Freites C v. Medina et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 25-CV-20465-BLOOM/Elfenbein
IVAN R. FREITES C., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HORACIO MEDINA, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________/
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on five motions filed by Pro se Plaintiffs Ivan R. Freites
C. 	(“Freites”), 	Miguel 	Enrique 	Otero 	C. 	(“Otero”), 	and 	Jorge 	Alejandro 	Rodriguez 	M.
(“Rodriguez”): (1) Expedited Post-Judgment Motion for Sanctions, Grievance Committee
Referral, and Formal Ruling on Disqualification (“First Sanctions Motion”), ECF No. [172]; (2)
Expedited Post-Judgment Motion for Sanctions Due to Perjury (“Second Sanctions Motion”), ECF
No. [225]; (3) Additional Post-Judgment Motion for Sanctions and Disqualification (“Third
Sanctions Motion”), ECF No. [233]; (4) Additional Post-Judgment Motion for Additional
Sanctions (“Fourth Sanctions Motion”), ECF No. [235]; and (5) Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to
the Court’s Inherent Authority and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (“Fifth Sanctions Motion”), ECF No.
[301]. The Honorable Beth Bloom referred the motions to me “for final disposition.”1 ECF No.
1 The Court previously ruled on three other post-dismissal motions Judge Bloom referred. Specifically, the
Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ Expedited Motion to Conduct Limited Discovery, ECF
No. [187], and recommended that Judge Bloom deny Plaintiffs’ Expedited Motion for Evidentiary Hearing
and Relief from Final Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2)–(3), ECF No. [218],
and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief to Enjoin Improper Coordination Between Defense
Counsel, ECF No. [269]. See ECF No. [305]; ECF No. [307]. The Court will rule on the remaining referred
motion, see ECF No. [227], in due course.
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[306]; see also Hopkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 618 F. App’x 959, 962 (11th Cir. 2015)
(noting sanctions motion was non-dispositive); Collar v. Abalux, Inc., No. 16-CV-20872, 2018
WL 7364572, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2018). 	For the reasons explained below, the motions,
ECF No. [172]; ECF No. [225]; ECF No. [233]; ECF No. [235]; and ECF No. [301], are
DENIED.
I. 	RELEVANT BACKGROUND
The Court has already described the factual background of this case on several occasions,
see ECF No. [165] at 2–5; ECF No. [307] at 1–5, so it repeats only the necessary facts here.
Plaintiffs 	are Venezuelan 	dissidents 	in 	exile 	who 	sued 	twenty 	Defendants 	for 	allegedly
coordinating a “malicious campaign involving defamation, intimidation, obstruction of justice,
witness tampering, and racketeering against” them. See ECF No. [52] at 15. Eventually, fourteen
Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint, see ECF No. [96]; ECF No. [100], and
Judge Bloom granted those motions, dismissing Plaintiffs’ four federal claims with prejudice and
their six state law claims without prejudice on May 16, 2025, see ECF No. [165]. 	Plaintiffs
appealed the dismissal of the Amended Complaint to the Eleventh Circuit, see ECF No. [180], and
the appeal remains pending, see ECF No. [238].
Before the dismissal, Plaintiff Freites moved to disqualify the law firm representing
Defendant Horacio Medina, Diaz Reus LLP (formerly Diaz, Reus & Targ, LLP) (“DRT”), along
with its attorneys Michael Diaz, Javier Coronado, and Marta Colomar (the “Motion to Disqualify
DRT”). 	See ECF No. [30]. Freites based the Motion to Disqualify DRT on an asserted conflict
of interest that arose because Rodriguez, who became a Plaintiff on March 19, 2025 (two weeks
after Freites filed that motion), see ECF No. [52], alleged that he consulted with DRT in
September/October 2023 about a separate lawsuit Plaintiffs eventually brought in Delaware federal
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court “regarding worker [indemnification] claims against” the Venezuelan state-owned oil
company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”) and its U.S. subsidiary CITGO (the “Delaware
Litigation”). See ECF No. [30] at 2–3; ECF No. [52] at 15. Supported by Rodriguez’s affidavit,
see ECF No. [30-1], Freites argued that the Delaware Litigation is “inseparably linked” with this
lawsuit because both involve Medina’s “coordinated effort” to “obstruct” the two lawsuits
“through defamatory attacks, witness intimidation, and other extrajudicial conduct.” See ECF No.
[30] at 2. 	Freites also argued that the communications between Rodriguez and DRT in
September/October 2023 involved “litigation strategies and claims that are central to this case,”
which gave DRT “insider knowledge” of Plaintiffs’ “strategic playbook” that Medina could
“exploit” to gain an unfair advantage. See ECF No. [30] at 3–10.
In early May 2025, Plaintiffs filed a motion to disqualify DRT attorney Gabor Gazso von
Klingspor (“G. Gazso”) based on their belief that he “was exposed to Rodriguez’s confidential
information” when he worked at a law firm led by his father Andres Gazso von Klingspor (“A.
Gazso”), which Rodriguez consulted in September 2023 about bringing claims against PDVSA
and CITGO (“Motion to Disqualify G. Gazso”). See ECF No. [144] at 2–6. 	In the Motion to
Disqualify G. Gazso, Plaintiffs argued that DRT and Carlos Sardi, who is counsel for several other
Defendants, tried to conceal G. Gazso’s identity from them during conferrals in this lawsuit to
prevent them from learning about his connection to A. Gazso. See ECF No. [144] at 8–10.
Plaintiffs also argued that G. Gazso sat beside Sardi — an “associate” of Defendant Medina’s
“allies” — at a January 2025 hearing in a related matter before Chief Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga
(the “Altonaga Case”), creating a “strong appearance of impropriety.” See ECF No. [144] at 10–
11. 	The Motion to Disqualify DRT and the Motion to Disqualify G. Gazso remained pending at
the time the Amended Complaint was dismissed in May 2025, so both motions to disqualify
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became moot. See ECF No. [165] at 40.
Since the dismissal of the Amended Complaint in May 2025, Plaintiffs have filed dozens
of documents, including many motions, with this Court. To best facilitate the resolution of these
motions, the Court held a status hearing on them and several other referred motions2 on October
24, 2025 (the “Status Hearing”). See ECF No. [295]. During the Status Hearing, the Court heard
from Plaintiffs and from defense counsel, which was comprised of three lawyers from DRT
(Colomar, G. Gazso, and John Foster) and one lawyer (Sardi) from Sardi Law PLLC. See ECF
No. [295]. The bulk of the Status Hearing focused on whether this Court has jurisdiction to decide
the referred motions because, as a general rule, a trial court’s jurisdiction ends once the appellate
court’s jurisdiction begins. See generally ECF No. [295]. During the Status Hearing, the Court
ordered the Parties to submit supplemental briefs on “whether the Court has jurisdiction to decide
a motion for disqualification of counsel while a case is on appeal.” See ECF No. [293]; ECF No.
[295]. The Parties timely submitted those briefs. See ECF No. [296]; ECF No. [297]; ECF No.
[298].
After the Status Hearing, Plaintiffs continued to file post-dismissal motions, including the
Fifth Sanctions Motion. See ECF No. [301]. Because the Court determined that an evidentiary
hearing was necessary “on one narrow issue” relevant to the resolution of the First Sanctions
Motion, ECF No. [172], and the Fourth Sanctions Motion, ECF No. [235], it set a hearing for
January 6, 2026 “to ascertain the facts connected to any communications between Rodriguez and”
DRT “in September/October 2023, including the Zoom meeting that was scheduled to occur on
2 Along with the five referred motions at issue here, the Court also heard from the Parties on the three
referred motions described above in footnote 1 as well as Defendant Horacio Medina’s Motion to Strike,
ECF No. [217]; Plaintiffs’ Motion to Consolidate their many post-dismissal Motions for Sanctions, ECF
No. [234]; and Defendant Medina’s Motion for Status Conference, ECF No. [266]. For the reasons stated
on the record, see ECF No. [295] at 7–12, the Court granted the Motion to Strike and the Motion for Status
Conference, see ECF No. [291]; ECF No. [292], but denied the Motion to Consolidate, see ECF No. [294].
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October 2, 2023” (the “Evidentiary Hearing”). 	See ECF No. [305] at 1–2. 	At the Evidentiary
Hearing, which occurred on January 6 and 7, 2026 and lasted more than eleven hours, the Court
heard testimony from Plaintiff Rodriguez; DRT partners Diaz, Colomar, and Coronado; DRT legal
assistant Aylin Hovispo; DRT receptionist Belkys Guillen; and DRT associate attorney Isabela
Hernandez-Peredo. See ECF No. [332]; ECF No. [333]. The Court also admitted documentary
evidence offered by both sides. 	See ECF No. [334]; ECF No. [343]. 	All five post-dismissal
Sanctions Motions, which ask the Court to sanction defense counsel in various ways, including by
imposing monetary sanctions and disqualifying them from representing Defendants in this case,
see ECF No. [172]; ECF No. [225]; ECF No. [233]; ECF No. [235]; ECF No. [301], are now ripe
for review. For ease of understanding, the Court describes the particulars of each motion within
its Discussion below. See infra Section III.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. District Court’s Jurisdiction While an Appeal is Pending
“As a general matter, the filing of a notice of appeal deprives the district court of
jurisdiction over all issues involved in the appeal.” Mahone v. Ray, 326 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th
Cir. 2003); see also Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, (1982) (“The filing
of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance—it confers jurisdiction on the court
of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the
appeal.”). “However, it does not prevent the district court from taking action in furtherance of the
appeal.” 	Mahone, 326 F.3d at 1179 (quotation marks omitted). 	“Nor does it prevent the court
from entertaining motions on matters collateral to those at issue on appeal.” Id.
In the related context of a Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal, which also deprives the
district court of jurisdiction over a case, the Eleventh Circuit has explained that, even after they no
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longer have jurisdiction, “district courts retain jurisdiction to consider at least five different types
of collateral issues: costs, fees, contempt sanctions, Rule 11 sanctions, and motions to confirm
arbitral awards.” Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Devine, 998 F.3d 1258, 1266 (11th
Cir. 2021); cf. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 397–98 (1990). As the phrase “at
least” makes clear, that list is not intended to be exhaustive. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has
recognized “the district court maintains jurisdiction” over other kinds of issues as well, including
whether “to order stays,” to “modify injunctive relief,” see Doe, 1-13 ex rel. Doe Sr. 1-13 v. Bush,
261 F.3d 1037, 1064–65 (11th Cir. 2001), or “to enjoin arbitration,” see Weaver v. Fla. Power &
Light Co., 172 F.3d 771, 773 (11th Cir. 1999). The important consideration when deciding if a
matter is collateral is whether it raises questions that are “separate and distinct from the issues
raised by the direct appeal,” see id., such that resolving those questions does “not affect[] the
questions presented on appeal,” see Bush, 261 F.3d at 1064.
B. Disqualification of Counsel Generally
“Although they implicate ethical concerns, motions to disqualify are substantive motions
affecting the rights of the parties.” 	Kleiman v. Wright, 662 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1252 (S.D. Fla.
2023) (quotation marks omitted). “When ruling on a motion to disqualify counsel, a court must
be conscious of its responsibility to preserve a reasonable balance between the need to ensure
ethical conduct on the part of lawyers appearing before it and other social interests, which include
the litigant’s right to freely chosen counsel.” Vital Pharms., Inc. v. Alfieri, 585 F. Supp. 3d 1347,
1349–50 (S.D. Fla. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). 	“Disqualification of counsel should be
resorted to sparingly and should be ordered only where there exists a reasonable possibility that
the impropriety already has occurred.” Id. at 1350 (alteration adopted, quotation marks omitted);
see also Norton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Hosp., 689 F.2d 938, 941 n.4 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that
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“[d]isqualification is a harsh sanction”). “Because a party is presumptively entitled to the counsel
of his choice, that right may be overridden only if compelling reasons exist.” 	In re BellSouth
Corp., 334 F.3d 941, 961 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted).
Motions to disqualify “are governed by two sources of authority — federal common law
and local rules of court.” Kleiman, 662 F. Supp. 3d at 1252. In the Southern District of Florida,
the Local Rules instruct that the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar govern the professional conduct
of attorneys. 	See S.D. Fla. L.R. 11.1(c). 	To grant a motion to disqualify that is “based on an
allegation of ethical violation, the court may not simply rely on a general inherent power to admit
and suspend attorneys, without any limit on such power.” Schlumberger Techs., Inc. v. Wiley, 113
F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1997). 	Instead, the “court must clearly identify a specific Rule of
Professional Conduct which is applicable to the relevant jurisdiction and must conclude that the
attorney violated that rule.” Id. That is because “accusations of unethical conduct are among the
most serious of allegations that a court must consider,” id. at 1562 (alterations adopted, quotation
marks omitted), as “disciplinary action and consequent disqualification may expose counsel to
further sanctions by the bar and portends adverse effects upon counsel’s careers and public image,”
Kleiner v. First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1200 n.14 (11th Cir. 1985).
