DAVIS v. THE FRANKLIN COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
ARIE DAVIS, on behalf of A.D.,
a minor,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE FRANKLIN COUNTY SCHOOL
SYSTEM, et al.,
Defendants.
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CASE NO. 3:25-cv-96 (CDL)
O R D E R
A.D. 	was 	an 	eleven-year-old 	black 	middle 	school 	student 	who
enrolled 	in 	Franklin 	County 	Middle 	School 	after 	his 	family 	moved
from Miami, Florida, to Franklin County, Georgia. 	Franklin County
is predominately white, and its middle school has a predominately
white student population. 	Arie Davis, A.D.’s father, alleges that
shortly 	after 	A.D. 	started 	attending 	Franklin 	County 	Middle
School, 	the 	School 	Principal, 	David 	Cawthon, 	and 	the 	School
Resource Officer, Brandon Dove, began discriminating against A.D.
because 	of 	his 	race 	by 	disciplining 	him 	more 	harshly 	than 	white
students. 	Davis 	alleges 	that 	this 	targeted 	campaign 	culminated
when 	Cawthon 	and 	Dove 	filed 	a 	Delinquency 	Complaint 	against 	A.D.
in Juvenile Court on a false charge that was ultimately dismissed
for 	lack 	of 	evidence. 	Davis 	now 	brings 	this 	action 	on 	A.D.’s
behalf, 	asserting 	claims 	for 	constitutional 	violations 	under 	42
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U.S.C. 	§ 	1983 	and 	state 	law 	torts 	against 	Cawthon, 	the 	Franklin
County 	School 	District, 	Dove, 	and 	the 	Franklin 	County 	Sheriff’s
Office.1 	Cawthon 	and 	the 	District 	moved 	to 	dismiss 	the 	claims
against them.2 	For the following reasons, both those motions (ECF
Nos. 17 & 18) are granted in part and denied in part.
MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss” under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 	12(b)(6), 	“a 	complaint 	must 	contain 	sufficient 	factual
matter, 	accepted 	as 	true, 	to 	‘state 	a 	claim 	to 	relief 	that 	is
plausible 	on 	its 	face.’” 	Ashcroft 	v. 	Iqbal, 	556 	U.S. 	662, 	678
(2009) 	(quoting 	Bell 	Atl. 	Corp. 	v. 	Twombly, 	550 	U.S. 	544, 	570
(2007)). 	The 	complaint 	must 	include 	sufficient 	factual
allegations 	“to 	raise 	a 	right 	to 	relief 	above 	the 	speculative
level.” 	Twombly, 	550 	U.S. 	at 	555. 	In 	other 	words, 	the 	factual
allegations 	must 	“raise 	a 	reasonable 	expectation 	that 	discovery
will reveal evidence of” the plaintiff’s claims. 	Id. at 556. 	But
“Rule 	12(b)(6) 	does 	not 	permit 	dismissal 	of 	a 	well-pleaded
complaint 	simply 	because 	‘it 	strikes 	a 	savvy 	judge 	that 	actual
proof of those facts is improbable.’” 	Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ.,
495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556).
1 The Complaint misspelled Cawthon’s name as “Cawthorn” and incorrectly
named the District as the “Franklin County School System.”
2 Dove and the Sheriff’s Office did not file motions to dismiss.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Davis 	alleges 	the 	following 	facts 	in 	support 	of 	his 	claims.
The 	Court 	must 	accept 	these 	allegations 	as 	true 	for 	purposes 	of
the pending motions.
I. 	A.D.’s Enrollment at Franklin County Middle School
A.D. 	was 	an 	eleven-year-old 	black 	middle 	school 	student 	who
enrolled in Franklin County Middle School in the fall of 2024 after
his family moved from Miami, Florida, to Franklin County, Georgia.
Franklin 	County’s 	racial 	demographic 	is 	approximately 	90% 	white,
and 	only 	1-5% 	of 	students 	in 	its 	middle 	school 	are 	black. 	The
Principal 	of 	Franklin 	County 	Middle 	School 	is 	David 	Cawthon, 	a
white 	male, 	and 	its 	School 	Resource 	Officer 	is 	Brandon 	Dove, 	a
white 	male 	who 	is 	a 	Sheriff’s 	Deputy 	with 	the 	Franklin 	County
Sheriff’s 	Office. 	Prior 	to 	his 	enrollment 	at 	Franklin 	County,
A.D. 	was 	a 	consistently 	high 	performing 	student 	and 	never
experienced any disciplinary issues inside or outside of school.
Shortly 	after 	he 	began 	attending 	Franklin 	County 	Middle
School, 	A.D. 	was 	bullied 	by 	white 	students. 	Instead 	of
disciplining the students bullying A.D., school personnel, “at the
direction of Defendant Cawthorn and Defendant Dove,” punished A.D.
Compl. ¶ 16, ECF No. 4. 	Davis details the following incidents in
his Complaint, which took place throughout the fall of 2024:
♦ 	A white male student texted A.D. the “N-Word” and
circulated the text to other students. 	Id. 	After
reporting the incident to school personnel, including
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Cawthon, the name-calling student was not reprimanded or
disciplined.
♦ 	A.D. was touched inappropriately by a white male student
in class. 	A.D. told his teacher, who did not intervene
and instead reprimanded A.D. for calling his parents to
report the incident. 	Cawthon issued a Consequence against
A.D. for this incident.3
♦ 	A.D. was kicked by a white female student. 	A.D. kicked
back at the student but did not make contact. 	Cawthon
issued a Consequence against A.D. for this incident.
♦ 	A student spat in A.D.’s face at the water fountain. 	A.D.
reported the student to school personnel, including
Cawthon and Dove, but the aggressor student was not
disciplined.
