Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE No. 24-cv-21432-ALTMAN/Strauss
EDUARDO CARRERA,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_____________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S UNOPPOSED
MOTION FOR AUTHORIZATION OF AN ATTORNEY FEE
Our Petitioner, Heather Freeman (the Plaintiff’s lawyer), has moved, “pursuant to § 206(b)(1)
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) for authorization of [a payment of] a gross attorney
fee of $18,186.25, representing 25% of the past due benefits for the claim, with instructions for the
agency to process a net attorney fee of $15,936.05 from Plaintiff’s past due benefits.” Unopposed
Motion for Authorization of an Attorney Fee Under Section 206(b)(1) of the Social Security Act (the
“Motion”) [ECF No. 21] at 1.1 After careful review of the Motion—and having independently
reviewed the character of Freeman’s representations and the subsequent results—we now GRANT
the Petition.
T HE F ACTS
Our Plaintiff, Eduardo Carrera, retained the Law Office of Heather Freeman, PLLC (the “Law
Firm”), on May 2, 2024, to represent him and his “beneficiaries entitled to benefits under the Social
Security Act in a civil action.” Social Security Contingent Fee Contract (the “Agreement”) [ECF
No. 21-1] ¶ 1. Under that Agreement, “[a]n attorney who successfully represents a Social Security
1 The Social Security Commissioner “neither supports nor opposes” the Motion. See Mot. at 7.
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benefits claimant . . . may be awarded . . . ‘a reasonable fee . . . not in excess of 25 percent of the
. . . past-due benefits’ awarded to the claimant.” Id. ¶ 3 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A)). Carrera
agreed that his “attorney may also seek payment of an attorney fee pursuant to the provisions of the
Equal Access to Justice Act (‘EAJA’)” and assigned his rights under the EAJA to his attorneys,
authorizing “any fee awarded under the EAJA to be paid directly to [Freeman or her designee].” Id.
¶¶ 7–8.
On April 17, 2024, Carrera filed his Complaint for Review of Denial of Social Security Benefits
(“the Complaint”) [ECF No. 1]. On July 2, 2024, the Commissioner filed an Unopposed Motion to
Remand (the “Motion to Remand”) [ECF No. 16], asking us to “enter a judgment with reversal and
remand of this civil action to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings pursuant to
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).” Motion to Remand at 1. That same day we granted the Motion
to Remand and remanded the case to the Commissioner for further action. See generally Order for
Entry of Judgment Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) [ECF No. 17]; Final Judgment [ECF No. 18]. Following
that remand, “a fully favorable decision [for Carrera] was issued by an Administrative Law Judge and
became the Commissioner’s final decision.” Mot. at 2. The Social Security Administration issued a
Notice of Award to Plaintiff on January 13, 2026, which was provided to Petitioner on January 20,
2026. See Mot. at 2–3; see also Social Security Administration’s Notice of Award (“Notice of Award”)
[ECF No. 21-2].
On July 9, 2024, Carrera filed an Unopposed Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs under the
Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 [ECF No. 19], which we granted, awarding
Carrera’s attorneys’ fees in the amount of $2,250.20. See Order Granting Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion
for Attorney’s Fees [ECF No. 20]. Freeman now asks that we either “authorize the agency to pay the
gross authorized fee [of $18,186.25] to [Freeman] and instruct [Freeman] to then refund the EAJA fee
amount [of $2,250.20] to [Carrera] upon receipt of the agency’s funds, or . . . order the disbursement
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of a net § 406(b) fee [of $15,936.05] by authorizing the agency to pay the amount equivalent to the
gross fee less . . . the EAJA attorney fee.” Mot. at 6–7.
T HE L AW
As relevant here, federal law provides as follows:
Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter
who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and
allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of
25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by
reason 	of 	such 	judgment, 	and 	the 	Commissioner 	of 	Social 	Security 	may,
notwithstanding the provisions of section 405(i) of this title, but subject to subsection
(d) of this section, certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of,
and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits. In case of any such
judgment, no other fee may be payable or certified for payment for such representation
except as provided in this paragraph.