Relevant here, Florida Bar Rules dictate that “a lawyer must not represent a client if either
“the representation of [one] client will be directly adverse to another client” or “there is a
substantial risk that the representation of [one] or more clients will be materially limited by the
lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest
of the lawyer.” See R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-1.7(a) (providing the rule for dealing with “conflict[s] of
interest” and “representing adverse interests”). There is an exception to Rule 4-1.7(a), however,
if the affected clients give “informed consent.” See R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-1.7(a), (b); Prudential Ins.
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Co. of Am. v. Anodyne, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1236 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (noting that the “conflict
is waivable”). Informed consent exists “if: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will
be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client; (2) the
representation is not prohibited by law; (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a
position adverse to another client when the lawyer represents both clients in the same proceeding
before a tribunal; and (4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing or
clearly stated on the record at a hearing.” See R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-1.7(b).
Similar rules apply to both former and prospective clients.3 As to former clients, Florida
Bar Rules dictate that a “lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter must not
afterwards: (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that
person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client
gives informed consent; (b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of
the former client except as these rules would permit or require with respect to a client or when the
information has become generally known; or (c) reveal information relating to the representation
except as these rules would permit or require with respect to a client.” See R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-1.9.
And as to prospective clients, “[e]ven when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, a lawyer who
has learned information from a prospective client may not use or reveal that information, except
as rule 4-1.9 would permit with respect to information of a former client.” See R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-
1.18(b). 	A lawyer cannot “represent a client with interests materially adverse to those of a
prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer received information
from the prospective client that could be used to the disadvantage of that person in the matter,
except” where both the client and prospective client give written informed consent. See R. Reg.
3 “A person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with
respect to a matter is a prospective client.” R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-1.18(a).
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Fla. Bar 4-1.18(c), (d)(1).
If “lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them may knowingly represent a client when
any 1 of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by rule 4-1.7 or 4-1.9 except as
provided elsewhere in this rule, or unless the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the
prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation
of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm.” See R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-1.10(a). Indeed, “[w]hen
a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly represent a person in the
same or a substantially related matter in which that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer was
associated, had previously represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to that person
and about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by rules 4-1.6 and 4-1.9(b) and (c)
that is material to the matter.” See R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-1.10(b). The same principle covers
prospective clients. See R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-1.18(c) (“If a lawyer is disqualified from representation
under this rule, no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake
or continue representation in the matter, except as provided in subdivision (d).”); R. Reg. Fla. Bar
4-1.18(d)(1) (defining exceptions to include when “both the affected client and the prospective
client have given informed consent, confirmed in writing”). But the informed consent exception
applies to Rule 4-1.10 and Rule 4-1.18, just as it applies to Rule 4-1.7(a). See R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-
1.10(d) (“A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the
conditions stated in rule 4-1.7.”); R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-1.18(d)(1).
Finally, Florida Bar Rules also explain lawyers’ duties to the Court. 	In particular, they
provide that a “lawyer shall not knowingly” make “a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or
fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the
lawyer.” See R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-3.3(a)(1). Nor can a lawyer “fail to disclose a material fact to a
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tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client.”
See R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-3.3(a)(2). 	And the “duties stated in” Rule 4-3.3 “continue beyond the
conclusion of the proceeding and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information
otherwise protected by rule 4-1.6.” See R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-3.3(d). A similar responsibility applies
to a lawyer’s conduct in general, as a “lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” See R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-8.4(c). Nor can a lawyer “engage in
conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice,
including to knowingly, or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate
against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis, including, but
not limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin, disability, marital
status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status, employment, or physical characteristic.” See
R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-8.4(d).
Where “a lawyer’s conduct is allegedly unethical but does not threaten the orderly
administration of justice” — by, for example, engaging in “in-court misconduct or deliberate
challenges to the court’s authority” — “violating an ethical rule is a necessary but not always
sufficient condition for disqualification.” Kleiman, 662 F. Supp. 3d at 1253 & n.2; Anodyne, 365
F. Supp. 2d at 1236 (noting that “disqualification is never automatic” (quotation marks omitted)).
“[E]ven if an ethical rule has been violated, the Court must look to ‘various factors, such as the
nature of the ethical violation; the prejudice to the parties; the effectiveness of counsel in light of
the violations; the public’s perception of the profession; and whether or not the attempt
to disqualify an attorney is used as a tactical device or a means of harassment.’” Kleiman, 662 F.
Supp. 3d at 1253 (quoting Anodyne, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 1237); see also Anodyne, 365 F. Supp. 2d
at 1237 (“Rather than reflexively requiring disqualification for an ethical infraction, the better
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approach is to employ a balancing test.”).
“The party moving to disqualify counsel bears the burden of proving the grounds for
disqualification.” 	In re BellSouth, 334 F.3d at 961. 	Courts in this Circuit “will not deprive an
attorney of the opportunity to practice his profession on the basis of a determination after the fact
that conduct is unethical if responsible attorneys would differ in appraising the propriety of that
conduct.” In re Finkelstein, 901 F.2d 1560, 1565 (11th Cir. 1990) (quotation marks omitted). And
the drafters of the Florida Bar Rules have noted that, while “opposing counsel may properly raise
the question” of whether a lawyer’s representation is proper if “the conflict is such as clearly to
call in question the fair or efficient administration of justice,” any such objection by an opposing
party “should be viewed with caution” because “it can be misused as a technique of harassment.”
See R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-1.7 cmt. (noting, in subsection titled “Conflict charged by an opposing
party,” also that “[r]esolving questions of conflict of interest is primarily the responsibility of the
lawyer undertaking the representation” but that “[i]n litigation, a court may raise the question when
there is reason to infer that the lawyer has neglected the responsibility”).
C. Sanctions, Including Disqualification, Under the Court’s Inherent Authority
“Courts have the inherent authority to control the proceedings before them, which includes
the authority to impose reasonable and appropriate sanctions.” See Martin v. Automobili
Lamborghini Exclusive, Inc., 307 F.3d 1332, 1335 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted).
“[T]he powers stemming from the Court’s inherent authority are ‘governed not by rule or statute
but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the
orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’” Barash v. Kates, 585 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1364 (S.D.
Fla. 2006) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)). 	A court’s “inherent
authority to impose sanctions is not displaced merely because particular statutes or rules may
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likewise provide a basis for the imposition of sanctions,” as “other statutes or rules ‘are not
substitutes for the inherent power.’” See id. at 1365 (quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46). Indeed,
a court’s “inherent authority is ‘both broader and narrower’ than other rules and statutes, in that
while other rules or statutes may reach only certain individuals or conduct, ‘the inherent power
extends to a full range of litigation abuses’” and, thus, “‘fill[s] in the interstices.’” See id. at 1365
(quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46).
“The purpose of the inherent power is both to vindicate judicial authority without resorting
to contempt of court sanctions and to make the non-violating party whole.” Purchasing Power,
LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., 851 F.3d 1218, 1225 (11th Cir. 2017); see also Kleiner, 751 F.2d at
1209 (“Courts possess the inherent power to protect the orderly administration of justice and to
preserve the dignity of the tribunal.”). “Because of their very potency, inherent powers must be
exercised with restraint and discretion.” 	Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44. 	“A primary aspect of that
discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial
process.” Id. at 44–45. “This power is not a remedy for protracted litigation; it is for rectifying
disobedience, regardless of whether such disobedience interfered with the conduct of the trial.
Courts considering whether to impose sanctions under their inherent power should look for
disobedience and be guided by the purpose of vindicating judicial authority.” Purchasing Power,
851 F.3d at 1225 (citation omitted).
“[I]nherent powers, which are incidental to a federal court, include the power to control
and discipline attorneys appearing before it.” In re Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1995);
see also Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1209 (“The inherent power of a court to manage its affairs necessarily
includes the authority to impose reasonable and appropriate sanctions upon errant lawyers
practicing before it.” (citation omitted)). “A trial judge possesses the inherent power to discipline
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counsel for misconduct, short of behavior giving rise to disbarment or criminal censure, without
resort to the powers of civil or criminal contempt” because the “court’s power to impose
appropriate sanctions on attorneys practicing before it springs from a different source than does
the power to punish for criminal contempt.” 	See Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1209 (footnote omitted).
The sanctions a trial court can impose under its “inherent power to discipline intentional attorney
misconduct” include “assessment of attorneys’ fees and costs, disqualification of counsel, and
monetary penalties payable to the clerk of the court.” Id. (citations omitted). “A court’s inherent
power to disqualify an attorney or otherwise sanction a party or attorney is rooted in concern for
the integrity of the judiciary and the public’s perception thereof.” In re BellSouth, 334 F.3d at 951.
“A court also has the power to conduct an independent investigation to determine whether
it has been the victim of fraud.” Martin, 307 F.3d at 1335. “To exercise its inherent power a court
must find that the party acted in bad faith.” Id. “A party demonstrates bad faith by delaying or
disrupting the litigation or hampering enforcement of a court order.” In re Sunshine Jr. Stores,
Inc., 456 F.3d 1291, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006) (alteration adopted, citation omitted). “[I]n the absence
of direct evidence of subjective bad faith, this standard can be met if an attorney’s conduct is so
egregious that it could only be committed in bad faith.” Purchasing Power, 851 F.3d at 1224–25.
“This is not the same as simple recklessness, which can be a starting point but requires something
more to constitute bad faith.” Id. at 1225.
D. Sanctions Under the Local Rules and the Rules of Civil Procedure
Outside of its inherent authority, the Court can sanction lawyers if a court rule authorizes
it. See Amlong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny’s, Inc., 500 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir. 2007) (recognizing
that sanctions can be based on a statute or rule of civil procedure in addition to the court’s inherent
authority); Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1542 (11th Cir. 1993) (analyzing
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sanctions under Rule 37); Barash, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 1363 (analyzing sanctions under Rule 11).
Under Rule 11, for example, “the court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law
firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1).
A sanction imposed under Rule 11 “must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the
conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated” and “may include nonmonetary
directives; an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective
deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees
and other expenses directly resulting from the violation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4); see also Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11(c)(5) (prohibiting money sanctions in two situations). A lawyer violates Rule 11 if
he files a document for an “improper purpose,” that contains unsupported factual contentions, or
that includes unwarranted factual denials or legal contentions.4 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
Likewise, under Rule 37, the court can sanction a party who “fails to provide information
or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e),” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); “fails to admit
what is requested under Rule 36” if “the requesting party later proves a document to be genuine or
the matter true,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(2); or “fails to serve its answers, objections, or written
response” to properly served “interrogatories under Rule 33” or “request[s] for inspection under
4 In full, Rule 11(b) provides:
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by signing,
filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to
the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims,
defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; (3)
the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery;
and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so
identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
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Rule 34,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1)(A)(ii). 	Sanctions under Rule 37(c) and (d) can include
“prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or
from introducing designated matters in evidence,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i), (c)(1), (d)(3),
and “requir[ing] the party failing to act, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was
substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust,” see Fed. R. Civ.
P. 37(c)(1)(A), (d)(3).
Finally, under Local Rule 7.1(a)(3), the court can sanction a party for failing to comply
with this District’s requirement that parties “confer (orally or in writing), or make reasonable effort
to confer (orally or in writing)” in “a good faith effort to resolve by agreement the issues to be
raised in” a motion. 	See S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.1(a)(3). 	Sanctions under Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) “may
include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation,
including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” See S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.1(a)(3).
III. 	DISCUSSION
As noted above, this Order addresses Plaintiffs’ five post-dismissal Sanctions Motions.
Before evaluating the merits of those motions, however, the Court must address its own authority
to decide them. See, e.g., Univ. of S. Alabama v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir.
1999) (“[A] federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte
whenever it may be lacking.”). The reason the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is in question
here is because the Amended Complaint has been dismissed and Plaintiffs have appealed that
dismissal. 	But while a notice of appeal deprives a district court of jurisdiction over all issues
involved in the appeal, it does not prevent the court from entertaining motions on matters collateral
to those at issue on appeal. See Mahone, 326 F.3d at 1179.
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Motions for sanctions appear on the illustrative list of collateral issues the Eleventh Circuit
compiled in Absolute Activist. See 998 F.3d at 1266 (including requests for “contempt sanctions”
and “Rule 11 sanctions”). 	While Absolute Activist did not involve a question about the district
court’s jurisdiction during the pendency of an appeal, it did analyze the district court’s jurisdiction
in the closely related context of a Rule 41 dismissal, which also deprives the district court of
subject-matter jurisdiction over a case. See id. The Eleventh Circuit has also made clear that the
important consideration when deciding if a matter is collateral is whether it raises questions that
are separate and distinct from the issues raised by the direct appeal, see Weaver, 172 F.3d at 773,
such that resolving those questions does not affect the questions presented on appeal, see Bush,
261 F.3d at 1064.
Plaintiffs’ five Sanctions Motions ask the Court for a range of relief that includes
everything from disqualifying defense counsel and referring them to the Court’s grievance
committee to ordering defense counsel to remove material from their websites and pay the
expenses Plaintiffs incurred to bring the motions. See ECF No. [172]; ECF No. [225]; ECF No.
