Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 26-cv-23271-BLOOM
NEIL LARAMENDI NAVARRO,
Petitioner,
v.
MIAMI ICE FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR,
Respondent.
______________________________________________/
ORDER ON AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Petitioner Neil Laramendi Navarro’s (“Petitioner”)
Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Amended Petition”), ECF No. [5]. The Court
issued its Order to Show Cause, ECF No. [3], and Respondent filed a Response, ECF No. [8], to
which Petitioner filed a Reply, ECF No. [9]. The Court has considered the Amended Petition, the
supporting and opposing submissions, the record, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully
advised. For the reasons that follow, the Amended Petition is granted.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Cuba, has resided in the United States since 1970. ECF
No. [5] ¶ 1. Petitioner was ordered removed to Cuba in 2006 after serving a prison sentence. Id.
For the past five years, Petitioner has been compliant with an Order of Supervision (“OSUP”). Id.
On May 7, 2026, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents took Petitioner into
custody following a traffic stop. Id. ¶ 3. ICE did not explain its reasons for revoking Petitioner’s
OSUP. Id. ¶ 4. ICE provided no written explanation, no finding of a violation, and no opportunity
for Petitioner to respond during an informal interview. Id.
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Petitioner argues his detention without the opportunity for individualized review violates
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Accardi Doctrine in that Respondent
violated the notice, interview, and opportunity to respond requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 241.4. ECF
No. [5] at 12-16. Petitioner requests that he be released from custody immediately, to enjoin the
Respondent from re-arresting or re-detaining Petitioner absent full and strict compliance with
federal law, and to grant attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. at 16.
Respondent responds that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s claims and that
it properly revoked Petitioner’s OSUP to effectuate Petitioner’s removal. ECF No. [8] at 7-9.
Respondent served Petitioner with a Notice of Revocation of Release on May 7, 2026, and
provided an informal interview on that same day. ECF Nos. [8-6]; [8-7]. Respondent contends it
served Petitioner with a second Notice of Revocation of Release on May 15, 2026, and Petitioner
was afforded another opportunity to respond in an informal interview. ECF Nos. [8-7]; [8-8].
Respondent argues it followed the regulatory procedures required to revoke Petitioner’s OSUP
consistent with 8 C.F.R. § 241.4. ECF No. [8] at 8.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241(a), district courts have the authority to grant writs of habeas
corpus. Habeas corpus is fundamentally “a remedy for unlawful executive detention.” Munaf v.
Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (citation omitted). A writ may be issued to a petitioner who
demonstrates that he is being held in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. See
28 U.S.C. §2241(c)(3). The Court’s jurisdiction extends to challenges involving immigration
detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, Respondent argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review ICE’s
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decision to revoke Petitioner’s release and take him into custody because those actions were taken
for the purpose of executing a final order of removal. ECF No. [8] at 7-8. While § 1252(g) “bars
courts from reviewing certain exercises of discretion by the attorney general, it does not proscribe
substantive review of the underlying legal basis for those discretionary decisions and actions.”
Madu v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 470 F.3d 1362, 1368 (11th Cir. 2006). “The Eleventh Circuit has
consistently held that even where the statutory framework grants agency discretion, courts have
jurisdiction to review whether an agency adhered to its own regulations and procedures.” See
Barrios v. Ripa, No. 1:25-CV-22644, 2025 WL 2280485, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2025) (citing
Kurapati v. U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immig. Services, 775 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014)
(finding that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) did not prevent the Court from assessing whether the government
followed its procedures when it revoked petitioner’s visa petition)).
Petitioner does not challenge the underlying removal order. See generally ECF No. [5].
Petitioner also does not challenge that Respondent may revoke an order of supervision. Id. Rather,
Petitioner challenges Respondent’s compliance with permissible bases to revoke an OSUP and
proper OSUP revocation procedures. Therefore, jurisdiction is proper. See Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer,
781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 152 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (holding that “district courts . . . have distinguished
between challenges to ICE’s discretion to execute a removal order, which are barred, and
challenges to the manner in which ICE executes the removal order, which are not.”); Grigorian v.
Bondi, 824 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 1249 (S.D. Fla. 2025) (holding that § 1252(g) did not strip the court
of jurisdiction to evaluate whether the government complied with OSUP revocation procedures).
B. Unlawful Revocation of OSUP
Petitioner argues that under the Accardi doctrine — which requires agencies to follow their
own binding regulations — revocation requires notice of the reasons for revocation and a prompt
interview to respond. ECF No. [5] ¶ 50. Respondent argues that Petitioner’s OSUP was revoked
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to effectuate a removal order under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4, and Petitioner was “provided with a Notice
of Revocation of Release and an informal interview consistent with the regulatory procedures.”
ECF No. [8] at 8 (citing ECF Nos. [8-7], [8-8]).
The basic premise of the Accardi doctrine, drawn from United States ex rel. Accardi v.