♦ 	A white male student called A.D. a “bitch” numerous times
in class. 	Id. 	A.D. reported this behavior to his
teacher, who took no action against the name-calling
student. 	Later that day, the same student pushed and
punched A.D., who pushed the student back, and a tussle
ensued. 	After the tussle was broken up, Cawthon blamed
A.D. for the incident and “ordered that he be suspended
for five days.” 	Id. 	The aggressor student was not
disciplined. 	Davis thereafter contacted Melanie Burton-
Brown, the Franklin County School System Superintendent,
and demanded that she review video of the incident and
talk to other student witnesses. 	It was ultimately
determined that A.D. was not the aggressor. 	After this
incident, Burton-Brown prevented Cawthon from having
contact with A.D.
In all, Cawthon issued “at least 6 to 7” Consequences against A.D.
within a sixty-day period “for incidents that either did not occur
or where [A.D.] was the victim.” 	Id. ¶ 17. 	While those incidents
were 	taking 	place, 	Davis 	alleges 	that 	Cawthon 	and 	Dove 	were
“conspiring to have [A.D.] criminally charged.” 	Id.
3 	A 	Consequence 	is 	a 	disciplinary 	citation 	issued 	against 	misbehaving
students which, when accumulated, lead to a suspension.
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II. 	Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings Against A.D.
In 	September 	of 	2024, 	Cawthon 	and 	Dove 	“accused 	[A.D.] 	of
hitting 	and 	poking 	a 	white 	female 	student 	with 	drumsticks” 	and
reported 	the 	incident 	to 	the 	student’s 	parents. 	Id. 	¶ 	18. 	When
the student’s mother met with Cawthon about the incident, Cawthon
“encouraged 	her 	to 	file 	criminal 	charges 	against 	[A.D.].” 	Id.
The 	student’s 	mother 	declined, 	informing 	Cawthon 	that 	the
student’s 	family 	had 	no 	interest 	in 	pressing 	criminal 	charges
against 	an 	eleven-year-old 	child 	for 	“a 	minor 	incident.” 	Id.
After 	an 	investigation 	by 	the 	school, 	however, 	there 	was 	no
evidence that the drumstick incident ever occurred.
A 	short 	time 	later, 	Dove 	told 	the 	white 	female 	student’s
parents 	that 	A.D. 	struck 	their 	daughter 	with 	a 	paper 	hall 	pass.
Dove encouraged the parents to press charges against A.D., and the
parents 	again 	declined. 	Several 	days 	afterward, 	the 	student’s
father 	met 	with 	Dove, 	who 	told 	the 	father 	that 	he 	reviewed 	video
footage of A.D. bullying his daughter. 	Dove told the father that
A.D. was “a problem child from Miami” and again encouraged him to
press 	criminal 	charges 	against 	A.D. 	Id. 	¶ 	20. 	When 	the 	father
declined to do so, Dove asked the father to write a sworn statement
to memorialize A.D.’s alleged bullying of his daughter, which the
father 	agreed 	to 	do. 	It 	was 	later 	discovered 	that 	the 	video 	of
the alleged bullying incident involving A.D. and the female student
did not exist.
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On 	October 	22, 	2024, 	Dove 	and 	Cawthon 	“caused 	a 	false
Delinquency 	Complaint 	to 	be 	filed 	against 	[A.D.]” 	in 	Franklin
County Juvenile Court. 	Id. ¶ 21. 	The Delinquency Complaint names
Dove 	as 	the 	investigating 	officer 	and 	includes 	the 	signature 	of
the white female student’s father as the Complainant. 	Compl. Ex.
A, Delinquency Complaint, ECF No. 4-1.4 The Delinquency Complaint
lists 	one 	charge 	of 	Simple 	Battery 	and 	provides 	the 	following
allegations in support of that offense:
On 	09-20-24 	[Resource 	Officer] 	was 	informed 	by
victim[’]s mother that her child was being assaulted at
school 	by 	the 	offender 	[A.D.] 	on 	one 	[sic] 	multiple
occasion[s] she is being struck with drum sticks, poked
and scratched by the offender. 	Her injuries are to her
arm and back.
Id. 	at 	2. 	In 	response 	to 	the 	Delinquency 	Complaint, 	Franklin
County 	prosecutor 	Kevin 	McFarlin 	filed 	a 	Delinquency 	Petition
against 	A.D. 	in 	Franklin 	County 	Juvenile 	Court. 	Compl. 	Ex. 	B.,
Delinquency Petition, ECF No. 4-2. 	The Petition charged A.D. with
Simple Battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23(a)(1), a criminal
misdemeanor. 	Id. 	The 	Petition 	alleges 	that 	A.D. 	“intentionally
. . . 	hit[] 	[the 	female 	student] 	in 	the 	arm 	and 	back 	with 	drum
sticks” and used “his hands to poke and scratch” her. 	Id.
While 	the 	juvenile 	case 	against 	A.D. 	was 	pending, 	Franklin
County School Assistant Superintendent Carl Dekker informed Davis
4 “A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a
part of the pleading for all purposes.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c).
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that 	he 	never 	received 	any 	complaint 	from 	students 	or 	parents
regarding the battery allegations against A.D. 	Nevertheless, A.D.
“was detained and made to appear in court on at least two separate
occasions” 	to 	face 	the 	battery 	charge. 	Compl. 	¶ 	24. 	The 	charge
was eventually dismissed, however, after multiple witnesses at the
middle 	school 	informed 	the 	prosecutor 	that 	there 	was 	no 	evidence
that A.D. ever committed the battery offense.