[233]; ECF No. [235]; ECF No. [301]. 	Plaintiffs base their requests on a variety of conduct,
including defense counsel’s alleged conflicts of interest, their failure to disclose relevant
information about potential conflicts, and their purportedly false and misleading statements to the
Court in filings and during hearings. See ECF No. [172]; ECF No. [225]; ECF No. [233]; ECF
No. [235]; ECF No. [301]. None of that relief, and none of the conduct upon which Plaintiffs base
their asserted right to that relief, was a foundation for, or even a consideration in, Judge Bloom’s
order dismissing the Amended Complaint. See ECF No. [165]. For those reasons, Plaintiffs’ five
Sanctions Motions raise issues that are separate and distinct from the issues Plaintiffs have
appealed, and resolving them will not affect the questions presented on appeal. See Weaver, 172
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F.3d at 773; Bush, 261 F.3d at 1064. That is the very definition of collateral, so the Court concludes
that it retains jurisdiction to resolve Plaintiffs’ five post-dismissal Sanctions Motions while the
appeal of the dismissal is pending. See Weaver, 172 F.3d at 773; Bush, 261 F.3d at 1064.
A. First Sanctions Motion – ECF No. [172]
1. 	The Parties’ Arguments
In the First Sanctions Motion, Plaintiffs ask the Court to refer DRT, along with its attorneys
Diaz, Coronado, Colomar, and G. Gazso, to this District’s “Ad Hoc Committee on Attorney
Admissions, Peer Review, and Attorney Grievance” for “investigation and appropriate disciplinary
action” based on their alleged violations of Rule 4-1.7, Rule 4-1.9, and Rule 4-1.10. See ECF No.
[172] at 2, 8–12, 19–20. They ask the Court to impose sanctions against DRT and those attorneys
“for conflict-of-interest misconduct and related litigation abuse” — specifically, for representing
Defendant Medina in this lawsuit without Rodriguez’s “informed consent” when Medina’s
interests are “directly adverse” to Rodriguez’s interests and DRT formed an attorney-client
relationship with Rodriguez by obtaining “confidential and privileged information” about the
purportedly related Delaware Litigation during an October 2023 Zoom meeting. 	See ECF No.
[172] at 3–4, 8–12. DRT then “worsened this conflict” by assigning G. Gazso to the case because
he has interned for Judge Bloom and because, though he did not work for DRT in October 2023,
he had access to Rodriguez’s confidential information through his father A. Gazso’s professional
association with Rodriguez. See ECF No. [172] at 4–5, 12–13. Plaintiffs argue DRT also violated
its Rule 4-3.3 duty of candor to the Court by failing to disclose (or “strategic[ally] conceal[ing]”)
its relationship with Rodriguez, G. Gazso’s internship, and the fact that PDVSA Ad Hoc has an
interest in this lawsuit. See ECF No. [172] at 4–5, 13–16.
For those reasons, Plaintiffs contend DRT should have been disqualified but were not
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because their disqualification motions, ECF No. [30] and ECF No. [144], were not resolved before
Judge Bloom dismissed the case on its merits. See ECF No. [172] at 6–7. They ask this Court to
issue a “post-judgment ruling on disqualification” that “DRT had a disqualifying conflict and
should have been barred from representing Defendants” to “clarify the impropriety, support
appellate review, and mitigate prejudice.” See ECF No. [172] at 15–20. Finally, they argue the
Court should sanction DRT under Rule 11, Rule 37, and Local Rule 7.1 for violating its conferral
and discovery obligations, including by requiring it to “provide a full accounting of all
communications” with, and any other involvement in this lawsuit by, PDVSA Ad Hoc. See ECF
No. [172] at 10, 15, 20–21.
In its Response, DRT contends that it has “never represented Rodriguez in any capacity”
and that, while “two DRT attorneys had a Zoom call with Rodriguez in 2023, that call did not
concern” this lawsuit. See ECF No. [175] at 3. Instead, “it involved an unrelated potential matter
in Switzerland, and the DRT attorneys never agreed to represent Rodriguez,” so DRT did not
obtain any privileged or confidential information that would conflict it out of representing Medina.
See ECF No. [175] at 3–5. 	Similarly, it argues G. Gazso did not obtain Rodriguez’s privileged
information through his father because A. Gazso submitted a sworn declaration averring that he
“has never met Rodriguez” and that “the alleged communications between” him and Rodriguez
“never took place.” See ECF No. [175] at 4. It argues that no formal ruling on Plaintiffs’ earlier
disqualification motions is required because Judge Bloom “expressly ruled on the pending
motions” in the dismissal, “finding them moot.” See ECF No. [175] at 5. And it argues it did not
violate its conferral and discovery obligations because it “did respond to Plaintiffs’ numerous
communications” about “whether PDVSA Ad Hoc had any involvement in its representation of”
Medina, just not “in the manner Plaintiffs desired, as the information sought was irrelevant and
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beyond the scope of permissible discovery.” See ECF No. [175] at 5–6.
In their Reply, Plaintiffs argue DRT is misrepresenting “the nature of its prior consultation”
with Rodriguez because Rodriguez’s email request for the October 2023 Zoom meeting “clearly
and explicitly requested a consultation regarding” U.S. federal court litigation related to PDVSA
and “workers rights.” See ECF No. [185] at 5. They argue they have evidence showing that A.
Gazso and Rodriguez have, in fact, communicated, including phone call and “other IT records,”
which means DRT submitted a “demonstrably false affidavit” to the Court. See ECF No. [185] at
4–5; ECF No. [182]. 	And they argue G. Gazso’s presence in the gallery at the January 2025
hearing in the Altonaga Case “clearly warrants scrutiny under Rules 4-1.9 and 4-1.10” despite it
being a public proceeding. See ECF No. [185] at 6.
2. 	Evidentiary Hearing
As noted above, the Court held the Evidentiary Hearing on January 6 and 7 “to ascertain
the facts connected to any communications between Rodriguez and” DRT “in September/October
2023, including the Zoom meeting that was scheduled to occur on October 2, 2023.” See ECF No.
[305] at 1–2. Because the evidence collected at the Evidentiary Hearing impacts the resolution of
the First Sanctions Motion, the Court provides more detail about the testimony and admitted
exhibits in this section. During the Evidentiary Hearing, the Parties presented the testimony from
Rodriguez and from DRT employees Diaz, Colomar, Coronado, Hovispo, Guillen, and Hernandez-
Peredo. See ECF No. [332]; ECF No. [333]. Because Plaintiffs invoked the rule of sequestration
as to any witness who was not also counsel of record, see Fed. R. Evid. 615; ECF No. [316] at 5–
6, Hovispo, Guillen, and Hernandez-Peredo waited outside the courtroom until it was their turn to
testify, see Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 1, 9, Jan. 6, 2026, while Diaz, Colomar, and Coronado remained in
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the courtroom, see ECF No. [330].5
i. 	Rodriguez’s Testimony
On direct examination, which proceeded by narrative because he is pro se, Rodriguez
testified that he emailed Diaz on September 20, 2023 to discuss starting litigation against PDVSA
and CITGO in Delaware federal court. See Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 1, 21. After speaking to Diaz at
least once on the phone about litigation finances, Rodriguez attended the Zoom meeting on
October 2, 2023. See id. at 21, 54. Rodriguez recalled that the meeting started “basically on time,”
after a three- or four-minute delay caused by a DRT employee’s lateness in joining. See id. at 21.
Once the meeting began, Rodriguez explained that he and Freites “were moving forward” with the
Delaware Litigation and also shared information about “another ongoing issue,” which Rodriguez
characterized as Medina’s “defamation campaign.” See id. at 21–22. Rodriguez told DRT about
his “strategy with regard to the” Delaware Litigation, “the things that were going on with regard
to Medina and the defamation campaign,” and how that defamation campaign “would impact the”
Delaware Litigation. See id. at 26.
During his direct examination, Rodriguez offered into evidence a chain of emails between
him and Diaz, on which Colomar, Coronado, Hernandez-Peredo, Freites, and a then-DRT
employee named Jorge Schmidt were eventually copied, that the Court admitted as Plaintiffs’
Exhibit 1.6 See id. at 35; ECF No. [30-1] at 32–37. The portion of the email chain from 2022 and
5 The Court granted Plaintiffs’ request for witness sequestration but denied their oral motion for
reconsideration of their Expedited Motion to Compel Zoom Logs, see ECF No. [328]; Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol.
1, 31, which the Court had previously denied because the records sought were unauthorized discovery, the
Motion was untimely, the subpoena’s compliance period was unreasonable, and Plaintiffs did not timely
identify the records on their Exhibit List, see ECF No. [329]. Due to the unreasonable compliance period,
the Court also denied Plaintiffs’ oral motion for a negative inference based on Defendants’ alleged
withholding of the requested Zoom call logs. See Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 1, 18.
6 Defendants offered a shorter version of the email chain that included only the 2022 and 2023 messages,
which the Court admitted as Defendants’ Exhibit A. See ECF No. [334-1]; Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 1, 147–50.
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2023 has the subject line “Re: Representation in Zurich/workers indemnization from CITGO and
PDVSA – International law commercial, workers rights, civil rights and human rights” and
includes Rodriguez’s initial September 20, 2023 message to Diaz. See ECF No. [30-1] at 33–34.
In the body of the September 20 message, Rodriguez requests an “initial consultation” about “a
case related to” PDVSA, “referring to litigation in Federal Court in the US” that sought “the
collection of unpaid workers compensation for several thousands of workers” estimated to be
worth “several billion” U.S. dollars. See ECF No. [30-1] at 34. It includes a numbered list of five
items Rodriguez hoped to accomplish during the consultation, including providing “a more
comprehensive overview of the case,” understanding DRT’s “approach to similar cases or issues,”
discussing “potential legal remedies and strategies,” addressing “any questions or concerns” DRT
had, and clarifying “the next steps and potential timelines.” See ECF No. [30-1] at 34. And it lays
out Rodriguez’s belief that the consultation would “be subject to client-attorney privilege, non-
binding with respect to engagement of parties, and without any associated fees or costs unless
specifically agreed upon in writing.” See ECF No. [30-1] at 34.
On cross-examination, Rodriguez clarified that the earlier emails in the chain are between
only him and Diaz and that Diaz later added other recipients to the October 2, 2023 message. See
Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 1, 43. Rodriguez admitted that the initial message to Diaz on September 20
did 	not 	mention 	Medina, 	defamation, 	Delaware, 	or 	Racketeer 	Influenced 	and 	Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) Act claims, which Plaintiffs asserted in the Amended Complaint. See id. at
44–45; ECF No. [52] at 12. He also admitted that Diaz had made clear in a responsive September
20 message that DRT could not and would not consider taking Rodriguez’s proposed case on a
contingency fee basis. See Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 1, 45; ECF No. [30-1] at 33.
When asked about the October 2 Zoom meeting, Rodriguez testified that he knew Diaz
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attended it because he spoke to Diaz during the meeting. See Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 1, 46. As to who
else attended, Rodriguez admitted he “presum[ed] that the persons copied in the email exchange,”
including Coronado, attended “the Zoom call” because they were “summoned by” their “boss”
Diaz “to be there.” See id. at 46–47. Rodriguez also admitted he could not say for certain who
attended the meeting because he did not “know who is talking” and it was “not relevant” to him
“who was doing the talking at that moment.” See id. at 47. He remembered there was “a woman
who spoke,” but he “cannot know who.” See id. at 48. He reiterated: “The only one I know is
Michael Diaz.” See id. Rodriguez admitted he did not “sign an engagement agreement or letter
with” DRT, receive any written legal opinion from DRT, or provide any additional “summaries or
documents” to DRT after the meeting, though he did send “a note.” See id. at 62–63. 	Nor did
DRT appear on his behalf in any legal action after the meeting. See id. at 63.
After having his recollection refreshed, see id. at 50, Rodriguez admitted he swore under
penalty of perjury in an affidavit that the Zoom “meeting was attended by Michael Diaz, Javier
Coronado, Marta Colomar, Jorge Schmidt, and Isabela Hernandez-Peredo.” 	See id. at 51; ECF
No. [30-1] at 7. Rodriguez also admitted he swore in his affidavit that “attorneys Michael Diaz,
Javier Coronado, Ayleen Hovispo and Marta Colomar, each of whom represent Medina,
previously engaged in” privileged discussions with him. See Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 1, 52; ECF No.
