Derhem v. Bay House Miami Condominium Association et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 20-cv-22318-WILLIAMS/TORRES
KANAYO DERHEM and
MOJTABA E. KOOSEJ,
Plaintiff,
v.
BAY HOUSE MIAMI CONDOMINIUM
ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANT’S
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
This cause comes before the Court on Defendant, Charles Brumsted Jr.’s
Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs against Plaintiffs (“Plaintiff-
Derhem,” “Plaintiff-Koosej,” and collectively, “Plaintiffs”). [D.E. 387]. The Motion has
been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.1 After review of the briefing and relevant
authorities, and for the reasons set forth below, we recommend that Defendant’s
Motion be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
1 On December 3, 2024, the Honorable Kathleen M. Williams referred this Motion to
the Undersigned Magistrate Judge for disposition. [D.E. 376].
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I. 	BACKGROUND
In a previous Order, this Court determined that Defendant is entitled to
attorneys’ fees for having prevailed on Counts II, III, and V of Plaintiffs’ Second
Amended Complaint. [D.E. 384]. The Court also determined that Defendant is not
entitled to fees for Count I; consequently, the Court ordered Defendant to file this
Supplemental Motion to adjust his requested fee award (to exclude time entries
related to Count I).
In the pending Motion, Defendant now seeks $186,459.00 in attorneys’ fees for
1,265.8 hours of billed time. Plaintiff-Derhem, meanwhile, asserts several broad
objections to the Motion, including that: Defendant’s team was unnecessarily large;
Defendant used block billing, repetitive short entries, vague entries, and redacted
entries; Defendant’s own conduct contributed to the attorneys’ fees amount; and
Defendant failed to adequately remove the hours expended on Count I.
Separately, Plaintiff-Koosej argues that the Court should limit his liability
because he was not a named Plaintiff until the Second Amended Complaint. Thus, all
fees incurred before January 24, 2022, Plaintiff-Koosej asserts, should be paid by only
Plaintiff-Derhem. And the same goes for an attorneys’ fees motion filed after two
Defendants, 	Mr. 	Zahniser 	and 	Mr. 	Desimone, 	successfully 	dismissed 	Plaintiff-
Derhem’s First Amended Complaint (to which Plaintiff-Koosej was not a party).
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II. 	APPLICABLE LAW AND PRINCIPLES
A. Attorneys’ Fees
In determining an appropriate fee award, we employ the lodestar method. See
City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992) (“The ‘lodestar figure has, as its
name suggests, become the guiding light of our fee-shifting jurisprudence. We have
established a ‘strong presumption’ that the lodestar represents the ‘reasonable’ fee”).
This method allows for a reasonable estimate of the value of an attorney’s service
because the movant submits evidence “supporting the hours worked and rates
claimed.” 	Hensley 	v. 	Eckerhart, 	461 	U.S. 	424, 	433 	(1983). 	If 	the 	movant’s
documentation of hours worked is inadequate, “the district court may reduce the
award accordingly.” Id.
The lodestar method requires the Court to first determine an attorney’s
reasonable hourly rate, and to multiply that rate by the number of hours reasonably
expended. See, e.g., Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994); Norman
v. Housing Auth. Of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988); see also
Harbaugh v. Greslin, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2005). Following the
Court’s calculation, “the court must next consider the necessity of an adjustment for
results obtained.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302. Accordingly, when awarding fees, the
Court must allow meaningful review of its decision and “articulate the decisions it
made, give principled reasons for those decisions, and show its calculation.” Id. at
1304 (citation omitted).
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In awarding attorneys’ fees, “courts are not authorized to be generous with the
money of others, and it is as much the duty of courts to see that excessive fees and
expenses are not awarded as it is to see that an adequate amount is awarded.” ACLU
of Georgia v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 428 (11th Cir. 1999). Courts, however, have
considerable discretion when determining whether a party to a case should receive a
fee award. See Cullens v. Georgia Dept. Of Transp., 29 F.3d 1489, 1492-1493 (11th
Cir. 1994) (emphasizing that the district court is “empowered to exercise discretion
in determining whether an award is to be made and if so its reasonableness.”).