After 	A.D.’s 	charge 	was 	dismissed, 	his 	father, 	Plaintiff
Davis, met with Matthew Bradley, the father of the female student
who was named as the victim in the delinquency complaint. 	Bradley
agreed 	to 	give 	a 	written 	statement 	of 	the 	incidents 	that 	led 	to
the 	filing 	of 	the 	Delinquency 	Complaint. 	Compl. 	Ex. 	C, 	Bradley
Statement, 	ECF 	No. 	4-3. 	In 	his 	statement, 	Bradley 	acknowledged
that he agreed to write up “an informal record” of A.D.’s alleged
bullying 	of 	his 	daughter 	at 	Dove’s 	request, 	but 	he 	made 	it 	clear
to Dove that he “did not want to press charges.” 	Id. at 1. 	Bradley
stated 	that 	he 	was 	not 	made 	aware 	of 	the 	Delinquency 	Complaint
until 	Prosecutor 	McFarlin 	called 	him 	regarding 	an 	upcoming 	trial
against 	A.D. 	for 	the 	alleged 	battery 	of 	his 	daughter. 	Bradley
stated that the allegations in the Delinquency Complaint were “more
serious” than those he provided to Dove and averred that he never
filed the Delinquency Complaint and had no intention of testifying
against 	A.D. 	in 	the 	juvenile 	case. 	Id. 	Bradley 	concluded 	that
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“the 	school’s 	administrators 	appear 	to 	have 	used 	[him] 	to 	harass
[A.D.] and his family.” 	Id. at 2.
Davis then met with Bradley, Dove, and Franklin County Sheriff
Andrews to discuss the Delinquency Complaint. 	During that meeting,
Bradley maintained that he never intended to sign the Delinquency
Complaint and indicated that Dove may have misled him into signing
it. 	Dove, on the other hand, claimed that Bradley was responsible
for the Delinquency Complaint. 	After the meeting, Sheriff Andrews
expressed to Davis that he believed the Delinquency Complaint was
fabricated by either Dove, Bradley, or both. 	Sheriff Andrews told
Davis 	that 	he 	would 	refer 	the 	matter 	to 	the 	Georgia 	Bureau 	of
Investigation. 	Despite 	numerous 	inquiries 	with 	the 	Sheriff’s
Office, Davis never received an update on any investigation.
Davis brought this action on behalf of his son, alleging that
Cawthon and Dove targeted A.D. because of his race and “conspired
to deprive [A.D.] of his constitutional rights” in order to “force”
Davis to unenroll A.D. from Franklin County Middle School. 	Compl.
¶¶ 32, 38.
DISCUSSION
Davis 	asserts 	claims 	under 	42 	U.S.C 	§ 	1983 	against 	the
Franklin 	County 	School 	District, 	the 	Franklin 	County 	Sheriff’s
Office, 	and 	Cawthon 	and 	Dove 	in 	their 	individual 	and 	official
capacities 	for 	violation 	of 	A.D.’s 	rights 	under 	the 	Fourth 	and
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Fourteenth 	Amendments.5 	Davis 	also 	brings 	state 	law 	tort 	claims
for 	false 	arrest 	and 	malicious 	prosecution 	against 	the 	Franklin
County 	Sheriff’s 	Office, 	Cawthon, 	and 	Dove. 	Defendants 	Cawthon
and the District moved to dismiss the claims against them.
At 	the 	outset, 	Cawthon 	and 	the 	District 	argue 	that 	Davis’s
complaint 	constitutes 	a 	shotgun 	pleading 	in 	violation 	of 	Federal
Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	10(b). 	The 	Complaint 	does 	share 	some
characteristics 	with 	a 	shotgun 	pleading: 	each 	count 	adopts 	the
allegations 	of 	all 	preceding 	counts, 	and 	Davis 	does 	not 	separate
his 	claims 	for 	relief 	under 	§ 	1983 	but 	rather 	combines 	them 	all
into 	a 	single 	count 	entitled 	“Violation 	of 	42 	U.S.C. 	198[3].”
Compl. at 8, ECF No. 4; see Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's
Off., 	792 	F.3d 	1313 	(11th 	Cir. 	2015) 	(describing 	categories 	of
shotgun 	pleadings). 	Nevertheless, 	a 	shotgun 	pleading 	is 	one 	in
which 	“it 	is 	impossible 	to 	comprehend 	which 	specific 	factual
allegations 	the 	plaintiff 	intends 	to 	support 	which 	of 	his 	causes
of action, or how they do so.” 	Est. of Bass v. Regions Bank, Inc.,
947 	F.3d 	1352, 	1358 	(11th 	Cir. 	2020) 	(emphasis 	added). 	Although
the 	Complaint 	is 	not 	a 	model 	of 	clarity, 	the 	Court 	was 	able 	to
sufficiently 	ascertain 	which 	claims 	for 	relief 	Davis 	brings 	and
which 	facts 	support 	those 	claims. 	Thus, 	the 	Court 	refuses 	to
5 	The 	Complaint 	states 	that 	Davis 	is 	seeking 	damages 	against
“individuals, individuals acting under the color of law, and government
organizations.” 	Compl. ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 	The Court thus construes
the Complaint to assert individual as well as official capacity claims.
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dismiss 	Davis’s 	complaint 	as 	a 	shotgun 	pleading. 	The 	Court
considers the remainder of Defendants’ arguments below.
I. 	Section 1983 Claims Against Cawthon
Davis 	asserts 	claims 	against 	Cawthon 	in 	his 	individual
capacity 	under 	§ 	1983 	for 	violations 	of 	A.D.’s 	Fourth 	and
Fourteenth 	Amendment 	rights. 	Cawthon 	argues 	that 	he 	is 	entitled
to 	qualified 	immunity 	against 	those 	claims. 	Qualified 	immunity
“protects government officials performing discretionary functions
from 	suits 	in 	their 	individual 	capacities 	unless 	their 	conduct
violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which 	a 	reasonable 	person 	would 	have 	known.” 	Shaw 	v. 	City 	of
Selma, 	884 	F.3d 	1093, 	1098 	(11th 	Cir. 	2018) 	(quoting 	Andujar 	v.
