USA v. Ellison

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 1:25-cr-20420-RAR
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JARQUIN DEMETRIUS ELLISON,
Defendant.
___________________________________ /
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Jarquin Demetrius Ellison’s Motion to
Suppress Physical Evidence (ECF No. 17).1 The Government filed a Response in Opposition (ECF
No. 21), to which Defendant filed a Reply (ECF No. 24), and I convened an evidentiary hearing
on the Motion on December 10, 2025. Having considered the Motion, Response, the record, the
evidence and arguments advanced at the hearing, and being otherwise fully advised in the
premises, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Suppress be
GRANTED for the reasons that follow.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Mr. Ellison is charged by indictment with one count of unlawful possession of a firearm
and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The charge stems from
the warrantless search of Mr. Ellison’s vehicle when he was arrested on a warrant for violations of
1 This Motion was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge by the Honorable Rodolfo A. Ruiz II, United States
District Judge. (ECF No. 18).
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his conditions of supervised release. This Motion seeks to suppress the firearm seized in that
search.
II. 	SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE
Mr. Ellison was previously adjudicated guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon and sentenced to a period of imprisonment for a term of 70 months, followed by a period of
supervised release for a term of three years.2 United States v. Ellison, No. 19-CR-20334-CMA,
(ECF No. 28 at 4) (S.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 2019). As a condition of supervised release, Mr. Ellison was
subject to “search of his person or property conducted in a reasonable manner and at a reasonable
time by the U.S. Probation Officer.” Id.
In the evening of May 27, 2025, Mr. Ellison was arrested by Detectives Daniel Aiken and
David Nees from the Miami-Dade County Sherriff’s Office pursuant to an arrest warrant for
violation of the conditions of his supervised release. Each Detective testified at the evidentiary
hearing on the present Motion, and their respective body-worn camera footage was received into
evidence.
On the date of the arrest, Detective Aiken was lead detective on the case and Detective
Nees was his partner. Neither officer was familiar with Mr. Ellison prior to this encounter. They
were assigned to locate Mr. Ellison to effectuate the arrest warrant for violation of his supervised
release. Detective Nees testified that Ellison was also wanted for questioning in relation to a
homicide investigation. The Detectives testified that they understood the arrest warrant arose from
an arrest earlier that month involving narcotics. The Detectives surveilled Mr. Ellison from
2 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the Court takes judicial notice of Mr. Ellison’s prior adjudication and
sentence in this jurisdiction. See generally United States v. Ellison, Case No. 19-CR-20334-CMA (S.D. Fla.). The
Government requested judicial notice of Mr. Ellison’s judgment and conviction (ECF No. 27), which was unopposed
and granted in open court.
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separate, unmarked vehicles outside the home of Mr. Ellison’s child’s mother; Mr. Ellison’s red
Honda Accord was parked in a seemingly private parking spot in front of the multi-family home.
Detective Nees testified that he witnessed Mr. Ellison exit the home and proceed to the
driver’s seat of his Honda. When Mr. Ellison turned the vehicle on, Detective Nees activated his
emergency lights and drove his vehicle into the driveway behind the rear of Mr. Ellison’s Honda.
Detective Nees testified that as he pulled up behind Mr. Ellison, he saw through the Honda’s rear
window Mr. Ellison reach behind the passenger seat toward the floorboard. Though Mr. Ellison’s
rear window is tinted, Detective Nees’s windshield is not. At all times during the arrest and
subsequent search, the body-worn camera footage confirms that the sun was still was out.
Detective Nees exited his vehicle with his weapon drawn and approached Mr. Ellison’s
driver’s side door with Detective Aiken, who had approached from the rear of the Honda. Mr.
Ellison cooperated with the Detectives’ orders as he was pulled out of the driver’s seat with his
hands up, leaned against the side of his vehicle, and was handcuffed by Detective Aiken; Detective
Nees observed and assisted.
