USA v. Soto

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 25-cr-20288-BLOOM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
ALEJANDRO SOTO,
Defendant.
______________________________/
ORDER ON MOTION IN LIMINE AND/OR FOR CLARIFICATION
REGARDING SCOPE OF ORDER ALLOWING
GOVERNMENT TO INTRODUCE DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the Government’s Motion In Limine and/or for
Clarification 	Regarding 	Scope 	of 	Order 	Allowing 	Government 	to 	Introduce 	Defendant’s
Statements, ECF No. [41], filed on January 27, 2026. Defendant filed a response on January 28,
2026. ECF No. [43]. The Court has carefully reviewed the Motion, the response, and is otherwise
fully advised. For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is denied.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Defendant and his counsel signed two Plea Agreements, one on June 13, 2025, and one on
June 30, 2025. See ECF No. [26-1]; [26-2]. Defendant and his counsel also signed a Stipulated
Factual Basis in Support of Guilty Plea on June 13, 2025. See ECF No. [26-3].
Paragraph 12 of both Plea Agreements states: “The Defendant further understands that in
the event that for any reason he does not plead guilty, any statements made previously by the
Defendant under this agreement or under a previously executed Kastigar letter or as part of any
plea discussions or as part of the facts contained in a factual proffer itself will be fully admissible
against him in any civil or criminal proceedings, notwithstanding any prior agreement with the
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government.” See ECF No. [26-1] ¶ 12.
During an October 28, 2025 hearing, Defendant did not change his plea to guilty and
instead notified the Court that he wishes to proceed to trial. ECF No. [33]. Following that hearing,
the Government filed a Motion In Limine to Admit Defendant’s Statements Made in Connection
with Anticipated Guilty Plea. ECF No. [26]. Defendant did not file a response to that motion.
On December 2, 2025, the Court granted the Government’s November 14, 2025 Motion In
Limine, permitting the Government to “introduce into evidence, in its case in chief, the signed
factual proffer dated June 13, 2025, and may introduce statements made by the Defendant during
the interview conducted on June 17, 2025” (“December 2, 2025 Order”). ECF No. [28]. The
Government’s present Motion seeks an order permitting the Government to introduce, in its case
in chief, phone screenshots that Defendant sent to the Government’s investigative team “following
the [June 17, 2025] interview.” ECF No. [41] ¶¶ 3-4. An FBI Report (FBI-302) of that interview
notes receipt of these screenshots and indicates the electronic images received from Defendant are
attached. Id.
The Government seeks clarification that these screenshots are covered by the Court’s
December 2, 2025 Order or requests that the Court separately rule that the screenshots are
admissible at trial “for the same reasons that the defendant’s statements made during the interview
of June 17, 2025 were ruled to be admissible at trial.” Id. ¶ 5. Defendant argues that the December
2, 2025 Order does not cover admission of the screenshots because the order admits Defendant’s
statements but does not extend to tangible evidence. ECF No. [43]. Defendant does not challenge
the validity of the Plea Agreement or assert that it was not entered into knowingly or voluntarily.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) establishes that Federal Rule of Evidence 410
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governs the admissibility of pleas and plea discussions. Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 11(f). Under Rule 410,
when plea discussions do not result in a guilty plea or that plea is later withdrawn, “a statement
made during plea discussions” are “not admissible against the defendant” unless the statement falls
under one of two exceptions. Fed. R. Evid. 410. However, a defendant may waive his right to
exclude his statements made during plea discussions as long as the waiver is made knowingly and
voluntarily. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 210 (1995) (“We hold that absent some
affirmative indication that the agreement was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily, an
agreement to waive the exclusionary provisions of the plea-statement Rules is valid and
enforceable.”).
Courts review plea agreements “in a manner that is sometimes likened to contractual
interpretation.” United States v. Harris, 376 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations
omitted). “Absent some indication that the parties intended otherwise, […] terms should be given
their ordinary and natural meaning.” See United States v. Rubbo, 396 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir.
2005). However, courts will construe the terms of a plea agreement “in light of the fact that it
constitutes a waiver of ‘substantial constitutional rights’ requiring that the defendant be adequately
warned of the consequences of the plea.” United States v. Copeland, 381 F.3d 1101, 1106 (11th
Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). Ambiguity in a plea agreement “must be read against the
government.” Id. at 1105-06 (internal citations omitted). 	An unambiguous, voluntary, and
knowing agreement will be enforced according to its terms. See, e.g., United States v. Elbeblawy,
899 F.3d 925 (11th Cir. 2018).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Because Defendant declined to plead guilty in this case, the terms of his Plea Agreement
provide that “any statements” made during his plea discussions as well as statements made “as part
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of the facts contained in a factual proffer itself” are “fully admissible against him” in any criminal
proceeding. See ECF No. [26-1] ¶ 12. The Court’s December 2, 2025 Order mirrored the language
of this waiver and permitted the Government to introduce the June 13, 2025 factual proffer and
statements made by the Defendant during the interview conducted on June 17, 2025. ECF No.
[28].
The Government and Defendant disagree whether “statements” encompasses the phone
screenshots Defendant provided following the June 17, 2025 interview. The Plea Agreement does
not define “statements” and there is no indication in the Plea Agreement that the parties intended
a specific meaning of the term. Thus, “statements” should be given its ordinary, plain meaning. A
“statement” is “the act of expressing something in words” or “a verbal assertion or nonverbal
conduct intended as an assertion.” Statement, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). A phone
screenshot, under this ordinary meaning, is not a statement.
U.S. v. Elbeblawy is inapposite here. In Elbeblawy, the court found defendant’s wavier was
voluntary and knowing and permitted the introduction of statements the defendant made during
plea discussions as well as evidence the defendant helped the government obtain. Elbeblawy, 899
F.3d at 932. However, Elbeblawy’s plea agreement stated: “the government will be free to use
against the defendant, directly and indirectly, in any criminal or civil proceeding any of the
information, statements, and materials provided by him pursuant to the agreement[.]” Id. at 935
(alterations adopted). Elbeblawy’s waiver expressly covered the admissibility of information and
materials beyond his statements.
In contrast, the Plea Agreement here only establishes the admissibility of “statements” and
includes no other terms, such as information or materials, that may be admissible. The Government
has provided no other authority by which to interpret “statements” broadly enough to include
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phone screenshots sent by the Defendant following the interview. The Government has also not
provided any indication that the parties intended for “statements” to be read that broadly, and
Defendant’s response to the Motion denies such a broad understanding. Absent such a showing,
expanding “statements” to include separately provided phone screenshots risks interpreting the
plea agreement such that the defendant was not “adequately warned of the consequences of the
plea.” See Copeland, 381 F.3d at 1106. As such, neither the Court’s December 2, 2025 Order nor
the waiver in the Plea Agreement address the admissibility of these phone screenshots.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Government’s Motion, ECF
No. [41], is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on February 4, 2026.
________________________________
BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to: Counsel of record
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