Rodriguez, 	486 	F.3d 	1199, 	1202 	(11th 	Cir. 	2007)). 	Because 	Davis
does 	not 	contest 	that 	Cawthon 	was 	acting 	within 	the 	scope 	of 	his
discretionary 	authority 	when 	the 	challenged 	conduct 	occurred, 	he
must 	demonstrate 	that 	“qualified 	immunity 	is 	not 	appropriate” 	in
his case. 	Myrick v. Fulton Cnty., 69 F.4th 1277, 1297 (11th Cir.
2023). 	To 	carry 	this 	burden, 	Davis 	must 	allege 	facts 	that, 	when
viewed 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	him, 	show 	(1) 	Cawthon’s
conduct violated a constitutional right and (2) that the violated
right 	was 	clearly 	established 	at 	the 	time 	the 	alleged 	violation
occurred. 	Id. 	The Court addresses each of Davis’s § 1983 claims
in turn.
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A. 	Equal Protection Claim Against Cawthon
Davis 	alleges 	that 	Cawthon 	violated 	A.D.’s 	right 	to 	Equal
Protection 	under 	the 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	because 	Cawthon
disciplined 	A.D. 	more 	harshly 	than 	white 	students, 	refused 	to
discipline 	white 	students 	who 	bullied 	him, 	and 	caused 	a 	false
Delinquency 	Complaint 	to 	be 	filed 	against 	him, 	all 	on 	account 	of
his race. 	The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides 	that 	“[n]o 	state 	shall 	. 	. 	. 	deny 	to 	any 	person 	within
its 	jurisdiction 	the 	equal 	protection 	of 	the 	laws.” 	U.S. 	Const.
amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4. 	“Proof of racially discriminatory intent
or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.” 	Andre v. Clayton Cnty., 148 F.4th 1282, 1306 (11th Cir.
2025) 	(quoting 	Vill. 	of 	Arlington 	Heights 	v. 	Metro. 	Hous. 	Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)).
The 	Court 	finds 	that 	Davis’s 	complaint 	adequately 	alleges
that 	Cawthon 	intentionally 	discriminated 	against 	A.D. 	because 	of
his race in violation of A.D.’s clearly established right to equal
protection of the laws. 	Cawthon argues that he was not personally
involved in any discriminatory discipline against A.D., but Davis
alleges 	that 	Cawthon 	disciplined 	A.D. 	“at 	least 	6 	to 	7 	times 	. 	.
. for incidents that either did not occur or where [A.D.] was the
victim” 	of 	racial 	bullying. 	Compl. 	¶¶ 	16-17. 	Davis 	further
alleges 	that 	Cawthon 	“direct[ed]” 	school 	personnel 	to 	“punish[]”
A.D. 	instead 	of 	disciplining 	the 	white 	students 	who 	bullied 	him.
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Id. 	¶ 	16. 	And 	the 	Complaint 	states 	that 	Cawthon’s 	actions 	“were
motivated 	by 	racial 	discrimination 	against 	[A.D.], 	a 	newly
admitted black American student in a predominately white school.”
Id. 	¶ 	35. 	These 	allegations 	state 	a 	claim 	that 	Cawthon 	violated
A.D.’s rights under the equal protection clause.
Cawthon contends that Davis has nevertheless failed to point
to 	any 	clearly 	established 	case 	law 	that 	gives 	“fair 	notice 	to
[Cawthon] 	under 	the 	unique 	facts 	of 	this 	case 	of 	any 	equal
protection 	violation.” 	Def.’s 	Mot. 	Dismiss 	18, 	ECF 	No. 	18-1. 	A
plaintiff is not required to point to a factually analogous case,
however, 	where 	“the 	conduct 	at 	issue 	‘lies 	so 	obviously 	at 	the
very 	core 	of 	what 	the 	[Constitution] 	prohibits 	that 	the
unlawfulness of the conduct was readily apparent to the official,
notwithstanding 	the 	lack 	of 	caselaw.’” 	Hunter 	v. 	City 	of 	Leeds,
941 F.3d 1265, 1278 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284
F.3d 1188, 1199 (11th Cir. 2002)). 	It is clearly established that
“[t]he 	central 	purpose 	of 	the 	Equal 	Protection 	Clause 	of 	the
Fourteenth 	Amendment 	is 	the 	prevention 	of 	official 	conduct
discriminating 	on 	the 	basis 	of 	race.” 	Washington 	v. 	Davis, 	426
U.S. 	229, 	239 	(1976). 	Thus, 	Cawthon 	had 	fair 	notice 	that 	his
alleged 	acts 	of 	racial 	discrimination 	violated 	A.D.’s
constitutional 	rights. 	Accordingly, 	Cawthon 	is 	not 	entitled 	to
qualified immunity on Davis’s equal protection claim.
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B. 	Due Process Claim Against Cawthon
Davis alleges that A.D. was “deprived of his rights to . . .
due 	process 	under 	the 	Fourteenth 	Amendment.” 	Compl. 	¶ 	37. 	The
Due 	Process 	Clause 	of 	the 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	provides 	that 	no
State 	shall 	“deprive 	any 	person 	of 	life, 	liberty, 	or 	property,
without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 	“To bring a
due process claim under [§] 1983, a plaintiff must establish ‘(1)
a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property
interest; 	(2) 	state 	action; 	and 	(3) 	constitutionally-inadequate
process.’” 	Resnick v. KrunchCash, LLC, 34 F.4th 1028, 1035 (11th
Cir. 	2022) 	(quoting 	Grayden 	v. 	Rhodes, 	345 	F.3d 	1225, 	1232 	(11th
Cir. 2003)).
