FARMER v. HUNSINGER et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
JASON FARMER,
Plaintiff,
v.
Hon. MIKE HUNSINGER, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:25-cv-00154-TES
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT JAMES FARMER’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S
FEES AND DEFENDANT KEVIN EPPS’ MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
Before the Court are two motions for fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court’s
inherent authority by Defendants James Farmer and Kevin Epps. [Doc. 76]; [Doc. 77].
Both Defendants seek fees against John Baker, who represents Plaintiff Jason Farmer,
for the time they spent responding to Plaintiff’s post-judgment motions. For the
following reasons, the Court DENIES both motions. [Doc. 76]; [Doc. 77].
A. Background1
After years of litigation in Georgia’s courts, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this
Court on October 1, 2025. [Doc. 1]. Following attempted amendments and a hearing, the
Court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss and entered judgment against Plaintiff.
[Doc. 54]; [Doc. 55]. Defendant Mills then timely filed a motion for attorney’s fees
1 See the Court’s previous orders for a full factual background. [Doc. 54]; [Doc. 75].
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pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. [Doc. 56]. Two weeks later, Plaintiff filed both a motion for
recusal and a motion for the court to alter its judgment. [Doc. 57]; [Doc. 58]. The Court
filed a disclosure in response to Plaintiff’s motion for recusal and held a hearing on all
three motions. [Doc. 59]; [Doc. 71]. Naturally, the parties fully briefed the pending
motions—relevant here, both of Plaintiff’s motions—in preparation for the hearing.
[Doc. 64]; [Doc. 65]; [Doc. 66]; [Doc. 67]; [Doc. 68]; [Doc. 69]; [Doc. 70]. After the hearing,
the Court granted Defendant Mills’ motion for attorney’s fees and denied both of
Plaintiffs’ motions. [Doc. 75].
Now, Defendants James Farmer and Kevin Epps seek attorney’s fees under §
1927 and the Court’s inherent authority from Plaintiff’s attorney for the post-judgment
motions and hearing. [Doc. 76]; [Doc. 77]; [Doc. 86, p. 5]. The Court, in compliance with
the Eleventh Circuit’s guidance, held a hearing on the motions on October 13, 2026.
[Doc. 92]; see also Amlong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny's, Inc., 500 F.3d 1230, 1242 (11th Cir.
2007) (“Plainly, an attorney threatened with sanctions under § 1927 is entitled to a
hearing.”).
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B. Discussion2
To start, the Court asked Defendants during the hearing why § 1927 and the
Court’s inherent authority were the correct vehicles to bring sanctions here instead of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Defendants responded, essentially, that the July 23,
2026, hearing fully revealed the alleged frivolity of Plaintiff’s previous motions.
Therefore, without the July 23 hearing, the record was not sufficiently developed for
sanctions. Furthermore, Defendant Farmer stated that they were simply trying to
respond to Plaintiff’s motions prior to the July 23 hearing and only were able to
consider sanctions afterward.
2 Defendant Epps touched on timeliness, so the Court also briefly addresses it here. [Doc. 77, p. 2]. Rule
54’s 14-day deadline expressly doesn’t apply to motions under § 1927. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(E). With
that said, “a motion for sanctions ‘should be served promptly after the inappropriate paper is filed.’”
Hyde v. Irish, 962 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Peer v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 1306, 1312 (11th Cir.
2010)). In determining the promptness of filing, courts have used a “reasonable time” requirement. Hill v.
Clark, No. 2:10-CV-00260-WCO, 2012 WL 13018385, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 16, 2012). “The precise bounds of
this ‘reasonable time’ standard have not been delineated.” Id. at 7. A motion under § 1927 may be brought
after final judgment, but also “should not be unnecessarily or unreasonably delayed.” Id. (quoting Steinert
v. Winn Grp., Inc., 440 F.3d 1214, 1223 (10th Cir. 2006)). For example, it is not reasonable for a party to
ignore sanctionable conduct, litigate the case, and then file a § 1927 motion after the case has been
dismissed. Id. So, the Court must determine when Defendants learned of the alleged sanctionable conduct
and then look at what transpired between that date and the date they filed their motions. Id. Here,
Defendants only seek sanctions for Plaintiff’s post judgment motions. See [Doc. 76, p. 3]; [Doc. 77, p. 1].