In the moments when they apprehended Mr. Ellison, Detective Nees testified that he saw
within the creases of Mr. Ellison’s driver’s seat and scattered on the driver’s floorboard what he
identified as tobacco filling from a cigarillo—referred to as, “guts”—and small pieces of
marijuana—referred to as “shake.” Detective Nees did not announce this finding to the other
officers. Detective Aiken testified that he saw tobacco guts on the floorboard, not marijuana or
“shake.”3
After Mr. Ellison was handcuffed, Detective Aiken guided him back to his unmarked
vehicle. Detective Nees remained at Mr. Ellison’s Honda Accord and announced to the handful of
3 Detective Aiken testified that later in the search he saw “shake,” but repeatedly clarified that initially, he saw tobacco.
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other officers on the scene observing the arrest words to the effect of “we’re just going to do a
quick check.” Again, Detective Nees does not report to the other officers either that he has already
seen marijuana in the car or that he observed Mr. Ellison reach under the passenger seat before he
was taken into custody.
Detective Nees returned to the driver’s seat and looked under a pillow that was laying on
the driver’s seat; he then opened the back driver’s side door and rummaged through items there
before returning to the driver’s seat. Detective Nees leaned over the driver’s seat and observed the
center console; at least one plastic baggie could be seen in the console. Detective Nees testified
that these baggies are used in connection with narcotics. Another officer was searching the
passenger side, and Detective Nees testified that he told that officer about the movement he
observed Mr. Ellison make towards the passenger seat through the rear window.
Detective Nees began searching through the trunk of the Honda, opening bags and boxes
therein with the assistance of a flashlight. While Detective Nees searched the trunk, his Sergeant
approached him and asked a question to the effect of, “you have a warrant, right?” Detective Nees
did not respond to the question. His body-worn camera footage shows him walk away from the
trunk and his hand briefly cover his body-worn camera.4 Detective Nees returned to the driver’s
side and leaned in again, this time to take the keys out of the ignition. Around this time Detective
Nees turned his body-worn camera off and Detective Aiken re-joined the Officers with his camera
still recording (without audio). Detective Aiken’s body-worn camera captured Detective Nees
continuing to search through the trunk. Detective Nees is seen closing the trunk, and then the
driver’s side doors. Detective Nees can be seen turning his attention to the area beneath the
4 Defendant’s subpoena to Detective Nees demanded his production of any evidence preservation policy or policy
relating to body-worn camera usage; he did not produce the requested documents nor explain his failure to comply
with the subpoena.
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passenger front seat with two other officers, who then call for Detective Aiken to observe the area
under the front passenger seat from the perspective of the back passenger seat. Around four
minutes into this search, the Detectives find the firearm that is the subject of Mr. Ellison’s current
charge.
Detective Aiken, as part of his duties as lead detective, took photographs of the evidence,
see Gov. Ex. 3, and documented the incident via an arrest report and an incident report—the reports
were not admitted into evidence but were the subject of testimony. Detective Aiken’s photographs
depicted the firearm and different vantage points of the passenger-side area where the firearm was
found. Detective Aiken did not take any photos of the driver’s seat or what the Government now
claims was marijuana. Nothing was field tested for the presence of marijuana; no marijuana was
collected or impounded. The only evidence that there was marijuana in the car is the Detectives’
testimony that they believed it was marijuana.
Detective Aiken testified that his basis for searching the vehicle was for an inventory search
because he intended to tow the vehicle from the scene. His two reports likewise memorialize that
an inventory search was the basis for the search of Mr. Ellison’s vehicle. The reports make no
mention of marijuana at all and, indeed, Detective Nees admitted on cross examination that the
first time any report memorialized his finding of marijuana in the car was his testimony at Mr.
Ellison’s supervised release revocation hearing, on September 23, 2025.5 Nees testified that he
believes he told his partner that he saw marijuana immediately upon Mr. Ellison’s arrest; he later
testified that he was “1000” percent sure that he told Aiken. He assumes that Aiken’s failure to
document the discovery of marijuana must have been the result of miscommunication.