It 	has 	long 	been 	clearly 	established 	that 	public
schoolchildren 	have 	a 	due 	process 	right 	to 	minimum 	procedures
before a public school takes away their protected right to attend
school. 	Goss 	v. 	Lopez, 	419 	U.S. 	565, 	574 	(1975). 	Public
schoolchildren are likewise entitled to minimum procedures before
a public school sustains and records serious charges of misconduct
against 	them 	that 	could 	“seriously 	damage” 	their 	standing 	with
teachers and other students or “interfere with later opportunities
for higher education and employment.” 	Id. at 575. 	Goss involved
suspensions “from school for periods of up to 10 days,” though the
Supreme Court noted that “the total exclusion from the educational
process for more than a trivial period . . . is a serious event in
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the life of the suspended child.” 	Id. at 576. 	Thus, the Supreme
Court concluded that for students facing “a suspension of 10 days
or less,” due process requires “that the student be given oral or
written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them,
an 	explanation 	of 	the 	evidence 	the 	authorities 	have 	and 	an
opportunity to present his side of the story.” 	Id. at 581.
Here, Davis alleges that after another student started a fight
with A.D. by punching him and pushing him, Cawthon blamed A.D. and
ordered him suspended for five days—an entire school week. 	Though
Davis does not explicitly allege that Cawthon failed to give A.D.
an 	opportunity 	to 	explain 	what 	happened 	and 	present 	his 	side 	of
the 	story, 	he 	does 	allege 	that 	a 	rudimentary 	investigation 	would
have 	revealed 	that 	A.D. 	was 	not 	the 	aggressor. 	A 	reasonable
inference from these allegations is that Cawthon did not give A.D.
a legitimate opportunity to contest the charges. 	The Court finds
that these allegations are sufficient to state a due process claim
against Cawthon, so Cawthon is not entitled to qualified immunity
on that claim.
C. 	Malicious Prosecution Claim Against Cawthon
Davis 	also 	alleges 	that 	Cawthon 	“falsely 	accused 	[A.D.] 	of
battery 	and 	initiated 	criminal 	proceedings 	against 	him 	without
probable 	cause 	and 	based 	on 	fabricated 	evidence.” 	Compl. 	¶¶ 	1,
33. 	The 	Court 	construes 	these 	allegations 	to 	assert 	a 	§ 1983
Fourth 	Amendment 	malicious 	prosecution 	claim. 	To 	state 	a 	Fourth
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Amendment 	malicious 	prosecution 	claim, 	a 	plaintiff 	must 	allege
four elements: “(1) the plaintiff was seized under legal process;
(2) 	the 	legal 	process 	justifying 	the 	plaintiff's 	seizure 	was
constitutionally infirm; (3) the suit or proceeding terminated in
the plaintiff's favor; and (4) the seizure would not otherwise be
justified 	without 	legal 	process.” 	Gervin 	v. 	Florence, 	139 	F.4th
1236, 1248 (11th Cir. 2025).
Cawthon 	argues 	that 	Davis 	cannot 	succeed 	on 	his 	malicious
prosecution claim, because he did not allege that A.D. was “seized”
by 	any 	Defendant. 	A 	§ 	1983 	claim 	for 	malicious 	prosecution
“requires 	a 	seizure 	‘pursuant 	to 	legal 	process.’” 	Williams 	v.
Aguirre, 	965 	F.3d 	1147, 	1158 	(11th 	Cir. 	2020) 	(quoting 	Black 	v.
Wigington, 	811 	F.3d 	1259, 	1267 	(11th 	Cir. 	2016)). 	“[W]arrant-
based 	seizures 	fall 	within 	this 	category”, 	as 	do 	seizures
“following an arraignment, indictment, or probable-cause hearing.”
Id. 	Here, Davis does not allege that A.D. was arrested following
his 	charge 	for 	simple 	battery. 	Rather, 	Davis 	alleges 	that
“Defendants 	caused 	[A.D.] 	to 	be 	detained 	without 	legal
justification” and that “[A.D.] was required to appear in court at
least 	twice, 	constituting 	a 	form 	of 	detention 	and 	a 	restraint 	on
his 	liberty.” 	Compl. 	¶¶ 	41, 	44. 	These 	allegations 	do 	not
establish that A.D. was seized pursuant to legal process following
an arraignment, indictment, or probable cause hearing. 	See Donley
v. City of Morrow, 601 F. App’x 805, 814 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding
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that plaintiff was not seized when he was “forced to appear at his
arraignment” to face criminal charges in municipal court). 	“Absent
a 	seizure 	related 	to 	the 	prosecution,” 	Davis 	does 	not 	allege 	“a
cognizable federal claim for malicious prosecution,” so Cawthon is
entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. 	Yancey v. Tillman,
No. 	22-10867, 	2022 	WL 	5071153, 	at 	*4 	(11th 	Cir. 	Oct. 	5, 	2022)
(reversing denial of motion to dismiss § 1983 malicious prosecution
claim where plaintiff “did not allege she was seized following an
arraignment, indictment, or probable-cause-hearing”).