An award must be reasonable and must fall within the guidelines for fee
awards promulgated by the Eleventh Circuit. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299-1302. It
is consequently within a court’s ultimate discretion to adjust the fees to an amount it
deems proper according to the Eleventh Circuit’s parameters. See, e.g., Columbus
Mills, Inc. v. Freeland, 918 F.2d 1575, 1580 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he Norman Court
left to the discretion of the district court the decision of whether to prune excessive
hours”); Cullens, 29 F.3d at 1492 (“[W]e reemphasize that the district court has
discretion in determining the amount of a fee award. This is appropriate in view of
the district court’s superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of
avoiding 	frequent 	appellate 	review 	of 	what 	essentially 	are 	factual 	matters.”)
(quotation omitted).
B. Costs
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1), a prevailing party is entitled to recover costs as
a matter of course unless directed otherwise by a court or statute. A strong
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presumption exists in favor of awarding costs. Id. A court may tax as costs those
expenses enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons,
Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987) (absent explicit statutory or contractual authorization,
federal courts are bound by the limitations set out in § 1920). “To defeat the
presumption and deny full costs, a district court must have a sound basis for doing
so.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1039 (11th Cir. 2000).
Pursuant to section 1920, a court may award the following costs:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily
obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any
materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the
case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; and
(6) Compensation 	of 	court 	appointed 	experts, 	compensation 	of
interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special
interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.
III. 	ANALYSIS
We 	will 	first 	assess 	Defendant’s 	hourly 	rates 	before 	assessing 	the
reasonableness of the time expended.
A. Reasonable Hourly Rate
This rate is defined as the “prevailing market rate in the relevant legal
community 	for 	similar 	services 	by 	lawyers 	of 	reasonably 	comparable 	skills,
experience and reputation.” Laranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299). The relevant market is “the place where the case
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is filed.” ACLU of Georgia, 168 F.3d at 427 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). The relevant legal community here is South Florida.
Several factors may be considered in arriving at that prevailing market rate,
as set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 488 F.2d 714, 717-719 (5th
Cir. 1974). The movant is required to submit to the Court satisfactory evidence to
establish that the requested rate accurately reflects the prevailing market rate. See
Duckworth v. Whisenant, 97 F.3d 1393, 1396 (11th Cir. 1996); Norman, 836 F.2d at
1299 (finding that the burden lies with fee applicant “of producing satisfactory
evidence that the requested rate is in line with prevailing market rates” and
“satisfactory evidence necessarily must speak to rates actually billed and paid in
similar lawsuits.”). Ultimately, the Court remains an expert on the issue of hourly
rates in its community and may properly consider “its own knowledge and experience
concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent judgment either
with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.” Loranger, 10 F.3d at 781 (quoting
Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303).
Here, Defendant seeks the following hourly rates:
• 	Craig J. Shankman (Partner): $150.00 to $175.00
• 	William Thomas Leveille, II (Associate): $125.00 to $150.00
• 	Dina R. MacDonald (Paralegal): $75.00
• 	Maria Gabriela Alvarez (Paralegal): $95.00
• 	Patricia A. Klug (Paralegal): $95.00
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As an initial matter, we note that Plaintiffs have not meaningfully objected to
any of 	Defendant’s proffered rates. 	Against that backdrop, we too find to be
reasonable the attorney rates between $185.00 and $235.00 for this condominium
discrimination dispute. Indeed, numerous courts in this Circuit have found even
higher rates to be reasonable in several types of landlord/tenant disputes, and none
of those rates are patently unreasonable in this market. See, e.g., Friedel v. Sun
Communities, Inc., No. 19-14394-CIV, 2022 WL 17669933, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 3,
2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 19-CV-14394, 2022 WL 17668290
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2022) (finding to be reasonable rates between $200 and $250 for
partners and associates in a landlord/tenant housing dispute); Julian Depot Miami
LLC v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 19-22838-CIV, 2020 WL 9460232, at *3 (S.D.
