaintiff's affidavits appear to include costs such as …, courthouse
parking fees … which are clearly nonrecoverable.”).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we recommend that Defendants’ Supplemental
Motion for Costs and Fees [D.E. 386] be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Specifically, we recommend that Defendants be awarded $173,985.85 in
attorneys’ fees (which represents a $423.00 reduction for fees incurred by Defendants’
state-court foreclosure action, and then a 40% deduction from the remaining amount
$290,399.41 that Defendants request).
Of that amount, Plaintiff-Derhem should be jointly and several liable for the
entire 	amount, 	and 	Plaintiff-Koosej 	should 	be 	jointly 	and 	severally 	liable 	for
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 24 of 26

25
$60,560.31 of that amount (which represents the initial amount of $290,399.41,
minus a $7,270.50 deduction for Plaintiff’s Florida Bar and DBPR complaints, a
$2,805.50 	deduction 	for 	fees 	related 	to 	Defendant-Zahniser 	and 	Defendant-
Desimone’s fees motion, a $179,389.56 deduction for fees incurred prior to January
28, 2022, and a 40% deduction for fees incurred by time spent on the non-recoverable
claims).
We further recommend that Defendants be awarded $5,108.78 in taxable costs,
which includes a $155.00 reduction for service, a $1,400 deduction for printing, and
a $13.29 deduction for parking. Because the costs relate to service and Plaintiffs’
deposition transcripts, both Plaintiffs shall be jointly and severally liable for the full
amount of costs.
Pursuant to Local Magistrate Rule 4(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, the parties have
fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation within which to
file written objections, if any, to the District Judge. Failure to timely file objections
shall bar the parties from de novo determination by the District Judge of any factual
or legal issue covered in the Report and shall bar the parties from challenging on
appeal the District Judge’s Order based on any unobjected-to factual or legal
conclusions included in the Report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; see, e.g.,
Patton v. Rowell, 2017 WL 443634 (11th Cir. Feb. 2, 2017); Cooley v. Commissioner
of Social Security, 2016 WL 7321208 (11th Cir. Dec. 16, 2016).
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 25 of 26

26
DONE and SUBMITTED in Chambers at Miami, Florida this 29th day of
December, 2025.
/s/ Edwin G. Torres
EDWIN G. TORRES
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:20-cv-22318-KMW Document 426 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/29/2025 Page 26 of 26