II. 	Section 1983 Claims Against the District
In 	addition 	to 	his 	individual 	capacity 	claims 	against
Cawthon, 	Davis 	asserts 	claims 	against 	the 	District 	under 	§ 	1983
for violations of A.D.’s constitutional rights. 	Davis also alleges
that 	Cawthon, 	in 	his 	official 	capacity, 	conspired 	with 	Dove 	to
deprive 	A.D. 	of 	his 	constitutional 	rights. 	The 	Court 	begins 	its
analysis with the conspiracy claim against Cawthon in his official
capacity, 	which 	the 	Court 	construes 	as 	a 	claim 	against 	the
District. 	See 	Monell 	v. 	Dep’t 	of 	Soc. 	Servs., 	436 	U.S. 	658, 	690
n.55 	(1978) 	(noting 	that 	official 	capacity 	suits 	“generally
represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity
of which an officer is an agent”).
A. 	Conspiracy Claim Against the District
In Count I of Davis’s complaint for claims under § 1983, Davis
alleges 	that 	“Defendants 	Cawthorn 	and 	Dove, 	acting 	in 	their
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official 	capacities 	as 	employees 	of 	the 	Franklin 	County 	School
System 	and 	Franklin 	County 	Sheriff's 	Office, 	respectively,
conspired to deprive [A.D.] of his constitutional rights.” 	Compl.
¶ 	32.6 	“A 	plaintiff 	may 	state 	a 	§ 	1983 	claim 	for 	conspiracy 	to
violate constitutional rights by showing a conspiracy existed that
resulted 	in 	the 	actual 	denial 	of 	some 	underlying 	constitutional
right.” 	Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1260 (11th Cir.
2010).
The District moved to dismiss any conspiracy claim against it
as 	barred 	by 	the 	intracorporate 	conspiracy 	doctrine.7 	That
doctrine 	holds 	that 	“acts 	of 	corporate 	agents 	are 	attributed 	to
the 	corporation 	itself, 	thereby 	negating 	the 	multiplicity 	of
actors necessary for the formation of a conspiracy.” 	McAndrew v.
Lockheed 	Martin 	Corp., 	206 	F.3d 	1031, 	1036 	(11th 	Cir. 	2000) 	(en
banc). 	Thus, 	“a 	corporation 	cannot 	conspire 	with 	its 	employees,
and 	its 	employees, 	when 	acting 	in 	the 	scope 	of 	their 	employment,
cannot conspiracy among themselves.” 	Id. 	The doctrine applies to
§ 	1983 	claims 	against 	public 	entities. 	Grider, 	618 	F.3d 	at 	1261
6 Davis’s Complaint lists 42 U.S.C. § 1985 once in its first paragraph.
That 	statue 	provides 	a 	cause 	of 	action 	regarding 	conspiracies 	to
interfere 	with 	civil 	rights. 	Davis 	averred 	in 	his 	response 	to
Defendant’s motion to dismiss that he does not intend to bring a claim
under that statute, so the Court will not construe Davis’s complaint as
bringing a § 1985 claim.
7 	The 	Court 	construes 	the 	District’s 	arguments 	regarding 	conspiracies
alleged under § 	1985 to apply 	equally to conspiracies 	alleged under §
1983.
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(applying 	the 	doctrine 	to 	§ 	1983 	claims 	against 	employees 	of 	a
city police department).
Davis alleged that both Cawthon and Dove are employees of the
District. 	Compl. ¶¶ 7-8. 	The alleged subject of their conspiracy
– the imposition of student discipline – relates to the performance
of their duties as employees of the District. 	Accordingly, because
both 	Cawthon 	and 	Dove 	were 	acting 	for 	the 	District 	when 	they
allegedly made an illicit agreement to violate A.D.’s rights, the
intracorporate 	conspiracy 	doctrine 	bars 	any 	conspiracy 	claim
against the District arising out of that agreement.8 	Thus, Davis’s
§ 1983 conspiracy claim against the District is dismissed.
B. 	Section 1983 Claims Against the District
The 	District 	argues 	that 	Davis’s 	remaining 	§ 	1983 	claims
against it must be dismissed because Davis did not allege that any
policy 	or 	custom 	of 	the 	District 	caused 	a 	violation 	of 	A.D.’s
constitutional 	rights.9 	In 	Monell 	v. 	Dep’t 	of 	Soc. 	Servs., 	the
8 	The 	Court 	recognizes 	that 	the 	Eleventh 	Circuit 	has 	acknowledged 	an
exception to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine as applied to claims
under 	§ 	1985 	where 	the 	alleged 	conspirators 	“‘engage 	in 	a 	series 	of
discriminatory 	acts’ 	. 	. 	. 	over 	a 	significant 	period 	of 	time 	in 	the
employment 	setting.” 	Grider, 	618 	F.3d 	at 	1262 	(quoting 	Dickerson 	v.
Alachua 	Cnty. 	Comm'n, 	200 	F.3d 	761, 	768-70 	& 	n.9 	(11th 	Cir. 	2000)).
However, the Eleventh Circuit has never adopted that exception for claims
under § 1985 or § 1983. 	Id. at 1263 & n.34.
9 	The 	District’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	focuses 	on 	the 	“policy 	or 	custom”
argument and does not clearly address the merits of A.D.’s § 1983 claims,
except to suggest that the allegations are too vague or conclusory. 	As
discussed 	above, 	though, 	taking 	the 	factual 	allegations 	as 	true 	and
drawing 	all 	reasonable 	inferences 	in 	Davis’s 	favor, 	the 	complaint
adequately alleges that Cawthon violated A.D.’s constitutional rights.
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Supreme Court held that a municipality may be liable under § 1983
when its “official policy” causes a constitutional violation. 	436
U.S. 	658, 	690-691 	(1978). 	“A 	plaintiff 	can 	establish 	municipal
liability under Monell in three ways: (1) identifying an official
policy; 	(2) 	identifying 	an 	unofficial 	custom 	or 	widespread
practice that is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a
custom 	and 	usage 	with 	the 	force 	of 	law; 	or 	(3) 	identifying 	a
municipal 	official 	with 	final 	policymaking 	authority 	whose
decision violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights.” 	Chabad
Chayil, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 48 F.4th 1222, 1229
(11th Cir. 2022).
