In the Matter of the Complaint of Bradley R. Perry

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION
IN ADMIRALTY
Case No.: 1:25-cv-22217-EA
IN THE MATTER OF:
THE COMPLAINT OF BRADLEY R. PERRY
AS OWNER OF THE M/Y MAD MAX (HULL
ID #VIC44404A424) ITS ENGINES, TACKLE,
APPURTANCES, EQUIPMENT, ETC. IN A
CAUSE OF EXONERATION FROM OR
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY,
Petitioner.
______________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON CLAIMANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Claimant Ricardo Martinez’s Motion to Dismiss
First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 52). Petitioner filed a Response (ECF No. 55), to which
Respondent filed a Reply, (ECF No. 58). This matter was referred to the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge for issuance of a Report and Recommendation on any dispositive matters by the
Honorable Rodolfo A. Ruiz, II, United States District Judge, (ECF No. 47); this matter has since
been reassigned to the Honorable Ed Artau, United States District Judge, for all further
proceedings, (ECF No. 51). The undersigned held a hearing on the Motion on January 27, 2026.
Having considered the Motion, the Response, the Reply, the arguments advanced at the January
27 hearing, the record as a whole, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the
undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Motion be DENIED.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner Bradley R. Perry (“Petitioner”), as the owner of the M/Y Mad Max (the
“Vessel”) filed a petition before this Court for exoneration of or limitation from liability. See (ECF
No. 1) (the “Petition”). The Petition alleges that on the evening of October 30, 2024, Petitioner
was aboard the Vessel with invited guests on a recreational outing as the Vessel was operated by
Captain William Stein. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 9). Petitioner claims that at all times material to this dispute, the
Vessel “was seaworthy properly and efficiently manned, supplied, equipped, and furnished; and
well and sufficiently fitted and supplied with suitable machinery, tackle, apparel and appliances,
all in good order and condition and suitable for the use for which it was engaged.” (Id. ¶ 8).
Petitioner alleges that, as Captain Stein was operating the Vessel1 on the return voyage, the Vessel
collided with an unlit, unmarked, and uncharted concrete platform located East of the Card Sound
Bridge in Miami-Dade County, Florida. (Id. ¶ 10). As a result of the allision, the Vessel was
damaged and individuals onboard have alleged they sustained injuries. (Id. ¶ 12). Petitioner claims
that the platform “was not visible, did not appear on the Garmin GPS/chartplotter, and constituted
a latent navigational hazard.” (Id. ¶ 11).
Petitioner alleges that the incident was caused solely by conditions beyond Petitioner’s
control and actual or constructive knowledge, and was not the result of any fault, neglect, or want
of care on the part of the Petitioner or anyone for whose acts Petitioner is or may be responsible.
(Id. ¶ 13). Further, Petitioner expressly denies any privity with or knowledge of any wrongful or
negligent act that could be the cause of the incident, (id. ¶¶ 24, 25); Petitioner claims that at the
time of the incident, he was asleep on the Vessel’s aft bench and was involved in neither the
navigation nor the operation of the Vessel.
1 Petitioner later amended his Petition by striking, with the Court’s leave, the allegation that Captain Stein had
rented the Vessel. See (ECF No. 39).
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Petitioner identified four claimants seeking damages as a result of this incident: Braxton
Meloon, Braelyn Clift, Ricardo Martinez, and Ava Adams. Petitioner seeks exoneration from these
claims or, in the alternative, a limitation of liability pursuant to 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30512.
Following the Petition’s filing, the Court entered a Monition and Injunction providing that
“all claims and proceedings against the owner related to this matter shall cease.” (ECF No. 3 at 1).
The Court Ordered that “by July 7, 2025, all persons or entities claiming damages . . . as a result
of the events . . . recited in the Complaint seeking exoneration or limitation, must file their
respective claims with the Clerk of this Court and serve copies thereof on Petitioner’s counsel or
be defaulted.” (Id. at 2).
Upon receiving notice, Claimant Ricardo Martinez appeared in this matter and filed the
instant Motion seeking dismissal of the Petition pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). (ECF No. 52).2
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Each allegation must be
simple, concise, and direct,” though no specific technical form is required. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b) provides that “[a] party must state its claims or defenses in
numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 10(b).
Dismissal is warranted where a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
2 The Motion additionally requested that the Court take judicial notice of certain GPS data taken from the Vessel by
Claimant’s expert; however, counsel withdrew that request at the hearing. I recommend that the Motion for Judicial
Notice be denied.
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sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. Though detailed factual allegations need not be provided, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
The allegations must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. Facts alleged are to be
taken as true and all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in claimant’s favor. See Chaparro v.
Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 2012).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, “[a] court may consider only the complaint itself and any
documents referred to in the complaint which are central to the claims.” Wilchombe v. TeeVee
Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009). “[W]here the plaintiff refers to certain documents
in the complaint and those documents are central to the plaintiff’s claim, then the Court may
consider the documents part of the pleadings for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.” Brooks v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997).
This action for exoneration from or limitation of liability under the Limitation of Liability
Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501 et. seq., is governed by Rule F of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty
or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
“Compared to Rule 8, Supplemental Rule F(2) requires a heightened degree of specificity[]”: “The
petitioner must provide a complete account of the incident, including details regarding the faults
of all parties involved.” Matter of Garcia, No. 20-21859-CIV, 2020 WL 3892416, at *2 (S.D. Fla.
July 9, 2020).
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III. 	DISCUSSION
In limitation proceedings such as this one, the court engages in a two-step analysis to
determine whether the vessel owner is entitled to exoneration from or limitation of liability. “First,
the court must determine what acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness caused the
accident. Second, the court must determine whether the shipowner had knowledge or privity of
those same acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness.” Hercules Carriers, Inc. v.