5 Detective Nees’ testimony differed between the two hearings. In September, he testified that he recognized the pieces
on the floorboard were marijuana. At this evidentiary hearing, he specified that he saw both tobacco pieces and
marijuana.
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The vehicle ultimately was not towed or impounded. It was released to Mr. Ellison’s
mother, at his request. Both Detectives testified that the marijuana was not removed from the
vehicle before it was released.
III. 	DISCUSSION
On the present Motion, Mr. Ellison bears both the burden of proof and persuasion. See
United States v. Newsome, 475 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The individual challenging the
search bears the burdens of proof and persuasion.”) (citation omitted). However, “if a defendant
produces evidence that he was arrested or subjected to a search without a warrant, the burden shifts
to the government to justify the warrantless arrest or search.” United States v. de la Fuente, 548
F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1977).
Mr. Ellison initially argued that the warrantless search of his vehicle was not supported by
probable cause, and that no exceptions to the warrant requirement justified the search of his
vehicle. Mr. Ellison’s motion specifically challenged the application of the search-incident-to-
arrest and inventory search exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. See (ECF
No. 17 at 3–4). However, the Government in its Response did not travel on the search-incident-to-
arrest or inventory search exceptions (nor does it dispute their inapplicability).
Instead, the Government argued that law enforcement had probable cause to search Mr.
Ellison’s vehicle, thereby placing this search within the scope of the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement. Specifically, the Government’s Response argues that Detective Nees saw
contraband—that is, marijuana—in plain view across the floorboard and center console of the car,
after observing Mr. Ellison reach towards the passenger seat. Alternatively, the Government argues
that, because Mr. Ellison was on supervised release at the time of the search, the search of his
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vehicle was proper because law enforcement’s search was more than supported by reasonable
suspicion, the standard required pursuant to United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
Mr. Ellison disputes the application of either of these exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Because reasonable suspicion is a lower threshold than probable cause, the Court
considers first whether the search was reasonable in light of Mr. Ellison’s status on supervised
release.
A. 	Whether the Search was Supported by Reasonable Suspicion.
In United States v. Knights, the Supreme Court set forth a balancing test to analyze the
reasonableness of a search of a probationer’s home and reasoned that: “The touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined ‘by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy
and, on the other, the degree to which [the search] is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.’” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001) (quoting
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). The Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit
in applying this balancing test have held “that the Fourth Amendment is not violated when a
probationer’s home is searched based on only reasonable suspicion, absent consent and absent a
warrant.” United States v. Williams, 650 F. App’x 977, 979 (11th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added)
(collecting cases). A factor to be considered in weighing a probationer’s privacy interest is whether
he is subject to a condition requiring him to submit to searches. See United States v. Carter, 566
F.3d 970, 974 (11th Cir. 2009).
Mr. Ellison argues that the Knights exception to probable cause is inapplicable here, due
to the fact that his supervised release lacked the condition that would require him to submit to
random warrantless searches; he further argues that proper consideration of the relevant facts here
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would not weigh in favor of finding his privacy interest in his property (car) diminished to permit
search solely on the basis of reasonable suspicion. Because the credible evidence here fails to
establish even reasonable suspicion, much less probable cause, the Court need not reach this
question, as the evidence fails under either standard.
The Government conceded at oral argument that its position here was dependent on the
credibility of Detective Nees’ testimony that he observed marijuana before he initiated his search
of the vehicle.6 Regrettably, Detective Nees did not testify credibly at this evidentiary hearing.
My finding that Detective Nees’ testimony is not worthy of credit is informed by the
inconsistencies in his testimony and other evidence, as well as his overall demeanor on the stand.7
First, his testimony that he immediately saw marijuana is not consistent with the objective evidence
adduced at the hearing, including the video that depicted his conduct on the scene. His testimony
that he was conducting a narcotics investigation based on his observations of marijuana is not
corroborated by any contemporaneous remark to his colleagues, who were also then searching the
car, that he found narcotics in the driver’s seat; rather, he announced his decision to just do “a
quick check” as he moved to open the door to the back seat. This, he testified on redirect, is his
normal practice; if I credit this admission, it too undermines his recent claim that it was the
discovery of narcotics, not habit, that motivated his decision to continue searching the vehicle.