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A); see also Bergen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 454 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“[Section] 406(b) authorizes an award of attorney’s fees where the district court remands the case to
the Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings, and the Commissioner on remand
awards the claimant past-due benefits.”). But a lawyer may not “charge[ ], demand[ ], receive[ ], or
collect[ ] for services rendered in connection with proceedings before a court . . . any amount in excess
of that allowed by the court.” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(2). According to the Supreme Court, “§ 406(b) does
not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead § 406(b) instructs courts
to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789,
808–09 (2002); see also Gossett v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 812 F. App’x 847, 850 (11th Cir. 2020) (noting
that, while contingency-fee agreements are “presumptively reasonable, . . . 406(b) calls for court review
of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular
cases” (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807)); Abner v. O’Malley, 2024 WL 69904, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 5,
2024) (Adams, Mag. J.) (“To receive a fee under [§ 406(b)], an attorney must seek court approval of
the proposed fee, even when there is a fee agreement between the attorney and the client.”). Courts
approach fee determinations “by looking first to the contingent-fee agreement” for reasonableness,
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and then assessing “the character of the representation,” the results achieved, whether the attorney
delayed the proceedings and would thus “profit from the accumulation of benefits during the
pendency of the case in court,” and whether the “benefits are large in comparison to the amount of
time counsel spent on the case.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. Finally, “[w]here EAJA fees have already
been awarded and counsel subsequently seeks fees under § 406(b), the amount of the EAJA award
must be repaid to the claimant or offset from the fees received under § 406(b).” Abner, 2024 WL 69904,
at *2 (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (emphasis added)); see also Jackson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 601 F.3d
1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Although an attorney who receives fees under both the EAJA and 42
U.S.C. § 406(b) must refund the smaller fee to his client, the attorney may choose to effectuate the
refund by deducting the amount of an earlier EAJA award from his subsequent 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) fee
request.” (emphasis added)).
A NALYSIS
Freeman seeks $18,186.25 in attorneys’ fees—or 25% of Carrera’s past-due benefits—as
permitted under both 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and her Agreement with Carrera. See Mot. at 1, 3; see also
Agreement at 1. The Commissioner doesn’t object to this fee request. Mot. at 7. And that’s because
the fee request is fair. Freeman timely filed the Motion within a reasonable time after she received the
Notice of Award on January 20, 2026. See id. at 2−3. The requested fee is reasonable given the
contingency-fee agreement the lawyers signed with the Plaintiff and the favorable decision Carrera
received, including an award of “$72,745.00 in past-due benefits and ongoing benefits (monetary and
Medicare).” Id. at 5; see also Notice of Award. And there’s no evidence that Freeman delayed the
proceedings and would thus “profit from the accumulation of benefits.” See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808.
Although Freeman requests a substantial fee for the 9.2 billable hours she spent representing the
Plaintiff, Freeman asserts (and no one disputes) that she “significantly expedited this matter by
providing initial contentions of error to the Defendant before undertaking a full briefing . . . resulting
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in the Defendant’s Motion to [R]emand.” Mot. at 5. We therefore conclude that a 25% payment (for
a total of $18,186.25) is fair and reasonable compensation for Freeman’s impressive service to Carrera
in this case. See, e.g., Watterson v. Astrue, 2008 WL 783634, at *2–3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2008) (Snyder,
Mag. J.) (finding a $28,767.10 fee reasonable for 26.4 hours of work in a similar Social Security case
because of the contingency percentage the attorneys and client had negotiated, the quality of the
representation, and the lack of delays caused by the attorneys); Pereau v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2023 WL
3765000, at *2–3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2023) (Otazo-Reyes, Mag. J.), report and recommendation adopted, 2023
WL 3750757 (S.D. Fla. June 1, 2023) (Martinez, J.) (finding a $15,000 fee reasonable for 30.5 hours of
work); Sanchez v. Kijakazi, 2021 WL 5088839, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2021) (Becerra, Mag. J.), report
and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 5085435 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2021) (Moore, J.) (finding $25,970.40
reasonable for 30.8 hours of work).
We therefore ORDER and ADJUDGE as follows:
1. 	The Unopposed Motion for Authorization of an Attorney Fee Under Section
206(b)(1) of the Social Security Act [ECF No. 21] is GRANTED.
2. 	Upon a determination that Carrera owes no qualifying, preexisting debts to the
Government, the Commissioner must pay Attorney Heather Freeman $18,186.25
from Carrera’s withheld, past-due Social Security benefits. Freeman must then refund
to Carrera the $2,250.20 in EAJA fees she previously received.
3. 	This 	case 	remains 	CLOSED. 	All 	pending 	deadlines 	and 	hearings 	are
TERMINATED, and any pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
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DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on March 2, 2026.
_________________________________
ROY K. ALTMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: 	counsel of record
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