[30-1] at 3. And Rodriguez admitted his affidavit statements did not “include any caveats [or] any
disclaimers” to alert a reader that Rodriguez had only “presumed” those people attended the
October 2 Zoom meeting or engaged in privileged discussions with him because they were “taken
from the email.” See Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 1, 51–53. As to the substance of the October 2 Zoom
meeting, Rodriguez reiterated that he talked with Diaz about legal strategies and a cease-and-desist
letter he and Freites sent to Medina on September 29, 2023 about the defamation campaign. See
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id. at 21–22, 53.
Rodriguez denied “saying all of those things just to try disqualify” DRT, and he
acknowledged that his testimony had to be truthful and that he was not permitted to lie to the Court.
See id. at 54–56. 	After initially denying that any court had previously determined that he had
committed fraud, Rodriguez later admitted that Chief Judge Altonaga, in the Altonaga Case, had
found that the plaintiffs, including Rodriguez, had “committed fraud upon the court.” See id. at
56–57. But Rodriguez clarified that the fraud finding was against “the plaintiffs, in general,” not
against him specifically. 	See id. at 57–58. 	Rodriguez did not offer any redirect examination
testimony. See id. at 65–66.
The Court did, however, allow Roriguez to recall himself as a witness after Diaz and
Colomar testified because they both noted the October 2 Zoom call “was delayed because there
was someone” Rodriguez “wanted to participate in the call” and Rodriguez did not have notice of
that position before their testimony. 	See Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 2, 115, Jan. 7, 2026. 	After being
recalled, Rodriguez testified that he “did not have any recall of a long delay” until Colomar
“refreshed” his “mind when she said that” he “was waiting for someone.” See id. at 115–16. When
he thought about who that person could be, he realized it was Freites. 	See id. at 117. 	He also
testified that he had sent “an identical email to four large firms” around September 20 because he
“was actively looking for representation” and that the “defamation by Medina had not occurred at
that point,” as he became aware of it between September 25 and September 27. See id. at 116–18.
On recall questioning by the Court, Rodriguez confirmed that Freites is the person he was trying
to add to the October 2 Zoom call but could did not remember how long Freites’s inability to join
the Zoom delayed its commencement. See id. at 119.
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ii. 	Diaz’s Testimony
On direct examination, Diaz testified that he does not recall Rodriguez “at all” but that he
learned from information he received during this case that DRT had, more than a decade before,
represented a company in which Rodriguez was a member. See id. at 67. He explained that, before
the Evidentiary Hearing, he “asked the office to verify any communications in whatever form
with” Rodriguez. 	See id. at 77–78. 	He also explained that there were not “any substantial
communications between” him and Rodriguez and that he had not shared anything that was
communicated between them with anyone outside of DRT. See id. at 82. He noted DRT has “a
rule” that its lawyers cannot conduct client intake interviews “alone,” so he copies other lawyers
when asking for an interview to ensure that “at least” one can join him. See id. at 84.
About the October 2 Zoom meeting, Diaz testified that he did not “remember who” from
DRT joined but that he had “since that time” come to “understand” it was Colomar. See id. at 86.
He did not recall exactly when the meeting began, but he remembered he got frustrated because
Rodriguez delayed the meeting “trying to bring someone else into the call” and having technical
trouble doing so. See id. at 87–88. He explained that “there was no one from PDVSA Ad Hoc
on” the Zoom call because DRT “didn’t even represent them at that time” and “didn’t even know
who” Medina was then. See id. at 88.
On cross examination, Diaz testified that he and Rodriguez spoke about “a BBC article”
that Rodriguez had read from 2021 that “talked about” DRT “recovering assets on behalf of the
Department of Justice that” it “worked in collaboration with, that had to do with Venezuela, and
PDVSA.” See id. at 90. Because of that article, Rodriguez “wanted to potentially introduce” DRT
“to someone with respect to a claim in an asset recovery case in Europe.” See id. They did not
talk about “a potential defamation case,” Medina, Freites, Otero, or “any of the claims” in the
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Amended Complaint. See id. at 90–91. Diaz testified that, after the meeting, Rodriguez was not
DRT’s client; DRT had not opened “a file” on, sent a “retainer agreement to,” or received payment
from Rodriguez; he had never provided Rodriguez any direct legal advice; and he never spoke to
Rodriguez again. See id. at 91–93.
Diaz testified that he had “absolutely not” “used any information of what happened during”
the Zoom call “in any capacity in defending Mr. Medina in this case.” See id. at 93. He explained
that the only records DRT had found “involving communications between” DRT and Rodriguez
were the October 2 Zoom meeting and the email chain requesting it, despite that Diaz “was explicit
in an email to” Rodriguez asking for “a summary of” Rodriguez’s “case” or “claim” so that Diaz
could “look at it.” See id. at 93–94. Rodriguez sent “nothing about the summary of the claims,
nothing about the parties involved, none of it.” See id. at 94.
On redirect examination, Diaz admitted that the email requesting the October 2 Zoom
meeting does not contain the word “recovery” or the word “assets.” 	See id. at 95–96. 	But he
explained that, even so, on the actual Zoom call they discussed an earlier Connecticut case DRT
had handled involving the PDVSA “pension fund” and an attempt to recover money that had been
stolen from it through a “Ponzi scheme,” which Diaz considered an “asset recovery type of case.”
See id. at 96–97. 	Diaz also admitted the email did not contain the word “contingency,” but he
explained that he inferred from Rodriguez’s worry about being charged for the Zoom call and from
Rodriguez’s 2022 email about another matter that Rodriguez was looking for a contingency fee
arrangement. See id. at 97–100. Diaz testified he first learned about Rodriguez’s “defamation-
related things, issues, causes of actions against Mr. Medina” when Rodriguez emailed DRT in
2025 suggesting they had a conflict of interest. See id. at 101.
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iii. 	Colomar’s Testimony
On direct examination, Colomar testified that she attended the October 2 Zoom meeting
with Rodriguez and Diaz. See id. at 125. She recalled that she was in DRT’s video room for about
30 minutes, but there “was a little bit of delay” in starting the meeting “because no one was on at
the beginning, and then someone else was going to connect” on Rodriguez’s side. See id. at 125,
135. Once it began, the Zoom call included “small talk” and the “conversation itself was over very
fast.” 	See id. at 135, 142. 	She acknowledged that it was “usual” to have people attend Zoom
meetings from locations outside of DRT’s offices but testified that it was not possible anyone other
than her, Diaz, and Rodriguez connected to the October 2 Zoom call because she “was seeing the
screen” and no one else was there. See id. at 137–39.
As for the substance of the meeting, Colomar remembered Rodriguez and Diaz “discussed
workers, something happened in Venezuela with some workers of PDVSA” and Rodriguez
“wanted a way of getting them paid.” See id. at 126. Diaz then “discussed his experience” being
“involved in a case related to pensions in Venezuela, that was litigated in the United States, and
that was pretty much it.” 	See id. 	When asked what she remembered about asset recovery, she
recalled that Rodriguez “wanted to recover assets for these workers,” to “find assets somewhere
to get them paid.” See id. Colomar acknowledged that Rodriguez’s email request for the meeting
mentions litigation in the U.S., but she explained that in the actual Zoom call they discussed that
Rodriguez was based in Zurich and “wanted to do something in Europe.” See id. at 127. They did
not discuss the September 29 letter Rodriguez and Freites sent to Medina, which Rodriguez “never
sent” to DRT, nor did they discuss Medina, who Colomar did not know of in October 2023. See
id. at 131.
On cross-examination, Colomar testified that Coronado, Schmidt, Hernandez-Peredo, and
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Hovispo did not attend the October 2 Zoom meeting and that no one from DRT other than her and
Diaz participated. See id. at 146. She reiterated that she, Rodriguez, and Diaz did not discuss “any
case involving” Medina, “any potential case” involving Medina, any “defamation campaigns
started by” Medina, or anything “related to a defamation claim” at all, nor did they discuss any of
the claims in the Amended Complaint or obstruction of justice. See id. at 147, 152. She testified
that, despite the topics included in Rodriguez’s September 20 email requesting the meeting, they
did not discuss “any litigation in U.S. federal court” or any pending or forthcoming legal actions
in the U.S. 	See id. at 151–52. 	She noted Rodriguez’s September 20 email did not attach any
documents and did not mention Medina or filing a lawsuit about defamation, RICO claims, or
obstruction of justice. See id. at 152.
Colomar confirmed that, after the meeting, Rodriguez was not DRT’s client; DRT had not
opened “a file” on, sent a “retainer agreement to,” or received payment from Rodriguez; and she
had never provided Rodriguez any legal advice or agreed to represent him in any legal matter. See
id. at 158–59. She testified that she had not “used any of what was discussed during the Zoom
call” in representing Medina and elaborated that doing so “would be impossible” because nothing
Rodriguez shared during the Zoom call “related to anything about the current case against Mr.
Medina.” See id. at 160. She agreed that Rodriguez had “described the discussions of this Zoom
call differently” than she had, and she thought the reason for the difference is that Rodriguez filed
the motion to disqualify DRT “as a retaliation for” DRT’s “Rule 11 motion.” See id.
She noted that DRT “found two things” when, prompted by the Motion to Disqualify DRT,
“the firm conducted an internal search for any records related to” Rodriguez and the October 2
Zoom meeting: the email chain that had been thoroughly discussed and a “time entry.” See id. at
142, 147–48. 	DRT’s “custodian of records” conducted a “thorough search for any emails, any
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phone logs, any time entries, any paper files, any retainers, anything that had to do” with Rodriguez
in DRT’s systems, and those were the only two records related to Rodriguez’s asserted bases for
disqualifying DRT. See id. at 148–49. Colomar verified that she had made the time entry, which
related to “business development on October 2” with Rodriguez, “at or near the time of” the
meeting, as is DRT’s practice. See id. at 154–55. The Court admitted Colomar’s October 2 time
entry as Exhibit AH. See id. at 156–57. As to the contents of the time entry, it noted Colomar had
a “telephone call with potential client Alejandro Rodriguez regarding potential claims against
PDVSA.” 	See id. at 157. 	The time entry did not mention Medina, defamation, RICO, or
obstruction of justice. See id. And it indicated Colomar spent 0.6 hours on the October 2 meeting,
which equates to approximately 36 minutes. See id. at 158.
On redirect examination, Colomar confirmed that her affidavit statements about the
October 2 meeting do not mention asset recovery. 	See Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 2, 86. She was also
adamant, and repeated many times in response to Rodriguez’s questions, that she “did not forget
what happened” in the October 2 Zoom meeting. See Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 1, 163. In fact, the Court
reminded Rodriguez that Colomar “unequivocally” testified “she remembers exactly what
happened at the meeting” when Rodriguez tried to refresh her recollection with a document. See
id. at 164.
Answering questions from the Court, Colomar explained that DRT does not typically take
contingency fee cases and had done so only three or four times in the sixteen years she had worked
there, all in personal injury scenarios. See Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 2, 92–93. She defined asset recovery
as “finding assets anywhere in the world that the claimants can seize or obtain” to “get paid for
their claims,” and she explained that DRT “work[s] a lot” on cases seeking to recover assets
“abroad.” See id. at 93. She noted that DRT had helped Venezuelan claimants recover assets in
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Switzerland in 2020 or 2021 and that, while she did not talk to Rodriguez at the October 2 Zoom
meeting because she was “just there as a witness,” he and Diaz discussed what would be the fastest
way to get the workers paid, including possibly through assets they knew were in Switzerland. See
id. at 94–96. Colomar did not recall Rodriguez explicitly saying what forum he wanted to bring
his potential lawsuit in, but she inferred that it “was likely something in Europe” based on “the
location of the assets.” See id. at 96–97.
iv. 	Other Testimony
Each of the remaining four witnesses — Coronado, Hovispo, Guillen, and Hernandez-
Peredo — testified that they did not attend the October 2 Zoom meeting. See Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol.
1, 104; Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 2, 29, 51, 66, 75. Hovispo, who is a legal assistant at DRT, and Guillen,
who is a receptionist at DRT and handles Diaz’s personal appointments, also testified that they did
not schedule or manage the October 2 Zoom meeting. See Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 2, 29, 43–44, 51–
52.
Coronado testified that he conducted “an internal review of whether” Rodriguez’s
allegation that DRT had a conflict of interest in representing Medina was “supported by internal
records or documents,” both by searching DRT’s systems and client files himself and by relying
on DRT’s “IT company provider” and DRT’s “administrative staff.” See Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 1,
119–20. Coronado also reviewed his own phone records, but the “only two records on file” were
“the email exchange” between Rodriguez and Diaz “where other people are copied around”
September and October 2023 and the “diary entry activity report by attorney administrative
partner” Colomar, which in Coronado’s opinion did “not substantiate the disqualification
allegations.” See id. at 120.