Unrelated to the precise question of whether and when he claims to have seen marijuana
in Mr. Ellison’s car, Detective Nees’ testimony on other points strained credulity. His explanation
for not answering his Sergeant’s question about whether he had a warrant was that he understood
6 Defendant similarly acknowledged that if Nees’ testimony is credited on this point, it would substantiate reasonable
suspicion for the search.
7 The Eleventh Circuit requires district courts “to conduct a proper credibility determination, which includes looking
to ‘the internal consistency of the [witness’s] testimony, or his candor or demeanor on the stand.’” United States v.
Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Gallego v. United States, 174 F.3d 1196, 1197 (11th
Cir.1999)).
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his Sergeant to be asking if he had an arrest warrant from the homicide unit. From the body-worn
camera video, it is clear that the Sergeant asked this question as he watched Detective Nees rifling
through containers in Defendant’s trunk. It seems to this observer that his question more plausibly
related to the ongoing search, and Detective Nees’ election to not verbally respond, and cover his
camera for a moment, does not lend credence to his explanation. Similarly, Detective Nees’
testimony that he saw Mr. Ellison reach under the passenger seat before he was arrested is
undermined by the absence of any objective evidence that the officers collectively suspected any
contraband was under that seat: almost four minutes elapsed before the gun was retrieved,8 and
the video does not clearly capture Nees directing any officer to search specifically under the seat.9
Finally, I had a chance to view and assess Detective Nees’ demeanor while testifying.
Detective Nees was extremely nervous on cross-examination, visibly sweating and wiping his face
by the time redirect began. He was combative and argumentative on cross, offered unsolicited
explanations to defend his testimony on redirect, and exaggerated his own confidence in his
recollection by volunteering that he was “a thousand percent” sure he had told his partner that he
saw marijuana.
Additionally, Defendant argues that Detective Nees’ testimony at the evidentiary hearing
contradicted his prior testimony offered in the September 23, 2025, supervised release violation
hearing before Chief Judge Altonaga. To the extent Detective Nees’ testimony is inconsistent with
his prior testimony, those differences are minor—previously, he described seeing the marijuana or
“shake” as he arrested Mr. Ellison; at the hearing before me, he testified that he saw both tobacco
8 The prosecutor argued that the time delay was attributable to the position of the gun. Whether that could plausibly
explain the delay or not, it was the prosecutor’s explanation; no witness testified that the position of the gun explained
the delay.
9 Again, while Nees testified that he reported the movement to another officer, I was unable to pick that statement out
from the audio recording of his body-worn camera footage.
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and shake. Standing alone, this discrepancy would not cause me to reject his uncorroborated
testimony, but I have weighed it among the other indications that his claim to having seen
marijuana is a recent development. Taking all of the evidence into consideration, I do not credit
Nees’ testimony to the extent it was not corroborated by objective evidence.
Detective Aiken, on the other hand, testified credibly that his basis for conducting a search
of Mr. Ellison’s vehicle was an inventory search because he was going to tow the car. Detective
Aiken presented with a calm and impassive demeanor and appeared to answer the questions as
best he could without overreach or exaggeration. His testimony appeared motivated only by his
concern for accuracy, as he even corrected defense counsel’s repetition of his prior testimony,
though the correction did not help the Government’s case: he clarified that he did not immediately
see the marijuana, as his partner had testified and as counsel’s question had assumed. Moreover,
Detective Aiken’s testimony is consistent with and corroborated by the objective evidence,
including his reports, which memorialize that an inventory search was conducted without reference
to narcotics, much less any narcotics investigation.
I note that Detective Aiken testified that Detective Nees told him at some point that his
search was pursuant to a narcotics investigation. While I accept Detective Aiken’s testimony on
this point, I noted the lack of specificity as to the timing of the statement and find it too vague to
corroborate Detective Nees’ claim that he saw narcotics before he began searching the car. In sum,
I accept Detective Aiken’s testimony and find that in fact, the Detective’s basis for searching the
vehicle at the scene was pursuant to Detective Aiken’s intention to tow the car.