Davis argues that the District may be held liable under Monell
because 	Cawthon 	is 	a 	“final 	policymaker” 	regarding 	student
discipline. 	Under certain circumstances, municipal liability may
be imposed for a single decision of a final policymaker. 	Pembaur
v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986); see Davis v. City
of 	Apopka, 	78 	F.4th 	1326, 	1352 	n.7 	(11th 	Cir. 	2023) 	(referencing
the so-called “final policymaker” avenue of municipal liability).
In assessing whether an individual decision maker's act or policy
is 	“final,” 	courts 	look 	to 	whether 	there 	is 	actual 	“opportunity”
for 	“meaningful” 	review. 	Holloman 	ex 	rel. 	Holloman 	v. 	Harland,
370 	F.3d 	1252, 	1292 	(11th 	Cir. 	2004). 	This 	inquiry 	depends 	on
state 	and 	local 	law, 	as 	well 	as 	local 	custom 	and 	the 	particular
facts of the case. 	Id.
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According 	to 	Plaintiff, 	Cawthon 	was 	a 	final 	policymaker 	for
the District because he had the authority to suspend students and
take 	other 	disciplinary 	measures, 	and 	he 	used 	that 	authority 	to
mete out unwarranted discipline to A.D. 	The District argues that
Cawthon 	cannot 	be 	a 	final 	policymaker 	because 	his 	disciplinary
decisions 	were 	subject 	to 	meaningful 	review. 	Specifically, 	the
District points to Davis’s allegation that Superintendent Burton-
Brown reviewed evidence of a fight between A.D. and another student
and afterward removed Cawthon from having contact with A.D. 	Compl.
¶ 16. 	Davis does not allege, however, that Burton-Brown took any
action to affirm or reverse any of Cawthon’s punishments. 	On the
contrary, 	Davis 	alleges 	that 	Cawthon 	issued 	Consequences 	against
A.D. at least “6 to 7 times,” “ordered that [A.D.] be suspended,”
and “direct[ed]” other school personnel to punish him; Davis does
not 	allege 	that 	any 	of 	these 	decisions 	were 	subject 	to 	review.
Compl. 	¶¶ 	16-17; 	see 	Holloman, 	370 	F.3d 	at 	1293 	(finding, 	on
summary judgment, that a school principal was a final policymaker
with 	respect 	to 	student 	discipline). 	At 	this 	stage, 	the 	Court
finds 	that 	Davis 	adequately 	pled 	that 	Cawthon 	is 	a 	final
policymaker for the District with respect to student discipline at
the middle school. 	Thus, Davis’s remaining § 1983 claims against
the District may proceed under Monell’s “final policymaker” avenue
of liability, and the District’s motion to dismiss those claims is
denied.
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C. 	Punitive Damages
The 	District 	contends 	that 	Davis’s 	claim 	against 	it 	for
punitive 	damages 	should 	be 	dismissed, 	because 	local 	governments
are immune from punitive damages under § 1983. 	The Court agrees.
See 	City 	of 	Newport 	v. 	Fact 	Concerts, 	Inc., 	453 	U.S. 	247, 	271
(1981) 	(holding 	that 	municipalities 	are 	immune 	from 	punitive
damages 	under 	§ 	1983). 	To 	the 	extent 	that 	Davis 	seeks 	punitive
damages under § 1983 against the District, that claim is dismissed.
III. State Law Claims
Davis 	also 	brings 	claims 	against 	Cawthon 	under 	Georgia 	law
for 	false 	arrest 	and 	malicious 	prosecution. 	The 	Court 	addresses
each of those claims in turn.
A. 	Malicious Prosecution Claim Against Cawthon
Davis 	brings 	a 	malicious 	prosecution 	claim 	against 	Cawthon
under Georgia law, alleging that he “acted with malice and without
probable cause in initiating” the juvenile delinquency proceedings
against 	A.D. 	Compl. 	¶ 	50. 	“A 	person 	may 	be 	held 	liable 	for
malicious 	prosecution 	when 	he 	provides 	information 	to 	an
investigating 	officer 	that 	he 	knows 	to 	be 	false, 	and 	in 	doing 	so
unduly 	influences 	the 	authorities 	to 	take 	the 	complained 	of
actions.” 	Turnage 	v. 	Kasper, 	704 	S.E.2d 	842, 	851 	(Ga. 	Ct. 	App.
2010). 	To state a malicious prosecution claim, Davis must allege
“(1) 	a 	criminal 	prosecution; 	(2) 	instigated 	without 	probable
cause; 	(3) 	with 	malice; 	(4) 	pursuant 	to 	a 	valid 	warrant,
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22
accusation, 	or 	summons; 	(5) 	that 	terminated 	in 	the 	plaintiff's
favor; 	and 	(6) 	caused 	the 	plaintiff 	damage.” 	McNeely 	v. 	Home
Depot, 	Inc., 	621 	S.E.2d 	473, 	474-75 	(Ga. 	Ct. 	App. 	2005). 	“The
requisite 	malice 	may 	be 	inferred 	from 	a 	total 	lack 	of 	probable
cause. 	Thus, 	the 	gravamen 	of 	the 	complaint 	is 	the 	absence 	of
probable 	cause 	on 	the 	part 	of 	the 	person 	instituting 	the
prosecution.” 	McKissick 	v. 	S.O.A., 	Inc., 	684 	S.E.2d 	24, 	27 	(Ga.
Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Barnette v. Coastal Hematology & Oncology,
P.C., 	670 S.E.2d 217, 220 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)).