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), is that “an agency must abide by its own regulations.” Chevron
Oil Co. v. Andrus, 588 F.2d 1383, 1386 (5th Cir. 1979). “[A]gency deviation from its own
regulations and procedures may justify judicial relief in a case otherwise properly before the
court.” Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 976 (11th Cir. 1984). Furthermore, it “goes without saying
that ICE, like all government agencies, must follow its own regulations.” Roble v. Bondi, 803 F.
Supp. 3d 766, 774 (D. Minn. 2025).
Thus, the Court begins by discussing the applicable regulations. Respondent contends it
properly revoked Petitioner’s OSUP under § 241.4. ECF No. [8] at 8. Under § 241.4, there are two
broad categories for revocations of release. Section 241.4(l)(1) covers revocation in response to a
violation of the conditions of release. For those detained pursuant to § 241.4(l)(1), the regulation
requires notification of the “reasons for revocation of his or her release or parole,” as well as “an
initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to Service custody to afford the alien an
opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.4(l)(1). Section 241.4(l)(2) is broader and includes cases where “[t]he purposes of release
have been served,” “[i]t is appropriate to enforce a removal order or to commence removal
proceedings against an alien,” or “[t]he conduct of the alien, or any other circumstance, indicates
that 	release 	would 	no 	longer 	be 	appropriate.” 	8 	C.F.R. 	§ 241.4(l)(2)(i),(ii),(iv). 	Though
§ 241.4(l)(2) does not contain the same notice and interview requirements, courts have “interpreted
section 241.4(l) as requiring an informal interview upon the revocation of release regardless of the
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reason for the revocation” — that is, the notice and informal interview requirement found in
§ 241.4(1)(1) applies to revocation under § 241.4(1)(2). See Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp.
3d 137, 163 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (collecting cases); Zhu v. Genalo, 798 F. Supp. 3d 400, 410
(S.D.N.Y. 2025) (“[P]aragraph (l) sets forth a unified set of procedures for the revocation of
removal.”); Grigorian, 824 F. Supp. 3d at 1252. Here, where there is no allegation that Petitioner
violated any conditions of his release, § 241.4(l)(2) applies. Thus, the Court turns to considering
whether the procedures required by § 241.4(l)(2) have been followed.
The Court begins with the notice requirement. “The undisputed purpose of this requirement
is to give the non-citizen an opportunity to respond to or otherwise contest the reasons for the
revocation.” Zhang v. Genalo, 814 F. Supp. 3d 307, 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2025). Petitioner was taken
into Respondents’ custody on May 7, 2026. ECF No. [5] ¶ 3. On that date, Respondent provided
Petitioner a Notice of Revocation of Release, ECF No. [8-6] (the “May 7, 2026 Notice”) and
contends that Petitioner “was given an informal interview regarding the reason for revocation.”
ECF No. [8-7] ¶ 17. The May 7, 2026 Notice has a box checked indicating Petitioner’s OSUP was
revoked under § 241.13 because “[c]ircumstances have changed such that there is a significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” ECF No. [8-6] at 1. Based on the
purpose of the notice requirement, the May 7, 2026 Notice was plainly insufficient because it did
not inform Petitioner of the reason his OSUP was revoked. That is, Respondent now asserts that
Petitioner’s OSUP was revoked to effectuate a removal order under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4, ECF No. [8]
at 8 — a reason different from the one stated in the May 7, 2026 Notice. Thus, the Court finds that
the May 7, 2026 Notice provided insufficient notice of ICE’s basis and reasons for revoking
Petitioner’s OSUP and did not afford Petitioner a meaningful opportunity to respond to or
otherwise contest the reasons in the corresponding informal interview. See Grigorian, 824 F. Supp.
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3d at 1255 (“The opportunity to contest detention through an informal interview is not some ticky-
tacky procedural requirement; it strikes at the heart of what due process demands.”). The May 7,
2026 Notice and informal interview are therefore insufficient to satisfy 8 C.F.R. § 241.4.
The Court now turns to Respondent’s actions taken after Petitioner filed the Amened
Petition. On May 15, 2026, Respondent provided Petitioner a second Notice of Revocation of
Release. ECF No. [8-8] (the “May 15, 2026 Notice”). The May 15, 2026 Notice has a box checked
indicating that under § 241.4 Petitioner’s OSUP was revoked because “[i]t is appropriate to enforce
the removal order against you as ICE has the ability and means to effectuate your removal.” Id. at
1. Respondent also provides the Declaration of Deportation Officer Gonzalo Partidas Jr.
(“Partidas”) who states that Petitioner rejected a second informal interview on May 15, 2026. ECF
No. [8-7] ¶ 19.