Fla. May 13, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 9460224 (S.D. Fla.
June 3, 2020) (finding the following hourly rates to be reasonable in a landlord/tenant
dispute: “(1) $350 for partners at Gurley & Associates, (2) $425 to $515 for partners
at Seyfarth Shaw, (3) $295 for counsel and associates at Gurley & Associates, (4) $300
to $375 for associates at Seyfarth Shaw, and (5) $150 for paralegals at Gurley &
Associates”).
Thus, Defendant should be entitled to his requested attorneys’ rates.
The Court also finds ample support to award Defendant his paralegal rates of
$75.00 to $95.00. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Legion Media, LLC, No. 8:24-CV-1459-
JLB-AAS, 	2025 	WL 	1195544, 	at 	*2 	(M.D. 	Fla. 	Apr. 	8, 	2025), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 1195906 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2025) (noting that
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the court “typically award[s] an hourly rate of $100.00 for paralegal services); Fed.
Trade Comm'n v. Student Debt Dr. LLC, No. 17-61937-CIV, 2018 WL 4922465, at *1
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 4922466
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2018) (finding to be reasonable a “rate for paralegals at … $75.00
- $100.00 per hour”); Centennial Bank v. M/V "Why Not", No. 22-CV-22883, 2024 WL
3072041, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2024), report and recommendation adopted sub nom.,
No. 22-22883-CIV, 2024 WL 3070755 (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2024) (“find[ing] that hourly
rates of $125.00 for paralegal Grubbs and $100 for paralegals Hart and Baum to be
more in-line with paralegal hourly rates approved by Courts in this District”).
B. Hours Expended
Next, the lodestar analysis requires that we determine the reasonable number
of hours expended in the litigation. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301. The award must
exclude compensation for hours “that would be unreasonable to bill to a client and
therefore to one’s adversary irrespective of the skill, reputation or experience of
counsel.” ACLU of Georgia, 168 F.3d at 428 (quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301)
(emphasis in original). The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing that the
time for which compensation is sought was reasonably expended on the litigation and
must provide the Court with specific and detailed evidence that will allow for an
accurate determination of the amount of the fees to award. Id. If the fee applicant
fails to exercise required “billing judgment,” the Court is obligated to “[prune] out
those [hours] that are ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’” Id. The
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Court is presumed to be an expert in reviewing the number of hours expended on
litigation for the purpose of attorney’s fees. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303.
The party opposing the fee application must satisfy his obligation to provide
specific and reasonably precise objections concerning hours that should be excluded.
ACLU of Georgia, 168 F.3d at 427. In the final analysis, however, “exclusions for
excessive or unnecessary work on given tasks must be left to the discretion of the
district court.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301.
For 	the 	most 	part, 	Plaintiff-Derhem’s 	objections 	are 	entirely 	too 	broad.
Plaintiff even admits in her surreply that her “opposition” is “not solely a line-by-line
challenge to the hours billed, but rather a request for the Court to exercise its
equitable discretion to deny a fee award in its entirety due to Defendants’ alleged
misconduct.” [D.E. 393-1 at 5]. Indeed, Plaintiff’s opposition is not a line-by-line
challenge at all; Plaintiff fails to identify any specific time entries to which she
objects. This practice, of course, is flagrantly insufficient under Eleventh Circuit
precedent. See Barnes, 168 F.3d at 428 (quoting Norman, 836 F.3d at 1301) (“In order
for courts to carry out their duties in this area, ‘objections and proof from fee
opponent’ concerning hours that should be excluded must be specific and ‘reasonably
precise.’”).
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The Court, however, will nonetheless review several of Plaintiff’s broad
objections to ensure Defendant does not receive a windfall.2 The Court will then
review Plaintiff-Koosej’s separate and distinct objections.