Therefore, they learned of the allegedly sanctionable conduct on June 10, 2026, when Plaintiff filed the
motions. [Doc. 57]; [Doc. 58]. Instead of filing their § 1927 motions then, Defendants waited two months.
See Hyde, 962 F.3d at 1311 (quoting Peer, 606 F.3d at 1312); [Doc. 76]; [Doc. 77]. During that two-month
period, Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s motions and then the Court ruled in Defendants’ favor. [Doc.
75]. Only after the Court ruled did Defendants file their § 1927 motions. Under current precedent, the
Court finds the delay a close call but reasonable. See Hyde, 962 F.3d at 1311 (stating that movant “should
have raised his [§ 1927] concern when the [allegedly sanctionable document] was first filed (or at least
closer in time to that point).”) (emphasis added). Therefore, the motions are timely.
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While the Court understands the parties’ arguments, it still thinks that Rule 11
was the better vehicle in this case, not § 1927 and the Court’s inherent authority. After
all, Defendants expressly limited their sanctions requests to the time and effort related
to responding to Plaintiff’s prior motions and seek fees from Plaintiff’s attorney himself.
See Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1106 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that Rule 11 “is aimed
primarily at pleadings” and addresses the conduct of both parties and attorneys, while
§ 1927 addresses “dilatory tactics throughout the entire litigation” and is focused solely
on attorney conduct), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Jackson v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1357 n.10 (11th Cir. 2018). Had Defendants filed Rule 11 motions
immediately after Plaintiff filed his previous motions, Plaintiff would have had a
chance to withdraw them and saved all parties and the Court the time and effort of
responding. Nevertheless, Defendants brought their motions under § 1927 and inherent
authority, so the Court addresses them under that standard.
Section 1927 “is not a ‘catch-all’ provision for sanctioning objectionable conduct
by counsel.” Schwartz v. Millon Air, Inc., 341 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir. 2003). Instead, it
provides that “[a]ny attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. In short, it allows for personal liability for an attorney’s
unreasonable and vexatious conduct. Id.
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Under § 1927, “something more than a lack of merit is required.” Schwartz, 341
F.3d at 1225. The three requirements for sanctions under § 1927 are: (1) “an attorney
must engage in unreasonable and vexatious conduct;” (2) “this conduct must multiply
the proceedings;” (3) “and the amount of the sanction cannot exceed costs occasioned
by the objectionable conduct.” Id. The Court begins, therefore, with the first
requirement.
“An attorney unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies the proceedings when he
‘willfully abuses the judicial process by conduct tantamount to bad faith.’” Silva v. Pro
Transp., Inc., 898 F.3d 1335, 1340 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Schwartz, 341 F.3d at 1225)
(alterations accepted). The party moving for sanctions must show objective bad faith.
Hyde v. Irish, 962 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2020). And, the objective standard is high.
The moving party must “show that the other side engaged in behavior that ‘grossly
deviates from reasonable conduct.’” Id. at 1310 (quoting Amlong, 500 F.3d at 1240–42).
Merely negligent conduct is insufficient. Id. at 1311. Finally, under the plain language of
§ 1927, courts “may,” but are not required to, issue sanctions if a movant meets the
statute’s high bar.
To show the requisite bad faith, Defendant Farmer points to much of the Court’s
language from its orders denying Plaintiff’s recusal motion and motion to alter
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judgment.3 [Doc. 76, pp. 2–3]. However, as Defendant Epps and Plaintiff both
acknowledge, that language, although strong, referred to the Court’s findings “under §
1988 . . . .” and did not refer to any finding as to Mr. Baker’s conduct or motives in
bringing the suit.4 [Doc. 77, p. 13]; [Doc. 83, p. 6]. Furthermore, Defendants both
explicitly limit their sanctions motions to Plaintiff’s post-judgment motions. [Doc. 76, p.