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v. 	Closing Arguments
In his closing argument, Rodriguez focused mostly on the fact that DRT could have saved
the Court and the Parties from having the Evidentiary Hearing if it would have produced the log
of the October 2 Zoom call to show who attended. See id. at 122–24. In its closing, DRT asked
the Court to deny the First Sanctions Motion and the Fourth Sanctions Motion because the
evidence showed that the communications between Rodriguez and DRT in September/October
2023 “were narrow” in that they involved only the email chain and the October 2 Zoom call. See
id. at 124–26. DRT noted the email chain did not refer to any claims in the Amended Complaint,
and it argued that, in the October 2 Zoom meeting, it did not “receive any confidential information
from” Rodriguez, “never provided any legal services to” him, and “never agreed to represent” him
“in any legal matter.” See id. at 125–26, 129.
DRT highlighted the fact that Rodriguez swore in his affidavit that Diaz, Colomar,
Coronado, Schimdt, Hernandez-Peredo, and Hovispo attended the Zoom call but then testified that
he had merely inferred their attendance because they were copied on the email chain. See id. at
126. 	DRT also pointed out that Rodriguez himself “on a number of occasions” during his
testimony did not “recall what happened during the meeting,” despite his certainty in his affidavit
about who was there and what they discussed. See id. at 127–28. On the other hand, Diaz and
Colomar had testified — credibly and consistent with each other and the rest of the evidence —
that the October 2 Zoom call was about only “some potential avenues that could be pursued in an
unidentified matter in Europe.” 	See id. at 127. 	And it reminded the Court that Rodriguez was
among a group of plaintiffs that Chief Judge Altonaga found had committed fraud on the court in
the Altonaga Case. See id. at 128.
Finally, DRT argued Plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden to show that disqualifying
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DRT was warranted because they had not shown DRT violated any rule of professional conduct.
See id. at 128–29. 	Nor had Plaintiffs demonstrated that the October 2 Zoom meeting had
established an attorney-client relationship between Rodriguez and DRT. See id. at 129. And they
had not shown any “compelling reasons requiring” the “extraordinary remedy of disqualifying the
entire firm and the attorneys that have appeared in this matter.” See id. at 130.
On rebuttal, Rodriguez argued it would be “incredible” to believe that he did not raise the
defamation claims against Medina during the October 2 Zoom call because he had filed the
Delaware Litigation only three weeks earlier and had become aware of the defamation just days
before, so those things were more urgent to him than the PDVSA workers claim. See id. at 131–
32.
3. 	Credibility Determination
As described above, Plaintiffs ask the Court to impose a wide range of sanctions on DRT
and its attorneys, including disqualifying them from representing Defendant Medina in this action,
based primarily on a conflict of interest they assert arose out of the information Rodriguez shared
with DRT during the October 2 Zoom meeting. See generally ECF No. [172]. The Court held the
Evidentiary Hearing specifically to determine what information was shared at that meeting and
with whom. See ECF No. [305]. During the Evidentiary Hearing, Rodriguez’s recollection of the
meeting’s discussion was markedly different than the recollections of Diaz and Colomar, so before
the Court can decide whether sanctions are warranted here, it must first determine whose
recollection is most credible. 	For at least four reasons, the Court finds most credible the
recollection of Colomar, whose testimony mostly aligns with Diaz’s testimony and best aligns
with the non-testimonial evidence in the record.
First, while Rodriguez, Diaz, and Colomar all recalled there being a delay before the Zoom
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call began, both Diaz and Colomar recalled that the delay resulted from two things: for the first
three or four minutes after the start time, no one was on the Zoom call, and then, for some
additional amount of time, the group was waiting for someone Rodriguez wanted to join. 	See
Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 1, 21, 87–88, 125, 135. Rodriguez, on the other hand, did not recall the second
delay until Colomar’s testimony refreshed his recollection that he had wanted Freites to join. See
Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 2, 115–19. Second, Colomar testified without hesitation that she remembered
what happened at the meeting, and the only detail she had trouble recalling was the precise kind
of injury the PDVSA workers had suffered to support the claims Rodriguez wanted to bring on
their behalf. See Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 1, 162–64. Rodriguez, however, had difficulty remembering
even which publication was included in the email chain he had in front of him at the Evidentiary
Hearing, saying when Colomar corrected him: “memory is frail.”7 See Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 2, 102.
Third, and importantly, Diaz’s and Colomar’s testimonies were consistent with their
affidavit statements about who attended the meeting and what they discussed during it. Each of
them testified that only they and Rodriguez were on the Zoom call, see Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 1, 86,
125, 137–39, and that the conversation focused on finding assets in Europe that they could recover
to pay the harmed Venezuelan PDVSA workers, see id. at 90, 126–27. In contrast, Rodriguez’s
testimony strayed from his affidavit statements in a concerning way. 	While in his affidavit he
unambiguously swore under penalty of perjury that Diaz, Coronado, Colomar, Schmidt, and
Hernandez-Peredo attended the meeting, see id. at 51; ECF No. [30-1] at 7, during the Evidentiary
Hearing he admitted that he had only “presumed” those people attended the October 2 Zoom
meeting because they were copied on the email containing the Zoom link, see Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol.
7 The Court notes that, on numerous occasions during the Evidentiary Hearing, Rodriguez asked for the
Court’s assistance in reading back the question to the witness even though he had just asked the question
seconds earlier. See Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 2, 14, 26, and 73.
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1, 46–53. Similarly, Rodriguez swore in his affidavit that Diaz, Coronado, Hovispo, and Colomar
had “previously engaged in” privileged discussions with him, see id. at 52; ECF No. [30-1] at 3,
when that belief was also merely a presumption based on the email recipients, see Evid. Hr’g Tr.
vol. 1, 46–53. 	Indeed, the unrebutted evidence at the Evidentiary Hearing was that Coronado,
Schmidt, and Hernandez-Peredo did not participate in the October 2 Zoom call. See Evid. Hr’g
Tr. vol. 1, 104; Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 2, 29, 51, 66, 75. 	Rodriguez admitted his affidavit did not
include any caveats or disclaimers to indicate that his statements were presumptions, see id.,
making them false statements under oath and his testimony a recantation of his earlier sworn
statements.
Further, looking at the email requesting the Zoom meeting, it makes no mention
whatsoever of the claims raised in the Amended Complaint. Consistent with Colomar’s testimony
about the Zoom call, the email seeks a consultation “related to workers[’] indemnization from”
PDVSA involving “[i]nternational commercial, workers[’] rights, civil rights and human rights,”
specifically seeking “the collection of unpaid workers[’] compensation for several thousands of
workers in an amount estimated in several billion USD.” See ECF No. [30-1] at 34. By contrast,
Rodriguez testified that, on the Zoom call, he shared information about Medina’s “defamation
campaign,” but his email is very specific about the nature of the consultation and it makes no
mention of Medina, defamation, or RICO claims.8 See ECF No. [30-1] at 34.
For all those reasons, though the Court does not think Rodriguez intentionally lied or
misrepresented facts, the Court finds he is an unreliable historian with an imprecise memory of the
October 2 Zoom meeting. Indeed, Rodriguez took great liberties by providing the Court with an
8 While the email references potential litigation in federal court, Colomar explained, upon questioning from
the Court, that the venue for the litigation was not discussed in the actual Zoom call so she simply inferred
the venue would likely be in Europe based on “the location of the assets.” Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 2 at 96–97.
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affidavit under oath in which he affirmatively identified people who attended the meeting or had
privileged discussions with him when the reality is that he did not accurately remember the meeting
participants. 	Instead of being truthful about his assumptions, which may have weakened his
position somewhat but would have ultimately made him more credible, Rodriguez was willing to
make grand accusations without a specific memory of the meeting’s attendees. 	As a result, the
Court cannot credit his testimony about the meeting’s participants as reliable.
Likewise, the Court cannot credit Rodriguez’s memory of what was discussed at the
meeting. While on this point Rodriguez’s affidavit and testimony were consistent — both explain
Rodriguez’s recollection that the discussions involved the PDVSA workers issue and Medina’s
defamation, see id. at 21–26; ECF No. [30-1] at 7 — that recollection deviates from the
documentary evidence in the record. 	As explained above, Rodriguez’s initial email to Diaz on
September 20 lays out in detail what Rodriguez wanted to discuss during the October 2 Zoom call,
and nowhere in that message does Rodriguez mention Medina or any RICO or defamation claims.
See ECF No. [334-1] at 3. While Rodriguez explained in his testimony that he was not aware of
the defamation until between five and seven days after he sent the September 20 email, see Evid.
Hr’g Tr. vol. 2, 116–18, which would explain why he did not include it in that message, that
explanation is not enough to quell the Court’s concerns with Rodriguez’s memory of the October
2 meeting.
Overall, the gaps in Rodriguez’s memory about the meeting are too great for Court to credit
his testimony about it. Until nearly the end of the Evidentiary Hearing, Rodriguez did not even
remember that he tried to have another individual join the Zoom call. See id. at 115–19. And as
already explained, Rodriguez has demonstrated that he is willing to let assumptions fill in his
memory gaps. 	Accordingly, the Court credits the testimony of Colomar and Diaz about who
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attended the October 2 Zoom meeting and what they discussed during it.
4. 	Analysis
Having established who attended the October 2 Zoom meeting and what they discussed,
the Court can now evaluate the merits of the First Sanctions Motion. As explained above, the
Florida Bar Rules prohibit lawyers (and their law firms) from representing a client with interests
that are “materially adverse” to those of a former or prospective client unless the former or
prospective client gives informed consent. 	See R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-1.9(a); R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-
1.18(c), (d)(1). Similarly, Florida Bar Rules prohibit lawyers (and their law firms) from using any
information relating to the representation of a former client or that was gained from a prospective
client “to the disadvantage of” the former or prospective client, except when the information has
become generally known or the Rules otherwise would permit or require it. See R. Reg. Fla. Bar
4-1.9(b); R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-1.18(b).
Here, Plaintiffs have not established that Rodriguez is a former client of DRT. 	Indeed,
Rodriguez admitted at the Evidentiary Hearing that he did not “sign an engagement agreement or
letter with” DRT, receive any written legal opinion from DRT, or provide any additional
“summaries or documents” to DRT after the meeting and that DRT did not appear in any legal
action on his behalf following the meeting. See Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 1, 62–63. Similarly, Diaz and
Colomar testified that, after the meeting, Rodriguez did not become DRT’s client; DRT did not
open “a file” on, send a “retainer agreement to,” or receive payment from Rodriguez; they never
provided any direct legal advice to Rodriguez; and they never spoke to Rodriguez again. 	Id. at
91–93, 158–59. Thus, although Plaintiffs cite to Rule 4-1.9 as the basis of the violation to support
their request for sanctions, the Court concludes that this is not the relevant rule for purposes of the
analysis in the First Sanctions Motion. Rather, the Court will focus its analysis on Rule 4-1.18,
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which regulates an attorney’s relationship with a prospective client, as that is what Rodriguez was
at the time of the Zoom call— a prospective client.
It is undisputed that Plaintiffs’ interests, including Rodriguez’s, are materially adverse to
Defendant Medina’s interests in this lawsuit and that Rodriguez never gave informed consent to
DRT in connection with its representation of Medina. Therefore, the precise question the Court
must answer is whether the October 2 Zoom meeting discussions gave DRT information that it
could use to Rodriguez’s disadvantage. The Court concludes Plaintiffs have failed to carry their
burden of establishing that DRT received any such information. See In re BellSouth, 334 F.3d at
961.
Crediting the Evidentiary Hearing testimony of Colomar and Diaz, the information
Rodriguez shared during the October 2 Zoom call was related to Venezuelan PDVSA workers who
were injured because they were deprived of proper compensation. See Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 1, 90,
126–27. Colomar testified that Diaz’s contributions to the meeting focused on the best and fastest
way to get those PDVSA workers paid, which included finding assets in Europe (more particularly
Switzerland, where Rodriguez lives) that could be recovered to compensate them. See id. at 126–
27; Evid. Hr’g Tr. vol. 2, 94–96. That testimony aligns with Rodriguez’s September 20 email to
Diaz requesting the meeting, which explains that Rodriguez’s prospective lawsuit “relates to the
collection of unpaid workers compensation for several thousands of” PDVSA and CITGO
“workers in an amount estimated” to be “several billion” U.S. dollars. See ECF No. [334] at 3.
Nothing about that information — in Rodriguez’s words, “matters related to PDVSA-
CITGO,” see id. — is relevant or related to the claims Plaintiffs assert in the Amended Complaint,
which focus on Defendants’ alleged defamation against them. See ECF No. [52] at 55–119; ECF
No. [307] at 1–3. 	The Amended Complaint also details an alleged RICO conspiracy with the
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common purpose to defame, intimidate, and silence Plaintiffs so as to obstruct justice and retaliate
against Plaintiffs’ legal activities (particularly the Delaware Litigation) and with predicate acts of
witness tampering, obstruction of justice, and money laundering. 	See ECF No. [52] at 55–119;
ECF No. [307] at 1–3. 	Those allegations and claims also have no connection to the PDVSA
workers’ compensation claims that were the focus of Rodriguez’s September 20 email and the
October 2 Zoom meeting.