Cawthon 	argues 	that 	he 	cannot 	be 	liable 	for 	instigating 	a
malicious 	prosecution 	against 	A.D., 	because 	his 	name 	does 	not
appear 	on 	the 	Delinquency 	Complaint 	and 	he 	merely 	encouraged 	a
student’s parents to file charges against A.D. 	But Cawthon ignores
Davis’s 	allegations 	that 	Cawthon 	and 	Dove, 	the 	investigating
officer, 	falsely 	accused 	A.D. 	of 	“hitting 	and 	poking” 	a 	student
with 	drumsticks; 	that 	Cawthon 	and 	Dove 	both 	urged 	the 	student’s
parents 	to 	file 	criminal 	charges 	against 	A.D.; 	and 	that 	Cawthon
and 	Dove 	ultimately 	“caused 	a 	false 	Delinquency 	Complaint 	to 	be
filed” 	against 	A.D., 	based 	in 	part 	on 	the 	fabricated 	drumstick
incident. 	Compl. 	¶¶ 	17-19, 	21, 	25. 	Thus, 	even 	though 	Cawthon’s
name 	does 	not 	appear 	on 	the 	delinquency 	complaint, 	it 	can 	be
inferred from the alleged circumstances that Cawthon played a role
in instigating the criminal prosecution against A.D. for the false
battery charge.
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Cawthon next argues that any battery charge against A.D. was
supported 	by 	probable 	cause, 	because 	the 	drumstick 	incident 	was
not fabricated. 	Cawthon attempts to rely on an email Cawthon sent
to one of A.D.’s teachers, in which Cawthon tells the teacher that
“[A.D.] 	hit 	[another 	student] 	several 	times 	with 	his 	band
instrument.” 	Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A, D. Cawthon Email to Z.
Almond (Sep. 16, 2024, 11:29 AM), ECF No. 18-3. 	At the motion to
dismiss stage, however, the Court must accept Davis’s allegations
as 	true 	and 	cannot 	rely 	on 	matters 	outside 	the 	pleadings. 	See
Page v. Postmaster Gen. & Chief Exec. Officer of U.S. Postal Serv.,
493 	F. 	App'x 	994, 	995 	(11th 	Cir. 	2012) 	(per 	curiam) 	(“In
adjudicating 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	the 	district 	court 	may 	not
resolve 	factual 	disputes.”). 	Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	accepts 	as
true Davis’s allegation that the alleged battery did not occur, so
Cawthon’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	the 	malicious 	prosecution 	claim 	on
probable 	cause 	grounds 	is 	denied. 	Finding 	that 	Davis 	adequately
pled 	all 	the 	remaining 	elements 	of 	a 	malicious 	prosecution 	claim
under 	Georgia 	law, 	the 	Court 	denies 	Cawthon’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss
that claim.10
B. 	False Arrest Claim Against Cawthon
Davis 	also 	brings 	a 	claim 	against 	Cawthon 	for 	false 	arrest.
In 	Georgia, 	false 	arrest 	is 	“[a]n 	arrest 	under 	process 	of 	law,
10 	Cawthon 	didn’t 	seek 	dismissal 	of 	Davis’s 	state 	law 	malicious
prosecution 	claim 	on 	official 	immunity 	grounds, 	so 	the 	Court 	doesn’t
address that issue.
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without probable cause, when made maliciously.” 	O.C.G.A. § 51-7-
1. 	As 	noted 	above, 	however, 	Davis 	does 	not 	allege 	that 	A.D. 	was
arrested on his simple battery charge. 	Thus, the complaint fails
to state a claim for false arrest, and that claim is dismissed.11
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies
in 	part 	the 	motions 	to 	dismiss 	filed 	by 	Cawthon 	and 	the 	District
(ECF 	Nos. 	17 	& 	18). 	The 	following 	claims 	are 	dismissed: 	(1)
Davis’s 	§ 1983 	malicious 	prosecution 	claim 	against 	Cawthon, 	(2)
Davis’s 	conspiracy 	claim 	against 	the 	District, 	(3) 	Davis’s
punitive damages claim against the District, and (4) Davis’s state
law 	false 	arrest 	claim 	against 	Cawthon. 	The 	Court 	denies
Defendants’ 	motions 	to 	dismiss 	for 	(1) 	Davis’s 	§ 1983 	equal
protection 	claims 	against 	Cawthon 	and 	the 	District, 	(2) 	Davis’s
§ 1983 	due 	process 	claims 	against 	Cawthon 	and 	the 	District, 	and
(3) Davis’s state law malicious prosecution claim against Cawthon.
Those 	claims, 	along 	with 	Davis’s 	claims 	against 	Dove 	and 	the
Franklin County Sheriff’s Office, remain pending.
11 	Even 	if 	Davis 	had 	alleged 	that 	A.D. 	was 	arrested, 	his 	false 	arrest
claim 	would 	still 	fail, 	because 	“an 	action 	for 	false 	arrest 	will 	not
lie” if the unlawful action against the plaintiff “is carried on to a
prosecution.” 	Schultz v. Lowe, 874 S.E.2d 842, 845 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022).
In that instance, a plaintiff’s “exclusive remedy” would be a claim for
malicious prosecution. 	Id. 	Here, Davis alleges that A.D. was prosecuted
on his simple battery charge before that charge was ultimately dismissed,
so Davis cannot state a claim for false arrest under Georgia law.
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The 	stay 	of 	discovery 	(ECF 	No. 	20) 	is 	lifted, 	and 	a 	Rules
16/26 	Order 	shall 	be 	issued 	requiring 	the 	parties 	to 	submit 	a
jointly proposed scheduling order for these proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 10th day of February, 2026.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
Case 3:25-cv-00096-CDL Document 30 Filed 02/10/26 Page 25 of 25