1. 	Volume of Attorneys
Plaintiff-Derhem first argues that it is unreasonable for Defendant to seek fees
for the work of two attorneys and three paralegals. In support, Plaintiff-Derhem
argues that this “suggest[s] an inefficient allocation of resources that would be
unreasonable to bill to a client, let alone an adversary.” [D.E. 391 at 2].
As an initial matter, we do not find the volume of professionals in this case to
be unreasonable. This case has included a torturous procedural history, with serial
filings, several amended complaints, and numerous stays and appeals. And without
the identification of specific time entries that indicate duplicative work, the Court
does not view Defendant’s team of attorneys as per se unreasonable—especially in
this voluminous, heavily-litigated, and procedurally-perplexing affair. See Johnson v.
Univ. Coll. of Univ. of Alabama in Birmingham, 706 F.2d 1205, 1208 (11th Cir. 1983)
(“The 	retaining 	of 	multiple 	attorneys 	in 	a 	significant, 	lengthy 	employment
discrimination case such as this one is understandable and not a ground for reducing
the hours claimed. The use in involved litigation of a team of attorneys who divide up
the work is common today for both plaintiff and defense work. While Johnson
2 We also note that several arguments raised in Plaintiff-Derhem’s opposition (and
sur-reply) address Defendant’s entitlement to fees. The Court, of course, already
addressed Defendant’s fee entitlement by separate Order (objections to which the
District Court may address after entry of this Report and Recommendation). [D.E.
383]. Consequently, the Court will not address those arguments here.
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recognizes the possibility of unnecessary duplication for which double compensation
should not be granted … a reduction is warranted only if the attorneys are
unreasonably doing the same work. An award for time spent by two or more attorneys
is proper as long as it reflects the distinct contribution of each lawyer to the case and
the customary practice of multiple-lawyer litigation.”).
Further, Plaintiff-Derhem provides the Court with no suggestion on how many
hours to reduce, which attorneys were unnecessary, which time entries should be
removed, or what amount of the fee award is unreasonable. Consequently, Plaintiff’s
objection is not only legally insufficient, but insufficient as a practical matter. See
Apple Glen Invs., L.P. v. Express Scripts, Inc., No. 814RCVR1527RTR33TGW, 2018
WL 2945629, at *14 (M.D. Fla. May 25, 2018), report and recommendation adopted,
2018 WL 2937469 (M.D. Fla. June 11, 2018) (“The defendant has not identified any
specific hours that were expended on litigating the fees for fees issue, nor has it even
stated some general amount that should be excluded for work on that issue. Because
the defendant has not provided any basis for determining an amount that should be
reduced in connection with litigation for fees on fees, this failure constitutes an
additional reason why the … challenge is unavailing.”).
2. 	Short Entries and Block Billing
Plaintiff-Derhem next objects that “[t]he billing contains a high frequency of
very short entries” and includes “instances of block billing.” [D.E. 391 at 2]. But
Plaintiff fails to highlight any specific time entries, what amount of hours the Court
should deduct, or any other support to render Plaintiff’s objection sufficient. The
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Court, meanwhile, will not rummage through 300 pages of exhibits to complete
Plaintiff’s work for her. This objection, then, should be overruled. See Rubinstein v.
Keshet Inter Vivos Tr., No. 17-61019-CIV, 2019 WL 8275157, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 17,
2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1445472 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 24,
2020) (quoting Shaw v. City of Selma, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1280 (S.D. Ala. 2017),
aff'd, 884 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 2018)) (noting that “the Court is ‘under no independent
obligation to rummage through the ... exhibits submitted ... in search of some excerpt
that might bolster [Plaintiffs’] point’”).
3. 	Vague, Insufficient, and Redacted Time Entries
Next, Plaintiff-Derhem argues that many of Defendant’s time entries “lack
sufficient detail” and thus are “unacceptably vague,” and that some billing entries are
impermissibly redacted.
As to the vague time entries, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s assessment.