Notwithstanding, I have considered whether the facts known to law enforcement were
sufficient to support a finding of reasonable suspicion to conduct the search. Discounting Nees’
recent claim that he observed Mr. Ellison’s reach under the seat or saw marijuana in plain view,
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the evidence established that the Detectives knew that Mr. Ellison was on supervised release; and
that he had recently been arrested for an incident involving narcotics.10
“Reasonable suspicion is more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch,
but is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence and less
than probable cause, which is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found.” United States v. Neely, 217 F. App’x 849, 851 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “it is by now well-
settled law that the reasonable suspicion inquiry focuses on the information available to the officers
at the time of the stop . . . not information that the officers might later discover.” United States v.
Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2012); see United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1237
(11th Cir. 2018) (applying reasonable suspicion standard to search). “The officer must ‘be able to
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant’ the search.” United States v. Holland, No. 22-11817, 2023 WL 7321612,
at *3 (11th Cir. Nov. 7, 2023) (quoting United States v. Yuknavich, 419 F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir.
2005)).
The undersigned has considered each of the cases advanced by the Government in support
of its argument that under similar circumstances, other courts have recognized the legality of a
warrantless search of a probationer that was supported by reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United
States v. Williams, Case No. 1714050, 2017 WL 11607836 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2017) (Maynard,
M.J.). The record before Judge Maynard included a multitude of facts supporting the finding of
reasonable suspicion; specifically, less than a month prior to the warrantless search, the probationer
10 Both detectives also testified that Ellison was wanted for questioning in relation to a homicide. Government counsel
argued that this fact should be considered in the context of the Government’s interest, under Knights, in the application
of the “reasonable suspicion” standard to conduct the search, but the Government did not argue that this knowledge
informed their reasonable suspicion.
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had been arrested and at the time of that arrest was found to be in possession of drug paraphernalia.
Evidence collected from that arrest included a scale and marijuana residue—which had been tested
and confirmed to be marijuana. When questioned about the arrest, the probationer gave
inconsistent explanations to his probation officer about the paraphernalia. All of these facts were
known to the probation officer before he initiated the warrantless search of the probationer’s
residence. Judge Maynard concluded that the probation officer’s awareness of these facts,
“coupled with [the] [d]efendant’s criminal history dealing drugs, was sufficient to raise a
reasonable inference [for the probation officer] that [the] [d]efendant was again engaged in drug-
related activity.” Id.
Here, the Government provided no evidence of the underlying arrest giving rise to the
supervised release arrest warrant other than the Detectives’ testimony that the arrest related to
narcotics. And while the Government requested that the Court take judicial notice of Mr. Ellison’s
prior judgment and conviction (for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon), the Government
did not advance evidence of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Ellison’s recent arrest or, critically,
what the Detectives knew about that arrest prior to their decision to search his car. The Detectives
here claimed no knowledge about the prior arrest beyond the fact that it involved narcotics. The
testimony advanced fell short of the “specific and articulable facts” required to meet the standard
for reasonable suspicion, see Yuknavich, 419 F.3d at 1311, and does not come close to the factual
showing on which the court in Williams relied, see 2017 WL 11607836 at *3.
The evidence advanced at the hearing additionally shows that tobacco was sprinkled on the
floorboards of Mr. Ellison’s vehicle, in plain view, and the Detectives testified that in their
experience, the guts of a cigarillo or cigarette may indicate that someone has used the empty
cigarillo or cigarette to smoke marijuana. Government counsel did not argue that the tobacco
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spotted by the Detectives would support a finding here of reasonable suspicion. Indeed, Detective
Aiken repeatedly explained that his justification for searching the car was not for investigatory
purposes, even though he had also seen the tobacco. Detective Nees’ testimony that he saw tobacco
and marijuana came across as an attempt to backfill reasonable suspicion based on evidence
collected later during the search. Faced with the objective evidence that Nees testified falsely about
discovering marijuana, “the Court cannot simply ignore it because the community may be better
off with this defendant facing jail time for his crimes.” See United States v. Rigby, No. 24-20273-
CR, 2024 WL 4792811, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024
WL 4785450 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2024).11
The Government also relies on the cases of United States v. Neely and United States v.