Because the information Rodriguez shared in the September 20 email and the October 2
Zoom meeting is unrelated to the claims Plaintiffs advanced in this lawsuit, DRT could not have
used that information to Rodriguez’s disadvantage. See R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-1.18(b). And because
DRT could not have used the information to Rodriguez’s disadvantage, DRT has not violated any
rule of professional conduct by representing Defendant Medina in this lawsuit. See R. Reg. Fla.
Bar 4-1.9(b); R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-1.18(b); R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-3.3.
Nor did DRT violate any rule of professional conduct by assigning G. Gazso to work on
this case. As to Plaintiffs’ argument that G. Gazso had access to Rodriguez’s confidential
information through his father A. Gazso’s professional association with Rodriguez, see ECF No.
[172] at 4–5, 12–13, the record does not support such a conclusion. In an affidavit filed in support
of DRT’s response to the First Sanctions Motion, A. Gazso avers that he has “never met or spoken
with” Rodriguez, “let alone discussed with him claims involving” Medina. See ECF No. [175-1]
at 2. He also avers that, while G. Gazso did work for his law firm between 2016 and 2022, he did
so “as a law clerk, not as an attorney.” See ECF No. [175-1] at 2. And he avers that, because he
“never communicated” with Rodriguez, G. Gazso “could not have had access to any information
concerning him.” 	See ECF No. [175-1] at 2. 	For his part, G. Gazso confirms each of those
statements in his own affidavit. See ECF No. [175-2]. He avers that he “never received or was
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exposed to any confidential information related to” Rodriguez while working at his father’s law
firm and that he “first became aware of” Rodriguez “in or around October 2024, when DRT began
monitoring” the Altonaga Case “in anticipation of potential claims against DRT’s client” Medina.
See ECF No. [175-2] at 2.
In his own affidavit in Reply, Rodriguez avers that A. Gazso’s affidavit statement about
never 	having 	communicated 	with 	him 	is 	“not 	accurate” 	because 	he 	“started 	telephonic
communication” with A. Gazso in “June 2020” to discuss “potential legal claims” against Medina,
PDVSA, and CITGO. See ECF No. [182] at 2. Rodriguez avers that he “can provide” a “record
log of starting communications” to A. Gazso, which he maintains for his “personal and business
affairs.” See ECF No. [182] at 1–2; ECF No. [225-1] at 53–57. 	He also avers that G. Gazso’s
affidavit statement about having no knowledge of him before October 2024 “is not credible” given
their “families’ long-standing connections,” including a decades-long close relationship between
Rodriguez and G. Gazso’s grandparents. See ECF No. [182] at 2–3. Rodriguez avers that he got
A. Gazso’s phone number from members of the extended Gazso family, which he asserts is more
proof that it is “highly improbable” that G. Gazso “was unaware” of Rodriguez or his
“circumstances.” See ECF No. [182] at 3.
During the October 24, 2025 Status Hearing, Rodriguez gave more detail about the “call
log” that he argues proves he and A. Gazso communicated in June 2020. See ECF No. [295] at
29; ECF No. [225-1] at 53–57. The call log, which was “machine-generated” from Rodriguez’s
“Skype account,” shows a single call placed on June 24, 2020 to a phone number that an internet
search suggests belongs to A. Gazso, but gives no other details. See ECF No. [225-1] at 53–57.
The call log entry does not, for example, indicate whether the call was answered and, if so, how
long the call lasted. 	See ECF No. [225-1] at 55. 	When the Court highlighted these critical
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omissions at the Status Hearing, Rodriguez agreed that he does not possess any records that could
supplement the call log.9 See ECF No. [295] at 29–32.
Taking all the evidence together, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not carried their burden
to establish that G. Gazso received or was exposed to Rodriguez’s confidential information
through his father A. Gazso. Both Gazsos unequivocally aver that A. Gazso has never
communicated with Rodriguez, and the Skype call log Rodriguez offers does not contradict those
averments. The call log does not definitively establish that the call actually connected and that a
conversation 	occurred, 	let 	alone that 	any 	conversation 	involved 	Rodriguez’s 	confidential
information, much less any confidential information about defamatory statements that Defendants
allegedly made in August and September of 2023, which was more than three years after this
alleged conversation with A Gazso. 	At most, the call log shows that Rodriguez called a phone
number that may be associated with A. Gazso, but even that conclusion is tenuous because the
“validation” Rodriguez provides is an unverified entry from a non-official website called
“FastPeopleSearch.com.” See ECF No. [225-1] at 57.
As for Rodriguez’s assertion that it is improbable G. Gazso did not know of him before
October 2024 because of their longstanding family connection, the Court has no problem accepting
that G. Gazso was not aware of a friend of his grandparents whom he may have met when he was
a child. And regardless, any such childhood meeting has no bearing on whether G. Gazso received
9 The Court did not allow any additional discovery on this matter because, even if the Court assumes that
Rodriguez placed a phone call to this phone number in June 2020 and that the phone number belonged to
A. Gazso, Plaintiffs could not possibly establish that Rodriguez shared privileged information with A.
Gazso during that call about the claims in the Amended Complaint. This is because Defendants did not
make the allegedly defamatory statements at issue in the Amended Complaint until August of 2023 and in
the months that followed — more than three years after any such phone call. Further, the Court notes that,
in his affidavit, see ECF No. [182] at 2, Rodriguez avers that he communicated with A. Gazso on “multiple
occasions” and that they had multiple “calls,” but he only provided proof of this singular phone call in June
of 2020.
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Rodriguez’s confidential information and, therefore, should be disqualified — along with the
entire law firm — from representing Medina. 	Because Plaintiffs have not established that G.
Gazso received any confidential information about Rodriguez from his father A. Gazso, neither he
nor DRT could have used the information to Rodriguez’s disadvantage. Accordingly, the Court
finds Plaintiffs have not shown G. Gazso or DRT violated any rule of professional conduct by
representing Defendant Medina in this lawsuit.10 See R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-1.9(b); R. Reg. Fla. Bar
4-1.10(a)–(b); R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-1.18(b); R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-3.3.
Finally, as to Plaintiffs’ argument that the Court should sanction DRT under Rule 11,
Rule 37, and Local Rule 7.1 for violating its conferral and discovery obligations, see ECF No.
[172] at 10, 15, 20–21, the Court finds nothing in the record to support a conclusion that DRT did
not confer with Plaintiffs as required or that it failed engage in discovery. 	As DRT explains, it
10 As to Plaintiffs’ arguments that G. Gazso had a duty to disclose his summer internship with Judge Bloom
and acted suspiciously by attending the January 2025 hearing in the Altonaga Case, the Court finds them
to be without merit. As G. Gazso explained during the Status Conference, the internship is included on his
publicly available LinkedIn profile and his DRT “website page.” See ECF No. [295] at 77–78. In any
event, G. Gazso’s participation in an internship program years before this lawsuit was filed does not support
a conclusion that Judge Bloom is biased in his favor. See Brown v. Brock, 169 F. App’x 579, 583 (11th Cir.
2006) (explaining that “an ethical danger exists only if the law clerk knows the judge’s thoughts about a
specific matter and the law clerk subsequently represents one of the parties to the matter before the judge.”);
Scopelliti v. City of Tampa, No: 14–CV–949–MSS–TGW, 2015 WL 13427797, at *1–2 (M.D. Fla. Nov.
20, 2015); Reed v. Chamblee, No. 22-CV-1059-TJC-PDB, 2024 WL 69570, at *2 n.4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 5,
2024). As this case was filed long after G. Gazso’s internship concluded, there was no occasion for Judge
Bloom to have shared her impressions about this matter with him. Similarly, G. Gazso’s attendance at a
court proceeding that is open to the public does not create a “strong appearance of impropriety,” especially
given his explanation that he attended because DRT anticipated Plaintiffs would be bringing claims against
Medina. See ECF No. [175-2] at 2.
As to Plaintiffs’ argument that DRT violated its duty of candor to the Court by failing to disclose or
strategically concealing the fact that PDVSA Ad Hoc has an interest in this lawsuit, see ECF No. [172] at
4–5, 13–16, the Court finds nothing in the record to support such a conclusion. Although Plaintiffs argue
that DRT’s use of the email address “pdvsaadhoc@diazreus.com” is a “smoking gun indicating that PDVSA
Ad Hoc personnel were actively involved in the defense’s strategy and communications,” see ECF No.
[172] at 4–5, that is a grand overstatement, and Plaintiffs offer nothing to substantiate their speculation.
And as DRT explains, the “email address pdvsaadhoc@diazreus.com is not, and has never been, an address
belonging to PDVSA Ad Hoc. It is a distribution list that directs messages to DRT personnel” including
Coronado, Diaz, Colomar, G. Gazso, Hovispo, and Hernandez-Peredo. See ECF No. [175-3] at 9.
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responded to Plaintiffs’ “numerous communications” about “whether PDVSA Ad Hoc had any
involvement in its representation of” Medina, just not “in the manner Plaintiffs desired, as the
information sought was irrelevant and beyond the scope of permissible discovery.” See ECF No.
[175] at 5–6. The Court finds nothing wrong with DRT’s actions in conferral and discovery.
For all those reasons, the Court concludes that DRT and its lawyers did not violate any rule
of professional conduct by representing Medina in this lawsuit, so sanctions are not warranted on
that basis. 	Likewise, the Court concludes that sanctions are not warranted under any federal or
local procedural rule, such as Rule 11, Rule 37, or Local Rule 7.1. Finally, the Court declines to
exercise its inherent authority to sanction DRT or its lawyers because Plaintiffs have not shown
that DRT committed any misconduct or disobedience that requires the Court to act to vindicate its
judicial authority, see Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1209; Purchasing Power, 851 F.3d at 1225, let alone
any misconduct or disobedience rooted in bad faith, Martin, 307 F.3d at 1335. Accordingly, the
First Sanctions Motion, ECF No. [172], is DENIED.
B. Second Sanctions Motion – ECF No. [225]
In the Second Sanctions Motion, Plaintiffs again ask the Court to refer DRT to this
District’s Grievance Committee, along with imposing “severe monetary and non-monetary
sanctions” against it for “bad-faith conduct and fraud on the Court,” issuing “a post-judgment
finding that DRT’s representation of Defendant Medina was improper due to its disqualifying
conflicts of interest,” and ordering DRT to “retract and correct” statements in an article on its
website that characterize the Delaware Litigation as a “misuse of legal proceedings to advance
unfounded allegations” involving PDVSA Ad Hoc. 	See ECF No. [225] at 7, 13. 	In support of
their requested relief, Plaintiffs mostly point the Court to the same allegations of wrongdoing the
Court already assessed in its resolution of the First Sanctions Motion. Specifically, Plaintiffs once
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more argue: (1) DRT and G. Gazso have conflicts of interests that make their representation of
Medina improper; (2) DRT’s submission of A. Gazso’s “false affidavit” is a fraud on the Court;
(3) DRT omitted from its discovery disclosures the PDVSA Ad Hoc Board’s involvement in this
lawsuit; and (4) G. Gazso had a duty to disclose his internship with Judge Bloom. See ECF No.
[225] at 2–6.
New to this motion, Plaintiffs argue that DRT failed to confer with Plaintiffs in good faith
when they sought to discuss the Skype call log they assert shows A. Gazso’s affidavit is untruthful.
See ECF No. [225] at 10. Plaintiffs also argue that DRT posted on its law firm website an article
about Judge Bloom’s May 2025 dismissal of the Amended Complaint in which it admitted PDVSA
“was a central party of interest” and “publicly maligned” Plaintiffs by characterizing their lawsuit
as a “misuse of legal proceedings to advance unfounded allegations” involving PDVSA Ad Hoc.
See ECF No. [225] at 7. Plaintiffs argue the Court can sanction DRT under its inherent authority
because DRT’s actions amount to “bad-faith conduct,” see ECF No. [225] at 7–9, and can sanction
DRT’s failure to confer under Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) as well, see ECF No. [225] at 9–10.
The Court has already extensively explained why Plaintiffs’ arguments about DRT and G.
Gazso’s purported conflicts of interests, A. Gazso’s affidavit, PDVSA’s purported involvement in
this lawsuit, and G. Gazso’s internship fail, see supra Section III.A, so it will not reiterate those
explanations here. 	For the reasons discussed above, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ requests for
sanctions on those bases.