Plaintiff asserts that several time entries on or near page ten of Defendant’s exhibit
are vague; those read: “review complaint for discrimination in housing practices,”
“Review 	correspondence,” 	and 	“telephone 	conference.” 	But 	upon 	review 	of
Defendant’s exhibit, the Court sees no such time entries.
The Court does, however, see time entries that read:
• 	“Review correspondence from … co-defendant’s counsel advising she
contacted the clerk and told them of the error removing her as counsel
and making us counsel for all parties, and that the clerk will correct the
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error and we do not therefore need to file a motion to correct scriveners
error.” [D.E. 387-1 at 9]; and
• 	“Review Plaintiff’s response in opposition to Defendant Bay House
Association’s Motion to Dismiss.” [Id. at 12].
But the Court struggles to find any time entries that resemble the ones
Plaintiff represents are direct quotes from Defendant’s exhibit. Plaintiff provides no
other examples that the Court can locate in Defendant’s exhibit. Nor does the Court’s
overall 	review 	of 	Defendants’ 	time 	entries 	reveal 	patently-vague 	descriptions.
Plaintiff-Derhem’s objection, therefore, should once again be overruled.
As to the redacted entries, the Court’s review reveals sufficient descriptions
outside of the redactions. For example, one of the redacted entries reads “Draft
memorandum to Nate Hartman (Claims Professional) discussing [redacted].” [Id. at
12]. Another such entry reads “Draft comprehensive memorandum to Insured
Charles Brumsted [redacted].” [Id. at 36]. Several other entries read similarly; i.e.,
while 	partially 	redacted 	to 	protect 	confidentiality, 	the 	Court 	remains 	able 	to
meaningfully review each time entry to determine their reasonable relation to the
litigation. Consequently, no deductions are appropriate on this score. See Alper Auto.,
Inc. v. Day to Day Imports, Inc., No. 18-81753-CIV, 2022 WL 3904327, at *5 (S.D. Fla.
July 26, 2022) (rejecting similar redaction argument because the Court “[did] not find
that the time entries in this case are so heavily redacted that I cannot discern the
legal work being done or accurately determine whether the time is compensable or
not. A review of the billing records shows that the redactions are consistent with Local
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Rule 7.3(a) and do not impede meaningful review. Thus, I do not find it reasonable to
deduct those hours from the total hours billed.”); Meyrowitz v. Brendel, No. 16-81793-
CV, 2018 WL 4440492, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2018) (“In sum, when considering
the time entries that include redactions, but are not completely redacted … the Court
does not find that the entries are unacceptably vague or too heavily redacted, and will
not deduct those hours from the total time billed.”).
4. 	Defendant’s Conduct
Plaintiff-Derhem also asserts that Defendant’s own conduct caused attorneys’
fees. For example, Plaintiff points to Defendant’s apparent evasiveness in depositions
and Defendant’s alleged spoliation of evidence.
For one, the Court never made such findings throughout the entirety of this
litigation. Consequently, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s one-line assertions,
amidst attorneys’ fees briefing, that Defendant committed sanctionable discovery
violations.
And by and large, throughout the harrowing procedural history of this case, it
was Plaintiff’s conduct that occasioned unnecessary litigation. Indeed, as this Court
noted in a prior order,
Plaintiffs 	have 	repeatedly 	failed 	to 	adhere 	to 	Court 	practices,
procedures, and deadlines and have been represented by various counsel
or appeared pro se. (See, e.g., DE 309; DE 266; DE 293). While the Court
affords more lenience to pro se plaintiffs, Plaintiffs consistent refusal to
adhere to procedures or Court orders has created a nearly unintelligible
record, requiring the Court to attempt to piece together Plaintiffs’
arguments and evidence through various disparate filings. As such,
inevitable inconsistencies exist. While the Court has attempted to
reconcile the various allegations, certain portions of the record remain
incomprehensible.
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[D.E. 317 at 6]. Thus, if any party’s conduct caused unnecessary attorneys’ fees, it
was Plaintiffs. This objection, therefore, should also be overruled.