3]; [Doc. 77, p. 1]. It goes without saying, then, that any sanctions must necessarily focus
on Mr. Baker’s post-judgment conduct, not his conduct beforehand or in any related
state cases.
To that end, Defendant Farmer argues that neither of Plaintiff’s post-judgment
motions had any merit and Plaintiff’s counsel’s zeal crossed the line into bad faith. [Doc.
76, p. 6]. Defendant Epps, on the other hand, argues that Plaintiff’s counsel acted in bad
faith when he “fil[ed] post-judgment motions that misdescribe[d] the order under
attack, omit[ted] the opposing party’s judicial-notice request, and mischaracterize[d] a
state-court record in support of an accusation against the presiding judge[.]” [Doc. 77, p.
13]
At the end of the day, however, Defendants’ allegations do not meet the high bar
required for sanctions under § 1927. First, lack of merit is an insufficient reason to
3 Plaintiff also quotes the Court in making his arguments against sanctions. See, e.g., [Doc. 83, p. 3]. As the
Court stated in the October 13, 2026, hearing, the Court disagrees with how broadly Plaintiff construes its
statements, especially since Plaintiff’s quotes lack any context.
4 The Court addresses its language in previous orders in more detail below.
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warrant sanctions. Schwartz, 341 F.3d at 1225. Second, assuming Defendant Epps’
allegations as accurate, Mr. Baker’s conduct in bringing those two motions, even if
unreasonable, does not warrant sanctions under governing precedent. See Amlong, 500
F.3d at 1242 (“an attorney's conduct will not warrant sanctions if it simply fails to meet
the standard of conduct expected from a reasonable attorney.”). Again, it isn’t enough
to show that Mr. Baker’s conduct in bringing the motions was unreasonable; rather, the
moving parties must show that he “grossly deviated” from the actions of a reasonable
attorney, which is required for sanctions under § 1927. Hyde, 962 F.3d at 1310–11
(quoting Amlong, 500 F.3d at 1240–42).
Third, the Court exercises its discretion to find that the post-judgment motions
were not so frivolous to constitute bad faith. “[A]n attorney acts in bad faith when [he]
‘knowingly or recklessly pursues a frivolous claim.’” Silva, 898 F.3d at 1340 (quoting
Schwartz, 341 F.3d at 1225). To be sure, the Court found that Plaintiff’s arguments within
the recusal motion were “not only speculative and stretching, but they [were]
undermined by the fact [Plaintiff] only raised them after the Court dismissed his case.”
[Doc. 73, p. 5]. But, the Court must adhere to binding precedent that requires objective
bad faith and “speculative and stretching” arguments aren’t enough in this particular
case. As the Court mentioned above, filing such a speculative and thin recusal motion
may not have been reasonable or well-grounded and certainly could be characterized as
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a sore-loser filing, but the Court doesn’t find that it “grossly” deviated from what a
reasonable attorney may have filed.5
Plaintiff’s motion to alter judgment did not constitute objective bad faith, either.
Defendants quote the Court’s order denying Plaintiff’s motion as grounds for a frivolity
finding. [Doc. 76, p. 6]; [Doc. 86, pp. 5–6]. To be sure, the Court previously made a
frivolity finding in this case.6 See [Doc. 75, p. 11 (“Plaintiff’s position is the epitome of a
frivolous and groundless argument.”)]. However, the Court’s finding was (1) regarding
Plaintiff’s claims under a § 1988 attorney’s fees standard, and (2) limited to Plaintiff’s
argument that he did not have to follow the Protective Order because he decided it was
void, and Defendant Hunsinger knew the order was void because Plaintiff told him it
was. [Id. at pp. 10–11]. The Court said this argument “would not only undermine
centuries of precedent, but . . . also inject pure, unadulterated chaos into the legal
system.” [Id. at p. 11].
5 Section 1927 sanctions are not just about pleadings, but conduct. Defendant Epps argued that filing a
motion to recuse has become “Plaintiff’s modus operandi when a judge rules against him.” [Doc. 86, p. 8].