As to Plaintiffs’ new arguments about DRT’s failure to confer about the Skype call log and
DRT’s website article about the dismissal of the Amended Complaint, the Court finds them to be
without merit. 	Starting with the conferral, Plaintiffs assert that they “sent a written request to
confer via email” to DRT on August 6, 2025 based on what they saw as a “material factual dispute
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created” by A. Gazso’s affidavit. See ECF No. [225] at 19. Plaintiffs “stated their intention to file
a motion requesting an evidentiary hearing to resolve this factual conflict and expressly asked if
Defendants would consent to the relief sought.” 	See ECF No. [225] at 19. 	DRT essentially
acknowledges that it did not respond to that conferral request before Plaintiffs filed the Second
Sanctions Motion on August 15, 2025, but it argues “sanctions under Rule 7.1(a)(3) are
inappropriate whenever the conferral would not have resolved the issues presented in the motion.”
See ECF No. [236] at 16–17. The Court agrees with DRT.
Although the Court does not condone DRT’s failure to confer on Plaintiffs’ request, the
Court notes that the failure to confer does not require the Court to impose sanctions on DRT, as
the language of Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) is “permissive,” not mandatory. See Koppey v. Liberty Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., No. 20-CV-23581, 2020 WL 13389220, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 31, 2020); S.D. Fla.
L.R. 7.1(a)(3) (“Failure to comply with the requirements of this Local Rule may be cause for the
Court to . . . impose on counsel an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a reasonable
attorney’s fee.” (emphasis added)). Second, courts in this District have denied requests for similar
relief under Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) when “conferral would not have resolved the issues presented in
the Motion.” 	See Koppey, 2020 WL 13389220, at *2 (denying request to deny a motion based
solely on the failure to confer). The Court finds that approach most appropriate here, as the relief
Plaintiffs sought was, in their own words, DRT’s agreement to an evidentiary hearing. See ECF
No. [225] at 19.
As DRT points out, Plaintiffs have requested an evidentiary hearing in most, if not all, of
their motions to this Court. See ECF No. [236] at 17. And DRT’s client, Defendant Medina, has
“consistently opposed” that relief in the past, see ECF No. [236] at 17 & n.8 (citing ECF No. [175];
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ECF No. [196]; ECF No. [221]), and opposes it again here, see ECF No. [236] at 17, 19–20. As a
result, the Court concludes that conferral about the request for an evidentiary hearing within the
Second Sanctions Motion would not have resulted in an agreement between Plaintiffs, Medina,
and DRT that an evidentiary hearing was necessary. The Court also notes that it would not have
granted an evidentiary hearing on the Second Sanctions Motion even if the Parties had jointly
requested one, as its earlier orders make clear. 	See ECF No. [286] (clarifying that the Status
Hearing was not an evidentiary hearing); ECF No. [305] at 1–2 (granting in part and denying in
part Plaintiffs’ requests for an evidentiary hearing). For all those reasons, the Court declines to
impose sanctions under Local Rule 7.1(a)(3). See Koppey, 2020 WL 13389220, at *2.
Moving to DRT’s website article about the dismissal of the Amended Complaint, the Court
concludes that it does not demonstrate bad faith, which is the key to unlocking the Court’s inherent
authority to sanction. See Martin, 307 F.3d at 1335. From the Court’s review, the article appears
to be a five-sentence-long advertising press release posted on DRT’s website. See ECF No. [225-
1] at 50–51. The first four sentences contain only statements of fact about the parties and claims
involved in this lawsuit and about Judge Bloom’s order dismissing it. See ECF No. [225-1] at 50–
51. Plaintiffs take issue with the fifth sentence: “This outcome reinforces that U.S. courts will not
permit the misuse of legal proceedings to advance unfounded allegations involving PDVSA Ad
Hoc and members of the Venezuelan opposition.” See ECF No. [225-1] at 50–51.
While the Court understands Plaintiffs dislike the connotation of the word “unfounded,”
the fact of the matter is, Judge Bloom did indeed find that their allegations in the Amended
Complaint were insufficient to state a claim for relief. See ECF No. [165]. That, essentially, is
the dictionary definition of “unfounded.” 	See Unfounded, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/unfounded (lacking a sound basis: groundless, unwarranted). 	Slightly stronger is
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Plaintiffs’ issue with the word “misuse,” implying something improper about Plaintiffs’ filing of
this lawsuit, which is a finding Judge Bloom did not make. 	See ECF No. [165]. 	Even so, the
article does not go so far as to malign Plaintiffs’ personally, as it does not directly accuse them of
impropriety or even say that this lawsuit in particular was a misuse of the judicial process. See
ECF No. [225-1] at 50–51. And importantly, the article did not delay or disrupt the litigation or
hamper the enforcement of a court order, which is how the Eleventh Circuit has described bad
faith. See In re Sunshine Jr. Stores, 456 F.3d at 1304.
Sanctions under the Court’s inherent authority are a potent remedy that “must be exercised
with restraint and discretion.” See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44. They apply when lawyers have been
disobedient to the point of abusing the judicial process such that the Court’s judicial authority must
be vindicated. See id. at 44–45; Purchasing Power, 851 F.3d at 1225. For those reasons, the Court
sanctions lawyers only if their “conduct is so egregious that it could only be committed in bad
faith,” which is “not the same as simple recklessness.” See Purchasing Power, 851 F.3d at 1224–
25. DRT’s press release, while certainly not a neutral retelling of this lawsuit’s outcome, is not so
egregious that it rises to the level of sanctionable bad faith conduct. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at
44–45; Purchasing Power, 851 F.3d at 1225; Martin, 307 F.3d at 1335; Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1209.
Accordingly, because none of its grounds meet the threshold for the sanctions Plaintiffs request,
the Second Sanctions Motion, ECF No. [225], is DENIED.
C. Third Sanctions Motion – ECF No. [233]
In the Third Sanctions Motion, Plaintiffs repeat their request for the Court to sanction DRT
and G. Gazso by disqualifying them from representing Medina in this lawsuit and by requiring
them to pay Plaintiffs’ costs and expenses in filing the motion. See ECF No. [233] at 12. 	This
time, however, Plaintiffs also ask that the same sanctions be imposed against Sardi and Sardi Law.
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See ECF No. [233] at 12. 	Plaintiffs base their requests on what they assert is “a series of
undisclosed, coordinated actions” by DRT and Sardi Law that amounts to “misconduct.” See ECF
No. [233] at 4.
Specifically, Plaintiffs argue DRT and Sardi Law began coordinating their efforts during
the Altonaga Case and were secretly representing many of the defendants in that matter while those
defendants claimed to be pro se, which prevented Rodriguez from challenging DRT’s participation
based on the same purported conflicts of interest that have been extensively described in this Order.
See ECF No. [233] at 4–7. Plaintiffs argue the coordinated representation continues in this lawsuit,
which taints Sardi and Sardi law with DRT’s conflicts and “demonstrates a sustained and concerted
effort to deceive the Court and opposing parties.” See ECF No. [233] at 5. This is especially true,
Plaintiffs argue, because Sardi asserted in a conferral email that he had never met Coronado or G.
Gazso before his involvement in this case, despite having sat next to G. Gazso during the January
hearing in the Altonaga Case, and refused to “provide his full professional identification.” 	See
ECF No. [233] at 7–8.
To begin, the Court adopts its analysis from the First Sanctions Motion and the Second
Sanctions Motion, which found that DRT and G. Gazso are not conflicted out of representing
Medina. See supra Sections III.A–B. Based on those findings, even assuming DRT clandestinely
cooperated with Sardi Law in the Altonaga Case and in this one, neither DRT nor G. Gazso could
have infected Sardi and Sardi Law with any kind of imputed conflict. For that reason, Plaintiffs’
request for sanctions against DRT, G. Gazso, Sardi Law, and Sardi based on any purportedly
disqualifying conflict is denied.
Moving to the new components of the Third Sanctions Motion, which object to DRT
coordinating its defense with Sardi and Sardi Law, the Court has already resolved this issue, too,
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in an earlier order. 	See ECF No. [307] at 24–27; ECF No. [338]. 	As they are known to do,
Plaintiffs filed an entirely separate motion based on the same allegedly improper coordination
between DRT and Sardi Law. See ECF No. [269]. Indeed, in Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary
Injunctive Relief to Enjoin Improper Coordination Between Defense Counsel, ECF No. [269],
Plaintiffs asked the Court to enjoin DRT and Sardi Law from coordinating strategies, sharing
information, and taking the same legal positions because DRT’s purported conflict gave both law
firms an unfair informational advantage that should have disqualified them from representing
Medina (the “Motion for Injunction”). See ECF No. [269] at 1–3, 6–9; ECF No. [307] at 24.
In its Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) on the Motion for Injunction, the Court
explained that there is nothing inappropriate about defense counsel coordination and that, in fact,
it is normal practice when counsel share a joint interest in defending against a plaintiff’s claims.
See ECF No. [307] at 25. 	For that reason, the Court recommended that Judge Bloom deny
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Injunction, see ECF No. [307] at 25–27, and Judge Bloom adopted that
recommendation, see ECF No. [338] at 3. Based on those rulings, the Court concludes that there
is no basis to conclude that DRT and Sardi Law have engaged in a sustained and concerted effort
to deceive the Court or Plaintiffs. 	So Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions against DRT, G. Gazso,
Sardi Law, and Sardi based on coordination of counsel is denied.
Finally, as to Plaintiffs’ contention that DRT and Sardi Law have deceived the Court by
secretly representing pro se defendants in the Altonaga Case, that is not a matter for resolution for
this Court. If Plaintiffs can demonstrate that such undisclosed representation occurred, they should
raise that issue to Chief Judge Altonaga in the context of the Altonaga Case. And as to Plaintiffs’
contention that Sardi deceived them when he said he had not met Coronado or G. Gazso “prior to
[his] involvement in this case” because he sat with G. Gazso during the January 2025 hearing in
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the Altonaga Case, see ECF No. [233] at 7, Sardi explained at the Status Hearing that he “did not
know” that G. Gazso “was there,” “did not notice him,” and had “no clue of who he was until this
case,” see ECF No. [295] at 52–53. The Court accepts that representation, made in a court
proceeding, by an officer of the Court.
But even assuming the statement were untrue, that is not the kind of conduct Rule 11, which
is the authority Plaintiffs provide for its sanctions request on this issue, exists to police. As the
text of Rule 11 demonstrates, it applies to “representations to the court” in “a pleading, written
motion, or other paper,” not to conferral emails between counsel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). While
the Court never condones misrepresentations made by counsel, regardless of where they are made,
Rule 11 does not authorize sanctions for misrepresentations between counsel and opposing parties.
Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions against Sardi based on his statements about Coronado and G.
Gazso is, therefore, denied. 	Accordingly, the Third Sanctions Motion, ECF No. [233], is
DENIED.
D. Fourth Sanctions Motion – ECF No. [235]
In the Fourth Sanctions Motion, Plaintiffs ask the Court to “exercise its inherent authority
to impose sanctions on Defendants and their counsel for a pattern of bad-faith conduct that is
calculated to bring contempt upon the administration of justice.” See ECF No. [235] at 21. This
pattern of bad-faith conduct includes “the submission of perjured testimony” — specifically, a
declaration in which Coronado avers that, while investigating Rodriguez’s allegations that DRT
had acquired confidential information from him in the October 2 Zoom meeting, Coronado
contacted Schmidt to ascertain whether Schmidt had ever communicated with Rodriguez
“concerning a defamation case involving someone named Horacio Medina” and that Schmidt
“advised” through a February 2025 WhatsApp message “that he has not had any such
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communications.” See ECF No. [235] at 17–21; ECF No. [59-14] at 2–3, 48. The pattern of bad-
faith conduct also includes the “vexatious multiplication of proceedings through the stonewalling
of Plaintiffs’ good faith attempts to correct the record,” see ECF No. [235] at 21, which refers to
the four-month delay in receiving Schmidt’s confirmation, see ECF No. [235] at 7–12.
Plaintiffs contend Coronado’s declaration is perjurious because Schmidt is copied on the
email chain requesting the October 2 Zoom meeting. See ECF No. [235] at 19. As they did with
Coronado, Hernandez-Peredo, and Hovispo, see supra Section III.A, Plaintiffs assert that
Schmidt’s inclusion on the email chain definitively establishes that Schmidt “was not only aware
of but was also directly and intentionally included in communications” about Rodriguez and his
potential claims, which is “sufficient to prove that” Schmidt lied when he said he “had no
communications with” Rodriguez. See ECF No. [235] at 17. Similarly, because Coronado was
also copied on the email chain, Plaintiffs argue Coronado knew Schmidt’s WhatsApp message
was untrue but relied on that “false information” in his declaration anyway. See ECF No. [235] at
17–19.
As the Court has now explained many times, the evidence at the Evidentiary Hearing made
clear that the only people involved in the October 2 Zoom meeting were Rodriguez, Diaz, and
Colomar and that the discussion at the Zoom meeting did not include discussions about defamation
or Medina. 	See supra Section III.A.2–3. 	So any assertion based on that Zoom meeting that
Schmidt and Coronado were untruthful has already been rejected. 	More particular to this exact
allegation, Schmidt’s confirmation that he “didn’t have any communication about” a “defamation
case involving someone named Horacio Medina,” see ECF No. [59-14] at 48, is entirely in line
with the Court’s conclusion about what the Zoom meeting discussion entailed, see supra Section
III.A.2–3.