5. Fees for Non-Recoverable Claims
Lastly, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant seeks to implicitly recover fees for the
three claims for which the Court denied entitlement. Specifically, this Court found
(in a Report and Recommendation) that Defendant is entitled to attorneys’ fees on
counts II, III, and V (all brought under Florida’s condominium laws), but not Count I.
In her opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant fails to adequately segregate
the hours expended on the recoverable claims versus the non-recoverable claims. And
as a result, much of Defendant’s fee award should be reduced because it is impossible
to tell how many hours were expended on only the recoverable claims.
In reply, Defendant points out that he highlighted in blue the time entries that
were 	removed 	because 	they 	related 	solely 	to 	the 	non-recoverable 	claims. 	But
Defendant does not at all address the thrust of Plaintiffs’ objection.
Upon review of Defendant’s billing records, Plaintiffs’ position on this point is
well taken and a deduction is appropriate. Primarily, this case was one that centered
on discrimination (i.e., non-recoverable Count I). Thus, for much of the briefing,
correspondences, and overall activity (e.g., Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Motion for
Summary Judgment, and more), much of the work was concentrated, or at least
shared with, the non-recoverable claims.
In other words, much of Defendant’s time entries include work expended on
the non-recoverable claims. For example, there are a myriad of entries that refer
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broadly to corresponding about, drafting, reviewing, and analyzing the motion to
dismiss (and Plaintiff’s related Complaint). See, e.g., [D.E. 387-1 at 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12]. The same goes for Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., [Id. at
253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258]. Meanwhile, a healthy portion of the briefing for each of
these motions was spent on the non-recoverable claims. For example, out of the
motion for summary judgment’s twenty pages, nine are dedicated to Count I (a non-
recoverable claim). [D.E. 213].
Consequently, it would be improper for Defendant to recover his full requested
amount, when a significant portion of that amount was spent on a non-recoverable
claim. Because Defendant’s billing record is so voluminous (over 300 pages), and
because it is too impractical to discern which precise time entries should be stricken,
an across-the-board cut is appropriate. See Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 783
(11th Cir. 1994) (holding that where the billing record is voluminous, “the district
court need not engage in an hour-by-hour analysis[; r]ather, ... it may [ ] reduce [the
hours devoted to litigation] in gross if a review of the resubmitted fee request
warrants such a reduction”); see also Paguaga v. Pinnacle One Price Dry Cleaning of
Davie, LLC, No. 20-22694-CIV, 2023 WL 2388272, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2023) (“An
across-the-board reduction is preferable here because, although the Court reviewed
the billing records submitted, the records are too voluminous to take an hour-by-hour
approach.”).
Here, a 40% reduction is appropriate. As already explained, the central claim
that dominated this litigation was Plaintiffs’ federal housing discrimination claim
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(Count I), with much of the substantive briefing (and its accompanying research,
strategy, and correspondences) and fact discovery geared toward that claim and its
theories. Granted, Defendant did make an effort to remove the time entries related
solely to the non-recoverable claims. But to award the entirety of the requested fee
amount would be to award a huge portion of fees related to Count I. In light of this,
40% is a fair reduction. It still awards Defendant with the bulk of his fee award, but
within a reasonable range of fairness given the need to deduct the healthy portion of
work that went towards the non-recoverable claims. See, e.g., Valdez v. Kalmd Home
Care LLC, No. 6:24-CV-237-GAP-RMN, 2025 WL 1727265, at *4 (M.D. Fla. June 4,
2025), report and recommendation adopted sub nom., 2025 WL 1726237 (M.D. Fla.