Petitioner replies that other than Respondent’s bare assertion, there is no evidence that any
informal interview ever occurred, much less one that complies with due process. ECF No. [9] at
2. 	Moreover, 	Petitioner 	points 	out 	that 	Respondent’s 	inexplicably 	toggle 	from 	revoking
Petitioner’s OSUP under § 241.13 to § 241.4 between the two Notices of Revocation of Release.
Id. Petitioner also contends that Respondent relies on “a declaration from ICE personnel that is not
based on personal knowledge” and that Respondent’s “vague and unsubstantiated claims to have
conducted an informal interview” are unreliable and are not “in conformity with any semblance of
due process.” ECF No. [12] at 1-2. Respondent has failed to rebut this assertion. See generally
Docket.
Petitioner alleges that he was never given the required informal interviews to respond to
the Notices of Revocation, and the only evidence provided by the Respondent that such an
interview took place is the Declaration of Partidas, who states that Petitioner was afforded an
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interview on May 7, 2026, and Petitioner declined an interview on May 15, 2026. ECF No. [8-7].
The Court finds Partidas’ Declaration unreliable as he provides no factual support for his
statement. Indeed, Partidas grounds his Declaration in the fact that he was familiar with Petitioner
“based on my review of his administrative file and the information detailed in ICE’s electronic
databases.” Id. ¶ 3. Partidas has no personal knowledge of whether the informal interview occurred
or was rejected. Such a conclusory Declaration is insufficient to establish that an interview took
place. See Olivera Loaces v. Miami ICE Field Office Director, 26-cv-24134-JEM (S.D. Fla July
16, 2026); see also Jose Manuel Barcenas Toruno v. Christopher J. Larose, 26-cv-104-RSH-DEB
(S.D. Cal Feb. 26, 2026) (“The Court has no alternative but to credit Petitioner’s own sworn
statement, uncontradicted by evidence, that he did not receive such an interview”).
The question, then, is whether the lack of sufficient notice and interview render Petitioner’s
detention unlawful, such that release is the appropriate remedy. Among courts that have confronted
similar issues, the majority hold that the failure to provide adequate notice upon revocation of an
order of supervision is grounds for release. See, e.g., Losada Diaz v. Parra, No. 25-22624-CV,
2026 WL 1223375, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2026); La Rosa Hernandez v. Parra, No. 26-21701
CIV, 2026 WL 1221818, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2026); Lugones v. Parra, No. 26-21615-CIV,
2026 WL 1223378, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2026). Similarly, most courts find that a substantial
delay in affording an informal interview means that the re-detention violates ICE’s regulations and
the petitioner’s constitutional rights to due process, thus warranting release. See, e.g., Banega v.
Warden of Soft Side S. Facility, No. 2:25 CV-1152-JES-DNF, 2026 WL 234042, at *3 (M.D. Fla.
Jan. 29, 2026); Cabrera v. Warden Alcatraz, No. 2:26-CV-01384-SPC-NPM, 2026 WL 1336255,
at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 14, 2026); Jean-Baptiste v. Mullin, No. 3:26-CV-484-MMH-LLL, 2026 WL
1109483, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2026); Bui v. Warden of the Otay Mesa Det. Facility, No. 25-
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CV-2111 JES DEB, 2025 WL 2988356, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2025); M.S.L. v. Bostock, No.
6:25-CV-01204-AA, 2025 WL 2430267, at *11 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025). The Court agrees with the
reasoning in those cases. Where ICE fails to follow its own regulations in re-detaining a
petitioner — the very regulations designed to protect the petitioner’s due process rights—the
petitioner is entitled to release, just as much as the petitioner would be if his due process rights
were violated in any other manner. Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 166 (W.D.N.Y.
2025); Constantinovici v. Bondi, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1165 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (“ICE’s failure to
follow such regulations thereby also violated Petitioner’s constitutional due process rights.”).
Ultimately, the Court finds that the Government was not entitled to detain Petitioner
without offering him an actual account of its reasons for doing so and a meaningful opportunity to
contest those reasons. Indeed, “if men must turn square corners when they deal with the
government, it cannot be too much to expect the government to turn square corners when it deals
with them.” Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 172 (2021). The Court thus finds that Petitioner
must be released from custody.
Because the Court finds release is warranted under the Accardi Doctrine, the Court need
not address Petitioner’s other arguments. The Amended Petition is granted.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. 	Petitioner’s 	Amended 	Petition 	for 	Writ 	of 	Habeas 	Corpus, 	ECF 	No. 	[5], 	is
GRANTED.
2. 	Respondent shall release Petitioner from custody IMMEDIATELY, pursuant to the
terms of Petitioner’s prior Order of Supervision. Respondent shall file a notice with the
Court within 48 hours confirming Petitioner’s release in compliance with this Order.
3. 	The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
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4. 	To the extent not otherwise disposed of, any scheduled hearings are CANCELED, all
pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT, and all deadlines are TERMINATED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on October 9, 2026.
_________________________________
BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: 	Counsel of Record
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