However, the record doesn’t support this allegation. Indeed, the Court’s recollection of the considered
probate court records is that a different party with a different attorney filed a motion to recuse Judge
Hunsinger. Neither the movants nor the Court found any case where any party that moved for recusal
after losing the case received sanctions under §1927. And, Mr. Baker isn’t the first lawyer to try to find a
different judge after losing a case.
6 The Court made two frivolity findings. The Court found generally that Plaintiff’s complaint was
frivolous. [Doc. 75, p. 19]. Defendants cite to the Court’s more specific frivolity finding in arguing this
motion, discussed below.
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Relevant to these § 1927 motions, Plaintiff did not raise this same frivolous
argument in his motion to alter judgment or his response brief to the present motions.
See [Doc. 57]; [Doc. 83]. The closest he came was his argument about a probate court’s
jurisdiction generally, which was part of his argument regarding consent.7 [Doc. 57, pp.
12–13]. In other words, Plaintiff did not reassert an argument the Court previously
deemed frivolous. Therefore, Defendants have not met their burden to show bad faith
and are not entitled to attorney’s fees under § 1927.
Prior precedent supports the Court’s conclusion. As stated above, this is not a
case where Plaintiff reasserted previous arguments that he knew were frivolous or
baseless because the Court or other binding precedent had already found them baseless.
Peer v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding bad faith when attorney knew
from prior litigation and documentation that his claims were baseless); Hyde, 962 F.3d at
1311 (no § 1927 sanctions where one exhibit arguably disproving part of complaint only
raised actions to mere negligence); Chiacchiarini v. Lowndes Cnty., Georgia, No. 7:17-cv-2
7 Defendant Epps argues that “[a] Rule 59(e) motion built on a premise the order does not contain is not a
request to correct manifest error. It required Defendants to brief, and the court to explain twice, a holding
that was never entered.” [Doc. 77, p. 9]. In other words, he argues that Plaintiff’s repeated consent
argument, which was the basis of his motion to alter judgment, warranted sanctions. However, lack of
merit alone is not sufficient to warrant § 1927 sanctions. Furthermore, while the Court thinks its order
was clear regarding its assumptions about consent, Plaintiff’s motion gave the Court the opportunity to
make absolutely sure of it, especially on the single instance where the Court simply stated that “Plaintiff
consented.” In other words, Plaintiff’s consent argument in his motion to alter judgment mirrored his
recusal arguments: “stretching,” but not bad faith. Similarly, the Court’s finding that Plaintiff’s 59(e)
motion “lacks any substance and is nothing more than Plaintiff taking the chance to lecture the Court on
how it could have done better” doesn’t automatically mean that the Court found objective bad faith in the
motion. Again, attorneys routinely those motions and escape § 1927 sanctions. [Doc. 75, p. 13].
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(HL), 2017 WL 3495423, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 15, 2017) (sanctions appropriate where
attorney was advised repeatedly that a party was not proper, but refused to take the
steps to dismiss the party, which dragged out litigation). This is also not a case where
Plaintiff refused to comply with this Court’s orders or otherwise properly participate in
the case. Chiacchiarini, 2017 WL 3495423, at *3; Weissman v. Cheokas, No. 1:17-cv-220
(WLS), 2023 WL 11964406, at *13 (M.D. Ga. July 25, 2023) (sanctions appropriate where
the plaintiff’s attorney “stubbornly declined” to provide substantive arguments or
evidence on three separate occasions to rebut the defendant’s motion to enforce a
settlement agreement), aff’d, No. 23-12527, 2026 WL 1759431 (11th Cir. June 18, 2026).
Additionally, Plaintiff’s motions in this case were not an extreme, obvious case
that warrants these types of sanctions. Weissman, 2023 WL 11964406, at *13; Norelus v.