June 20, 2025) (“After carefully reviewing the billing records, and because I cannot
determine the reasonableness of the hours requested because counsel has not
parceled out which hours were spent on only the claims she ultimately prevailed on,
I 	recommend 	reducing 	the 	claimed 	hours 	across-the-board 	by 	fifty 	percent.”);
Davenport v. City of Columbus, Ga., No. 4:06-CV-150 (CDL), 2009 WL 235253, at *5
(M.D. Ga. Jan. 30, 2009) (“With the exception of a handful of tasks which Plaintiff
appears to concede relate solely to unsuccessful claims (which Plaintiff has already
excluded), it would be difficult, if not impossible, to attribute the time entries to
‘successful’ or ‘unsuccessful’ claims. The Court therefore concludes that an across-the-
board reduction of hours to account for unsuccessful claims is appropriate, as Plaintiff
suggests. … Accordingly, the Court concludes that a 50% reduction is warranted to
account for Plaintiff's separate and distinct unsuccessful claims.”); cf. Otto v. City of
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Boca Raton, No. 24-10478 (11th Cir. Oct. 20, 2025) (reversing and remanding an
across-the-board 	cut 	where 	the 	district 	court’s 	decision 	was 	“arbitrary 	and
unwarranted,” because the court did not explain the calculation of its deductions, and
no “billing defect or excess … could account for such a large reduction”).
Accordingly, 	we 	recommend 	that 	Defendant 	be 	awarded 	$108,634.96 	in
attorneys’ 	fees 	(which 	represents 	a 	40% 	deduction 	from 	the 	$186,459.00 	that
Defendant requests).
C. Plaintiff-Koosej’s Fee Liability
Next, we determine whether both Plaintiffs should be jointly and severally
liable for the entire fee award. Plaintiff-Koosej argues that, because he was not a
named Plaintiff until the Second Amended Complaint, all fees incurred prior to that
time should be paid exclusively by Plaintiff-Derhem (who has been a Plaintiff
throughout the entirety of the litigation). In response, Defendant argues that joint
and several liability between both Plaintiffs for the entire fee award is proper.
Further, Plaintiff-Koosej seeks reductions for an attorneys’ fees motion filed after
dismissal of the First Amended Complaint (to which Plaintiff-Koosej was not a party),
and motions filed by Plaintiff-Derhem as a pro se litigant. In response, Defendant
argues that joint and several liability between both Plaintiffs for the entire fee award
is proper.
1. 	Fees Incurred Prior to the Second Amended Complaint
“The default rule is that costs are to be imposed jointly and severally, and the
burden is on the party seeking to avoid that to introduce evidence justifying
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apportionment and persuade the court to do that.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Silver Star Health & Rehab, 739 F.3d 579, 586 (11th Cir. 2013). “[E]quities favoring
apportionment include: (i) whether the court had consolidated cases on its own
initiative; (ii) whether costs can be easily split; and (iii) and unequal cost attribution.”
Akai Custom Guns, LLC v. KKM Precision, Inc., No. 20-CV-61469, 2025 WL 2663071,
at *8 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL
2659801 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2025) (citing Fernau v. Enchante Beauty Products, Inc.,
No. 18-CV-20866, 2021 WL 1923285, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 13, 2021)).
Here, we find that equity weighs in favor of reducing Plaintiff-Koosej’s fee
liability. Defendant argues that he should not be penalized for Plaintiff-Koosej’s
staggered introduction into the litigation. But by the same token, we also cannot
penalize Plaintiff-Koosej—who was not a party to this case—for not joining himself
as a Plaintiff.
While the presumption may be that fees are to be imposed jointly and severally,
Plaintiff-Koosej has presented a compelling argument to overcome that presumption:
he was not a party to this 2020 case until 2022. And Defendant has provided no
responsive authority that Plaintiff-Koosej should pay fees for litigation to which he
was not a party.
Further, the Court can easily and fairly determine Plaintiff-Koosej’s fee
liability, as Plaintiff-Koosej became a party upon the filing of the Second Amended
Complaint. Thus, January 28, 2022 (the date of the first time entry related to the
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Second Amended Complaint) is the date from which Plaintiff-Koosej should be jointly
responsible for fees.
And to be clear, we agree that, from the point that Plaintiff-Koosej joined this
case, he should be jointly and severally liable for the fee award (except for Plaintiff-
Koosej’s below, discrete objections). But we find no basis to require Plaintiff-Koosej
to pay fees for litigation in which he did not participate. See Levin v. Levans, Inc., No.