Claimant State of Florida, 768 F.2d 1558, 1563–64 (11th Cir.1985) (quoting Farrell Lines, Inc. v.
Jones, 530 F.2d 7, 10 (5th Cir.1976)). “Privity is a broader concept than having actual knowledge
of an incident, and lack of privity refers to a situation in which even a reasonable inspection could
not have led the shipowner to obtain the requisite knowledge.” Matter of Garcia, 2020 WL
3892416, at *3. Further, “[t]he shipowner’s privity or knowledge is not measured against every
fact or act regarding the accident; rather, privity or knowledge is measured against the specific
negligent acts or unseaworthy conditions that actually caused or contributed to the accident.”
Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc. v. Shubert, 86 F.3d 1060, 1064 (11th Cir. 1996).
Claimant Martinez seeks to dismiss the Petition on the basis that Petitioner has not alleged
sufficient facts to establish that he lacks privity or knowledge. Furthermore, because Petitioner
was present on the boat at the time of the allision, Claimant submits that Petitioner will be unable
to demonstrate that he lacked privity or knowledge and the Petition should be dismissed with
prejudice. Petitioner responds that his allegations are sufficient to meet the pleading standard, and
that dismissal of this Petition with prejudice on a finding that he indeed had privity or knowledge
of the alleged negligence would be premature at this stage.
“[T]he admiralty court may decide the privity or knowledge issue without first deciding
the liability issue—at least where the boat owner concedes privity or knowledge, or where it is
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otherwise impossible under any set of circumstances for the vessel owner to demonstrate the
absence of privity or knowledge.” Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc. 86 F.3d at 1064 (“If it is truly
impossible under any set of circumstances for Suzuki to establish its lack of privity or knowledge,
then the limitation action should be dismissed[.]”). The Court agrees with Petitioner that
Claimant’s request for dismissal with prejudice—in essence, a request for judgment as a matter of
law—is premature here because Petitioner has not conceded privity or knowledge, and Claimant
has not demonstrated that it would be impossible to demonstrate the absence thereof.
It is true that Petitioner’s presence on the Vessel at the time of the incident warrants “closer
scrutiny” to evaluate his lack of privity or knowledge. See Tittle v. Aldacosta, 544 F.2d 752, 756
(5th Cir. 1977). However, the Eleventh Circuit has rejected summary disposition on a motion to
dismiss solely based on an owner’s presence aboard, or even control, of the vessel in question. See
Petition of M/V Sunshine, II, 808 F.2d 762, 765 (11th Cir. 1987).
[I]n most circumstances negligence in operation will be sufficiently connected to
the owner on board his own small vessel and operating it that he will be found to
have privity or knowledge, but this common sense recognition of how the facts
will usually work out is not an ineluctable doctrine to be applied at the pleading
stage, on conclusory and disputed allegations, as a substitute for the knowledge
necessary to lead a court to rational decision.
Id.; see also Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1066 (finding summary judgment was
improper where court could “envision set of circumstances” where vicarious liability through other
parties existed). Claimant’s Motion travels on the theory that the Vessel was going too quickly and
that Petitioner should have told Captain Stein to slow down. However, the Motion does not rule
out the possibility that, under some set of circumstances, Petitioner could show a lack of privity or
knowledge. Plaintiff alleges that he was asleep at the time of the incident, and that the platform
was not visible. While Petitioner’s allegations may ultimately be disproven, summary disposition
at this stage is improper.
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Claimant argues that the facts pled are insufficient to establish a lack of privity or
knowledge. See Supp. Rule F(2) (requiring a petitioner to “set forth the facts on the basis of which
the right to limit liability is asserted”); see also M/V Sunshine, II, 808 F.2d at 764 (“While ‘the
narrative need not necessarily be elaborate,’ it ‘should be full and complete.’”) (quoting Benedict,
Admiralty, § 74, p. 8–25 and 8–26)). Claimant relies upon Matter of Lopez-Castro, where Judge
Graham dismissed a petition without prejudice for failure to plead with specificity the facts
underlying the vessel collision. No. 05-21812-CIV, 2005 WL 8155930, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 15,
2005). The petition in Lopez-Castro, however, merely stated that: two vessels collided; the
collision was not the petitioner’s fault; and the collision was caused by acts of which the petitioner
had no privity or knowledge. Id. Judge Graham reasoned that the allegations were all legal
conclusions, rather than factual allegations providing a narrative of the collision.
Petitioner here alleges that Captain Stein was operating the Vessel; Petitioner was asleep
at the time of the incident; and that the platform with which the Vessel collided was not visible
and did not appear on the Vessel’s Garmin GPS/chartplotter. See (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 11, 26). These are
factual allegations beyond legal conclusions that distinguish the present Petition from that in
Lopez-Castro.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDS that
Claimant Ricardo Martinez’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 52) be
DENIED.
A party shall serve and file written objections, if any, to this Report and Recommendation
with the Honorable Ed Artau, United States District Court Judge for the Southern District of
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Florida, within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of the hearing.3 Failure to timely file objections will bar
a de novo determination by the District Judge of anything in this recommendation and shall
constitute a waiver of a party’s “right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2016); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
see also Harrigan v. Metro-Dade Police Dep’t Station #4, 977 F.3d 1185, 1191–92 (11th Cir.
2020)
RESPECTFULLY SUMBITTED in chambers in Miami, Florida, on this 29th day of
January, 2026.
________________________________________
LAUREN F. LOUIS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
3 The undersigned’s recommendation was announced in open court after the hearing.
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