Denny’s, Inc., 628 F.3d 1270, 1282 (11th Cir. 2010) (upholding § 1927 sanctions when
attorneys submitted improper errata document changing their client’s deposition
testimony in 868 ways, and then still pursued the claims even as increasingly
contradictory evidence emerged). Nor do Defendants’ motions concern repeated
meritless and improper motions or arguments. Burgos v. Sand Canyon Corp., No. 4:19-cv-
76 (CDL), 2020 WL 3258417, at *2 (M.D. Ga. June 16, 2020) (sanctions appropriate where
attorney filed five meritless and improper motions advancing the same frivolous
arguments that were already made in a response brief).
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Finally, Defendants ask the Court in the alternative to exercise its inherent
authority and issue sanctions. [Doc. 76, p. 1]; [Doc. 77, p. 16]. However, such a request is
untimely. Hill, 2012 WL 13018385, at *4 (stating that Rule 54’s 14-day post-judgment
deadline likely applies to the Court’s inherent power). Even if it was timely, the Court
declines to exercise its inherent authority to sanction because, “if appropriate sanctions
can be imposed under provisions such as Rule 11, courts should not exercise their
inherent power.” Peer, 606 F.3d at 1315.
The Court notes (and finds it important as mentioned above) that the parties
could have brought Rule 11 sanctions related to the post-judgment motions or § 1988
motions as prevailing parties on the merits of the case. Rather, they chose other
procedural vehicles. The Court will not substitute inherent authority for § 1927 because
“a district court’s authority to issue sanctions for attorney misconduct under § 1927 is
either broader than or equally as broad as the district court’s authority to issue a
sanctions order under its inherent powers.” Amlong, 500 F.3d at 1239. The Court
declines to issue sanctions under its inherent authority.8
8 On a final note, Plaintiff, confusingly, asked the Court to take judicial notice of “two public records of
Georgia courts not already on this docket: the Probate Court of Oconee County’s Order for Referral of
September 4, 2025 . . . and the Court of Appeals of Georgia’s August 13, 2025 order in A26E0016 denying
reconsideration of its release order.” [Doc. 83, p. 16]. For the probate court’s order, the Court previously
took notice of the entire docket for Estate Nos. 183, and 189. [Doc. 54, p. 5 n.1]. As for the Georgia Court
of Appeals order, it is not clear why Plaintiff wants the Court to take judicial notice of it. He does not
appear to cite it in his argument, and the part of his argument that the Court assumes it would apply
combats an argument that Defendants did not use to support sanctions. [Doc. 83, pp. 6–10]; [Doc. 86, p. 3
(“This is not a case where sanctions are sought because Plaintiff’s original claims lack merit, though they
unquestionably did.”)]; [Doc. 77, p. 1 (“Defendant Epps does not ask the court to revisit the merits.”)].
The Court sees no need to take judicial notice of these orders.
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C. Conclusion
To be clear, the Court doesn’t condone Mr. Baker’s actions in bringing this case
or the course of related litigation, nor should this denial of sanctions be taken as an
endorsement of any of his legal arguments or theories. The Court unequivocally stands
by its previous orders and findings. Surely, the Court understands the movants’
frustration with the case and the several other cases this estate litigation has spawned
and sprawled through nearly every layer of court in Georgia’s judicial system. From the
Defendants’ perspective, the Court can understand why they might feel as though
Plaintiff and his attorney have attempted to wear them down and overwhelm them
through repeated lawsuits. Plaintiff and Mr. Baker also made unnecessary work for this
court through their hyperfocus on out-of-context statements by the Court and opposing
parties and their stubborn refusal to address relevant and binding precedent directly on
point. Had all Defendants sought their fees and expenses as the prevailing parties
under § 1988, the Court would likely have granted them all.
But, Defendants limited their motions to Plaintiff’s post-judgment conduct in
bringing the motion to recuse and Rule 59(e) motion. As explained above, § 1927 sets a
high bar. While Defendants are surely frustrated that they have yet to disentangle
themselves from this web of litigation, they didn’t show enough to warrant a finding of
objective bad faith in the bringing of these two motions. Accordingly, the Court
DENIES Defendants’ motions for sanctions under § 1927. [Doc. 76]; [Doc. 77].
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SO ORDERED, this 13th day of October, 2026.
S/ Tilman E. Self, III
TILMAN E. SELF, III, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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