08-61730-CIV, 2010 WL 1571192, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2010), report and
recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 1610417 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2010) (“There is no
basis for this Court to apportion the attorney's fees award between Defendant Levine
and a former Defendant who was not a party to the underlying settlement agreement
and, in fact, was dismissed from the lawsuit.”); see also Shelton v. Schar, No. 5:17-
CV-86-OC-PGBPRL, 2018 WL 6261485, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2018) (apportioning
fee award based on “a per-plaintiff basis”).
2. 	Fees Incurred for Zahniser and Desimone’s Fees Motion
Moreover, Plaintiff-Koosej argues that he should not have to pay fees that
related to Mr. Zahniser’s and Mr. Desimone’s motion for attorneys’ fees, because that
motion was filed after those Defendants prevailed on the First Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff-Koosej, meanwhile, did not become a party to this case until the Second
Amended Complaint. Thus, Plaintiff-Koosej has highlighted several time entries that
relate to the drafting of that motion.
Applying the same rationale as above, we agree that Plaintiff-Koosej should
not 	have 	to 	pay 	attorneys’ 	fees 	for 	litigation 	to 	which 	she 	was 	not 	a 	party.
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Consequently, we recommend the deduction of $360.00; this represents the sum of
the time entries Plaintiff-Koosej identified that relate to Zahniser and Desimone’s
motion for attorneys’ fees, excluding those time entries that occurred before January
28, 2022, because those time entries already are being excluded as to Plaintiff-
Koosej).
3. 	Fees Incurred from Plaintiff-Derhem’s Pro Se Filings
Lastly, Plaintiff-Koosej seeks a deduction for fees incurred for many of
Plaintiff-Derhem’s pro se filings. But upon review of the docket, Plaintiff-Koosej
signed onto practically all of the filings for which Plaintiff-Koosej now seeks a fee
deduction. And when the Court provided Plaintiff-Koosej an opportunity to, for
example, disavow himself from Plaintiff-Derhem’s response to Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, Plaintiff-Koosej filed a notice to indicate that he joined in
Plaintiff-Derhem’s response. [D.E. 294].
Thus, in the event Plaintiff-Koosej ever took issue with joining in Plaintiff-
Derhem’s pro se filings, Plaintiff-Koosej hardly reflected that effort in the record.
Accordingly, without more precise argument, the Court does not find that equity
weighs in favor of limiting Plaintiff-Koosej’s fee liability on this score.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we recommend that Defendant’s Supplemental
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees [D.E. 387] be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Specifically, 	we 	recommend 	that 	Defendant 	be 	awarded 	$111,875.40 	in
attorneys’ 	fees 	(which 	represents 	a 	40% 	deduction 	from 	the 	$186,459.00 	that
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Defendant requests). Plaintiff-Koosej, however, should be jointly and severally liable
for only $49,338.90 of that amount (which, in addition to the 40% cut, excludes
$360.00 	related 	to 	Defendant-Zahniser’s 	and 	Defendant-Desimone’s 	motion 	for
attorneys’ fees, and all time entries prior to January 28, 2022).
Pursuant to Local Magistrate Rule 4(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, the parties have
fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation within which to
file written objections, if any, to the District Judge. Failure to timely file objections
shall bar the parties from de novo determination by the District Judge of any factual
or legal issue covered in the Report and shall bar the parties from challenging on
appeal the District Judge’s Order based on any unobjected-to factual or legal
conclusions included in the Report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; see, e.g.,
Patton v. Rowell, 2017 WL 443634 (11th Cir. Feb. 2, 2017); Cooley v. Commissioner
of Social Security, 2016 WL 7321208 (11th Cir. Dec. 16, 2016).
DONE and SUBMITTED in Chambers at Miami, Florida this 30th day of
December, 2025.
/s/ Edwin G. Torres
EDWIN G. TORRES
United States Magistrate Judge
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