Stewart in its briefing on the presence of reasonable suspicion. See 217 F. App’x 849 (11th Cir.
2007); 213 F. App’x 898 (11th Cir. 2007). In Neely, the Eleventh Circuit noted the fact that
reasonable suspicion would have been supported by the defendant’s flight from law enforcement.
217 F. App’x at 851. Mr. Ellison urges that the Court’s observation there was dicta, not a holding
that the probationer’s expectation of privacy was sufficiently diminished as to require only
reasonable suspicion to justify a warrantless search. Notably here, there is no evidence that Mr.
Ellison attempted to flee from law enforcement. In Stewart, the Eleventh Circuit made no finding
on reasonable suspicion because the parole conditions in that case did not necessitate such a finding
to justify a search. 213 F. App’x at 899. There, the defendant was subject to the parole condition
that he submit to a search “at any time,” and the Eleventh Circuit relied on precedent stating that
such a condition created no reasonable expectation of privacy for the parolee. Id. Thus, not only
11 The undersigned’s citation to Rigby here does not indicate a finding of the Detective’s bad faith as a basis for finding
the search was not supported by reasonable suspicion.
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does Stewart fail to support the proposition that reasonable suspicion is present here (for which
the Government cites it), it is inapposite to this case insofar as Mr. Ellison was required to submit
to searches “conducted in a reasonable manner and at a reasonable time.” United States v. Ellison,
No. 19-cr-20334-CMA, (ECF No. 28 at 4) (S.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 2019).
Ultimately, because the present record is insufficient to support a finding that law
enforcement had a reasonable suspicion to search the car, the evidence seized from Mr. Ellison’s
vehicle should be suppressed. Further, because reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than the
probable cause required of the automobile exception12 to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement, the Government’s reliance on that exception should fail as well.
B. 	Whether the Search Was a Proper Inventory Search.
Detective Aiken testified he understood that the basis of the search was an inventory search
in advance of towing the vehicle. An inventory search is one of the most well-recognized
exceptions to the probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). An inventory
search serves three main purposes: “(1) the protection of the owner’s property . . . (2) the protection
of the police against lost or stolen property and (3) the protection of the police from potential
danger.” Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369 (internal citations omitted); Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372. An
inventory search of an impounded vehicle is lawful where law enforcement “(1) had the authority
to impound the car, and (2) followed department procedures governing inventory searches.” United
States v. Isaac, 987 F.3d 980, 988 (11th Cir. 2021); see also United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d
1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 1991).
12 Mr. Ellison argued vehemently that his vehicle should not legally be within the scope of the automobile exception
because it was not mobile and it was parked on the curtilage of a home. Because the evidentiary showing is not
sufficient to support a finding of probable cause in any event, the Court does not address the merits of Defendant’s
arguments on whether the automobile exception is properly applied in this circumstance.
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Although Detective Aiken believed he was conducting an inventory search, the evidence
fails to establish that it was in fact pursuant to department procedures. Indeed, the Government did
not advance any argument that the exception should apply.
IV. 	RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Mr. Ellison’s
Motion to Suppress be GRANTED.
The parties will have FOURTEEN (14) DAYS from the date of service of this Report and
Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any, for consideration by the
Honorable Rodolfo A. Ruiz II, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida.
Pursuant 	to 	Federal 	Rule of 	Criminal 	Procedure 59(b), 	Eleventh 	Circuit 	Rule 3-1, 	and
accompanying Internal Operating Procedure 3, the Parties are hereby notified that failure to object
in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the District
Court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140 (1985).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 20th day of
January, 2026.
____________________________________
LAUREN F. LOUIS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Copies to:
Counsel of Record
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