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The Court has also expansively explained that Diaz’s decision to copy some of his
employees on the email chain to ensure that at least one person could join the Zoom call as a
witness does not establish that all copied employees actually communicated with Rodriguez. See
supra Section III.A.2–3. Similarly, and unsurprisingly to anyone who receives a large number of
work emails, the Evidentiary Hearing testimony established that those employees did not interpret
being copied on an email message by Diaz to be a direct communication to them. See Evid. Hr’g
Tr., vol. 2, 32. For all those reasons, the Court does not view either Schmidt’s WhatsApp message
confirming that he had never communicated with Rodriguez or Coronado’s declaration alerting
the Court to Schmidt’s response as untruthful, which means that those statements do not support
Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendants and their counsel engaged in a pattern of bad-faith conduct.
The Court, therefore, declines to exercise its inherent authority to impose sanctions on them on
that basis. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44–45; Purchasing Power, 851 F.3d at 1225; Martin, 307
F.3d at 1335; Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1209.
As for Plaintiffs’ contention that the four months between their request for Schmidt to
verify the accuracy of the WhatsApp message and Schmidt’s verification was “stonewalling,” see
ECF No. [235] at 7–12, 21, Plaintiffs do not provide any evidence to support that the delay was
intentional. Coronado’s declaration explains that Schmidt “no longer works for” DRT, see ECF
No. [59-14] at 3, which would explain why Coronado had to use WhatsApp to reach him. Plaintiffs
argue that they asked Coronado for Schmidt’s phone number so that they could contact him
directly about the WhatsApp message and that Coronado refused to give it, see ECF No. [235] at
8, but the Court finds nothing inappropriate about declining to provide a former employee’s
personal phone number to an opposing party. 	That is not stonewalling; it is security. 	And
regardless of when Schmidt provided the verification, the fact of the matter is that Schmidt
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confirmed that the WhatsApp conversation that Coronado attached to his affidavit was not a
fabrication and that it accurately captures the exchange between him and Coronado on February
24, 2025. Thus, notwithstanding any delay, the outcome is no different as Schmidt confirmed the
accuracy of the information in Coronado’s affidavit. For all those reasons, the Court does not view
the four months between Plaintiffs’ request for Schmidt to verify the WhatsApp message and
Schmidt’s verification as stonewalling by defense counsel or as support for Plaintiffs’ argument
that Defendants and their counsel engaged in a pattern of bad-faith conduct. The Court therefore
also declines to exercise its inherent authority to impose sanctions on them on that basis. 	See
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44–45; Purchasing Power, 851 F.3d at 1225; Martin, 307 F.3d at 1335;
Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1209. Accordingly, the Fourth Sanctions Motion, ECF No. [235], is
DENIED.
E. Fifth Sanctions Motion – ECF No. [301]
In the Fifth Sanctions Motion, Plaintiffs ask the Court to sanction Colomar, G. Gazso,
Foster, and Sardi by referring them to this District’s Grievance Committee and by ordering them
to pay Plaintiffs’ costs and expenses related to the motion because they violated their duty of
candor to the Court during the Status Hearing. See ECF No. [301] at 17–18. Plaintiffs also ask
the Court to order the “immediate redaction from the public record of all references to the private
medical information of Plaintiff Otero’s spouse.” See ECF No. [301] at 18. Plaintiffs assert that
the Court can take these actions under its inherent authority, 28 U.S.C. § 1927,11 this Court’s Local
Rule 11.1(c), and Florida Bar Rules 4-3.3 and 4-8.4(c)–(d). See ECF No. [301] at 16–17.
Plaintiffs contend Colomar violated that duty by asserting that Plaintiff Otero does not
11 In full, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides: “Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court
of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably
and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’
fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
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speak English when he, in fact, holds several degrees from Cambridge University and by
deliberately trivializing the seriousness of Otero’s wife’s heart condition when she described Mrs.
Otero as merely ill. See ECF No. [301] at 10–11. Plaintiffs contend G. Gazso violated that duty
by arguing that the October 2 Zoom meeting was not substantially related to this lawsuit because
part of the subject line referenced representation in Zurich and by arguing that he had not concealed
his internship with Judge Bloom because it was included on his public LinkedIn profile. See ECF
No. [301] at 8–10. Plaintiffs contend Foster violated that duty by referring to the email chain as a
single email. 	See ECF No. [301] at 7–8. 	And Plaintiffs contend Sardi violated that duty by
misleading the Court into thinking it had denied Plaintiffs’ request to redact Mrs. Otero’s medical
information when the Court’s order on the motion containing it was silent on that point, by
claiming he had referred to Mrs. Otero in a filing only generally and without revealing her name
when the substance of his filing made clear that he was referring to her, and by making a bad-faith
misapplication of the law applicable to deposing opposing counsel. See ECF No. [301] at 4–7.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that each of Plaintiffs’ examples of how Colomar, G.
Gazso, Foster, and Sardi violated their duty of candor is based on a granular (and mostly non-
dispositive) problem with an argument they made during a court proceeding. 	In this way,
Plaintiffs’ argument aligns with their overall approach throughout this litigation, which is often
formalistic to the point of nit-picking, shifting the focus from the resolution of large-scale legal
and factual issues to a battle over semantics. While the Court acknowledges that some of the
lawyers’ statements may in fact have been incomplete or even inaccurate, the Fifth Sanctions
Motion is a good example of why it has taken the Court more than fifty pages to resolve only a
handful of actual legal issues. That is its own version of wasting judicial resources, if not vexatious
multiplication of the litigation.
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Moving to the merits of the motion, the Court concludes that none of the conduct Plaintiffs
highlight rises to the level of bad-faith conduct sufficient to support the imposition of sanctions
under the Court’s inherent authority. Although Otero’s Cambridge degrees suggest that he speaks
English, the Court has not heard Otero speak in English during any of the many proceedings he
has attended. So the Court does not fault Colomar for her assumption that he cannot. Similarly,
Colomar’s choice to refer to Mrs. Otero as ill instead of describing the full extent of her medical
problems is likely not a deliberate trivialization of the seriousness of her condition; it could, in
fact, be an attempt to respect Plaintiffs’ request that Mrs. Otero’s medical information not be
disclosed. 	While Plaintiffs may assume the worst about defense counsel, their assumptions are
not proof of bad faith intent.
Plaintiffs fault G. Gazso for arguing that the October 2 Zoom meeting was not substantially
related to this lawsuit based in part on a snippet of the email chain’s subject line that referred to
Zurich and for arguing that his internship’s appearance in his public LinkedIn profile supports a
conclusion that he did not conceal it. But pointing to the pieces of evidence that support a client’s
position is exactly what a lawyer is supposed to do; G. Gazso did not lie to the Court by drawing
the Court’s attention to a part of the email chain that weakens Plaintiffs’ argument. Nor did G.
Gazso breach any duty of candor by not affirmatively disclosing his internship, as the Court has
already thoroughly explained. See supra Section III.A. Similarly, the Court does not view Foster’s
decision to label the email chain as a single email as dishonest; the phrase “single email” is broad
enough to encompass an email chain, particularly where — as in this case — the Court, the
lawyers, and Plaintiffs have consistently referred to and dealt with the email chain as a complete
entity.
Finally, Sardi did not lie when he reminded the Court that it had denied the motion that
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contained Plaintiffs’ request to redact Mrs. Otero’s medical information. The Court did deny that
motion in full. See ECF No. [286]. The Court’s silence on the redaction issue does not mean that
issue remains live for resolution. As the Court made clear during the Status Hearing, that motion
“is all done.” See ECF No. [295] at 56. 	Nor did Sardi falsely claim to have kept Mrs. Otero’s
identity confidential. His filing did not identify her, other than to say she was Otero’s wife. See
ECF No. [281]. The Court fails to see how Sardi could respond to Plaintiffs’ motion, which was
based on a medical issue affecting a Plaintiffs’ spouse, see ECF No. [275], without at least that
level of identification. 	Finally, Sardi did not misapply the law when he argued at the Status
Hearing that it would be “highly improper” to have an opponent “take the deposition of an attorney
who is actively defending a defendant in a case.” 	See ECF No. [295] at 69. 	That is a fair, if
general, representation of the law on this issue, and Plaintiffs can rest assured that the Court
understands the nuance pertaining to counsel of record who become central fact witnesses. And
most importantly, none of these instances in fact confused or misled the Court during the Status
Hearing, so there was no prejudice to Plaintiffs or harm to the dignity of the tribunal. See Kleiner,
751 F.2d at 1209.
Once again, the Court concludes that defense counsel’s conduct is not so egregious that it
rises to the level of sanctionable bad faith conduct. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44–45; Purchasing
Power, 851 F.3d at 1225; Martin, 307 F.3d at 1335; Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1209. 	Nor does the
conduct warrant sanctions under the other sources of law Plaintiffs suggest, as it did not multiply
the proceedings “unreasonably and vexatiously,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1927; was not a knowing false
statement of fact or law, see R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-3.3(a)(1); and did not involve dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, misrepresentation, or practice that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, see R. Reg.
Fla. Bar 4-8.4(c)–(d). Accordingly, because none of its grounds meet the threshold for the
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sanctions Plaintiffs request, the Fifth Sanctions Motion, ECF No. [301], is DENIED.
F. 	DRT’s Request for Sanctions
In its responses to the Fourth and Fifth Sanctions Motions, DRT makes its own request for
sanctions against Plaintiffs. See ECF No. [251] at 10–12; ECF No. [303] at 17–19. Sardi does the
same in his response to the Fifth Sanctions Motion. See ECF No. [304] at 5–6. DRT and Sardi
base these requests on Plaintiffs’ persistent filings — which they view as improper and intended
only to increase legal costs, “burden the Court’s resources, and demonstrate their disregard for the
Court’s authority” — and on Plaintiffs’ “consistent pattern of ignoring this Court’s rules and
procedures,” which has resulted in the Court striking or denying “numerous filings on that basis.”
See ECF No. [251] at 10–12; ECF No. [303] at 17–19; ECF No. [304] at 5–6. They ask the Court
to “impose a narrow injunction against Plaintiffs, preventing further filings without leave of the
Court.” See ECF No. [251] at 10–12; ECF No. [303] at 17–19; ECF No. [304] at 5–6.
While the Court does not disagree that Plaintiffs have been prolific filers, keeping this case
going for nearly eight months after Judge Bloom dismissed the Amended Complaint and Plaintiffs
appealed that dismissal to the Eleventh Circuit, the Court declines to exercise its authority to
impose a pre-filing injunction at this juncture. See Johnson v. 27th Ave. Caraf, Inc., 9 F.4th 1300,
1317–18 (11th Cir. 2021); cf. Traylor v. City of Atlanta, 805 F.2d 1420, 1421 (11th Cir. 1986)
(explaining that a district court has considerable discretion in restricting the filing of patently
frivolous lawsuits). 	As the Court explained in an earlier R&R, while Plaintiffs have not been
successful on most of their motions to date, some of those motions have not been patently
frivolous. See ECf No. [307] at 27–31. But let this be Plaintiffs’ final warning: if they continue
to file motions and other documents at the same pace and those motion continue to be denied, the
Court will give serious consideration to Defendants’ next request for a pre-filing injunction. For
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now, though, DRT and Sardi’s request for sanctions against Plaintiffs is DENIED.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the motions, ECF No. [172]; ECF No. [225]; ECF No.
[233]; ECF No. [235]; and ECF No. [301], are DENIED.12 Similarly, DRT and Sardi’s request
for sanctions against Plaintiffs, see ECF No. [251] at 10–12; ECF No. [303] at 17–19; and ECF
No. [304] at 5–6, is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Miami, Florida on January 20, 2026.
_____________________________________
MARTY FULGUEIRA ELFENBEIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc: 	All Counsel of Record
Ivan R. Freites C.
c/o Villasana
4370 NW 107th Ave, Apt. 102
Doral, FL 33178
PRO SE
Miguel Enrique Otero C.
Plaintiff.v.Medina@proton.me
PRO SE
Jorge Alejandro Rodriguez M.
Plaintiff.2.v.Medina@proton.me
PRO SE
12 For clarity, the Court notes that this denial applies to all of Plaintiffs’ requests for post-judgment
discovery and evidentiary hearings, unless noted otherwise in its prior order, see ECF No. [172] at 2, 19;
ECF No. [225] at 12–13; ECF No. [233] at 12; ECF No. [235] at 21–22; ECF No. [301] at 18, ECF No.
[305], and which, because of the Court’s resolution of the merits issues above, are moot.
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